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Abstract 
Reforming UK Surrogacy Law: Bridging the Gap Between Regulation and 
Practice 
Emma Walmsley 
The law regulating surrogacy in the UK is outdated, piecemeal and increasingly unfit 
for purpose. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SA Act 1985), which prohibits 
commercial surrogacy in the UK, was enacted at a time of great hostility towards 
surrogacy and other forms of Artificial Reproductive Technologies (ARTs). In recent 
years the practice of surrogacy ‘has been accepted as a method of enabling childless 
couples to experience the joy and fulfilment of parenthood.’1 Despite the growing 
acceptance of surrogacy, regulation – including the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 – makes it difficult for intended parents to apply for a parental 
order following surrogacy. A parental order, which confers joint and equal legal 
parenthood and parental responsibility upon both intended parents, ‘ensures the child’s 
security and identity as lifelong members of the intended parent’s family’.2 The 
legislation entrenches the two-parent nuclear ‘ideal’ by only allowing couples, one of 
whom must have contributed their gametes to create the child, to apply for a parental 
order. As such, a plethora of ‘less conventional’ families are prohibited from applying 
for a parental order, including single parents, non-genetic parents and platonic co-
parents.  
In addition to the narrow view of parenthood adopted by UK regulation, the ban on 
payments, the unenforceability of contracts, and the prohibition on advertising has 
resulted in a shortage of surrogates. Some intended parents have resorted to the 
‘dangerous and murky waters of the internet’3 and entered into high risk ‘do-it-
yourself’ arrangements which have led to legal complications and the exploitation of 
vulnerable women. Other intended parents have ventured overseas and entered 
                                                 
1 CW v NT and Another [2011] EWHC 33 (Fam). [1] (Baker J). 
2 J v G [2013] EWHC 1432 (Fam), para [27] (Theis J). 
3 CW v NT, op cit, n1. 
vi 
 
international commercial surrogacy arrangements. Such arrangements result in 
conflict of laws and children being left ‘marooned stateless and parentless’.4 It is clear 
that surrogacy operates in a different context to the one that existed at the time of the 
SA Act 1985, and urgent reform is required to bridge the gap between regulation and 
practice. The declaration of incompatibility issued by the High Court between section 
54 (1) HFEA 2008 and Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights presents an opportunity to revisit the surrogacy landscape.5 This thesis uses a 
combination of doctrinal analysis and empirical work to identify the reforms that are 
necessary to protect the procreative liberty of intended parents and the rights of the 
resulting child; two concerns which have been strikingly absent from the law 
regulating this area. 
 
 
  
                                                 
4 X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWCH 3030. [10] (Hedley J). 
5 Re Z (A Child) (No. 2) [2016] EWCH 1191 (Fam). 
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Chapter One 
 
  1. Introduction 
The law governing surrogacy in the UK has ‘developed in a haphazard fashion and 
piecemeal changes made over the years have resulted in a regulatory framework that 
is contradictory and confusing for all involved’.1 In January 1985, there was public 
outcry when married mother of two, Kim Cotton, received £6500 for acting as a 
surrogate.2 After local authority intervention the intended parents, who were from the 
US, were granted wardship by the courts. Delivering the judgment, Latey J referred to 
the ‘difficult and delicate problems of ethics, morality and social desirability raised by 
surrogacy’.3 This provided impetus for the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SA 
Act 1985), which Freeman describes as ‘an ill-considered and largely irrelevant panic 
measure, which in essence criminalised commercial surrogacy’.4 The provisions of the 
SA Act 1985 were heavily influenced by the recommendations of the Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology,5 which was set up to 
consider the ‘social, ethical and legal implications of recent and potential 
developments in human fertilisation and embryology’.6 The Warnock Committee was 
unanimous that surrogacy for convenience alone was ‘totally ethically unacceptable’7 
but the majority went even further and held that: 
                                                 
1 A Alghrani and D Griffiths, ‘The regulation of surrogacy in the United Kingdom: the case for 
reform’, [2017] Child and Family Law Quarterly, 165, p166. 
2 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846. Hereafter ‘Baby Cotton’. See also, BBC 
News, ‘Inquiry over ‘baby-for-cash deal’, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/ 
stories/january /4/ newsid_2495000/2495857.stm  (last accessed 17/07/18). 
3 Ibid. 
4 M Freeman, ‘Is Surrogacy Exploitative?' in S McLean (ed), Legal Issues in Human Reproduction 
(Dartmouth, 1989), at p 165. 
5 M Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
Cmnd 9314 (1984). Hereafter ‘Warnock Report’. 
6 Ibid, 1.1.  
7 Ibid, 8.17. 
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‘Even in compelling medical circumstances the danger of exploitation of one human 
being by another appears to the majority of us far to outweigh the potential benefits, 
in almost every case…’8  
The majority recommended that legislation be introduced to criminalise the creation 
or the operation in the UK of both profit and non-profit agencies but stopped short of 
suggesting criminalising private individuals entering surrogacy arrangements; it did 
not want ‘...children being born to mothers subject to the taint of criminality’.9 The 
Warnock Report also recommended that surrogacy agreements should be deemed 
‘illegal contracts and therefore unenforceable in the courts’.10 The Committee clearly 
influenced the restrictive stance of the SA Act 1985 which prohibits commercial 
involvement in the initiation and negotiation of surrogacy agreements,11 makes the 
publication or distribution of adverts indicating a willingness to take part in surrogacy 
(or seeking a surrogate) a criminal offence12 and makes surrogacy arrangements 
unenforceable.13 Despite the significant social, technological and legal changes that 
have occurred over the last three decades, the SA Act 1985 remains the primary 
legislation governing surrogacy in the UK. 
In 1997 another Committee, chaired by Brazier, was established to review UK 
surrogacy law.14 It found that the incomplete implementation of the recommendations 
of the Warnock Committee had ‘created a policy vacuum within which surrogacy has 
developed in a haphazard fashion’.15 The Brazier Review considered three main areas: 
(1) whether surrogates should be allowed payment; (2) whether an agency should be 
established to regulate surrogacy arrangements; and (3) whether the findings on these 
issues suggest that existing legislation needs to be changed.16 These issues, which are 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, 8.17-8.18. 
10 Ibid, 8.19. 
11 Section 1A SA Act 1985. 
12 Section 3 SA Act 1985. 
13 Section 2 SA Act 1985. 
14 Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation Cm 4068 
(1998), Margaret Brazier, Alastair Campbell and Susan Golombok. Hereafter ‘Brazier Review'. 
15Ibid, 3. 
16Ibid, 1.2. 
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yet to be resolved, are revisited in this thesis. The next legal development was the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990) which was updated in 
2008. For the purposes of surrogacy, the HFEA 2008 sets out: (1) certain requirements 
that intended parents must satisfy to apply for a parental order following surrogacy17 
and (2) provisions explaining who the child’s legal parents are.18 The HFEA 2008 did 
not make any substantive changes to the earlier provisions regulating surrogacy in the 
1990 Act, except to extend parental orders to same-sex couples. The next piecemeal 
change was the introduction of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental 
Orders) Regulations 2010,19 which applied section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 
2002 (ACA 2002) to parental order applications. This means the child's welfare must 
now be the court’s ‘paramount consideration…throughout his lifetime’. These 
piecemeal changes have led to a patchwork of regulation with contradictory policies. 
The SA Act 1985 prohibits commercialisation, yet the Parental Order Regulations 
2010 effectively require the judiciary to award a parental order where payments 
exceed reasonable expenses.20  
1.1 Is UK Surrogacy Regulation in Need of Reform? 
Since the inception of the SA Act 1985, attitudes towards surrogacy have transformed. 
Celebrities including Sir Elton John,21 Kim Kardashian,22 and, most recently, Olympic 
                                                 
17 Section 54 HFEA 2008. A parental order confers joint and equal legal parenthood and parental 
responsibility upon both intended parents and fully extinguishes the parental status of the surrogate 
under English law. This ensures the child’s security and identity as lifelong members of the 
intended parent’s family. See J v G [2013] EWHC 1432 (Fam), [27] (Theis J). 
18 Sections 33-48 HFEA 2008. 
19 No. 985. Hereafter, ‘Parental Order Regulations 2010’. 
20 See for example, X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), [26] (Hedley J). 
Hereafter ‘X & Y’. 
21 BBC News, 28th December 2010, ‘Sir Elton John becomes father via surrogate’, 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-12084650> (last accessed 16/07/18). 
22 The Guardian, 16th January 2018, ‘Kim Kardashian and Kanye West announce birth of third 
child’, <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/jan/16/kanye-west-and-kim-kardashian-
announce-birth-of-third-child  > (last accessed 16/07/18). 
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swimmer Tom Daley,23 have normalised surrogacy as a method to have children. It is 
not just celebrities who use surrogacy; in 2015, a supermarket worker, Kyle Casson, 
became a single father after his 46-year-old mother Anne offered to be a surrogate.24 
Kyle was awarded an adoption order by the courts, rather than the more appropriate 
parental order, because single people are not allowed to apply for a parental order 
under the HFEA 2008.25 The acceptability of surrogacy as an avenue to parenthood is 
evident in the number of children born as a result of the practice. In 2016, 
Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS), which is a non-profit surrogacy 
organisation set up by former surrogate, Kim Cotton, celebrated its 1000th surrogate 
birth since it opened in 1988.26 In 2012, Crawshaw et al., identified an average of 
fewer than 50 parental orders being granted per year up to 2007 in the UK. This rose 
to 75 in 2008, 79 in 2009, 83 in 2010, and 149 in 2011.27 This shows a sharp increase 
in the number of parental orders being applied for since 2007, which could indicate 
surrogacy is being used more widely.28 Ultimately, surrogacy has become a routine 
method of family making. In CW v NT and another29 Baker J stated that, ‘in recent 
years the practice of surrogacy – whereby a woman gives birth to a child for others - 
has been accepted as a method of enabling childless couples to experience the joy and 
                                                 
23 The Guardian, 30th June 2018, ‘Tom Daley and Dustin Lance Black announce birth of their son’ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/jun/30/tom-daley-dustin-lance-black-son-robert-ray > 
(last accessed 16/07/18). 
24 BioEdge, 7th March 2015, ‘British mum becomes surrogate for son’s 
baby’,https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/british_mum_becomes_surrogate_for_sons_baby/1135
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25 Re B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption) [2015] EWFC 17 (13 February 2015).  
26 Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy website, https://www.surrogacy.org.uk/ (last 
accessed 17/07/18). 
27 M Crawshaw, E Blyth and O Akker, ‘The changing profile of surrogacy in the UK – Implications 
for national and international policy and practice' (2012) 34(3) Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 265, p269. 
28 The number of people having children through surrogacy could be higher than these figures 
indicate, because it is not a mandatory requirement to apply for a parental order in the UK. The 
data only captures families who have applied for a parental order. 
29 [2011] EWHC 33 (Fam).  
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fulfilment of parenthood.’30 This stands in sharp contrast to Latey J’s hostility towards 
surrogacy in Baby Cotton.31 
Despite the growing acceptability of this method of family-formation, single people, 
co-parents, multiple parents and doubly-infertile32 individuals are unable to apply for 
a parental order following surrogacy. Prohibitive regulation in the UK, including the 
ban on payments to surrogates, has led to a shortage of surrogates.33 This has driven 
UK intended parents into high-risk ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) arrangements, which are 
routinely facilitated through the ‘dangerous and murky waters of the internet’.34 Other 
intended parents venture overseas to jurisdictions where surrogacy regulation is more 
liberal, but encounter a plethora of practical and legal complications after choosing 
this route.35 Therefore, UK regulation fails to protect the rights of the intended parents 
using surrogacy, and the rights of the children involved. It is suggested that two 
policies, underpinning current regulation, are responsible for this: (1) the promotion 
of the ‘sexual’ family;36 and (2) the prohibition on commercial surrogacy. This thesis 
critiques these policies and asks the following research questions: 
1) How fit for purpose is the current patchwork of regulation currently governing 
surrogacy? 
2) Does the legislation’s preference towards the sexual family affect the 
procreative rights of the intended parents and the rights of the child? 
3) How does the ban on commercial surrogacy affect procreative rights and the 
rights of the child? 
                                                 
30 Ibid, [1]. 
31 Op cit, n2. 
32 Double-infertility occurs when an individual is both unable to carry a pregnancy to term (gestate) 
and use their gametes. 
33 ‘Childless UK Couples Forced Abroad to Find Surrogates’, The Guardian, 20th February 2016, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/feb/20/childless-uk-couples-forced-abroad-
surrogates> (last accessed 16/09/18). 
34 Op cit, n29, [38] (Baker J). 
35 See for example X & Y, op cit, n20. 
36 M Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and other Twentieth Century Tragedies 
(Routledge: New York and London, 1995) 143. Fineman defines the ‘sexual family’ as one 
consisting of a married heterosexual couple and their genetically related offspring. See also, J 
McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the 
Tenacity of the Sexual Family Form’, (2010) 73(2) Modern Law Review, 175-207. 
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4) How has the judiciary (for England and Wales) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) treated the rights of the child and the intended parents’ 
procreative liberty?  
5) Which reforms are necessary to centralise procreative liberty and children’s 
rights in UK surrogacy legislation? 
In answering these questions, this thesis’ principal objective is to address what legal 
reforms are needed to protect the procreative rights of those using surrogacy, and the 
rights of the resulting child. In doing so, the thesis uses a combination of theoretical 
approaches, doctrinal analysis and small-scale empirical work. 
(I) Procreative Liberty 
The theme of ‘procreative liberty’ is used throughout this research to critique the 
current law and suggest reforms that can better respect the choices of those using 
surrogacy in the UK. Procreative liberty is defined by Professor John Robertson in 
Children of Choice37as the right to reproduce and the converse right not to.38 In later 
work, he explains that the liberty to avoid having offspring and the liberty to have 
offspring, are different rights, which are ‘connected by their common concern with 
reproduction’.39 According to his theory, the liberty to have offspring applies equally 
to methods of ‘non-coital’ reproduction, including surrogacy. Although his theory has 
limitations,40 it provides a useful starting point to explore the meaning and value of 
procreative rights. For Robertson, procreative liberty is valuable and should have legal 
status: 
‘…If desired and frustrated, one loses the “defence ‘gainst Time’s scythe” that 
“increase” or replication of one’s haploid genome provides, as well as the physical 
and social experiences of gestation, childrearing, and parenting of one’s offspring. 
                                                 
37 J. A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, 291pp, 
Princeton University Press (1996). 
38 Ibid. 
39 J. A. Robertson, ‘Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics’, American Journal of Law & 
Medicine, 29 (2003):  439-87, p447. 
40 See Gilbert Meilaender, ‘Products of the Will: Robertson's Children of Choice’, 52 Washington 
and Lee Law Review 173, 173 (1995); and Laura M. Purdy, ‘Children of Choice: Whose Children? 
At What Cost?’, 52 Washington and Lee Law Review 197, 205 (1995). 
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Those activities are highly valued because of their connection with reproduction and 
its role in human flourishing.’41 
For Robertson, the ability to procreate genetically related offspring, experience 
gestation and parent one’s child, are activities that should have presumptive primacy.42 
Being deprived of the ability to make these reproductive choices, according to his 
theory, prevents prospective parents of ‘an experience that is central to individual 
identity and meaning in life’.43  This thesis reflects upon whether current regulation 
adequately assists intended parents using, or seeking to use, surrogacy. As Robertson 
acknowledges, whilst ‘procreative liberty’ ‘denotes freedom in activities and choices 
related to procreation…the term does not tell us which activities fall within its 
scope’.44 This thesis aims to carve out a more precise understanding of the activities 
that should fall within the realm of ‘procreative liberty’ in the surrogacy context. Some 
of the questions asked throughout this thesis include, whether single people should be 
able to use surrogacy and apply for a parental order; whether parents without a genetic 
connection to the future child should be able to apply for a parental order; and whether 
UK regulation restricts the procreative liberty of intended parents by pushing them 
into DIY and international commercial surrogacy arrangements. Such questions will 
be answered with reference to doctrinal analysis of domestic and Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and the author’s empirical work, which consists of interviews with 
surrogates and intended parents.45 
Although Robertson’s own understanding of the activities that fall within the scope of 
procreative liberty is currently too narrow,46 his categories are useful for initiating a 
discussion of procreative rights and surrogacy. He categorises the right to procreate 
                                                 
41 J. A. Robertson, op cit, n39, p454. 
42 Children of Choice, op cit, n37, pp 24-25. 
43 Ibid. 
44 J. A. Robertson, ‘Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New 
Reproduction’, 59 South California Law Review, 939 (1986). P955. 
45 See Appendices.  
46 Robertson’s procreative liberty framework only applies to genetic reproduction. For criticism 
see A Alghrani ‘Uterus transplantation in and beyond cisgender women: revisiting procreative 
liberty in light of emerging reproductive technologies’, Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 
lsy012, https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsy012.  
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into two groups: (1) the right to procreate genetically (e.g. access ARTs) and, (2) the 
right to rear and parent one’s genetic offspring. These theoretical rights have found 
some traction in the ECtHR’s development of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention and 
it is questioned how these rights have been developed by the ECtHR in the specific 
context of surrogacy.  
(II) The Centralisation of Children’s Rights in the Surrogacy Context 
UK surrogacy regulation makes very little provision for the welfare or rights of the 
children involved. The SA Act 1985 predates both the Children Act 1989 and United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1991 (CRC). The Parental Order 
Regulations 199447 made the child’s welfare the court’s ‘first consideration’, but 
following the 2010 Regulations, which imported section 1 of the ACA 2002 into 
section 54 HFEA 2008: 
‘Welfare is no longer merely the court’s first consideration but becomes its paramount 
consideration...it will only be in the clearest case of the abuse of public policy that the 
court will be able to withhold an order if otherwise welfare considerations support its 
making.’48  
This late addition has rendered many of the provisions in section 54 HFEA 2008 
unworkable, including the single parent exclusion, the genetic requirement, and the 
prohibition on commercial surrogacy. A children’s ‘rights-based’ approach, 
incorporating the CRC and ECHR, is used in this thesis as a lens to analyse: (1) how 
current surrogacy regulation, and its underlying policies affect children’s rights;49 (2) 
whether the judiciary has interpreted the law in a manner consistent with children’s 
rights; and (3) the reforms that are needed to centralise the rights of the child in this 
context.  
                                                 
47 Parental Orders (Human Fertilisation and Embryology) Regulations 1994, (SI No 2767), sch 
1(1)(a).   
48 Re L (A Minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam), [10] (Hedley J). 
49 Within the CRC and ECHR. 
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As Tobin notes there is a ‘growing trend towards calls for the adoption of a rights-
based approach.’50 According to UNICEF: 
‘A child rights-based approach is grounded in the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC), a set of internationally agreed legal standards which 
lay out a vision of childhood underpinned by dignity, equality, safety and 
participation. Taking a child rights-based approach means using the Convention as a 
practical framework for working with and for children and young people.’51 
Ultimately, it is a ‘framework that can be used by planners, decision-makers and 
frontline professionals in both statutory and voluntary agencies’.52 The approach, 
which aims to put rights into practice, is ‘guided by a set of seven mutually-reinforcing 
principles’53 including: dignity, best interests of the child, non-discrimination, life, 
survival and development, participation, interdependence and indivisibility and 
transparency and accountability.54 The adoption of a rights-based approach is 
important because, as Hollingsworth and Stalford submit:  
‘It can help to increase the visibility of children within the law by ensuring that their 
status as rights-holders is recognised, that their voices are heard and that their interests 
are identiﬁed and factored into judicial decision-making.’55 
Five indicators of a children’s rights-based approach,56 identified by Stalford and 
Hollingsworth, are used in this thesis to see how visible children’s rights are in the 
surrogacy context. The authors use these primary characteristics to assess case law, 
but this thesis extends this analysis to assess the case law and legislation. First, it is 
                                                 
50 J Tobin, ‘Beyond the Supermarket Shelf: Using a Rights Based Approach to Address Children's 
Health Needs’, 14 International Journal of Children’s Rights, 275-306 (2006), p276. 
51 Child Rights Partners Putting Children’s Rights at the Heart Of Public Services, 
<https://www.unicef.org.uk/child-rights-partners/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/11/Unicef-
UK_CRP-information-booklet_14.11.16.pdf > (last accessed 08/10/18). 
52 See ‘A Child Rights-Based Approach: Seven Principles Grounded in the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child’, < https://www.unicef.org.uk/child-friendly-cities/child-rights-based-
approach/ > (last accessed 17/07/18). 
53 Op cit, n50. 
54 Ibid. 
55K Hollingsworth and H Stalford, ‘Towards Children’s Rights Judgments’, chapter 3, in Rewriting 
Children’s Rights Judgments: From Academic Vision to New Practice, edited by H Stalford, K 
Hollingsworth and S Gilmore, 2017 (Hart Publishing, 1st ed). P53. 
56Ibid. These indicators overlap with Tobin’s ‘substantive’ children’s rights approach. 
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considered whether UK legislation and the judiciary ‘explicitly adopt a child-rights 
approach by drawing on and utilising to maximum effect the formal legal tools which 
give effect to children’s rights, including (but not conﬁned to) the CRC’.57 Second, 
this thesis will ask whether surrogacy regulation (and the judiciary) has drawn ‘on 
scholarly insights to address theoretical tensions, conceptual challenges and prevailing 
presumptions which stymie the resolution of cases in ways which best protect 
children’s rights’.58 It will also be asked whether the legal processes relating to 
surrogacy, for example the parental order process, ‘maximise children’s participation 
by endorsing and conforming with, where possible, child-friendly procedures’.59 It 
will be considered whether the narrative used in the legislation and cases relating to 
surrogacy ‘centralise the child’s perspective and voice’.60 Finally, it will be asked 
whether surrogacy-conceived children have been ‘acknowledged as one of the 
audiences’ for legal judgments and surrogacy regulation, ‘through the use of child-
appropriate language, structure and style’.61  These indicators of a child rights-based 
approach are also used to develop reforms in this area.  
Another child rights-based approach that can help increase the visibility of surrogacy-
conceived children is Tobin’s ‘substantive children’s rights model’.62 He identifies a 
spectrum of children’s rights approaches, starting with those which engage least with 
children’s rights, to those which engage with children’s rights in a more rigorous way. 
The spectrum consists of ‘invisible’, ‘incidental’, ‘selective’, ‘rhetorical’, ‘superﬁcial’ 
and ‘substantive’ approaches to children’s rights.63 Under an ‘invisible’ approach, the 
judiciary or legislature fails to identify the relevance of children’s rights to any aspect 
of the proceedings.64 With an incidental approach, children’s rights are relevant but 
are not essential to ‘either the conceptualisation or resolution of the issues before a 
                                                 
57 Ibid, p53. 
58 Ibid, p54. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 J Tobin, ‘Judging the Judges: Are They Adopting the Rights Approach in Matters Involving 
Children?’  (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 579. 
63 Ibid, p593.  
64 Ibid, p594. 
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court…they are merely incidental — a marginal feature of the judicial process that 
exists on the periphery.’65 The issue is ‘reduced to the need to reconcile the tension 
between the rights of the parents and the obligation of the state’.66 A selective approach 
occurs when a court makes ‘signiﬁcant rather than incidental references to children’s 
rights to inform or defend its resolution of the issues’.67 However, the analysis is ‘not 
grounded in a comprehensive and internally coherent application of a rights based 
approach.’68 For example the judiciary or legislation may focus on one right to the 
exclusion of others. Under a rhetorical approach, children are told that their autonomy 
will be respected when in truth a welfare approach model is adopted.69 This has arisen 
in the context of medical decision making, where the courts have regularly held 
children to be competent in the context of access to contraceptive advice70 but denied 
their competency when they refuse life-saving treatment.71  
The superﬁcial approach arises when the judiciary identify the central relevance of 
children’s rights but fail to ‘consider the actual scope and nature of the rights in 
question and/or fail to undertake a rigorous assessment as to the manner in which these 
rights must be balanced against any competing considerations.’72With this approach, 
children’s rights are used as a trump card to divert ‘the court’s attention from the need 
to undertake a careful examination of the available evidence and a rigorous balancing 
of the competing interests.’73 The optimum ‘substantive’ rights-based approach is 
based on the CRC, and consists of several core principles: (1) A recognition that 
children have rights, (2) a recognition of the supportive role of a family and the 
evolving capacity of a child, (3) a requirement to consider children’s rights in all 
                                                 
65Ibid. 
66 Ibid, p596. 
67 Ibid, p597. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See for example, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (‘Gillick’) [1986] 
1 AC 112. 
71 See for example, Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 
177, CA and Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627 CA. 
72 J Tobin, op cit, n62, p602. 
73 Ibid, p603. 
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matters concerning them, (4) a requirement to ensure the best interests of children are, 
as a minimum, a primary consideration in all matters concerning them, and (5) a 
requirement to avoid a subjective and speculative assessment of a child’s best interests 
and to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the views of a child.74  Like 
Hollingsworth and Stalford, Tobin uses this spectrum to assess whether judicial 
decision-making adopts a rights-based approach. This thesis uses the spectrum of 
approaches to assess how the judiciary (both domestic and the ECtHR) have responded 
to the issue of surrogacy and whether the legislation itself adopts a child rights-based 
approach. 
Although the CRC is not directly incorporated into UK domestic law, ‘that is to say, 
an individual cannot go to a UK court to complain about a breach of any of rights in 
the Convention’, 75 Article 26 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties76 
provides that ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.’ The UK must be held to account to see whether it 
has been guided by the CRC in the formulation of UK surrogacy regulation. In order 
to maximise the effect of the CRC as a tool for promoting children’s rights, Kilkelly 
suggests that the principles and the provisions of the Convention should be used to 
offer guidance on the interpretation and application of the ECHR.77 This ‘would help 
to fulfil the potential of both treaties to protect and promote children’s rights at the 
international level and at the domestic level where the ECHR is part of domestic 
law’.78  
It is acknowledged that tensions could arise between the underpinning theoretical 
frameworks of procreative liberty and children’s rights, that are used in the thesis. 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The UK’s compliance with the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child Eighth Report of Session 2014–15’, para 18, p8, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201415/jtselect/ jtrights/144/144.pdf (Last accessed 
15/11/17). 
76 Vienna, 23 May 1969. 
77 U Kilkelly, ‘The best of both worlds for children’s rights: Interpreting the European Convention 
on Human Rights in the light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’. (2001) Human 
Rights Quarterly, 23, pp 308–326. 
78Ibid. 
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Allowing single parents, non-genetic parents and multiple parents to apply for a 
parental order following surrogacy, raises questions for the child’s rights, particularly 
their right to identity which is inherent in Articles 7 and 8 CRC and Article 8 of the 
ECHR. Therefore, it is important to clarify that whilst this thesis advocates greater 
procreative freedom for intended parents (particularly when it comes to applying for 
a parental order) this must always be balanced with a consideration of how it will 
affect the child. This is consistent with the Parental Order Regulations 2010 which 
state that the child must be the Court’s paramount concern in parental order 
applications. Therefore, the chapters on procreative liberty are ‘filtered’ with a 
subsequent chapter considering the children’s rights issues. For instance, chapter 2 
considers how the procreative liberty of single parents are affected by the ‘relationship 
provisions’ in section 54 HFEA 2008 and the following chapter 3 considers how the 
relationship provisions – and any reforms suggested in chapter 2 – affect the rights of 
the child. Again, in chapters 6 and 7 the problems with DIY and international 
commercial surrogacy arrangements are looked at from the perspective of the intended 
parents and the children involved, to ensure that reforms do not just increase 
procreative liberty but also centralise the rights of the child.  
1.2 A Roadmap to the Thesis 
Before the thesis took shape, key judgments including ‘Baby Cotton’,79 
X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy),80 and CW v NT and another,81 were read and analysed. 
This process helped to identify some of the main issues with UK surrogacy regulation, 
including payments, cross-border surrogacy and DIY arrangements. It also led to a 
discovery of ‘Family Law Week’,82 a valuable research tool containing many of the 
judgments on surrogacy and parental orders, and updates on legal reform. All the 
surrogacy cases heard by the English judiciary were read and the majority are used 
throughout the thesis to highlight problems with UK surrogacy regulation.83 Much of 
                                                 
79 Op cit, n2. 
80Op cit, n20. 
81 Op cit, n29. 
82 https://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ho0 (last accessed 27/01/19). 
83 No surrogacy cases heard by the judiciary in Wales or Northern Ireland were identified. Only 
one case heard by the Scottish courts was identified, C and C v S 1996 S.L.T. 1387. The English 
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the secondary literature on procreative liberty84 and children’s rights85 was identified 
at the early stages of the project, along with important commentators in the area of 
surrogacy law.86  Some of the secondary literature was identified after taking part in 
the Children’s Rights Judgment Project87 and other secondary material, including 
Martha Fineman’s ‘The Neutered Mother’88 was discovered at a later stage in the 
thesis. These sources were used to develop the themes of procreative liberty, children’s 
rights and the nuclear family. 
Chapter 2 explores the human rights implications of the ‘relationship provisions’ in 
section 54 HFEA 2008. To apply for a parental order, the intended parents must be 
‘husband and wife’,89 ‘civil partners’90 or ‘two persons who are living as partners in 
an enduring family relationship and are not within prohibited degrees of relationship 
in relation to each other’.91 The preference towards the two-parent ‘sexual family’ 
inherent in these provisions, can be traced back to the Warnock Report where it held 
that ‘the interests of the child dictate that it should be born into a home where there is 
a loving, stable, heterosexual relationship…with both father and mother…’.92  The 
HFEA 1990’s exclusion of unmarried parents and homosexual couples from the moral 
vision of the ‘family’ also exposes how surrogacy regulation is underpinned by the 
                                                 
cases apply to the whole of the UK. 
84 J Robertson, Children of Choice, op cit, n37. 
85 J Tobin, op cit, n62. The book edited by H Stalford, K Hollingsworth and S Gilmore (op cit, 
n55) was incorporated later in the thesis after it was published in 2017. 
86 Including work by M Crawshaw and E Blyth, op cit, n27; M Freeman, op cit, n4; K Horsey, 
‘Fraying at the Edges: UK Surrogacy Law in 2015’, Medical Law Review, Volume 24, Issue 4, 1 
November 2016, pp608–621,https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fww013;and A Alghrani, D Griffiths 
and M Brazier “Surrogacy Law: From Piecemeal Tweaks to Sustained Review and Reform” in 
Alison Diduck, Noam Peleg and Helen Reece, (eds) Law In Society: Reflections on Children, 
Family, Culture and Philosophy- Essays in Honour of Michael Freeman (2014, Brill Publishers) 
pp425-453. 
87 I took part in the Children’s Rights Judgments Project between 2014-17 and contributed to the 
edited collection (op cit, n55). The project helped me identify sources on children’s rights, 
including work by M Freeman. 
88 Op cit, n35. 
89 Section 54(2)(a) HFEA 2008. 
90 Section 54(2)(b) HFEA 2008. 
91 Section 54(2)(c) HFEA 2008. 
92 Op cit, n5, para 2.9. 
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‘sexual family’. The legislation was updated in 2008, to allow same-sex couples, those 
in civil partnerships and those in ‘enduring family relationships’ to apply for a parental 
order. The HFEA 2008 also extended access to single and same sex couples using 
artificial reproductive technologies to create a family.93 Nevertheless, single parents 
continue to be excluded from applying for a parental order, which echoes the outdated 
two-parent model endorsed by the Warnock Committee. In 2016, Lady Warnock noted 
how three decades on, she regrets how the Committee treated the practice in 1984:  
‘I do feel rather ashamed of the stance that I took about surrogacy … I'm sure we 
could have done better.’94  
The regulation’s preference towards the ‘sexual family’ must be revisited. As Morgan 
notes, ‘the most radical challenge to understandings of the family has been presented 
by assisted conception…The legal, biological and social constructs of parenthood 
have all faced vigorous re-examination, and new definitions and new family forms 
have become available’.95 Same-sex couples can adopt,96 single people can also 
adopt,97 and single women are entitled to become parents using In Vitro Fertilisation 
(IVF).98 Despite these progressive changes, the two-parent ‘ideal’ continues its grip 
upon the law regulating surrogacy and there is ‘increasing tension between the 
respective roles of biology, intention and functional parenting in the attribution of legal 
                                                 
93 See J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘“No Father Required”? The Welfare Assessment in the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008’, Feminist Legal Studies (2010) 18:201–225. 
94 BioNews, 1st February 2016, ‘Meeting Mary Warnock’, K. Horsey and S. Avery, available at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_611935.asp (accessed 23/05/16). 
95 D Morgan ‘The Surrogacy Issue: Who Is the Other Mother?’ (1994) 8 International Journal of 
Law and Family, 386-412. At pp387-88. 
96 The ACA 2002. 
97 Section 1(3) of the Adoption Act 1926, sections 14 and 15 of the Adoption Act 1976 and, now, 
section 51 of the ACA 2002. 
98 The HFEA 2008 Act deleted section 13(5) HFEA 1990, that clinicians consider the need for a 
father of any potential child before offering a woman treatment and substituted for it a requirement 
that clinicians must consider the child’s need for ‘supportive parenting’, thus allowing single 
women and lesbian couples to use IVF. 
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parental status’.99 Single parents100 and co-parents101 use surrogacy to create a family 
but are denied a parental order, which is the most appropriate order for acquiring legal 
parenthood and parental responsibility for a surrogacy-conceived child.102 Chapter 2 
critically reflects on the potential human rights violations of the relationship 
provisions and considers whether a more inclusive definition of parenthood is 
achievable to reflect today’s diverse family forms.  
Chapter 3 continues to explore the problematic ‘relationship provisions’, this time 
through the lens of children’s rights. The government’s assertion that surrogacy-
conceived children require two parents who are in an enduring family relationship is 
questioned. The judiciary’s response to the exclusion of single parents in ‘Re Z’ and 
‘Z (A child) (No 2)’103  is considered and it is asked whether Munby P’s approach is 
consistent with a child rights-based approach.104 The chapter aims to highlight how 
the relationship provisions, which deny children with less conventional families a 
parental order, affect the child’s rights to identity.105  
The grip of the ‘sexual family’ upon surrogacy regulation is a topic that is also 
explored in chapters 4 and 5. Section 54(1)(b) of the HFEA 2008, provides that one of 
the perquisite’s to applying for legal parentage and a parental order is that ‘the gametes 
of at least one of the applicants were used to bring about the creation of the embryo…’. 
Where neither intended parent has contributed their gametes to the creation of the 
embryo, that couple cannot apply for a parental order. Chapter 4 considers how 
                                                 
99 T Callus, 2012. ‘A New Parenthood Paradigm for Twenty-First Century Family Law in England 
and Wales?’ Legal Studies 32 (3): 347–368. 
100 Re B v C, op cit, n25; Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: parental order) 
[2015] EWFC 73 (hereafter ‘Re Z’); In the matter of Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam) 
(hereafter ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’. 
101 See V Jadva, T Freeman, E Tranﬁeld and S Golombok, ‘‘Friendly allies in raising a child’: a 
survey of men and women seeking elective co-parenting arrangements via an online connection 
website’, Human Reproduction. Vol. 30, No. 8 pp.1896–1906, 2015, which discusses the rise of 
co-parenting arrangements. 
102 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), (Munby P) [7]. 
103 Op cit, n100. 
104 K Hollingsworth and H Stalford, op cit n55 above; J Tobin, op cit, n62; and U Kilkelly, op cit, 
n77. 
105 Articles 7 and 8 CRC; and Article 8 ECHR. 
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‘doubly-infertile’ intended parents are marginalised by the genetic requirement and 
explores two cases, one from South Africa106 and the other from the ECtHR,107 to see 
whether the genetic requirement violates Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. One of the 
main aims of the chapter is to address, and rebut, the oft-cited argument that doubly-
infertile parents should ‘adopt instead’. It is considered whether Robertson’s 
procreative liberty framework could be modified to encompass double-donor 
surrogacy. Chapter 5 continues to explore the tensions between biological, gestational 
and social / psychological claims to parenthood. It considers whether the motherhood 
provision in section 33 HFEA 2008 – which assigns legal motherhood to the surrogate 
and ‘no other woman – is in the best interests of the child. The chapter also considers 
whether assigning legal parenthood to the child’s intended parents could help refocus 
the law away from family structure, to the ‘actual contingencies of care-giving’.108 
Chapter 6 explores how surrogacy is practised by intended parents and whether UK 
regulation has driven prospective parents into risky ‘DIY’ arrangements, facilitated by 
the ‘dangerous and murky waters of the internet’.109 DIY arrangements are appealing 
for intended parents, who can circumvent the lengthy waiting lists for joining a non-
profit organisation, meet a wider range of surrogates, and avoid the watchful eye of a 
professional organisation. However, this thesis aims to demonstrate how DIY 
arrangements can go wrong and, when this happens, the problems outweigh any 
procreative freedom the intended parents hope to achieve by ‘going it alone’. A 
combination of empirical and doctrinal analysis is used to explore the types of DIY 
arrangements entered into by UK intended parents and the consequences that emerge 
when these arrangements go awry.  
                                                 
106 AB v Minister of Social Development As Amicus Curiae: Centre for Child Law (40658/13) 
[2015] ZAGPPHC 580; 2016 2 SA 27; [2015] 4 All SA 24. Hereafter ‘AB v Minister of Social 
Development (HC); AB and Another v Minister of Social Development [2016] ZACC 43. Hereafter 
‘AB and Another (CC)’. 
107 Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy Appl no. 25358/12 (ECtHR, 27 January 2015, Second 
Chamber) (ECtHR, 24 January 2017, Grand Chamber). Hereafter ‘Paradiso’ and ‘Paradiso (GC)’ 
respectively. 
108 M Fineman, op cit, n36. 
109 CW v NT and Another, op cit, n29. At [38] (Baker J). 
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In addition to DIY arrangements, prohibitive surrogacy regulation in the UK has 
driven some intended parents overseas, to more surrogacy-friendly jurisdictions.110 
Doctrinal analysis of the cases and interviews carried out with intended parents, who 
had children after entering international commercial surrogacy arrangements, are used 
to explore the factors influencing the decision to use cross-border surrogacy 
arrangements. The chapter considers which law reforms could help encourage 
intended parents to use surrogacy in the UK, rather than entering high risk DIY and 
international arrangements. 
1.3 Bringing the Research to Life through Empirical Work 
To add to the theoretical and doctrinal analysis, a small-scale qualitative study was 
undertaken, to learn more about the experiences of surrogates and intended parents 
involved with surrogacy in the UK or overseas. Ethical approval111 was obtained for 
this study and the empirical findings are used throughout the thesis to illustrate 
problems with the law for children’s rights and procreative liberty.112 The qualitative 
study involved audio-recorded telephone interviews with eight intended parents and 
two surrogates,113 who responded to an advert on ‘Family Law Week’.114 All 
participants were given an information sheet,115 which included contact details, 
information about the aims of the research, details of the risks involved, and 
information about data storage and confidentiality. Informed consent was obtained 
from all the interviewees included in the thesis.116 At one end of the interviewing 
                                                 
110 The Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘A Preliminary Report on the Issues 
Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements drawn up by the Permanent Bureau’, 
Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012 for the attention of the Council of April 2012 on 
General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, para 5, p 7. Available at, < 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d4ff8ecd-f747-46da-86c3-61074e9b17fe.pdf> (last accessed 
15/11/17). 
111 See Appendix One, ‘Evidence of Ethical Approval’. 
112 The empirical case studies feature most predominantly in chapters 4-7. 
113 See Appendix Five ‘Pseudonyms and Interview Codes’. Only participants who signed the 
consent form have been included in the thesis. 
114 http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed160230 (last accessed 25/06/18). 
115 Appendix Three, ‘Participant Information Sheet’. 
116 Appendix Two ‘Participant Consent Form’. 
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spectrum is the structured interview which is composed of closed questions and fixed 
choice responses.117 At the other end of the spectrum, is the unstructured interview 
which involves open-ended questions. Semi-structured interviews, which include a 
‘combination of closed and open questions aimed at collecting both factual and 
attitudinal data’,118 were conducted.119 The semi-structured interview approach was 
used because it generated a discussion about how surrogates and intended parents felt 
about surrogacy regulation and their factual experiences with the process. This 
approach led to ‘unexpected, unanticipated and serendipitous responses…which 
reveal[ed] new lines of thinking in terms of relationships or hypotheses’.120 For 
instance, in one interview with Liz, the approach led to an unanticipated discussion 
about gamete donor anonymity.121 Overall, the flexibility of the semi-structured 
technique led to some unexpected and fruitful responses, while the structure helped to 
keep the interviews focussed on relevant issues.  
Originally, two online surveys were designed to ascertain the level of satisfaction that 
intended parents and surrogates have with the current system of regulation. Online 
links to the survey were made available on ‘Family Law Week’. However, the survey 
data was not used because it was unreliable. This is because SelectSurvey – the survey 
platform provided by the University – did not allow for participants to be given an 
individual username and password. As such, anyone could log onto the survey without 
their identity being verified. Some of the answers indicated that participants had taken 
the survey more than once or did not have experience of surrogacy. It was decided that 
the interview responses were more reliable, so the survey data was discarded.  
During the telephone interviews theoretical sampling was used. According to 
Draucker et al., theoretical sampling occurs when ‘data collection and analysis occur 
simultaneously’.122 This was achieved in the qualitative study by simultaneously 
                                                 
117 P McNeill and S Chapman (2005), Research Methods. 3rd ed. Routledge, p6. 
118 Ibid, p57. 
119 Appendix Four, ‘Sample of Interview Questions’. 
120 P McNeill and S Chapman, op cit, n117, p59. 
121 Interview 05IM, recorded on 26/08/16 (interview on file with the author). 
122 Draucker, C. B., Martsolf, D. S., Ross, R. & Rusk, T. B. (2007) ‘Theoretical Sampling and 
Category Development in Grounded Theory’. Qualitative Health Research, 17, 1137-1148, p1139. 
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comparing the interview transcripts and collapsing them into categories and codes. 
The interview questions were often refocused and differed to those in the interview 
schedule. This use of theoretical sampling helped generate specific information about 
emerging concepts, including the circumvention of donor anonymity rules,123 a topic 
which was not initially included in the interview schedule. The semi-structured 
interviews with the intended parents and surrogates included a ‘life history’ approach. 
Life history presents an individual’s experience of particular events,124 in this case 
surrogacy. According to this approach, ‘research relies heavily on interview data, but 
this may be cross-referenced to documents and other secondary sources’125 such as 
case law, legal advice and diary entries. The purpose of the life history approach is to 
‘give voice’ to those who have experienced surrogacy and to ‘awaken public 
understanding and concern for the issue’.126 The interviews gave a powerful insight 
into the surrogates’ and intended parents’ experiences with surrogacy. 
There was a risk that the interviews would cause emotional distress for the intended 
parents, who talked about a very intimate area of their personal lives, including fertility 
problems. Similarly, the surrogates also revealed their personal motivations and the 
problems they encountered with the law. Two safeguards were implemented: (1) the 
participant would be offered a break if they became distressed and (2) the interview 
would be stopped completely, if the participant became overly distressed. These 
safeguards were not needed during any of the ten interviews. One of the limitations 
with conducting telephone interviews was a reduced ability ‘to monitor, support, or 
even terminate the study if adverse reactions become apparent.’127 Nevertheless, 
                                                 
123 Interview 05IM, recorded on 26/08/16 (on file with the author). 
124 S Germeten, ‘Personal Narratives in Life History Research’, Scandinavian Joumal of 
Educational Research, 2013, J Routledge Vol. 57, No. 6, 612-624. 
125 M Hammond and J Wellington (2013), Research Methods: The Key Concepts. 1st ed. Routledge, 
pp97-99. 
126 Ibid. 
127 British Psychological Society (2013). Ethics Guidelines for Internet-mediated Research. 
INF206/1.2013. Leicester: Author. Available from: 
https://www.bps.org.uk/sites/bps.org.uk/files/Policy%20%20Files/Ethics%20Guidelines%20for
%20Internet-Mediated%20Research%20%282013%29.pdf (last accessed (05/10/18). 
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verbal cues and changes to the participants’ tone were monitored. Ultimately, the 
interviewees led the discussion, which allowed them to tell their stories. 
The study originally planned to use NVivo, a type of Computer Aided Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS), to facilitate in-depth qualitative analysis of textual 
data sources.128 However, coding databases were set up using Microsoft Word instead. 
This software proved easier to make codes and organise quotations from the 
transcripts. Coding is an ‘interpretive, analytic process in which thinking about the 
data is extended beyond the descriptive to a more abstract level’.129 The following 
codes emerged from the interview transcripts: (1) ‘relationship and contact with the 
surrogate’, (2) ‘parental orders’, (3) ‘genetic relatedness’, (4) ‘intended parents’ 
involvement in the process’, (5) ‘international surrogacy’, and (5) ‘Do-it-Yourself 
surrogacy’. It is important to acknowledge that the sample size of the study, eight 
intended parents and two surrogates, is small. As such, the interviews are used as real-
life case studies to illustrate the issues, rather than as an indicative sample. 
Nevertheless, the views and experiences of the surrogates and intended parents 
interviewed resonate with much of the existing research around the topic, and on-going 
calls for reform.130 The interview participants are anonymised in this project and 
pseudonyms have been used to protect their identity. A few words about their character 
and circumstances will lend some colour to the research. 
(I) Introducing the Intended Parents 
(a) Bea131  
                                                 
128P Bazeley & L Richards (2005), The Nvivo Qualitative Project Book, SAGE Publications, 
chapter 4. 
129 Ibid. 
130 See A Alghrani and D Griffiths, op cit, n1; M Crawshaw et al., op cit, n27; K Horsey and S 
Sheldon, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’, Medical Law Review, 
20, Winter 2012, pp. 67–89; and Surrogacy in the UK: Myth Busting and Reform, Report of the 
Surrogacy UK Working Group on Surrogacy Law Reform (November 2015): 
https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/research/projects/current/surrogacy/Surrogacy%20in%20the%20UK
%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (last accessed 13/04/18). 
131 Interview 01IM, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author). 
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Bea and her husband Jack became parents to twins after entering a surrogacy 
arrangement in the UK with a surrogate, Pippa. The surrogate was married and 
domiciled in the UK. The couple decided to use surrogacy because Bea could not fall 
pregnant naturally due to Crohn’s disease. Operations on her abdomen left her 
fallopian tubes damaged from infection. After trying IVF, the ‘next logical step’132 for 
them was surrogacy. Bea and Jack joined one of the main non-profit surrogacy 
organisations in the UK, (COTS).133 However, they met Pippa through a secret 
‘Facebook’ group. This was Pippa’s seventh pregnancy, so it was high risk, especially 
as she became pregnant with twins. It is assumed that Bea and / or Jack are genetically 
related to the twins, because they were awarded a parental order which requires at least 
one of the parties to have contributed their gametes to the creation of the child.134 The 
relationship between Bea and Pippa deteriorated during the pregnancy due to several 
factors which are discussed in the thesis. When Bea and Jack applied for a parental 
order seven weeks after the children’s births, Pippa refused to consent ‘for a long time’ 
and would not communicate with the Child and Family Court Advisory and Support 
Service (CAFCASS).135 This led to delay and meant the children’s long birth 
certificate was not issued until 18 months after their birth. Bea and Jack’s case will be 
used (particularly chapter 6) to consider the causes and problems of ‘do-it-yourself’ 
surrogacy arrangements facilitated by the internet. 
(b)  Sophie136  
At the time of Sophie’s interview, she was 35 and had a one-year old son with her 
husband Will, via surrogacy. Sophie’s eggs were used to create the child along with 
Will’s sperm. Sophie and Will entered into a surrogacy arrangement in the UK with a 
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
133 COTS website, https://www.surrogacy.org.uk/ (last accessed 17/07/18).  
134 Section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008. It was not disclosed whether Bea and / or Jack are genetically 
related to the twins. 
135 ‘Cafcass looks after the interests of children involved in family proceedings. It is independent 
of the courts and social services, but works under the rules of the Family Court and legislation to 
work with children and their families, and then advise the courts on what is considered to be in the 
best interests of individual children.’ https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/children-and-
family-court-advisory-and-support-service (last accessed 05/10/18). 
136 Interview 02IM, recorded on 09/07/16 (on file with the author).  
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surrogate, Ellen, who was a UK national and domiciled in the UK. Sophie decided to 
use surrogacy after developing a bladder pain condition in her early 20’s. She had been 
with Will since she was 20 and they had always wanted to have children together. 
They decided to use surrogacy to have a child that was genetically related to them 
both. Sophie and Will joined COTS137 and were matched with a surrogate. They spent 
a lot of time getting to know Ellen and her family, and were in weekly contact over 
the telephone. Sophie and Will applied for a parental order around seven weeks after 
their son was born. Sophie and Will’s case is used in the thesis to explore the 
advantages of using a non-profit surrogacy organisation like COTS, and to question 
whether intended parents should be awarded legal parenthood earlier on. 
(c) Rosie138   
Rosie decided to use surrogacy because she could not carry a pregnancy to term. She 
and her husband, Gareth, tried to become parents for six years before joining 
Surrogacy UK (SUK),139 another not-for-profit surrogacy agency, where they met 
their surrogate Penny. The embryo was created using Rosie’s eggs and donor sperm. 
During the pregnancy Rosie and Gareth were in regular contact with their surrogate, 
Penny. Their case is used to consider whether the intended parent’s should be given 
legal parenthood earlier on. 
(d) Steve140 
Steve and his partner Robert, a same-sex couple, had a child via surrogacy. Robert’s 
sister donated her eggs to the couple and Steve used his sperm, making him the 
biological father. The couple lived in Scotland and originally joined SUK to try to find 
a surrogate. After being part of the charity for almost two years Steve and Robert had 
not yet found their surrogate and felt their location in Scotland deterred surrogates 
from offering to help. Since Robert is American, and their embryos were stored in 
America, they chose to enter a commercial surrogacy arrangement in the US. They 
                                                 
137 Op cit, n133. 
138 Interview 03IM, recorded on 11/07/16 (interview on file with the author). 
139 SUK website, https://www.surrogacyuk.org/ (last accessed 08/06/18).  
140 Interview 04IF, recorded on 07/10/16 (interview on file with the author). 
24 
 
met their surrogate, Anna, an American surrogate living in the US, through a friend. 
The intended parents and Anna spent time getting to know each other in the States. 
Before Anna gave birth to Steve and Robert’s son, they received the American birth 
certificate for the child. However, when the couple returned to the UK they had to 
apply for a parental order and spent thousands of pounds on the surrogacy and legal 
fees. They paid for ‘really expensive legal representation’ with the full fees amounting 
to £25,000 ‘on top of the nearly £200,000’ the couple already spent on the 
surrogacy.141 Steve believes that the law should permit commercial surrogacy in the 
UK and feels that this would encourage more surrogates to offer their help. Steve and 
Robert’s case is used in Chapter 7 to consider the problems with international 
commercial surrogacy arrangements. 
(e) Liz142  
Liz and her husband Dan had twins through surrogacy after entering an international 
commercial surrogacy arrangement in India. They initially tried SUK in 2009, but it 
had a three-year waiting list due to a shortage of surrogates. The couple decided to 
enter an international commercial surrogacy arrangement in India and used two Indian 
surrogates to carry their twins. The children are full biological siblings; their biological 
father is Dan and their biological mother is an anonymous egg donor from Cape Town. 
When the children were born, Liz lived in India for four months whilst waiting for 
permission to return to the UK with the twins. When she returned Liz applied for a 
parental order after a month or so. The case was heard by Wall P who was concerned 
about the payments that had been made to the surrogates and Indian clinic.143 
Nevertheless, parental orders were granted as it was ‘plainly in the interests of these 
two children that they should be brought up by [the couple] as their parents.’144 Liz 
gave access to her diary which recorded her time in India. Details from the diary have 
not been recorded in this thesis but have helped build a bigger picture of Liz’s 
experiences of international commercial surrogacy and her time in India. Liz’s case is 
                                                 
141 Ibid. 
142 Interview 05IM, recorded on 26/08/16 (interview on file with the author). 
143 In the matter of X and Y (Children) And in the matter of Section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 [2011] EWHC 3147 (Fam). 
144 Ibid, [41] (Wall P). 
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used in the thesis to consider the factors driving UK intended parents overseas; the 
legal and practical implications of commercial arrangements overseas; and whether 
the ‘reasonable expenses’ requirement in section 54(8) HFEA 2008 is sustainable. 
Liz’s case is also used to look at the rules on UK gamete donor anonymity and 
whether, from the child’s point of view, intended parents should be able to circumvent 
these rules by using overseas donors. 
(f) Gemma145 
At the time of the interview, Gemma was an intended mother who entered a surrogacy 
arrangement in the UK with her friend Sinead, the surrogate. Gemma had endometria 
cancer when she was 30 and had to have a full hysterectomy.  Sinead offered to be a 
surrogate and at the time of interview was eight months pregnant. Gemma’s case is 
interesting because not only is she a single mother, she does not have a genetic tie to 
the child either. This means the HFEA 2008 doubly discriminates against her with its 
preference towards the ‘sexual family’. Gemma’s case is used to highlight that single 
parents of choice and non-genetic parents are excluded from the legislation and cannot 
apply for a parental order. 
(g) Lauren146 
Lauren and her husband Zak entered a surrogacy arrangement in the UK, with a 
surrogate Molly, who is also domiciled in the UK. Lauren found out she would never 
be able to get pregnant or carry her own child when she was 15. She was diagnosed 
with Mayer Rokitansky Kuster Hauser syndrome (MRKH), 147 a congenital absence of 
the uterus which meant she was unable to get pregnant. She thought about adoption 
but decided from 15, that she would use surrogacy. Lauren and Zak joined SUK. 
Lauren explained that SUK is based on friendship and investing in a genuine bond. 
They got to know their surrogate, Molly, and her family over six months. After six 
months Lauren, Zack and Molly sat down with a mediator from SUK and went through 
                                                 
145 Interview 06IM, recorded on 11/07/16 (interview on file with the author). 
146 Interview 07IM, recorded on 15/07/16 (interview on file with the author). 
147  https://www.mrkh.org.uk/mrkh.html (last accessed 28/08/18). 
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an agreement form148 which covered every single aspect of the surrogacy, from ‘diet 
to contact levels during, before and after’ the surrogacy. After being happy with the 
agreement, Lauren, Zak and Molly signed it and started treatment.  
When Lauren and Zak applied for a parental order, they found the technical aspect, 
the parental order application form, very simple.149 However, the couple felt they were 
in a vulnerable situation with regards to parenthood. The parental order was not 
granted until the children were 15 months old due to administrative errors on the part 
of the courts and CAFCASS. Until the parental order was awarded, Lauren and Zak 
were not the children’s legal parents; Molly, the surrogate, was the legal mother due 
to section 33 HFEA 2008. Lauren was unsure if she would have been able to give 
consent to emergency medical treatment if the children required it. This case is used 
to consider whether legal parenthood should be granted to intended parents at birth; 
the discrimination faced by single and non-genetic parents; and the arguments against 
commercial surrogacy. 
(h) Sally150  
 Sally and David, both domiciled in the UK, had a son through surrogacy. Sally did 
not have a womb and could not carry a child herself. Surrogacy was the only option 
for having a child that was genetically theirs. Sally’s eggs and David’s sperm were 
used to create their son. Sally’s mother Mary, also interviewed for this project, was 
the surrogate. This meant Sally and David did not have to worry about financial costs 
or the uncertainty of the surrogate changing her mind. Sally and David were there 
throughout the pregnancy. They found the parental order process difficult due to 
administrative errors from the court and CAFCASS. Sally’s case is used to consider 
the differences between using a family member as a surrogate and using an 
organisation like SUK or COTS. 
 (II) Introducing the Surrogates 
                                                 
148 Which was non-binding due to the SA Act 1985. 
149 It is important to note however, that Lauren is a solicitor which might explain why she found 
the technical aspect unproblematic. 
150 Interview 08IM, recorded on 08/07/16 (interview on file with the author). 
27 
 
This section gives a few details about the two surrogates interviewed for the project. 
(a) Kate151  
At the time of interview, Kate had been a surrogate before and had started treatment 
for her second surrogacy. She does not have any children of her own and decided not 
to use her own eggs for this reason. She was a surrogate with SUK and decided to help 
a same-sex couple in 2013. Kate is still in contact with the couple and the child knows 
who she is. Kate’s case is interesting because she agrees with the current law, that the 
surrogate should be recognised as the legal mother. Her case is used to consider the 
idea of ‘multiple parenthood’ and whether UK birth certificates should adopt a similar 
model to British Columbia, where up to five names can be put on the child’s birth 
certificate. 
(b) Mary152 
Mary’s daughter Sally was diagnosed with MRKH when she was 16 which meant that 
she could not carry her own child. 10 years later Mary became aware of an American 
woman who had been a surrogate for her daughter. When Mary’s daughter planned to 
get married to her partner, she offered to be a surrogate for them. In 2013 her promise 
became a reality and Mary gave birth to Sally’s child; Mary was 48 at the time. Mary 
was unhappy that she and her husband (Sally’s father) had to be on the birth certificate. 
Although the birth certificate was reissued after the parental order was made, she said 
that Sally was not completely happy with the wording because it ‘did not reflect the 
fact they were the actual parents’.153 Mary’s interview is used to consider surrogacy 
arrangements between family members and whether parenthood should be assigned to 
the intended parents sooner. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter contextualised UK surrogacy regulation and introduced the 
two main policies reflected in current regulation: (1) the ‘sexual family’ form, and (2) 
                                                 
151 Interview 01SM, recorded on 07/07/16 (interview on file with the author). 
152 Interview 02SM, recorded on 10/07/16 (interview on file with the author). 
153 Ibid. 
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a rejection of commercialisation. Alongside the doctrinal and theoretical analysis used 
to approach the research questions, the thesis will also use empirical ‘case studies’ 
from interviews with eight intended parents and two surrogates. The empirical study 
revealed some important lessons for future socio-legal research in this field. Firstly, 
the interview participants in this study were very private individuals. They had faced 
problems of infertility, discrimination, debt and the stigma of using surrogacy as a 
method to create a family. In future it is suggested that interviews should, ideally, take 
place in a face-to-face setting which might help the participant feel more at ease and 
able to expand on their experiences. Secondly, it would have been useful to conduct 
follow up interviews as an opportunity to: (a) resolve any unanswered questions that 
were missed during the first interview and, (b) see how the surrogate and intended 
parents have got on since the first interview in terms of receiving their parental order 
and levels of post-birth contact between the child and surrogate. Finally, it would be 
valuable, particularly for promoting a child rights-based approach in this field, to 
conduct interviews with surrogacy born children (possibly older children / 
adolescents). This could help generate a clearer idea about the experiences and feelings 
of surrogacy conceived children.  
Nevertheless, the interviews conducted with the eight intended parents and two 
surrogates have been invaluable and their stories have helped illuminate the barriers 
and difficulties imposed by surrogacy laws and policy. The recent declaration of 
incompatibility issued by Munby P in ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’,154 and the Law 
Commission’s inclusion of surrogacy in its 13th Programme of Law Reform,155 
presents an opportune time to examine UK surrogacy regulation, which is ‘fraying at 
the edges’156 and in need of urgent reform. 
                                                 
154 Op cit, n100. 
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Chapter Two 
 
2. The Human Rights Implications of the HFEA 2008’s ‘Relationship 
Provisions’: What about Less Conventional Families? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Adult sexual partnerships have been central to regulating family relationships in the 
UK. In 1995 Martha Fineman lamented that the ‘sexual family’, consisting of the 
married heterosexual couple and their genetically related offspring:1 
 ‘Has been at the centre of the development of family law and policy, being assumed 
both as the reality for which legislation should be made and the ideal norm, which it 
should strive to enforce’.2  
She explains that this has resulted in ‘legislation that is more concerned with family 
form than the actual contingencies of care-taking relationships and dependency’.3 This 
chapter argues that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA) is no 
exception to this criticism. Section 54 provides that only two people, who are ‘husband 
and wife’,4 ‘civil partners’,5 or ‘living as partners in an enduring family relationship’6 
can apply for a parental order following surrogacy. These ‘relationship provisions’ 
reflect Fineman’s concern that ‘our societal and legal images and expectations of 
family are tenaciously organized around a sexual affiliation between a man and a 
                                                 
1M Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and other Twentieth Century Tragedies 
(Routledge: New York and London, 1995) 143. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Section 54(2)(a) HFEA 2008. 
5 Section 54(2)(b) HFEA 2008. 
6 Section 54(2)(c) HFEA 2008. 
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woman’7 rather than the ‘actual contingencies of care-taking relationships’.8 
Consequently, UK surrogacy regulation has reinforced the primacy of the two-parent 
family as the ideal environment to procreate, thus marginalising the procreative 
choices of individuals who do not subscribe to this model.  
By channelling parents into these rigid categories, the HFEA 2008 ignores the reality 
that single parents and co-parents, who are not necessarily in a sexual relationship, use 
surrogacy.9 This chapter uses doctrinal analysis to explore the human rights of 
intended parents who do not conform to the ‘relationship provisions’ and are prevented 
from acquiring legal parenthood and parental responsibility through a parental order.10 
Leading cases from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) suggest that the 
right to become a genetic parent, falls within Article 8’s protection for a private and 
family life.11 In Evans v UK12 it was held that private life: 
‘…is a broad term encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an individual’s physical and 
social identity including the right to personal autonomy, personal development and to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world… 
incorporates the right to respect for both the decisions to become and not to become 
a parent.’13 
Soon after, the Grand Chamber considered another UK assisted reproduction policy 
in Dickson v United Kingdom.14 A majority of 5:2 held there had been a violation of 
                                                 
7 M Fineman, op cit, n1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Re B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption) [2015]; Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act: parental order) [2015] EWFC 73 (hereafter ‘Re Z’); In the matter of Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] 
EWHC 1191 (Fam) (hereafter ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’. 
10 A parental order confers joint and equal legal parenthood and parental responsibility upon both 
intended parents and fully extinguishes the parental status of the surrogate under English law. This 
ensures the child’s security and identity as lifelong members of the intended parent’s family. See 
J v G [2013] EWHC 1432 (Fam), para [27] (Theis J). 
11 See M Eijkholt, ‘The Right to Found a Family as a Stillborn Right to Procreate?’ (2010) 18 
Medical Law Review 127. 
12 Evans v UK App no 6339/05 (ECtHR, 10 April 2007). See also M Ford, ‘Evans v UK, What 
Implications for the Jurisprudence of Pregnancy?’(2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 171. 
13 [71]. 
14 Dickson v UK, [2007] ECHR 44362/04 (Grand Chamber, 4 December 2007). 
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the applicant’s Article 8(1)15 right and that ‘the refusal of artificial insemination 
facilities concerned their private and family lives which notions incorporate the right 
to respect for their decision to become genetic parents’.16 In S.H and Others,17 the 
ECtHR clarified that the right to respect for the decisions to have, and not to have a 
child, fall within Article 8 ECHR18 and that the right to become a genetic parent also 
applies in the context of assisted reproduction.19 Although these leading cases have 
concerned access to reproductive treatments rather than ‘the novel issues raised by 
legal regulation of surrogacy’,20 they demonstrate that the right to become a genetic 
parent is protected by Article 8 ECHR. This chapter aims to show how the provisions 
in section 54(2) HFEA 2008 violate Articles 8 and 14 ECHR because they prevent less 
conventional intended parents from acquiring the legal parenthood and parental 
responsibility necessary to look after their genetically related children. The legislation 
effectively punishes single people for making the ‘incorrect’ procreative choice and 
creating children outside the ‘sexual family’. 
It is recalled from the introductory chapter that procreative liberty is defined by 
Robertson in his seminal work, Children of Choice,21 as the right to procreate and the 
converse right not to.22  Robertson divided the right to procreate into two distinct sub-
rights: (1) a right to procreate genetically related children and (2) a right to ‘rear’ one’s 
genetic child.23  Surrogacy facilitates genetic reproduction, however, the relationship 
provisions in the 2008 Act deny certain groups of parents an opportunity to apply for 
                                                 
15 97(1). 
16 [66]. 
17 SH v Austria (Application no 57813/00) Grand Chamber 3rd November 2011. 
18 [80]. 
19 [82]. 
20 A Mulligan, ‘Identity Rights and Sensitive Ethical Questions: The European Convention on 
Human Rights and The Regulation of Surrogacy Arrangements’ Medical Law Review, 2018, Vol. 
26, No. 3, pp. 449–475. 
21 J. A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, 291pp, 
Princeton University Press (1996). 
22 Ibid. 
23 See, J Robertson, ‘Is there a Right to Gestate?’ 2017, Journal of Law and the Biosciences,1–7, 
lsx010, https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsx010, where the author emphasises the right to genetic 
procreation. This was the author’s last paper, which was published shortly after his death. 
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a parental order and regularise their status as the child’s legal parents. This interferes 
with Roberson’s second procreative right, to ‘rear’ one’s genetic child. A parental 
order provides important stability for the child and their intended parent(s). As 
observed by Munby P in Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time limit),24 the order recognises 
the biological connection between the child and the intended parent, and the intentions 
of the parties from the outset that the intended parents will be the child’s legal and 
social / psychological parents.25 Therefore, the narrow definition of parenthood 
currently afforded by the HFEA 2008 has serious consequences for families who do 
not conform to the two-parent model. 
The first section of this chapter explores how the types of families created by 
surrogacy have transformed because of legal and social changes to our understanding 
of parenthood and family life. The Warnock Committee’s view that it is immoral to 
have a child using ARTs or surrogacy outside the confines of the heterosexual married 
unit,26 has radically altered and is out dated.27 Single women and men now use 
surrogacy to procreate without a partner. This new type of family, referred to as ‘single 
parenthood by choice’, is discussed using case law,28 literature29 and empirical work. 
The motivations of ‘single parents by choice’, and whether the law has accommodated 
this emerging family form, are explored. The discussion provides the context for the 
second section, which critiques the legal response to single parent surrogacy families 
using two related judgments: ‘Re Z’ and ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’.30  The cases concerned 
                                                 
24 [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam). 
25 Ibid, [7] (Munby P). 
26 M Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
Cmnd 9314 (1984). Hereafter, ‘Warnock Report’.  At 2.11. 
27 See for e.g. parliamentary debates on the child’s ‘need for a father’ requirement in section 13 
(5) HFEA 1990, which was replaced with the child’s ‘need for supportive parenting’. See 
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-08/humanfertilisationandembryologyhl/documents.html  
(last accessed 10/01/18). 
28 B v C; ‘Re Z’; and, ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’, op cit, n9. 
29 See for example, V Jadva, S Badger, M Morrissette and S Golombok, 'Mom by Choice, Single 
by Life's Circumstances ... Findings from a Large Scale Survey of the Experiences of Single 
Mothers by Choice' (2009) 12(4) Human Fertility 175; and F Kelly, ‘Autonomous from the start: 
single mothers by choice in the Canadian legal system’, 24 Child and Family Law Quarterly, 257 
2012, p257. 
30Op cit, n9. 
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a single father who challenged the exclusion of single parents in section 54 HFEA 
2008. In respect of the first, Munby P’s reasoning for not ‘reading down’ the two-
person requirement in that case is questioned, and it is asked whether the judicial 
response to the section 54 relationship provisions betrays a preference to the two-
parent model. The implications of the second judgment, ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’, where a 
declaration of incompatibility was issued, are then explored. The acceptance of single 
parenthood in some contexts (e.g. In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) and adoption), but not 
surrogacy, is also challenged as a form of discrimination.31 
After exploring the human rights implications of the single parent exclusion, the next 
section questions whether the enduring family relationship requirement in section 
54(2)(c) HFEA 2008 also violates Articles 8 and 14.32 This issue has been overlooked 
by the judiciary, commentators and policy-makers. Nevertheless, the provision has 
serious implications for less conventional intended parents, including co-parents. This 
section focuses in particular on the court’s interpretation of the ‘enduring family 
relationship’ threshold in Re F and M33 and Re X (Surrogacy Time Limit).34 It is 
considered whether a conjugal sexual relationship is at the heart of the court’s 
interpretation of the provision and whether this could severely restrict less 
conventional families, including co-parents who want to have a child together but are 
not in a ‘relationship’, and extended kinship relationships such as single parents who 
have the support of their parents, siblings or older children.35 In light of the potential 
human rights violations of the relationship provisions in section 54(2) HFEA 2008, 
this chapter critically reflects upon whether a more inclusive definition of parenthood 
and family is achievable.  
                                                 
31 Section 51 Adoption and Children Act 2002 clarifies that single people can adopt. Single women 
are also allowed access to IVF which has been made easier following the removal of section 13 
(5) HFEA 1990 from the 2008 Statute.  
32 Articles 8 and 14 ECHR respectively.  
33 (Children) (Thai Surrogacy) (Enduring Family Relationship) [2016] EWHC 1594 (Fam). 
Hereafter ‘Re F and M’. 
34  Op cit, n24. 
35 See for instance B v C, op cit, n9, where the single intended father’s mother was the surrogate 
for his child. 
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2.2 The Rise of Single Parents by Choice: What are the Human Rights 
Implications of the Two-Parent Requirement?  
In 1984, the majority of the Warnock Committee objected to surrogacy and stated that 
‘even in compelling medical circumstances the danger of exploitation of one human 
being by another appears to the majority of us far to outweigh the potential benefits, 
in almost every case’.36 Moreover, even the minority believed there were only ‘rare 
occasions when surrogacy could be beneficial to couples as a last resort’.37 The Report 
explicitly favoured a two-parent model of the family: 
‘The interests of the child dictate that it should be born into a home where there is a 
loving, stable, heterosexual relationship and that, therefore, the deliberate creation of 
a child for a woman who is not a partner in such a relationship is morally wrong’.38  
For the Warnock Committee, only the two-parent model was capable of providing the 
child with a loving and stable home.39 Warnock acknowledged that there was a group 
of same sex men who were aware of ‘the potential of surrogacy for providing a single 
man with a child that is genetically his’.40 The Warnock Committee rejected the use of 
surrogacy and ARTs in this way and argued that ‘as a general rule it is better for 
children to be born into a two-parent family, with both father and mother’.41 This 
reflects Fineman’s definition of the ‘sexual family’ which consists of a married 
heterosexual couple and their genetically related offspring.42 A number of social and 
legal changes have created greater acceptance of single parent families. Firstly, as 
Dewar argues, marriage has now been ‘displaced as the central concept linking law to 
                                                 
36 The Warnock Report, op cit, n26,8.17. 
37 Ibid, ‘Expression of Dissent: A. Surrogacy’, p87. 
38Ibid, 2.9. 
39 This was challenged at the time by S Golombok and J Rust ‘The Warnock Report and single 
women: what about the children?’ Journal of medical ethics, 1986, 12, 182-186. The authors did 
not ‘foresee special problems for children brought up in’ single parent families (p185). The 
children’s rights implications of the ‘relationship provisions’ are examined in the next chapter. 
40 The Warnock Report, op cit, n26, 2.10. 
41 Ibid, 2.11, p11. 
42 M. Fineman, op cit, n1, 143. 
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families’43 and instead, other concepts such as cohabitation or parenthood have 
grown.44 Separation and / or divorce has also created ‘a social environment in which 
single mothering is common and somewhat accepted’.45 Secondly, the mainstreaming 
of ARTs, ‘and the relatively recent willingness of fertility clinics to provide services 
to single women, have all enabled single women to become mothers without the direct 
involvement of a male sexual partner.’46 The Warnock Committee’s promotion of the 
sexual family, to the exclusion of all others, is out of sync with these progressive 
changes.  
(I) Single Parenthood by Choice 
Single parenthood by choice, as distinct from single parenthood as a result of divorce 
or separation, has also become more acceptable. Research has largely focused on 
single mothers by choice (SMC),47 which looks at ‘women who make a conscious 
decision to have and raise a child without a male partner’.48 The main example is single 
women who decide to use IVF and donor sperm to conceive and raise a child alone. 
Unlike divorced or unmarried single mothers, SMC (i.e. those using ARTs) make an 
active decision to parent alone.49 This became possible in 2008 after the ‘child’s need 
for a father’ requirement was controversially removed from section 13(5) of the HFEA 
1990 and replaced with a requirement to consider the child’s need for ‘supportive 
parenting’.50 This gave more rights to single women and lesbian couples, who can now 
                                                 
43 J Dewar, ‘Family Law and Its Discontents’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 
14, (2000), 59-85, p61. 
44 Ibid. 
45 F Kelly, op cit, n29, p262. 
46  Ibid. 
47Op cit, n29. 
48E Sutherland, ‘'Man not included' - single women, female couples and procreative freedom in 
the UK', Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 15, No 2, 2003, p160. 
49 S Golombok, S Zadeh, and S Imrie, v Smith, T Freeman, ‘Single Mothers by Choice: Mother–
Child Relationships and Children’s Psychological Adjustment’, Journal of Family Psychology, 
2016, Vol. 30, No. 4, 409–418, p410. 
50 The HFEA 2008 deleted the ‘child’s need for a father’ requirement and replaced it with the 
‘child’s need for supportive parenting’. ‘Supportive parenting’ is defined by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s Code of Practice (8th edition) in the following terms at 
para 8.11: ‘Supportive parenting is a commitment to the health, well being and development of the 
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more easily undergo fertility treatment without the need for a male partner.51 SMC 
also choose surrogacy. During empirical work for this thesis, one single intended 
mother, Gemma,52 was interviewed about her experiences with surrogacy. At the time 
of the interview, the surrogate, Sinead, was eight months pregnant and Gemma was 
excited about the prospect of becoming a new mother. However, this excitement was 
also tinged with disappointment at the fact Gemma would not be able to apply for a 
parental order. She said, ‘I don’t think single people should be discriminated against’ 
and hoped the law would change. It is discriminatory that single parents by choice are 
excluded from legislation; they deserve a legal framework that reflects their 
procreative decision to parent alone. 
Aside from SMC, surrogacy presents an additional form of single parenthood by 
choice, which was rejected by the Warnock Report. It allows single men to create 
genetically related offspring with the help of a surrogate and egg donor. Single fathers 
by choice are described by Carone as ‘heterosexual or gay men who actively choose 
to parent alone through adoption or, increasingly, surrogacy and egg donation.’53 In 
the past, single fathers have been treated with suspicion by the law. When the 
Government debated the Adoption Act 1926, an amendment to remove the clause 
prohibiting sole male applicants from adopting female infants was withdrawn. 
Keating notes that the Bill’s proposer, Sir Robert Newman, was outraged at the Bill’s 
assumption: 
‘that the ordinary man who wants to adopt a child must necessarily do so for improper 
reasons … Why a man, because he happens to be a bachelor or a widower, should be 
                                                 
child. It is presumed that all prospective parents will be supportive parents, in the absence of any 
reasonable cause for concern that any child who may be born, or any other child, may be at risk of 
significant harm or neglect. Where centres have concern as to whether this commitment exists, 
they may wish to take account of wider family and social networks within which the child will be 
raised.’ Available at, < https://www.hfea.gov.uk/media/2062/2017-10-02-code-of-practice-8th-
edition-full-version-11th-revision-final-clean.pdf>  (Last accessed 22/08/18). 
51 See J McCandless and S Sheldon. 2010. ‘‘No Father Required’? The Welfare Assessment in the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008)’ Feminist Legal Studies 18(3) 201-225. 
52 Interview 06IM, recorded on 11/07/16 (interview on file with the author). 
53 N Carone, R Baiocco and V Lingiardi, ‘Single fathers by choice using surrogacy: why men 
decide to have a child as a single parent’, Human Reproduction, Vol.32, No.9 pp. 1871–1879, 
2017.  
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assumed to be an unfit person or not to have a proper reason for wishing to adopt a 
female child, I cannot understand.’54 
This attitude is also evident in Baroness Warnock’s objection to single, gay men using 
surrogacy: 
‘We were told of a group of single, mainly homosexual, men … campaigning for the 
right to bring up a child. Their primary aim at present is to obtain … equal rights in 
the adoption field, but they are also well aware of the potential of surrogacy for 
providing a single man with a child that is genetically his… we believe that as a 
general rule it is better for children to be born into a two-parent family, with both 
father and mother although we recognise that it is impossible to predict with any 
certainty how lasting such a relationship will be.’55 
Despite providing no evidence whatsoever as to why, or how, single homosexual men 
using surrogacy would harm children, the HFEA 1990 was clearly influenced by 
Warnock’s suggestion and limited surrogacy to heterosexual married couples. 
Although the HFEA 2008 extended parental orders to those in civil partnerships and 
enduring family relationships, it chose to ignore the single men and women opting to 
use surrogacy. It is possible that men are particularly discriminated by the single 
parent exclusion in section 54 HFEA 2008 because single women can use IVF, 
providing they can carry a pregnancy to term, whereas single men are always 
dependent upon a surrogate to carry the child.  
Unlike SMC, little research has been carried out to explore single fathers by choice,56 
or the barriers they encounter when using surrogacy. Carone’s study recruited 28 
single fathers by choice to investigate the parent–child relationship and the child’s 
adjustment when the child was 3–8 years old. A further five single father surrogacy 
families with younger children (aged 9–30 months) were included, resulting in a total 
of 33 single fathers. All the fathers resided in Italy. The study is ‘the first to explore 
                                                 
54 J Keating, A Child for Keeps: The History of Adoption in England, 1918-45, ‘Legislation Takes 
Shape’, p111 Ch 4, (2009) (Palgrave Macmillan). 
55 The Warnock Report, op cit, n26, 2.10-2.11. 
56 K M Johnson (2017) ‘Single, straight, wants kids: media framing of single, heterosexual 
fatherhood via assisted reproduction’, Journal of Gender Studies, 26:4, 387-401, DOI: 
10.1080/09589236.2015.1108840. 
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the experiences and decisions of single men who actively choose to parent alone and 
build their family using surrogacy and egg donation’.57 It revealed that single fathers 
by choice ‘tell a similar story to that of single mothers who use donor insemination 
to conceive;’58 single fathers by choice are also well educated and financially secure 
in professional occupations. Moreover, their decision to have a child without a partner 
was ‘complex and carefully considered, and one that was taken following discussion 
with family, friends, health practitioners and other single fathers’.59The study 
identified that the main reasons for deciding to become a single father by choice 
included: ‘no longer wanting to wait for the right relationship’, a desire to have a 
genetic child, and career and financial stability.60 It is outdated and discriminatory, 
that this group of prospective parents are ignored by the HFEA 2008.61 
The motivations of Italian single fathers by choice identified by Carone et al., also 
correspond with the story of Ian Mucklejohn. In February 2001, Mr Mucklejohn, then 
54, became the first known single man in the UK to have genetic children 
by surrogacy. Here he explains his reasoning for founding his family via this route:  
“I hadn’t found someone to spend the rest of my life with, nor was I arrogant enough 
to assume there was somebody who’d wish to spend their lives with me,’ he says. ‘But 
I’d always wanted a family, as far back as I can remember.”62  
Mr Mucklejohn found an American egg donor and a surrogate to carry the triplets to 
term in the US. It was only later when he returned to the UK and sought to have his 
relationship as the child’s father legally recognised, he ran into difficulty due to the 
provisions in the HFEA 1990. The choice to become a single parent is not unique to 
the UK, with single fathers using surrogacy to have genetically related offspring in 
                                                 
57 N Carone et al., op cit, n53, p1877 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60Ibid, p1876. 
61 See B v C; ‘Re Z’; and ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’, op cit, n9. 
62 The Telegraph, 19th June 2016, ‘The UK's first male surrogate on life as a single dad of tearaway 
teen triplets’, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/fatherhood/the-uks-first-male-
surrogate-on-life-as-a-single-dad-of-tearaway/ (last accessed 24/05/17). 
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India,63 the US64 and as Carone et al’s study demonstrates, Italy. Despite the rise of 
single parents by choice, the HFEA 2008 has not been revised to accommodate single 
parent surrogacy families in the UK. This is contrary to the Grand Chamber’s decision 
in EB,65 which clarified that the right to become a parent should not depend on one’s 
sexual status. In EB the applicant’s status concerned sexual orientation but there is no 
reason why EB would not apply to other statuses, including relationship status.66  As 
such, the relationship provisions in section 54 HFEA 2008 are inconsistent with the 
parenting rights developed by Strasbourg.  
A more recent example of the discrimination faced by single intended fathers using 
surrogacy is evident in the judgment, B v C.67 The resulting child, A, was conceived 
using a donor egg and B's sperm, following transfer of the embryo to C, who carried 
A until full term.68 The gestational surrogate (C) was the intended father’s mother. C's 
husband, D, fully supported the arrangement.69 C agreed to undertake this role when 
another maternal relation, who had offered to be a surrogate for B, had to withdraw 
prior to any treatment, due to her own medical position.70 Under the HFEA 2008 
provisions, C and D were the legal parents of A.71 Unable to apply for a parental order, 
B decided to make an adoption application instead, which was made with the full 
support of C and D.72 Theis J stated that, ‘An adoption order will provide the legal 
security to A's relationship with B, which will undoubtedly meet A's long term welfare 
needs.’ However, Theis J’s conclusion in B v C calls into question the same judge's 
                                                 
63 The Indian Express, June 6th 2017, ‘Pursuit of Happiness’, <  
http://indianexpress.com/article/entertainment/ pursuit-of-happiness-8-4690650/> (accessed 
11/06/17).  
64The Guardian, 2nd November 2013, ‘Why Men Decide to Become Single Dads’, 
https://www.theguardian.com /lifeandstyle/2013/nov/02/men-single-dad-father-surrogacy-
adoption (last accessed 11/06/17). 
65 E.B. v. France (no. 43546/02). 22 January 2008 (Grand Chamber). 
66 In ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’, op cit n9, it was held that being single was a status for the purposes of 
the Convention. The judgment is looked at shortly. 
67 Op cit, n9. 
68 [12] (Theis J). 
69 [2] (Theis J). 
70 [2] (Theis J). 
71 [6] (Theis J). 
72 [6] (Theis J). 
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reasoning in A v P (Surrogacy: Parental order: Death of Applicant),73 that adoption 
would not be a satisfactory solution for a surrogacy-conceived child. Firstly, further 
consents would be required from the surrogate parents (s19 Adoption and Children 
Act 2002) or their consent would need to be dispensed with (s 20 ACA 2002).74 
Secondly, an order from the High Court would be required to authorise the placement, 
because the child will not have been placed for adoption by an adoption agency.75 
Thirdly, there are implications for the birth certificate and adoption register certificate 
that can distort the child’s relationships with his / her parents.76 Applying for an 
adoption order is, therefore, more onerous for the intended parent(s) than seeking a 
parental order. In A v P, Theis J reiterated again that ‘no other order, or combination 
of orders, would have the same transformative legal effect as a parental order’77 so it 
is questionable why she accepted it uncritically in B v C. 
One possible explanation is that the parental order granted in A v P protected the two-
parent model. By contrast, in B v C, which concerned single parenthood, the court 
settled for an adoption order instead. An adoption order does not present an adequate 
solution in terms of B’s right to a private and family life (Article 8 ECHR) and his 
right to non-discrimination (Article 14 ECHR) because it distorts the reality that he 
is the child’s biological father. It is recalled that Munby P stated in Re X78 that 
requiring the applicant(s) to seek an adoption order instead of a parental order would 
create ‘immense and irremediable prejudice’79 and that adoption ‘is not an attractive 
solution given the commissioning father’s existing biological relationship with X’.80 
The adoption order in B v C similarly fails to recognise B’s genetic relationship with 
his son, thus placing the parent and child in a position of ‘immense and irremediable 
prejudice’,81 as compared to a surrogacy family consisting of two parents. Instead of 
                                                 
73 [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam). 
74 [7] (Theis J). 
75 [7] (Theis J). 
76 [7] (Theis J). 
77 [29] (Theis J). 
78 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time limit), op cit, n24. 
79 Ibid, [65] (Munby P). 
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81 Ibid, [65] (Munby P). 
41 
 
rewarding the thoughtful consideration B undertook before making the decision to 
become a single parent by choice,82 the HFEA 2008 punished him for not conforming 
to the two-parent model. In 2015, the Report of the Surrogacy UK Working Group 
on Surrogacy Law Reform called for parental orders to be extended to single 
parents.83 This report was endorsed by Lady Warnock, which suggests that her views 
on parenthood have evolved since 1984.84 The following sub-sections discuss two 
important judgments85 where a single father used the ECHR to challenge the two-
parent requirement in the HFEA 2008, and considers what this means for the 
procreative rights of single parents using surrogacy.  
2.3 Is the Single Parent Exclusion Compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights? 
 (I) Re Z (a Child): A Preference to the Two-Parent Model?  
‘Re Z’ and ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’86 concerned the right to apply for a parental order and 
acquire legal parenthood. In the first judgment, heard in 2015, the legal issue was 
whether it was open to the court to make a parental order on the application of one 
person, despite section 54(1) of the HFEA 2008 providing that the legislation requires 
a parental order to be made by two people.87 A parental order is important because it 
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85 ‘Re Z’ and ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’, op cit, n9. 
86 Ibid. 
87 [8] (Munby P). 
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allows the intended parents to acquire parental responsibility and legal parenthood. 88 
The parental order also fully extinguishes the parental status of the surrogate under 
English law.89  
The child concerned was Z, who was born in August 2014 in the State of Minnesota 
in the US. Z was conceived with the applicant father's sperm and a donor's egg which 
was implanted in an unmarried American surrogate.90 Following Z’s birth, the father 
obtained a declaratory judgment from the appropriate court in Minnesota, relieving 
the surrogate of any legal rights or responsibilities for Z and establishing the father's 
sole parentage of Z; following that court order he was registered as the child’s father 
in Minnesota.91 The father returned to the UK with Z. However, under UK law the 
surrogate was the child’s legal mother by virtue of section 33 of the HFEA 2008.92 
The current law, which recognised the surrogate as the child’s legal mother, severely 
undermined the procreative intentions of those involved; it had always been the 
surrogate’s and intended father’s intention for the latter to raise the child. Whatever 
the father’s legal rights had been in Minnesota, he did not have parental responsibility 
for Z in the UK because he was unable to apply for a parental order as a single person.93 
The child’s position was secured by making him a ward of court.94 
In Re Z, Munby P had to consider whether section 54(1) could be ‘read down’ in 
accordance with section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to enable a single father 
to apply for a parental order.95 Munby P recalled that: 
‘There are only two possible routes by which the court can secure the permanent 
transfer in this country of parental responsibility from the surrogate mother to the 
father: by means of a parental order in accordance with section 54 of the 2008 Act; or 
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93 [3] (Munby P). 
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by means of an adoption order in accordance with section 46 of the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002’.96  
It was stated that, ‘for reasons that are well understood and apparent from a number 
of authorities … the father would very much prefer to be able to obtain a parental 
order’.97 The most persuasive reason is that a parental order, rather than an adoption 
order, reflects the child’s ‘psychological, legal and biological reality’.98  The father 
argued that ‘the exclusion of single parents from applying for a parental order is a 
discriminatory interference with a single person's rights to a private and family life, 
which is inconsistent with Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention’.99 Article 8 ECHR sets 
out the right to respect for a private and family life, whilst Article 14 ECHR sets out 
the right to non-discrimination in respect of another Convention right. The father 
submitted that being single (in contrast to being one of a couple) is a ‘status’ within 
Article 14 of the ECHR.100 This argument relied on analysis from In re G (Adoption: 
Unmarried Couple).101 That case concerned Article 14 of the Adoption (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1987, which provided that an adoption order could only be made on the 
application of more than one person if the applicants were a married 
couple.  Reversing the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the House of Lords declared that 
it was unlawful for the Family Division of the High Court of Justice in Northern 
Ireland to reject the appellants as prospective adoptive parents on the ground only that 
they were not married. The House of Lords held that being unmarried was a status for 
the purposes of Article 14 ECHR102 and that the appellants were ‘being discriminated 
against by being denied the eligibility that the law gives to married couples’.103  
By analogy, it is suggested that single parents by choice, who are denied the 
opportunity given to couples, are also discriminated against on the basis of their 
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relationship status. The father argued that there was no incompatibility between the 
provision requiring two people to apply for an order and his convention rights, 
(Articles 8 and 14), because the relevant provisions in section 54 could be ‘read down’ 
by the court in accordance with section 3(1) of the 1998 Act.104 The provision states 
that, ‘so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
rights’. However, after analysing the key authority on section 3 HRA 1998, the House 
of Lords judgment in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,105 Munby P found that to read down 
the two-person requirement in a way that would be compatible with the father’s 
convention rights would exceed the permissible boundaries. In his view, ‘the two 
people requirement was a clear and prominent feature of the legislation throughout’.106 
He found that whilst contemporary and long-established adoption law allowed single 
people to adopt, ‘section 30 HFEA 1990 contained no provision for a parental order 
to be made in favour of one person’.107  
It is suggested that Munby P’s reasons for not reading down the two-person 
requirement are unconvincing, when viewed alongside other cases where section 54 
HFEA has been interpreted flexibly. For example, in Re DM and LK,108 a parental 
order was awarded not-withstanding the fact that the applicants did not live together. 
Following the birth, the child had been in the full-time care of her mother. DM, the 
father, had spent as much time as he could with LK and his daughter, but had 
responsibilities for his own children.109 Since both LK and DM intended to live 
together full time, once their respective responsibilities allowed this, the court was 
satisfied that LK and DM were ‘two persons who are living as partners in an enduring 
family relationship’, thus satisfying section 54(2)(c). It was submitted on behalf of the 
applicants, that LK and DM have: 
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107 [13] (Munby P). 
108 [2016] EWHC 270 (Fam). 
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‘been in a relationship for over 2 years, they have introduced their respective families 
to each other and live together as a couple as much as their respective child and work 
commitments permit this to happen. Their intention is to live together in the future, 
when their family circumstances allow…There was a brief separation in July 2015; 
this is explained in their statements.’110 
Although this finding respects the diversification of family forms, including parents 
who do not cohabit, the underlying policy behind LK and DM seems to be to protect 
the future two-parent model. The court’s emphasis on the couple’s intention to live 
together suggests that a family who intends to cohabit are more deserving of a parental 
order than a single person who is just as committed to their child.  
A preference towards the two-parent family appears again in A and B (No 2 – Parental 
Order),111 where Theis J made a parental order in favour of the intended parents who 
were married but separated. One of the intended parents had even obtained a non-
molestation order against the other. Theis J held that the children had homes with each 
parent, and although they had separated, the parents remain married. The fact that the 
courts decided to award a parental order in these circumstances, indicates a preference 
towards a married two-parent family model, even where the adult relationship is 
problematic. If a parental order can be awarded to a separated couple whose 
relationship has involved domestic violence, then surely Munby P could have awarded 
the same order to the child in Re Z, where the CAFCASS Legal team, on behalf of the 
child, encouraged an order to be made. It is argued that the decision not to award the 
order to the single father in Re Z was contrary to the best interests of the child and the 
Parental Order Regulations 2010,112 which require the court’s ‘paramount’ concern, 
when deciding whether to make a parental order, to be the child’s welfare.  
The preference to the two-parent family, is also evidenced by the judiciary’s approach 
to other provisions in section 54, which have been consistently stretched, particularly 
following the Parental Order Regulations 2010. In Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time 
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Limit),113 Munby P made a parental order for a child who was almost 3 years old, 
notwithstanding the ‘explicit and unambiguous rule’114 in section 54(3) of the HFEA 
2008 that ‘the applicant must apply for the order during the period of 6 months 
beginning with the day on which the child is born’. It was held that Parliament could 
not have ‘intended that the gate should be barred forever if the application for a 
parental order is lodged even one day late,’115 and it followed, that the word ‘must’ 
should be interpreted purposively in such a way that furthers the child’s welfare.116 
Munby P dismissed adoption as ‘not an attractive solution given the commissioning 
father’s existing biological relationship with X’.117 McK Norrie observes that Munby 
P stretched the time limit condition so far that ‘it effectively leaves the provision 
meaningless… To hold that ‘must’ means ‘may’ means that ‘must’ means nothing at 
all’.118Accordingly, if Munby P was able to read the 6 month time limit condition in 
section 54(3) in a way that rendered it ‘meaningless’, to protect the child’s welfare, 
then the two person requirement should also have been interpreted purposively to 
further the welfare of children with single parents. This creates the impression that the 
judiciary are willing to utilise child-welfare concerns in cases that protect the two-
parent family, but not where single parents are involved. 
(II) Z (A Child) (No. 2): Declaration of Incompatibility and New 
Developments? 
In ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’119 the father returned to the High Court, this time seeking a 
declaration of incompatibility in accordance with section 4 of the HRA 1998 Act. The 
Secretary of State conceded that there was a difference in treatment between a single 
person entering into a lawful surrogacy arrangement, and a couple entering the same 
                                                 
113 Op cit, n24. 
114 K Mck Norrie, ‘English and Scottish adoption orders and British parental orders after surrogacy: 
welfare, competence and judicial legislation’, [2017] Child and Family Law Quarterly, Volume 
29 (1), p2. 
115 [55] (Munby P). 
116 K Mck Norrie, op cit, n114, p2. 
117 [7] (Munby P). 
118 K Mck Norrie, op cit, n114, p5. 
119 Op cit, n9. 
47 
 
arrangement, on the sole ground of the single person’s relationship status,120 which 
can no longer be justified within the meaning of Article 14.121 All three parties, the 
father, Z and the Secretary of State, invited the court to make a declaration of 
incompatibility pursuant to section 4(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) in the 
following terms:  
‘… Sections 54(1) and (2) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 are 
incompatible with the rights … under Article 14 ECHR taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 insofar as they prevent the Applicant from obtaining a parental order on the 
sole ground of his status as a single person as opposed to being part of a couple.’122 
The High Court agreed with the ‘narrow footing’ on which the Secretary of State 
proceeded.123 The single parent exclusion was incompatible with Article 8, taken in 
conjunction with Article 14, and a declaration of incompatibility was made.  
The disadvantage (as opposed to reading down the provision) is that ‘a declaration 
leaves the offending provision intact and of continuing validity’.124 Until reforms are 
undertaken, single people are still unable to apply for a parental order which means 
their rights to Articles 8 and 14 ECHR remain compromised. In a subsequent case, Re 
A (Foreign Surrogacy - Parental Responsibility),125 the single intended father found 
himself in the exact predicament as the father in Re Z. He was unable to apply for a 
parental order because of his relationship status as a single man. The court stated that: 
‘Such an order, if it were available, would provide greater legal security and stability 
for A, as it would extinguish the parental status and parental responsibility of the 
Respondent and lead to the issue of a British birth certificate, which arguably better 
reflects the reality of A’s family situation...’126 
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The single father considered making an application to adopt but decided not to, given 
that the child was born through an international commercial surrogacy arrangement. 
Such an application could ‘create complications in respect of criminal restrictions in 
the Adoption and Children Act 2002 concerning payments (s 95 ACA 2002) and the 
bringing of a child into the UK for the purposes of adoption (s 83 ACA 2002)’.127 
Moreover, the single father considered it inappropriate to adopt a child who is his own 
biological child,128 something previously acknowledged by Munby P in Re X, the case 
concerning the six month time limit.129 
The only option for the father to acquire parental responsibility was to apply for a 
Child Arrangements Order under section 12 of the Children Act 1989 (CA 1989). The 
court held that it was clearly in the child’s interests for the father to have parental 
responsibility, ‘so that he is able to take all steps that are necessary to be able to meet 
the day to day welfare needs of A. It also provides clarity in relation to his legal status 
and position in relation to A’.130 The court granted the application having been entirely 
satisfied that A’s welfare needs will be met by making the Child Arrangements 
Order.131 However, unlike a parental order, a child arrangements order does not 
permanently reassign parenthood. Instead, it determines who the child is to live with, 
spend time or otherwise have contact,132 and where a child is to live, spend time or 
otherwise have contact with any person.133  A Child Arrangements Order lasts until 
the child is 16,134 or 18 where stated in the court order. Ultimately, it is no substitute 
for a parental order, which is the most appropriate legal order for surrogacy-conceived 
children.  
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In November 2017, the Department of Health laid a remedial order in Parliament for 
scrutiny.135 The Draft Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (Remedial) 
Order 2018 inserts section 54A, which allows one applicant to make a parental order. 
The purpose of the Remedial Order is to remedy the incompatibility of section 54 of 
the HFEA 2008 with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. It is contended that the changes 
introduced by Section 54A of the Remedial Order cause further discrimination in 
relation to Article 8 ECHR and repeat the mistakes of the current legislative regime 
by focusing on adult relationships, rather than the parent’s relationship with his / her 
child. Section 54A(2) of the Remedial Order states that at the time of the parental order 
application the single applicant must not be ‘married or a civil partner’,136 or ‘living 
as the partner of another person in an enduring family relationship’.137 The single 
applicant can be married or in a civil partnership if the court is satisfied that ‘the 
applicant’s spouse or civil partner cannot be found’,138 ‘the spouses or civil partners 
have separated and are living apart and the separation is likely to be permanent’,139 or 
by reason of physical or mental ill-health ‘the applicant’s spouse or civil partner is … 
incapable of making an application with the applicant for an order under section 54.’140 
The Government has not explained why it is necessary for a single applicant to prove 
their separation is permanent and as such, the remedial provision risks dictating what 
forms of family are acceptable. 
Furthermore, as noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the government has 
not explained why a single applicant must prove they are not in an enduring family 
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relationship to have their ‘biological relationship with their child legally recognised 
under the HFEA’.141 It is unclear why it is necessary to: 
‘require a single parent’s partner with no biological relationship to the child (and no 
desire to be recognised as such a parent) to be recognised as that child’s parent merely 
in order for the biological parent to be recognised.’142 
Parents in an enduring family relationship may have valid reasons for not wanting both 
partners on the order ‘such as the fact a relationship is relatively new, or going through 
a rough patch’.143  By stopping single intended parents with a biological link to their 
child from applying for a parental order because they happen to be in a relationship or 
cannot prove their separation is permanent, risks making a distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate families, something the ECtHR deemed inconsistent with 
Article 8 ECHR many years ago in Marckx v Belgium.144 Section 54A discriminates 
against surrogacy families, because the same barriers to legal recognition of the 
relationship between a biological parent and child would not exist for families who 
conceive naturally. The HFEA 2008 must break away from focusing on the parent’s 
relationship with other adults and start recognising and supporting the intended 
parent’s relationship with their child. Although section 54A seems like a positive step 
towards allowing single people to apply for a parental order, it is discriminatory in its 
current form. The HFEA 2008 should allow single people to apply for a parental order 
without interrogating them about whether they are ‘single enough’.   
(III) Single Parenthood, IVF and Adoption: Why should Surrogacy be 
the ‘Odd One Out’? 
The limited procreative choices of single intended parents using surrogacy is 
discriminatory when compared to other areas of single parenthood. When clause 54 of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill was debated in the House of Commons 
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on 12 June 2008, an amendment that would have allowed single parents to apply for a 
parental order was withdrawn. Dawn Primarolo, MP, suggested that because 
surrogacy is such a sensitive issue, the HFEA Bill does not extend parental orders to 
single people. She stated that this: 
‘ … recognises the magnitude of a situation in which a person becomes pregnant with 
the express intention of handing the child over to someone else, and the responsibility 
that that places on the people who will receive the child. There is an argument, which 
the Government have acknowledged in the Bill, that such a responsibility is likely to 
be better handled by a couple than a single man or woman.’145 
Although surrogacy undoubtedly raises sensitive issues, no research has been carried 
out to support the claim that two intended parents are required to cope with the 
demands of surrogacy. Moreover, the government’s position is inconsistent with its 
position on allowing single women to access IVF. As McCandless has observed: 
‘…it is hard to reconcile this with the Government’s determination not to discriminate 
against single-parent families, as evidenced by their earlier rejection … that the words, 
‘the child’s need for a father’ should be replaced by ‘the child’s need for a second 
parent’.146  
It is discriminatory for a single parent family to be considered an appropriate family 
structure in some contexts but not others, and it is unclear whether this differentiation 
relates to ‘uncertainty about the acceptability of surrogacy as a reproductive technique, 
or the creation of families with only one parent.’147  
On the one hand, the problem seems to be with surrogacy rather than single parenthood 
per se, especially as single parenthood is allowed in the context of IVF148 and 
                                                 
145 HC Debs, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill Committee, Col 248-249 (12 June 2008), 
Dawn Primarolo, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmpublic/human/080612/am/80612s02.ht
m> (last accessed 02/01/17).   
146 J McCandless, ‘The Role of Sexual Partnership in UK Family Law: the Case of Legal 
Parenthood’, chapter 3, p23 in Families- Beyond the Nuclear Ideal (ed D Cutas and S Chan), 
Bloomsbury (2012).  
147 Ibid, p24. 
148 It is acknowledged that the supportive parenting requirement is another attempt to promote the 
two-parent model. 
52 
 
adoption. In Re Z (A Child),149 the single father argued that distinguishing between 
surrogacy and adoption based on the notion that the latter involves more complex and 
sensitive features is an ‘artificial, disproportionate and discriminatory interference 
between adoption and surrogacy’.150 The ‘complex’ and ‘sensitive’ features of 
adoption, ‘are not regarded as a bar to single people adopting,’151 so they should not 
be regarded as a bar to single people using surrogacy either. It is suggested that just as 
many, if not more, sensitive issues arise from adoption, especially since some adopted 
children experience non-optimal childhood environments pre-adoption. In England 
and Wales, over 60% of children who go into care are looked after due to abuse and 
neglect.152 Although the vast majority of children who enter the public care system in 
the UK are afforded protection and most receive good care: 
‘A significant minority experience further harm at the hands of their caregivers. Abuse 
and neglect arise in both residential and foster care. It may occur in any type of 
placement at any time... 153  
The implications of this abuse and / or neglect for these children are not barriers to 
single people adopting.154 During the year ending 31 March 2016, 11% of adopted 
children (500) were adopted by single adopters.155  If single people are trusted to deal 
with the magnitude of adopting a child who may have come from a background of 
abuse or neglect, then single intended parents, like the father in B v C who plan to have 
a child, should be allowed to acquire a parental order.  
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It is acknowledged that with adoption, single parenthood might seem more acceptable, 
or the ‘lesser of two evils’, because it is better to give a child a permanent stable home 
with a single parent, than keep them in care. By contrast, surrogacy is about planning 
a child that has not yet come into existence. Unlike the adoption context, there is an 
opportunity to promote the best possible conditions for raising that child, which is 
viewed by the government as a two-parent family. However, this distinction fails 
because the law allows single parent surrogacy arrangements to be made in the first 
place, but then limits opportunities to nurture that family bond and fully integrate the 
child with the intended parent following its birth.  
In addition to the government’s differential treatment of single parenthood in adoption 
and surrogacy, a further artificial distinction was made with IVF. Primarolo suggested 
that: 
‘IVF involves a woman becoming pregnant herself and giving birth to her child – 
there is not a direct parallel. Surrogacy, however, involves agreeing to hand over a 
child even before conception. The Government are still of the view that the magnitude 
of that means that it is best dealt with by a couple …’156 
This quote reveals a worrying inference that the absence of a gestational tie between 
the intended parent and child, somehow means the intended parent(s) is not the child’s 
‘real’ parent, and thus two parents are required to compensate for the absence of a 
gestational tie. Studies by Golombok, carried out when the child was one,157 two158 
and three,159 indicated that the absence of a gestational link does not affect 
psychological adjustment or mother-child relationships. The government’s inference 
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that one parent will not provide enough love or stability for a surrogacy-conceived 
child, is yet another attempt to re-inscribe the two-parent model as the only 
environment to have children. This discriminates between the Article 8 right of single 
parent families formed from natural reproduction, adoption and IVF (who are granted 
legal parenthood and / parental responsibility) and the Article 8 right of single parent 
families created through surrogacy, who are denied a parental order. Considering the 
human rights violations with the single parent exclusion, and the unjustified 
differential treatment between single parent surrogacy, adoption and IVF, it is 
suggested that policy-makers should act quickly to remove the two-person 
requirement from the HFEA 2008. 
2.4 The ‘Enduring Family Relationship’ Requirement and the ‘Sexual 
Family’? 
A second ‘relationship provision’ - ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold – has gone 
uncriticised by academic commentators and the judiciary, who have tended to focus 
solely on the ‘two-person’ requirement for those seeking a parental order. While In 
the Matter of Z may provide a catalyst for reforms that allow single people to apply 
for a parental order,160 the judgment completely overlooked the ‘enduring family 
relationship’ requirement in section 54(2)(c) HFEA 2008. As aforementioned, on 1 
December 2017, a draft remedial order was sent to Parliament to change the law on 
surrogacy for single parents. However, it remains extremely unclear as to whether 
reforms will also target the ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold.  Consequently, 
there is a risk that even if the two-person requirement is removed, the legislation will 
discriminate against couples, or multiple parents, who do not meet the enduring family 
relationship threshold. This section intends to expose the problems with this provision 
for the procreative choices of less conventional surrogacy families, including those 
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based on co-parenting agreements, wider kinship networks, and multiple parent 
families. 
(I) A Prioritisation of Conjugality over Care? 
The ‘enduring family relationship’ requirement in section 54(2)(c) of the HFEA 2008, 
is not defined by statute. In Re F and M (Children) (Thai Surrogacy) (Enduring Family 
Relationship),161 Russell J stated that: 
‘Parliament pointedly and specifically decided not to define an enduring family 
relationship in terms of its longevity … and to leave it to the High Court to test 
whether a couple are in an enduring family relationship.’162 
However, it is submitted that the case law has interpreted the enduring family 
relationship requirement in a way that requires couples to be in a sexual relationship, 
similar to marriage or civil partnership. This is problematic, because the value of a 
family should primarily reside in its caregiving functions.163 As Wood argues, ‘it is in 
the state's interest to recognize and reward relationships of care, regardless of 
conjugality, because they help individual members of society and lessen our collective 
burden.’164 In Re F and M, two intended parents made parental order applications for 
twins who were born in Thailand as a result of a commercial surrogacy agreement. 
The Parental Order Reporter (POR) expressed reservations about the relationship of 
the applicants and whether it was, in fact, an enduring family relationship as required 
by section 54(2)(c) of the HFEA 2008.165 Russell J similarly stated that ‘the only real 
concern which can legitimately be raised in respect of the intended parent’s 
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relationship is the longevity of their relationship which is presented by the word 
“enduring”’.166 Nevertheless, she found that their relationship was enduring: 
‘By the time of the hearing they had been in a relationship for nearly two years, had 
been through the treatment and conception with the respondent together and supported 
the respondent through pregnancy together, they have supported each other 
throughout her pregnancy and they have cared for F and M together as a family since 
the day they were born.’167 
It is suggested that on the face of it, this appears to constitute a liberal interpretation 
of ‘enduring family relationship’ because one of the parties had entered the surrogacy 
arrangement before meeting his partner. The length of the parent’s relationship before 
the conception was also quite short but, according to the POR’s welfare assessment, 
the children ‘are much loved and well cared for children, who demonstrated an 
attachment to both [P] and [B]…’.168 The acknowledgement that both F and M have 
cared for the twins from the day they were born promises a functional interpretation 
of family life, which focuses on the performative aspect of care-giving rather than 
family structure. Nevertheless, the judgment’s repeated emphasis on the applicant’s 
plans to marry undermines this and demonstrates that the interpretation of ‘enduring 
family relationship’ is still very much characterised by a sexual partnership169 or 
marriage-like unit.   
A similar conjugal interpretation of the ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold is also 
evident in ‘Re X’.170 Although the applicants were separated at the time the parental 
order application was issued, Munby P found that the requirement was met because 
the couple remained married, therefore satisfying section 54(2)(a) HFEA 2008. The 
question was whether the child’s ‘home’ was ‘with’ the intended parents at the time 
of the application, for the purposes of section 54(4)(a).171 Munby P held that the child 
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had his ‘home’ with both the intended parents, albeit that they lived in separate 
houses.172 Moreover, even if this finding was not right, Munby P held that the ECHR 
applied and that the HFEA 2008 should be 'read down' to achieve a finding that the 
child had his home with the intended parents.173 The judgment referred to Kroon v The 
Netherlands,174 where the Strasbourg court accepted that family life existed between 
two parents and their children, even though the parents had never married, did not 
cohabit and lived in separate houses. Accordingly, he held in the case before him, that 
there was family life within the meaning of Article 8 between the intended parents and 
the child.175 Re X demonstrates how the judiciary are prepared to stretch certain 
aspects of section 54, in this case the ‘home’ requirement, to do justice to the married 
two-parent family. The applicants had separated, so finding that they satisfied the 
statutory provision, because they were technically ‘married’, still places marriage and 
the two-parent structure at the heart of the ‘enduring family relationship’ test. In Re Z, 
Munby P could have referred to the Strasbourg jurisprudence he relied on in Re X, 
such as Marckx v Belgium176 where family life was found to exist between a child and 
his unmarried mother. However, he insisted that the two-person requirement could not 
be read down.  
The court’s definition of the ‘enduring family relationship’ in these cases, suggests 
that the couple at the heart of the family remains a sexual one. It is argued that 
legislation needs to confront the definition of ‘enduring family relationship’ and 
develop it beyond the two narrow conjugal situations in Re X and Re F and M where 
the parties were: (1) separated but still married, and (2) intended to marry. 
(II) Recognising the Choices of Platonic Co-Parents 
The current interpretation of ‘enduring family relationship’ raises concerns for less 
conventional groups of parents, who have a shared desire to parent but are not in a 
sexual ‘relationship’ or living together as partners. Co-parenting has become more 
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popular in recent years and is used by same-sex couples and heterosexual men and 
women who have not met a partner and would rather co-parent than miss the 
opportunity of parenthood completely.177 According to Jadva et al: 
‘Elective co-parenting is a relatively new phenomenon, whereby a man and a woman 
who are not married, cohabiting or involved in a sexual relationship with each other 
have a child together and typically raise the child in separate households’.178  
With the increasing use of ARTs and the role of the internet, a growing number of 
people seek co-parenting arrangements to have children, ‘in order for both biological 
parents to be involved in the child’s upbringing’.179 Until Jadva et al’s study, which 
looked at co-parents using the website ‘Pride Angel’, selective co-parenting had been 
principally associated with the gay and lesbian community. In 2013, the Guardian 
reported a story about co-parenting which involved two people who decided to have a 
child together despite not being in a sexual or romantic relationship.180 Sabrina was a 
single gay woman and Kam was a gay man in a same-sex relationship. Kam and 
Sabrina, the child’s biological parents, found each other on the internet with the sole 
intention of having a child. However, Jadva et al’s study shows that, ‘with the rise of 
co-parenting websites, increasing numbers of heterosexual men and women are 
seeking these types of parenting arrangements’.181 Approximately one-third of men 
and one half of women seeking co-parenting arrangements were heterosexual and the 
majority (68%) were single.182  
If two adults met online and decided to enter into a surrogacy arrangement and co-
parent as a platonic couple, it is unlikely they would be able to apply for a parental 
order because of the court’s conjugal interpretation of ‘enduring family relationship’. 
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A platonic couple would not be able to satisfy the factors in Re F and M, where the 
applicants lived together and planned to marry. When 53 participants (30 men and 23 
women) in Jadva’s study provided responses to the open-ended question, ‘Please 
describe how you see your relationship with the co-parent’, the most common terms 
used related to friendship.183 Given the two-parent model that underpins the HFEA 
2008, it is unlikely that the courts would interpret ‘friendship’ as satisfying section 
54(2)(c) HFEA 2008.  
Contrary to the conjugal interpretation of ‘enduring family life’ in Re F and M and Re 
X, the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 8 ECHR indicates that two adults who are not 
in an ‘enduring family relationship’ might have ‘family life’ because factors such as 
co-habiting are unnecessary. This is evident with the ECtHR’s extension of Article 8 
protection to unmarried parents in Inze v Austria,184 where the European Court held 
that ‘very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment 
on the ground of birth out of wedlock could be regarded as compatible with the 
Convention.’185 Equally, in Marckx186the Belgian Parliament was found to be in 
violation of Article 8 by refusing to establish the same automatic legal affiliation 
between an unmarried mother and her child as they did for a married mother and her 
child. In Berrehab187  the right to private and family life was held not to ‘presuppose 
permanent cohabitation’.188 Subsequently in Keegan v Ireland,189 the Court held that 
family life is not confined to marriage-based relationships and ‘there thus exists 
between the child and the parents a bond amounting to family life even if at the time 
of the child's birth the parents are no longer co-habiting or if their relationship has then 
ended’.190  Nevertheless, as Stalford has observed: 
                                                 
183 Ibid, p1903. 
184 Inze v Austria, ECHR, Judgement 28 October 1987, Series A, 126. 
185 Ibid, at 41. 
186 Op cit, n144. 
187 Berrehab and Koster v The Netherlands (1989) 11 EHRR 322. 
188 Ibid, [21]. 
189 18 EHRR 342 1994. 
190 Ibid. See also Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands Application number 00018535/91 October 
27, 1994, para 30. 
60 
 
 ‘…that is not to say however, that the ECHR represents the ‘gold standard’ in its 
approach to and interpretation of families and family life. Indeed, there is an abundant 
academic literature criticizing the limitations of the ECHR which, it is claimed, is still 
predicated on the nuclear, married, heterosexual ideal’.191 
For example, in Khan v UK192 the ECtHR confirmed that other factors that could 
constitute family life for the purpose of Article 8, include ‘the nature and duration of 
the parents’ relationship, and in particular whether they had planned to have a child; 
whether the father subsequently recognised the child as his; contributions made to the 
child’s care and upbringing; and the quality and regularity of contact.’193 It found that 
family life arose between the applicant and his baby daughter because despite not 
residing with her, he had regular contact with the child. Nevertheless, the factors in 
Khan suggest that some kind of relationship must have initially existed between the 
parties for family life to arise. As such, the ECtHR must also move away from a 
conjugal interpretation of family life to reflect the different types of family structures 
that now exist. 
Returning to the HFEA 2008, the judiciary’s conjugal interpretation of ‘enduring 
family relationship’ denies other diverse family relationships from acquiring a parental 
order. For instance, there is no reason why a single man who has a child through 
surrogacy, should not be allowed to apply for a parental order alongside his mother 
(the child’s grandmother) as in B v C.194 These kinds of collaborative parenting 
structures already occur in the context of natural reproduction: 
‘[F]or example, where a mother and father raise a child with their own daughter, who 
has become pregnant at a young age while still living at home. Many would see this 
as the ideal arrangement in which a teenage mother might raise her child and certainly 
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would not see anything wrong in her own parents taking on a substantial parenting 
role with respect to the new baby.’195 
Single parents who enter into a surrogacy arrangement and have a very supportive 
mother and father, or other relatives, might have more of an ‘enduring family 
relationship’ than many intended parents who satisfy section 54(2)(c) HFEA 2008. In 
the aforementioned case of B v C, the single father, Mr Casson, had the support of his 
mother, who had acted as the surrogate. Theis J praised the ‘close relationships within 
this family’ which would help ensure the child’s ‘lifelong welfare needs are met’.196 
As a result of his mother’s support, the single father was able to return to work after 
his son’s birth, while his mother helped out with childcare duties.197 It is argued that 
the support provided by the surrogate to her son, and grandson, amounts to just as 
much of an ‘enduring family relationship’ as the one found in Re F and M. The 
‘enduring family relationship’ provision should have been based on factors such as 
commitment to the child and the quality of relationships. This would have 
encompassed co-parents who have a shared desire to parent, and single intended 
parents who enter into an arrangement with the support of a family member.  
The more recent case of X (A Child - foreign surrogacy)198 raises new questions for 
the ability of platonic co-parents to apply for a parental order following surrogacy. In 
the case, only two of the parental order requirements in section 54 HFEA 2008 gave 
rise ‘to the slightest query’.199 The first was section 54(2)(a) which provides that the 
applicants must be husband and wife. The applicants were married but one of them is, 
‘as the other has always known, gay, and their relationship and marriage is thus … 
platonic and not romantic’.200 Munby P held that this did not in any way affect their 
ability to satisfy the requirement of marriage because a sexual relationship is 
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unnecessary.201 Section 54(4)(a) provides that ‘at the time of the application and the 
making of the order … the child’s home must be with the applicants.’ In this case the 
intended parents had different homes and the child’s time was split between them; this 
clearly established that the child’s home was with the applicants.202 Munby P did not 
have any doubt that he should make the parental order which was ‘so manifestly in the 
best interests of the child’.203  
Despite the happy outcome of the case, it raises uncertainties for platonic intended 
parents. Friends who decide to co-parent may view the case as opening the door for 
co-parents to apply for a parental order. Especially as Munby P states that relationships 
are ‘no concern of the judges or of the State’ and that ‘we should not make windows 
into people's souls.’204 However, it is suggested that the case does not create a new 
opportunity for platonic couples / friends to apply for a parental order. If the couple in 
X (A Child – foreign surrogacy) were unmarried, the outcome would have been 
different. Their relationship would have been the business of the judges because the 
relationships of single parents and unmarried couples have been subject to scrutiny.205 
It is only by virtue of the couple’s married status that they were able to apply for a 
parental order. Platonic co-parents who are unmarried would need to rely on the 
‘enduring family relationship’ threshold which still requires a sexual component.  
It is suggested that the ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold should be removed 
from the HFEA 2008. If the government decides to remove the two-person 
requirement, but leaves the ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold for couples intact, 
platonic co-parents could be encouraged to choose one parent to apply for a parental 
order as a single person, (or enter a platonic marriage).206 This would not reflect the 
intentions of co-parents who want to share the responsibilities of raising a child 
without being in a sexual relationship or marriage. This could lead to unfair 
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consequences for procreative rights; one co-parent would have more rights than the 
other, as the parental order would be in their sole name. This could also result in the 
child being confused about the identity of his / her parents. Thus, policy-makers should 
remove all the relationship provisions, to avoid these problems.207  
2.5 Moving from Form to Function: A New Definition of Parenthood? 
The ‘relationship provisions’ within section 54 HFEA 2008 fail to support the variety 
of family structures created through surrogacy. Single parents, co-parents, and other 
relationships of kin are involved in creating and parenting surrogacy-conceived 
children. Given the human rights issues with the ‘relationship provisions’, surrogacy 
regulation needs to extend parental orders beyond the ‘sexual family’. Although an 
imperfect solution,208 it is suggested that the relationship provisions should be replaced 
with a functional definition of parenthood. This approach focuses on the way a 
relationship functions, rather than its legal form.209  In 2001, The Law Commission of 
Canada published a Report, Beyond Conjugality,210 which challenged the centrality of 
the ‘conjugal family’ in legal policy. The Law Commission asked whether it could 
‘imagine a legislative regime that accomplishes its goals more effectively by relying 
less on whether people are living in particular kinds of relationships?211 Amongst its 
recommendations, the Law Commission suggested that: 
‘The government should review all of their laws and policies that employ relational 
terms to determine whether the relationships are relevant to, or an effective means of 
accomplishing, each law’s objectives’.212  
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In light of the declaration of incompatibility and period of law reform, the UK 
government is urged to re-evaluate section 54 HFEA 2008 and ask whether measuring 
‘enduring family relationships’ by conjugality is relevant to the best interests and 
welfare of the child. It should also ask itself whether requiring intended parents to be 
married or in a civil partnership is relevant, and whether section 54A, which demands 
evidence of the intended parent’s single status, achieves the aim of a parental order, 
which is to provide life-long security to the child and their parents.  
There is much appeal with the alternative functional approach, which was discussed 
in the Canadian judgment, Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop.213 L'Heureux Dube 
J commented that the functional approach: 
‘…[O]ffers distinct advantages over a more formalistic approach which 
systematically excludes all but a specific form of relationship. Further, it provides an 
objective yet flexible standard, which allows for a more accurate recognition of a 
greater number of family groupings which share characteristics which are thought to 
be essential in specific contexts....’214 
The functional approach embodies the idea that ‘the role of law is not to “channel” 
people into certain accepted family forms’,215 such as a two-parent family, ‘but rather 
to reflect and support a diverse range of relationships’.216 A functional definition of 
parenthood also rests on a ‘performative aspect’ in which the parties are granted rights 
(e.g. legal parenthood) because of ‘what they do in relation to one another, not because 
of the status of who they are or what manner of legal formality they have 
undertaken.’217 One specific definition of parenthood presented by Minow, includes 
people who have ‘taken care of the child on a daily basis, is known to the child as a 
parent, and has provided love and financial support’.218 This functional definition of 
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parenthood focuses on what Fineman calls the ‘contingencies of care-giving’ rather 
than tying parenthood to adult relationships. If adopted by the HFEA 2008, the ‘non-
sexual family’ would finally be valued by UK surrogacy legislation and placed on an 
equal footing with the ‘sexual family’. 
Although Minow favours a functional definition of families, she worries that the 
government might assign family-like status ‘in order to punish people or deny them 
benefits for which they would otherwise be eligible’.219 She says, there ‘is an important 
difference between the expanded family chosen by its participants and the expanded 
family used by the government to achieve its own ends.’220 It is acknowledged that a 
functional approach to defining adult relationships could be used by the government 
for its own ends.221 However, in the specific context of replacing the relationship 
provisions in section 54 HFEA, this is less of a concern because the family is expanded 
by its own participants. Rather than legal parenthood being imposed by the legislation, 
the intended parent(s) (whether they are single, co-parents, friends or family members) 
would assign the role of legal parenthood to themselves by choosing to apply for a 
parental order.  
It is acknowledged that the replacement of the ‘relationship provisions’ with a 
functional approach to parenthood and families, will invoke a broader debate about 
the role of family law. Policy-makers will need to reflect, not just on the HFEA’s 
‘relationship provisions’ in section 54 but on all other polices which tie parenthood to 
relationship status. This is an ambitious task which could call into question the very 
foundation of family law. Nevertheless, a realistic starting point would be to remove 
the relationship provisions from the HFEA 2008 so that a diverse range of surrogacy 
families can apply for parental order. It will be argued in chapter 5 that the new 
gateway criteria for applying for a parental order, in addition to section 54(2) -(8),222 
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should be intention; a forward-looking concept that focuses on who intends to perform 
the day-to-day care taking role.223  
The functional approach does not need to be an aspirational concept. In Canada, 
Natasha Bakht and Lynda Collins were best friends who successfully fought a two-
year legal battle to be officially recognised as co-parents to Natasha's disabled son.224 
This was the first time in Canadian history that two people who have never been in a 
romantic relationship have been legally recognised as parents. The co-parents sought 
an order that would secure the child’s existing relationship with the child’s non-
biological mother, Lynda, and ensure she had equal footing alongside Natasha. The 
friends found that Elaan’s best interests were ‘met through a combination of support 
from his biological mother, his non-biological mother, extended family, privately-
funded care, and state support...’.225 As Bakht and Collins recognise, ‘this is not to say 
that non-conjugal co-parenting units are superior to their more traditional 
counterparts’226 or single parent families. Instead, the point being made is that ‘there 
is no limit to the configurations of relationships that can support the healthy raising of 
children’.227 A functional approach to parenthood in section 54 HFEA 2008 would 
allow people to organise their own families and give single people, multiple parents, 
platonic co-parents and other kin relationships, the opportunity to apply for a parental 
order. A functional approach to defining intended parents for the purpose of section 
54 HFEA 2008, would recognise the single fathers in B v C and In the Matter of Z, as 
the legal fathers of their children because of the day to day caring role they have 
performed since their children were born. Their status as single people is irrelevant to 
these care-giving functions. If this approach was adopted by the HFEA 2008, UK 
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surrogacy regulation would finally accommodate the rights of single and platonic 
intended parents and give greater respect to Article 8 ECHR.228 
2.6 Conclusion  
The arguments presented in this chapter support a more inclusive legal conception of 
parenthood than is currently assigned by the HFEA 2008. Single parents are allowed 
to use surrogacy, so it is illogical that the legislation does not follow this through and 
allow this group of parents to apply for a parental order. The recent judgment in Z (A 
Child) (No 2) confirms that the exclusion of single parents from applying for a parental 
order, is contrary to Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR, and therefore discriminates against 
the procreative decisions of single people. By analogy, it is argued that the ‘enduring 
family relationship’ threshold similarly violates the same Convention rights because 
it prevents co-parents and wider kin relationships from applying for a parental order. 
This chapter suggested that the relationship provisions are examples of what 
McCandless and Sheldon call the ‘tenacity of the sexual family form’.229 This is no 
longer satisfactory given the diverse types of families created by ARTs and surrogacy. 
In light of the human rights violations created by the ‘relationship provisions’, they 
should be removed from the HFEA 2008 to allow single people, co-parents and 
couples alike to apply for a parental order. This would better respect the ‘actual 
contingencies of care-taking relationships’ between parents and their children and 
move away from regulation that focuses on relationship status and structure.230 The 
following chapter considers whether the removal of the relationship provisions is also 
necessary to protect the rights of surrogacy-conceived children whose parents do not 
fit neatly into the ‘two-parent’ model.   
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Chapter Three 
 
3. Exploring the Children’s Rights Implications of the HFEA 2008’s 
‘Relationship Provisions’: What About Children without Two Parents? 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter continues to explore the problematic ‘relationship provisions’ in section 
54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 2008), including the 
two-person requirement1 and the ‘enduring family relationship’2 threshold. The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), and the ‘Parental Orders Regulations 2010’,3 are used to 
consider the implications of the ‘relationship provisions’ for the rights of the child. In 
2002 Jackson stated that it is: 
‘…worth drawing attention to privacy’s uneven distribution within society: some 
people’s domestic arrangements have always been more private than others. Single 
parents, for example, have often been subjected to public scrutiny and criticism, at 
times again justified by concern for the ‘best interests of the child’.4  
This ‘uneven distribution’5 is evident within UK surrogacy regulation, which excludes 
single people and those not in an ‘enduring family relationship’ from applying for a 
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parental order on the basis that it is in the ‘best interests’ of surrogacy-born children 
to have two parents.6  
This chapter uses the central tenets of a children’s rights-based approach,7 to assess: 
(1) whether the government’s exclusion of single parents from parental order 
applications is in the ‘best interests’ of children without two parents, (2) whether the 
judiciary have adopted a children’s rights-based approach in cases involving the 
‘relationship provisions’, and (3) what (children’s) rights are affected by the 
‘relationship provisions’.  It is important to use a child rights-based approach because: 
‘It can help to increase the visibility of children within the law by ensuring that their 
status as rights-holders is recognised, that their voices are heard and that their interests 
are identiﬁed and factored into judicial decision-making.’8 
Hollingsworth and Stalford’s indicators of a child rights-based approach9 and Tobin’s 
substantive approach10 to children’s rights, were intended to be used to assess the 
judicial methodology in cases concerning children. This chapter uses the approaches 
to reflect not only upon the judiciary’s treatment of children’s rights in relation to the 
relationship provisions, but also the government’s methodology for excluding single 
parent families from section 54 of the HFEA 2008. 
The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first scrutinises the UK government’s 
assertion that surrogacy-conceived children require two parents who are in an 
‘enduring family relationship’.11 It is questioned whether the government’s decision 
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to exclude families who do not conform to the two-parent model protects the best 
interests of children without two parents.  Drawing upon Article 3 CRC, General 
Comment No. 14 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child,12 and academic 
commentary,13 the first section explores the concept of ‘best interests’. It uses these 
understandings to evaluate whether the government’s insistence on a two-parent 
model during the HFE Bill 2008 has undermined Article 3 (1) CRC, which ‘gives the 
child the right to have his or her best interests assessed and taken into account as a 
primary consideration in all actions or decisions that concern him or her, both in the 
public and private sphere’.14  
The second section of the chapter uses Tobin’s spectrum of rights-approaches, and 
other indicators of a children’s rights approach,15 to evaluate how the English judiciary 
responded to the two-parent requirement in Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act: Parental Order),16 and In the Matter of Z (A Child) (No. 2).17 The 
exclusion of the ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold from the judgment, despite 
the provision having serious implications for the rights of children with less 
conventional parents, is also critiqued. It is important to evaluate the judiciary’s 
response to the ‘relationship provisions’ because until legislative reforms are 
undertaken, single intended parents are reliant upon the courts to interpret the 
provisions creatively.   
The final section considers how the ‘relationship provisions’, which deny children 
with less conventional families a parental order, affect the child’s right to identity, 
which is inherent in Articles 7 and 8 CRC. The judiciary’s response has been to bypass 
                                                 
12 General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken 
as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1)* 
http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_C_GC_14_ENG.pdf (last accessed 
20/08/18).  
13 M   Freeman, ‘Article 3: the Best Interests of the Child’ in A Alen, J Vande Lanotte, E Verhellen, 
F Ang, E Berghmans, M Verheyde  and B Abramson (eds),  Commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff , 2007). 
14 General Comment No. 14, op cit, n12. Para 1, p3. 
15 Op cit, n7. 
16 [2015] EWFC 73. Hereafter, ‘Re Z’. 
17 [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam). Hereafter, ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’. 
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the problems with the two-person requirement and award an adoption order,18 child 
arrangements order19 or wardship20 instead. It is asked whether these are adequate 
solutions for the best interests of the surrogacy-conceived child, including the child’s 
genetic identity, the psychological relationship with their parent, and their ‘identity of 
origin.’21  
3.2 Is there a Children’s Rights Justification for the Two-Parent Model in 
Section 54 HFEA 2008? 
(I) Parental Orders and the Best Interests of the Child 
The best interests principle in Article 3 (1) CRC provides that: 
‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.’ 
As noted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment No. 
14,22 the concept of the child’s ‘best interests’ is not new, and in fact pre-dates the 
CRC.23 It was already enshrined in the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child,24 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,25 
as well as national and international laws.26 The child’s ‘best interests’ in Article 3 (1) 
CRC, has been described as ‘pivotal to the whole of the Convention’27 because it ‘lays 
                                                 
18 See B v C (Surrogacy - Adoption) [2015] EWFC 17. Hereafter ‘B v C’. 
19 See Re Z (surrogacy agreements) (Child arrangement orders) [2016] EWFC 34; and Re A 
(Foreign Surrogacy- Parental Responsibility) [2016] EWFC 70, hereafter ‘Re A’. 
20 See M v F & SM (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008) [2017] EWHC 2176 (Fam). 
21 B Bennett Woodhouse ‘"Are you my Mother?": Conceptualizing Children's Identity Rights in 
Transracial Adoptions’, 2 Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 107 1995, p 111. 
22 Op cit, n12. 
23 Ibid, para 2, p3. 
24 Para 2. 
25 Articles 5 (b) and 16, para. 1 (d)). 
26 General Comment, No. 14, op cit, n12. Para 2, p3. 
27 M Freeman, op cit, n13, p25. 
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down the general standard which underpins the rights set out in subsequent articles’.28 
The CRC explicitly refers to the child's best interests in other articles including Article 
9 (separation from parents), Article 10 (family reunification), Article 18 (parental 
responsibilities) and Article 20 (deprivation of family environment and alternative 
care). Reference is also made to the child's best interests in the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography 
(preamble and Article 8). 
According to General Comment No. 14, the concept of the child's best interests is 
‘aimed at ensuring both the full and effective enjoyment of all the rights recognized in 
the Convention and the holistic development of the child’.29 The Committee expects 
States to interpret ‘development’ as a ‘holistic concept, embracing the child’s physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development’.30 General Comment 
No. 14 also states that ‘an adult’s judgment of a child’s best interests cannot override 
the obligation to respect all the child’s rights under the Convention.’31 Moreover, there 
is no hierarchy of rights in the CRC and instead, ‘all the rights provided for therein are 
in the “child's best interests”’.32 
According to General Comment No. 14, the child’s best interests can be interpreted as 
a threefold concept. Firstly, it is a substantive right. The child has a right to have his 
or her best interests assessed and taken as a primary consideration when different 
interests are being considered, in order to reach a decision on the issue at stake.33 
Secondly, ‘best interests’ is a fundamental, interpretative legal principle; ‘If a legal 
provision is open to more than one interpretation, the interpretation which most 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Op cit, n12, para 4, p5. 
30 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment no. 5 (2003): General 
measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 27 November 
2003, CRC/GC/2003/5, para 12, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538834f11.html [accessed 22 August 2018] 
31 Op cit, n12, para 4, p5. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, para 6 (a), p4. 
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effectively serves the child’s best interests should be chosen’.34 Finally, it is a rule of 
procedure: 
‘Whenever a decision is to be made that will affect a specific child, the decision-
making process must include an evaluation of the possible impact (positive or 
negative) of the decision on the child or children concerned...’35 
The CRC does not define ‘best interests’, and Freeman suggests that it is best to view 
the concept as ‘indeterminate’36 because different societies and historical periods will 
disagree. For some, best interests ‘can be reduced to a satisfaction of material needs. 
Poverty or homelessness is clearly not in a child’s best interests’.37 Others, however, 
focus on ‘emotional security, psychological well-being, attention to developmental 
interest.’38  
The judiciary have consistently explained the importance of a parental order for the 
‘lifelong welfare’ and ‘best interests’ of a surrogacy-conceived child. In Re X (A Child: 
Surrogacy Time Limit),39 Munby P proclaimed that a parental order provides the child 
with the ‘optimum legal and psychological solution’.40 In J v G41 Theis J also 
acknowledged that a parental order is capable of safeguarding the children's welfare 
on a lifelong basis because it confers ‘joint and equal legal parenthood and parental 
responsibility upon both the applicants’ and fully extinguishes the parental status of 
the surrogate under English law.42  In CC v DD,43 Theis J reiterated that it was clear 
that a surrogacy-conceived child’s: 
                                                 
34 Ibid, para 6 (b), p4. 
35Ibid, para 6 (c), p4. 
36 M Freeman, op cit, n13, p27. 
37 Ibid, p27. 
38 Ibid, p27. 
39 [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam). Hereafter ‘Re X’. 
40 Ibid, [7] (Munby P). 
41 [2013] EWHC 1432 (Fam), 
42 Ibid, [27] (Theis J). 
43 [2014] EWHC 1307 (Fam). 
74 
 
‘Lifelong welfare can only be met by securing his relationship with both of the 
applicants in a lifelong way that will give them equal status that will endure for the 
rest of their lives. The only order that is capable of doing that is a parental order.’44 
Even prior to the Parental Order Regulations 2010, the judiciary acknowledged how 
important a parental order was for the lifelong welfare of the surrogacy-born child. In 
X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy)45 Hedley J noted how the effect of a parental order is to 
confer status for life and that it ‘is difficult to see how applying any principle other 
than welfare with a ‘lifelong’ perspective would be apt in deciding’46 the application. 
The judiciary, who are at the forefront of deciding parental order applications, have 
persistently held that the parental order creates the best result for a surrogacy-
conceived child, one which promotes their best interests and lifelong welfare.  
The government’s decision during the HFE Bill 2008 to exclude single parents and 
their children from acquiring a parental order is not only inconsistent with the 
judiciary’s view on parental orders, but also violates Article 3 CRC. As 
aforementioned, legislative bodies should have the best interests of the child as its 
primary consideration when making decisions that concern children. However, when 
the decision was made to retain the two-person requirement- a decision that affects a 
surrogacy-conceived child without two parents – the government did not evaluate the 
possible impact (positive or negative) of the decision for this group of children,47 or 
consider how the provision affects the child’s best interests. Instead, while debating 
the HFE Bill 2008, the government made a general assertion that the responsibilities 
of surrogacy are better handled by two people, rather than one: 
 ‘The Bill does not extend parental orders to single people… There is an argument, 
which the Government have acknowledged in the Bill, that such a responsibility is 
likely to be better handled by a couple than a single man or woman.’48 
                                                 
44 [43] (Theis J), 
45[2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam). Hereafter ‘X & Y’. 
46 [25] (Hedley J). 
47Op cit, n12, para 6 (c), p4. 
48 Primarolo (MP), op cit, n6, column 248.  
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This does not explain how it is in the ‘best interests’ of children (with single parents) 
to be left without a parental order. It is suggested that child welfare assumptions 
relating to single parenthood were used in a paternalistic way by the government to 
promote what Fineman defines as the ‘sexual family’.49 The government did not 
discuss the rights of the child at all during its discussions on the two-person 
requirement. The provision ignores the reality that single parents can, and do, enter 
surrogacy arrangements all the time.50 UK law does nothing to prevent single people 
having a child through surrogacy, so it is inconsistent that the HFEA 2008 should 
punish the children of single people once they have been born by denying them an 
order that is vital for their welfare. 
In the context of children’s rights judgments, Hollingsworth and Stalford argue that 
‘in certain circumstances judges should be informed by wider empirical evidence 
about children.’51 This is invaluable in certain contexts including where ‘robust, 
empirically verified insights are needed to counter the dominance of strong political 
and economic factors’.52 There is evidence to suggest that children conceived via 
surrogacy and other ARTs fare just as well with single parents by choice53 and this 
should have been used during the HFE Bill 2008 to ‘counter the dominance’54 of the 
two-parent ideal.  It is suggested that it is not just the judiciary who should adopt a 
children’s rights approach; policy-makers also need to use the empirical insights 
available when making laws that will affect a specific group of children (i.e. those 
without two parents). The two-person requirement is not in the ‘best interests’ of the 
child because singling out certain families creates discrimination for children living 
                                                 
49 M. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and other Twentieth Century Tragedies 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1995) 143. 
50 This is evident from B v C, op cit, n18; Re Z, op cit, n16; Z (A Child) (No 2), op cit, n17; and the 
author’s interview with a single mother of choice, Gemma, who had a child through surrogacy. 
51 K Hollingsworth and H Stalford, op cit, n7, p67. 
52Ibid. 
53 See, S Golombok and J Rust, ‘The Warnock Report and single women: what about the children?’ 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 1986, 12, 182-186. At pp184-85. See also, S Golombok, S Zadeh, S 
Imrie, V Smith and T Freeman, ‘Single Mothers by Choice: Mother–Child Relationships and 
Children’s Psychological Adjustment’, Journal of Family Psychology, 2016, Vol. 30, No. 4, 409–
418, p410.  
54 K Hollingsworth and H Stalford, op cit, n7, p67. 
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outside the ‘two-parent’ model, which is contrary to Article 2 CRC. This could result 
in children experiencing stigma, or other disadvantages, for belonging to a single 
parent family.   
The use of the child’s ‘best interests’ as a tactic to limit families to the nuclear ‘ideal’ 
is also evident in the Warnock Report55 which sought to deny infertile single women 
‘the chance of parenthood without the direct involvement of a male partner’.56 Section 
2.9 shows how it attempted to contain the possibilities of ARTs on the grounds of child 
welfare:  
‘…The interests of the child dictate that it should be born into a home where there is 
a loving, stable, heterosexual relationship and that, therefore, the deliberate creation 
of a child for a woman who is not a partner in such a relationship is morally wrong.’ 
Single women were deemed incapable of providing the same ‘loving’ and ‘stable’ 
relationship to a child as a heterosexual couple57 despite evidence at the time, 
presented by Golombok, who did not foresee any special problems for children 
brought up in single mother or lesbian families.58 Golombok further noted the double 
standards in respect of Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID) or In Vitro Fertilisation 
(IVF), which was denied to single mothers who would make loving parents and ‘the 
many children who are born into non-loving and unstable heterosexual 
relationships’.59 Despite Golombok’s evidence-based research, the rhetoric that 
children required a mother and a father stuck. The HFEA 1990 introduced the legal 
requirement that: ‘A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless 
account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the 
treatment (including the need of that child for a father)...’60 The effect of the provision 
                                                 
55 M Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
Cmnd 9314 (1984). Hereafter referred to as ‘The Warnock Report’. 
56 Ibid, 2.9. 
57 Ibid, 2.9. 
58S Golombok and J Rust, op cit, n53, pp184-185. 
59 Ibid, p185. 
60 According to Sally Sheldon, the inclusion of the need for a father was introduced in an 
amendment put forward by Conservative MP David Wilshire and passed by 226 to 174 votes. See 
S Sheldon, ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’, Modern 
Law Review, 2005, 68(4) 523-553, p 532. 
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was to keep the heterosexual two-parent family intact, and to discourage single women 
and lesbian couples from seeking AID or IVF.61  
In 2006, the Department of Health concluded that the child’s need for a father 
provision ‘could not be justified in terms of evidence of harm…’.62 In the following 
year, The Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill was 
appointed.63 The Joint Committee ‘heard oral evidence from 46 witnesses comprising 
expert specialists, representatives of interested organisations and individuals.’64 
Giving evidence, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFE Authority) 
took the view that ‘considerations relating to the welfare of the child should not make 
reference to particular family structures’.65 Many acknowledged that the child’s best 
interests depend less on family structure, and more on ‘security and unconditional 
love’.66 Following lengthy debate, the need for a father provision was replaced with 
the child’s need for ‘supportive parenting’.67 
(II) ‘Single Parenthood by Choice’: What are the Child Welfare 
Assumptions Underpinning the ‘Two-Parent Model’?  
Despite the removal of the child’s ‘need for a father’ clause, which helped more single 
people access IVF, the government still decided to retain the two-parent requirement 
in section 54 HFEA 2008 because of the alleged ‘additional responsibilities and 
burdens’68 accompanying surrogacy. These additional responsibilities and burdens 
were neither explained, nor set out, by the government.  It is suggested that this view 
                                                 
61 Single women and lesbians could access treatment, but the requirement presented an unfair and 
discriminatory barrier for these groups of prospective parents. 
62Department of Health. 2006. Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Proposals 
for revised legislation (Cm 6989). London: HMSO. 2.26, p10. 
63 Joint Committee 2007 House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on the Human 
Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Vol I: Report (Session 2006–2007, HL paper 169-I, HC paper 
630-II). 
64 Ibid, chapter 1, para 4. 
65Ibid, chapter 1, para 227. 
66 Ibid. 
67 ‘Supportive parenting’ is defined in chapter 2 (fn 50).   
68 Dawn Primarolo (MP), op cit, n6. 
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of children as welfare dependents who cause burdens and responsibilities reveals 
misconceptions about single parenthood, poverty, and marriage. These 
misconceptions, which were evident during the enactment of section 13(5) HFEA 
1990 and discussion of the HFE Bill 2008, have perpetuated the idea that children 
need two parents. McCandless and Sheldon note that despite the removal of the child’s 
need for a father, supportive parenting reasserts ‘the importance of the ‘sexual family’ 
form, albeit in modiﬁed form’.69 The language of ‘supportive parenting’ suggests that 
‘children should ideally be raised by two parents: what changes is the necessity that 
one of the two must be a father…’.70 It is argued that one assumption driving the belief 
that ‘two parents are better than one’ is that single parent families cost the state too 
much money. This concern was explicit during the House of Lords debate in 1990. 
Lord Lauderdale stated:  
‘To allow and encourage by state provision—it is at the taxpayers’ expense 
ultimately—begetting of children into what are designed to be one-parent families 
does not make sense as regards serious sociological responsibility’.71  
The HFEA 1990 was enacted ‘at a time of widespread, media fuelled concern about 
increasing social security expenditure on single parent families…the need to ensure 
ﬁnancial provision for children was signiﬁcant.’72 Related to this, is an additional 
perception that children from single parents will be impoverished. During 80 hours of 
parliamentary debate on the HFE Bill 2008, it was stated that ‘the influence of a father 
is indisputable in …the likelihood that a child will live in poverty…’.73 
Another assumption, fuelling the preference of a two-parent model, is that the marital 
unit is the best environment to have children. During the House of Commons debate 
                                                 
69 J McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘‘‘No Father Required’’? The Welfare Assessment in the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008’, Feminist Legal Studies, (2010) 18:201–225, p209. 
70 Ibid. 
71 House of Lords Debates Volume 516, Column 1103 (6 March 1990). Available at 
<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1990/mar/06/human-fertilisation-and-
embryology-bill> (last accessed 22/08/18). 
72 J McCandless and S Sheldon, op cit, n69, p204. 
73 Tim Loughton, HC Debs, Vol 476, Col 211, (20 May 2008). Available at, 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080520/debtext/80520-
0012.htm#08052057001205> (last accessed 22/08/18). 
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in 1990 on the ‘child’s need for a father’, ‘speakers who were reluctant to conﬁne child 
bearing to the marital unit were often equally convinced that it should nevertheless 
remain the preserve of co-habiting heterosexual couples’.74 David Blunkett MP argued 
for example, that ‘child bearing is not a right… man and woman together must take 
responsibility for the wellbeing and love of the child.’75 McCandless and Sheldon state 
that a reading of the debates pre-1990: 
‘Might suggest that parliamentarians were less concerned with the need to ensure a 
ﬁnancial provider or hands-on (male) carer than they were with the symbolic value of 
ensuring children were only born into (quasi) marital units.’76  
The same criticism can be levelled at Primarolo’s position in 2008, where she insisted 
that only two parents are capable of dealing with the responsibilities and burdens of 
surrogate parenthood.77  In order to challenge the assumptions that have grown around 
single parenthood, the following subsections consider whether ‘single parenthood by 
choice’ in the context of surrogacy: (1) costs the state too much and / or causes child 
poverty, and (2) denies children the same chances as those born to two parents. 
(a) Does Single Parenthood by Choice Cause Poverty or Non-Optimal 
Outcomes for Children: What does the Evidence Indicate?  
Studies on SMC, which were neglected from the debate on section 13(5), have mainly 
looked at women who had used donor insemination to become single mothers.78  These 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 HC Debs Vol 174, Col 1023 (20 June 1990). Available at < 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm198990/cmhansrd/1990-06-20/Debate-20.html> (last 
accessed 22/08/18). 
76 J McCandless and S Sheldon, op cit, n69, p205. 
77 Op cit, n5. 
78 Leiblum S R, Palmer M G & Spector I. P (1995). ‘Nontraditional mothers single heterosexual, 
lesbian women and lesbian couples electing motherhood via donor insemination’. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynecology, 16, 11–20; Klock S C., Jacob M C & Maier D (1996). 
‘A comparison of single and married recipients of donor insemination’. Human Reproduction, 11, 
2554–2557; C Murray & S Golombok (2005a). ‘Going it alone: solo mothers and their infants 
conceived by donor insemination’. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 75, 242–253, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0002-9432.75.2.242; and C Murray & S Golombok (2005b). ‘Solo 
mothers and their donor insemination infants: follow-up at age 2 years’. Human Reproduction, 26, 
1655–1660, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/humrep/deh823.  
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studies found that women seeking donor insemination were ‘older, highly educated, 
professional women who are financially secure’.79 In 2009, Jadva et al., collected 
further data on the motivations and experiences of 291 single mothers by choice using 
online questionnaires. The ﬁndings from this sample of single mothers by choice 
indicate that: 
 ‘[S]ingle women who choose to become mothers are a distinct group who differ in a 
number of important ways from those who become single mothers following 
separation or divorce. The mothers in this study tended to be well educated women 
who held full-time jobs and were not experiencing marked ﬁnancial difﬁculties.’80 
Carone et al’s study also indicates that single fathers of choice are well educated, 
financially secure, and have professional occupations.81 The study found that the 
men’s decision to have a child without a partner was ‘complex and carefully 
considered, and one that was taken following discussion with family, friends, health 
practitioners and other single fathers’.82 These findings indicate that single parents by 
choice are a very different group than parents who find themselves single as a result 
of a relationship breakdown or unintended pregnancy. Therefore, the government’s 
suggestion that single parenthood causes child-poverty83 does not stand up to scrutiny 
in the surrogacy context. 
The second misconception driving the two-parent model, is that marriage is the ‘best’ 
or ‘optimum’ environment to raise children. McCandless and Sheldon observe that the 
debates surrounding s 13 (5) HFEA 1990 frequently asserted that the marital unit was 
seen as ‘the only sure start in life for children’.84 Evidence shows that the two-parent 
marital unit is not the only forum to raise children who are happy and stable. In 2005 
                                                 
79 Ibid, Klock S C et al, p2557. See also C Murray and S Golombok, p251. 
80 V Jadva, S Badger, M Morrissette and S Golombok, 'Mom by Choice, Single by Life's 
Circumstances ... Findings from a Large Scale Survey of the Experiences of Single Mothers by 
Choice' (2009) 12(4) Human Fertility 175, p182. (Emphasis added). 
81 See N Carone, R Baiocco and V Lingiardi, ‘Single fathers by choice using surrogacy: why men 
decide to have a child as a single parent’, Human Reproduction, Vol.32, No.9 pp. 1871–1879, 
2017. P1877. 
82 Ibid, p1877. 
83 E.g. Tim Loughton (MP), op cit, n73. 
84 J McCandless and S Sheldon, op cit, n69, p205. 
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a study by Murray and Golombok, which compared 27 single heterosexual mother 
families and 50 married heterosexual parent families, all with infants conceived by 
donor insemination, found no differences between the two family types in terms of 
mothers’ psychological well-being, adaptation to motherhood, expressed warmth, and 
emotional involvement or bonding with their infants.85 Murray and Golombok also 
found that the families continued to function well as the children reached 2 years old.86 
The aim of Golombok et al’s more recent study, reported in 2016, was to: 
 ‘Add to the small but growing body of research on solo mother families by 
conducting an in-depth, multimethod, multi-informant, controlled study of families 
with children who were old enough to understand that they did not have a father’.87  
The study compared 51 solo-mother families with a 4-9 year old conceived by donor 
insemination and 52 two-parent donor conceived families.88  The investigators 
hypothesised that ‘children’s adjustment would not be a direct function of the number 
of parents in the family’.89 Instead, children’s adjustment would be associated with the 
‘quality of mother-child relationships.’90 This hypothesis proved correct and 
Golombok and her colleagues found that the donor-conceived children of SMC 
experienced similar levels of parenting quality to the comparison group of donor-
conceived children in traditional two-parent families.91 This accords with an earlier 
study in 1998 by Chan, Raboy and Patterson,92 which compared 30 solo mother 
families and 50 two-parent lesbian families with 7-year-old children conceived by 
donor insemination. The study found ‘no significant differences among children’s 
adjustment … as a function of the number of parents in the home’.93 
                                                 
85 C Murray & S Golombok (2005a), op cit, n78.  
86 C Murray & S Golombok (2005b), op cit, n78. 
87 S Golombok, S Zadeh, S Imrie, V Smith and T Freeman, op cit, n53, p410.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, p415. 
92 R. W Chan, B Raboy & CJ Patterson, (1998). ‘Psychosocial adjustment among children 
conceived via donor insemination by lesbian and heterosexual mothers’. Child Development, 69, 
443–457. 
93 Ibid, p 453. 
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Golombok et al’s findings also suggested that ‘solo motherhood, in itself, does not 
result in psychological problems for children’.94 The study acknowledged that: 
‘a large body of research on the psychological wellbeing of children in single-mother 
families formed by divorce has consistently shown that children whose parents 
divorce are more likely to show emotional and behavioural problems than are children 
in intact families.’95 
However, the children’s difficulties were largely associated with aspects of the 
divorce, rather than single-parenthood, ‘including conflict between parents and 
financial hardship following divorce’.96 Therefore, unlike divorced or unmarried 
single mothers, SMC make an active decision to parent alone and their children are, 
‘less likely to have experienced the economic hardship or maternal psychological 
problems that commonly result from marital breakdown and unplanned single 
parenthood’.97 Unelected single mothers, also ‘experience a considerable drop in 
income, which can cause problems for children as well as stress for the mother… 
single mothers by choice are spared all this’.98 This small, but growing, body of 
research shows that single parenthood by choice is a completely different situation 
than single parenthood resulting from unplanned pregnancy or relationship 
breakdown. The nuances exposed by this research calls into question the government’s 
deep-rooted belief that children cannot thrive without two parents. 
Although Golombok’s study is limited for the purposes of this chapter (it looks at 
donor conceived children with single parents and not surrogacy-conceived children), 
two parallels can still be made. Firstly, like the SMC who had a donor-conceived child, 
single parents entering into surrogacy arrangements also choose to parent alone and 
thus differ from those who unintentionally find themselves in that situation due to 
                                                 
94 S Golombok, S Zadeh, S Imrie, V Smith and T Freeman, op cit n53, p416.  
95 Ibid, p409. 
96 Ibid, p409. 
97 Ibid, p410. 
98 The Guardian, 14th September 2015, Helen Russell, ‘‘There’s no stigma’: Why so many Danish 
women are opting to become single’. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/sep/14/no-stigma-single-mothers-denmark-
solomors (last accessed 18/06/17). 
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unplanned pregnancy or marital breakdown. Secondly, like SMC using donors, single 
parents entering into surrogacy arrangements have not experienced the problems 
associated with marital breakdown or unplanned single parenthood. Therefore, 
surrogacy-conceived children born to single parent families are unlikely to encounter 
the emotional and behavioural problems some children experience following divorce 
and the subsequent conflict and financial hardship that often follows when parents 
divorce.  
Golombok explains that the active decision of solo mothers to parent alone has 
contributed to the positive outcomes for these families because they ‘are extremely 
wanted children whose mothers went to great lengths to conceive them whereas 
divorced single mothers and unmarried single mothers who had unplanned 
pregnancies did not set out to parent alone’.99 It is recalled from B v C, that the single 
father, Mr Casson had wanted to be a father for some time and ‘waited until his 
circumstances were settled in terms of a job and home to enable him to provide the 
care a child would need.’100 This suggests that the intention to be a single mother or 
father using surrogacy would also contribute to positive parent-child relationships and 
positive child outcomes. Further research needs to be carried out to compare single 
parent surrogacy families (by choice) and two parent surrogacy families, to confirm 
these parallels. More research also needs to be undertaken to look at single fathers by 
choice101 to see whether these parallels apply to single men. Nevertheless, the 
comparisons drawn between Golombok’s study and single parent surrogacy present a 
challenge to the rhetoric that children only fare well with two parents.  The 
government’s decision not to use any of the available research on single parenthood 
by choice during the discussion on section 54 HFE Bill 2008, shows that the 
relationship provisions were made without ensuring appropriate consideration was 
given to the best interests of the child or the ‘empirically verified insights’102 on single 
parenthood by choice that were available.  
                                                 
99S Golombok, S Zadeh, S Imrie, V Smith and T Freeman, op cit, n53, p416. 
100 [10] (Theis J). 
101 N Carone et al, op cit, n81, was the only study found on single fathers of choice. 
102 K Hollingsworth and H Stalford, op cit, n7, p53. 
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3.3 Exploring the Judiciary’s Response to the ‘Relationship Provisions’: 
Has a Substantive Children’s Rights Approach been Achieved?  
Given the legislative limitations with the HFEA 2008, this section uses Tobin’s 
framework, and other indicators of a children’s rights approach,103 to see how the 
judiciary have responded to the ‘relationship provisions’ in Re Z (A Child)104 and Z (A 
Child) (No 2).105  
(I) A Critique of Munby P’s Methodology in Re Z (A Child)  
In Re Z,106 Munby P stated that he could not read down the two-person requirement 
using section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998,107 because to do so would ‘remove 
“the very core and essence”…of what Parliament has enacted…’108 Nevertheless, 
Tobin suggests that these constitutional constraints are sometimes overstated, because 
the: 
 ‘[G]rowing recognition and acceptance of children’s rights within society provide 
greater opportunities for judges to develop and act upon interpretative theories that 
are receptive to and grounded in the values that underlie the substantive model of 
children’s rights under the CRC’.109  
The Parental Order Regulations 2010 have, to some extent, given the judiciary greater 
opportunities to ‘develop and act upon interpretative theories’ that are grounded in the 
CRC. Even in X and Y,110 which was decided before the 2010 Regulations made the 
child’s welfare the court’s ‘paramount’ concern, Hedley J introduced three questions 
to facilitate the retrospective authorisation of payments that go beyond reasonable 
                                                 
103 Op cit, n7. 
104 Op cit, n16. 
105 Op cit, n17. 
106 Op cit, n16. 
107 The provision states, ‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.’ 
108 [33] (Munby P). The facts of the judgment are set out in chapter 2 (part 2.2). 
109J Tobin, op cit, n7, p579. 
110 Op cit, n45. 
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expenses, despite commercial surrogacy being explicitly prohibited by the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985 (SA Act 1985).111 First, ‘was the sum paid disproportionate 
to reasonable expenses?’112 Second, ‘were the applicants acting in good faith and 
without ‘moral taint’ in their dealings with the surrogate mother?’113 Third, and finally, 
‘were the applicants party to any attempt to defraud the authorities?’114 In answering 
these questions, the court reminded itself that: 
 ‘it is almost impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the 
case comes to court, the welfare of any child (particularly a foreign child) would not 
be gravely compromised (at the very least) by a refusal to make an order’.115  
Since the 2010 Regulations,116 the courts have acknowledged in stronger terms that 
when deciding whether to authorise payments retrospectively, the court must regard 
the child’s welfare as the ‘paramount’ consideration.  Hedley J noted in Re L (A 
Minor)117 that the effect of the 2010 Regulations was to import Section 1 of the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 into Section 54 HFEA 2008. This means ‘that 
welfare is no longer merely the court's first consideration but becomes its paramount 
consideration.’118  Hedley J continued: 
‘The effect of that must be to weight the balance between public policy considerations 
and welfare (as considered in RE X and Y (supra)) decisively in favour of 
welfare…’119 
The Parental Order Regulations 2010120 have therefore given the judiciary the 
opportunity to interpret section 54 more creatively, in order to ensure the ‘welfare’ of 
                                                 
111 Section 2. 
112 [21] (Hedley J). 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 [24] (Hedley J). 
116 Op cit, n3. 
117 [2010] EWHC 3146. 
118 [9] (Hedley J). 
119 [10] (Hedley J). 
120 Op cit, n3. 
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the surrogacy-conceived child is ‘paramount’.121 The judiciary have made use of the 
Regulations in its decisions on 54 (8) HFEA 2008, which present ‘a very clear 
picture…of a permissive approach to payments beyond reasonable expenses, meaning 
that recognition of parenthood as a result of a commercial surrogacy agreement is 
almost a foregone conclusion’.122 It is suggested that Munby P could have used the 
paramountcy principle in the Regulations to award a parental order to Z and his father. 
This would not be an unusual approach for Munby P, who developed and acted upon 
interpretative theories that are grounded in the values that underlie the ECHR in ‘Re 
X’.123 In this case, decided before ‘Re Z’, Munby P awarded a parental order to a child 
who was almost 3 years old, notwithstanding the clear rule in section 54(3) HFEA 
2008 that a parental order must be applied for within 6 months of the child’s birth. 
Munby P held that even if his decision was a ‘step too far’, his reasoning would be 
justified having regard to the ECHR and the child’s Article 8 right to a private and 
family life:  
‘[T]he statute must be ‘read down’ in such a way as to ensure that the “essence” of 
the protected right is not impaired and that what is being protected are rights that are 
“practical and effective” and not “theoretical and illusory.”’124 
It is disappointing that Munby P did not utilise the same reasoning in ‘Re Z’; If reading 
down the two-person requirement was a ‘step too far’ then surely, he could have used 
Z’s right to a private and family life under Article 8 ECHR to justify his position. It is 
recalled from the previous chapter that the inconsistent approaches between the two 
judgments could betray a preference to the two-parent model, which was only at stake 
in Re X.125 The refusal to ‘read down’ the two-person requirement has compounded 
the discriminatory effects of the legislation, and leaves children with single parents in 
an uncertain social and legal position. 
                                                 
121 It is acknowledged however, that this depends on how the judiciary interpret ‘welfare’. 
122 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Case Commentary: The regulation and recognition of surrogacy under 
English law: an overview of the case-law’, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 27, No 1, 2015, 
pp83-96. P87. 
123 Op cit, n39. 
124 [58] (Munby P). 
125 See chapter 2, part 2.1. 
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(II) ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2): A Missed Opportunity for Promoting 
Children’s Rights? 
In the subsequent case, ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’,126 the court held that the exclusion of 
single parents from applying for a parental order is incompatible with the child’s (and 
his father’s) right to respect for a private and family life (Article 8), taken in 
conjunction with the right to non-discrimination (Article 14 ECHR).127 The judgment 
acknowledges that children in Z’s position have rights, specifically Articles 8 and 14 
of the Convention but falls short of achieving a more ‘substantive children’s rights’128 
approach. Firstly, the judgment is too ambiguous in its discussion of the child’s right 
to private and family life and non-discrimination in Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. 
Secondly, it fails to acknowledge the relevance of the CRC or use its provisions and 
principles to help interpret and apply Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. Thirdly, the judgment 
neither acknowledges nor discusses the relevance of the ‘enduring relationship’ 
threshold and how it could also affect the child’s rights within the ECHR and CRC. 
Finally, the judgment does not emphasise how the child’s rights to ‘identity’ are 
affected by being denied a parental order. The first three criticisms are discussed in 
the following sub-sections, and the latter is discussed in the final part of the chapter.  
(a) A Superficial Treatment of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR? 
In ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’, Munby P discussed the child’s rights to Article 8 and 14 
ECHR by loosely referring to the two linked ECtHR cases of Mennesson v France129 
and Labassee v France.130 However, the judgment failed to analyse those decisions in 
any detail or highlight the key message from those cases;131 namely, the importance 
of recognition of the legal parent-child relationship for the child’s identity and family 
life. In Mennesson, it was held that France’s refusal to give the children’s parents legal 
                                                 
126 Op cit, n17. 
127 As such, Munby P issued a declaration of incompatibility between the two-person requirement 
in section 54(1) HFEA 2008 and Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. 
128 J Tobin, op cit, n7. 
129 (Application no. 65192/11) European Court of Human Rights, 26 June 2014. 
130 (Application no. 65941/11) European Court of Human Rights, 26 June 2014. 
131 The judgments are referred to in passing at paras [9] and [12]. 
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parentage violated the twins’ right to respect for private life under Article 8, because 
it left the children in a state of ‘legal uncertainty’ and undermined their identity within 
French society.132 The ECtHR recognised nationality and the right to inheritance as 
the relevant elements of identity133 and found that this was affected because despite 
the children’s genetic father being French, they were unable to obtain French 
nationality.134 In addition, the children’s inheritance rights were ‘less favourable’.135 
The Court found that by preventing the recognition and establishment under domestic 
law of the relationship between the twins and their genetic father, France ‘overstepped 
the permissible limits of its margin of appreciation.’136 This refusal was held by the 
ECtHR to be contrary to the paramountcy of the best interests of the child principle.137 
Munby P could have drawn upon Mennesson to emphasise how denying legal 
parentage to single intended parents raises the same rights-implications for the 
surrogacy-conceived child’s family life and identity. Without a parental order, 
children are left in a situation of ‘legal uncertainty’; their identity as the biological 
child of an intended parent through surrogacy is undermined, particularly where an 
adoption order is applied for instead.138 Instead of undertaking a rigorous assessment 
of Mennesson, the decision adopts a ‘superficial approach’139 to Article 8 ECHR, 
whereby the central relevance of Z’s right to respect for a private and family life is 
identified, but the actual scope and nature of this right, and how it is affected by the 
single person exclusion140 are not discussed.   
In ‘Z (a child) (No 2)’, the child’s right to non-discrimination was not engaged with 
whatsoever, despite the judgment acknowledging that ‘this is in reality, a 
discrimination case.’141 The judgment should have reiterated that children with single 
                                                 
132 [96]. 
133 [97] and [98]. 
134 [97]. 
135 [98]. 
136 [100]. 
137 [84]. 
138 This is discussed in part 3. 
139 J Tobin, op cit, n7, p601. 
140Ibid. 
141 [13] (Munby P). 
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parents and platonic co-parents are treated differently to children whose parents are a 
‘couple’. The discrimination faced by the child in ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’, is akin to the 
discrimination faced by children born outside the institution of marriage, so it is 
surprising the judgment did not refer to seminal cases such as Marckx v Belgium,142 
which concerned the discriminatory treatment of an unmarried mother and her 
daughter. At the time, Belgium law did not recognise a legal bond between an 
unmarried mother and her child.143 The only way Paula Marckx, the mother, could 
improve the child’s status was to adopt her child. The Court held that this 
discriminatory treatment violated the mother’s and child’s Article 8 right, taken in 
conjunction with Article 14. Namely, that under Belgian law, ‘a “legitimate” child is 
fully integrated from the moment of his birth into the family of each of his parents, 
whereas a recognised “illegitimate” child, and even an adopted “illegitimate” child, 
remains in principle a stranger to his parents’ families’.144 Accordingly, the Court 
stated that, ‘respect for family life implies in particular…the existence in domestic law 
of legal safeguards that render possible as from the moment of birth the child’s 
integration in his family’.145  By analogy, the HFEA 2008 fails to uphold the principles 
in Marckx, because it does not provide legal safeguards that allow the child’s 
integration into his / her solo-parent family. As the court said in Marckx, a ‘law that 
fails to satisfy this requirement violates paragraph 1 of Article 8’.146  
The Marckx decision was confirmed in Johnston and Others v Ireland,147 another case 
omitted from Z (A Child) (No 2). Johnston concerned a cohabiting couple who were 
unable to marry. Mr Johnston, the first applicant, was unable to divorce his wife 
because Article 41.3.2 of the Irish Constitution rendered divorce unavailable in 
Ireland.148 Mr Johnston and his new partner had a daughter (out of wedlock) who 
suffered from several legal disadvantages when compared with children born to 
                                                 
142 31 European Court of Human Rights (ser. A) (1979). 
143 [14]. 
144 [44]. 
145 [31] 
146 [31]. 
147 (Application no. 9697/82) 
148 [17]. 
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married parents. For example, ‘an illegitimate child inheriting property from his 
parents is potentially liable to pay capital acquisition tax on a basis less favourable 
than a child born in wedlock’.149 The question arose as to whether respect for family 
life in Article 8 ECHR, which the family was said to enjoy,150 ‘imposed a positive 
obligation on the State to improve the child's legal situation’.151 The Court considered 
that the Marckx principles were ‘equally applicable’ to the case of an unmarried 
couple, both of whom are the child's birth parents.  The court held that an examination 
of the child’s present legal situation, seen as a whole, reveals that it: 
‘Differs considerably from that of a legitimate child; in addition, it has not been shown 
that there are any means available to her or her parents to eliminate or reduce the 
differences…the absence of an appropriate legal regime reflecting the third 
applicant’s natural family ties amounts to a failure to respect her family life’.152 
By analogy, the absence of an appropriate legal regime in the HFEA 2008 that supports 
the surrogacy-conceived child’s ties with his/her single parent also amounts to a 
discriminatory interference with the child’s family life, privacy and identity. It is 
unacceptable that more than three decades on from Marckx and Johnston v Ireland, 
the children of single parents continue to be discriminated against in this new context. 
(b) Using the ECHR and CRC Together to Maximise the Discussion on 
Children’s Rights? 
The lack of discussion of any of the rights within the CRC means the judgment is a 
missed opportunity for using the CRC in conjunction with the ECHR. In this respect 
the judgment fails to ‘explicitly adopt a child-rights approach by drawing on and 
utilising to maximum effect the formal legal tools which give effect to children’s 
rights, including (but not conﬁned to) the CRC’.153 As Kilkelly has observed, ‘It is 
important to look for alternative methods to maximize its [the CRC] potential for 
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153 K Hollingsworth and H Stalford, op cit, n7, p54. 
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vindicating the rights of children…’.154 She suggests that the principles and the 
provisions of the CRC should be used to offer guidance on the interpretation and 
application of the ECHR.155 This, Kilkelly suggests, ‘would help to fulfil the potential 
of both treaties to protect and promote children’s rights at the international level and 
at the domestic level where the ECHR is part of domestic law’.156 Rather than using 
the CRC to offer guidance on the interpretation and application of Articles 8 and 14 
ECHR, ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’ fails to acknowledge the relevance of Article 16 CRC. 
The provisions states, ‘no child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his or her privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or 
her honour and reputation.’157 This could have been utilised alongside a discussion of 
Article 8 ECHR to emphasise how leaving children without a parental order affects 
the entire family unit, and ignores the ‘supportive role of the family’.158 The use of the 
CRC could have helped expose the magnitude of the children’s rights problems with 
the two-person requirement.   
‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’ also fails to use the CRC’s principle of non-discrimination in 
Article 2 CRC (which applies to the whole of the CRC) to offer guidance on the 
interpretation and application of Article 14 ECHR. Article 2 CRC forbids the State 
Party to treat the child differently on the basis of race, sex or other status, when doing 
so will impair the child’s enjoyment to another right in the Convention. The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasised that Article 2 CRC ‘requires 
that all children enjoy Convention rights equally, regardless of their status (under 
Article 2(1)) or, notably, that of their parents (under Article 2(2))’.159 The differential 
treatment between children with single parents and those with two parents 
discriminates on the basis of their parents’ status, which is contrary to the Committee’s 
guidance. Moreover, as General Comment No. 7 observes, discrimination has 
                                                 
154 U Kilkelly, op cit, n7, p311. 
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158 J Tobin, op cit, n7, p587 
159 U Kilkelly, ‘Protecting children's rights under the ECHR: the role of positive obligations’, 61 
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extremely negative effects for children. It ‘excludes children from full participation in 
society and affects children’s opportunities and self-esteem, as well as encouraging 
resentment and conflict among children and adults.’160 It is argued that section 54(1) 
HFEA sends out a discriminatory message to children with single intended parents, 
who are treated as second class citizens because of their family structure. As the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has acknowledged: 
‘[T]he family has always been shaped in a diversity of ways and naturally faces 
different challenges or living conditions… Could it be considered that only in certain 
circumstances would the family or family life have decisive social value?’161 
By excluding all families except the genetic two-parent model, the HFEA 2008 sends 
out a discriminatory message that only the two-parent families have ‘decisive social 
value’. This, in the words of Baroness Hollis, stigmatises children ‘in the name of 
some family form that we wish them to have, but that they do not have, and cannot, as 
children, choose to have it’.162 The impact of this was exposed during an interview 
with Gemma, a single parent by choice who had decided to enter a surrogacy 
arrangement. She was unable to apply for a parental order and faced great uncertainty 
as a result of her single status. Section 54 HFEA 2008 sends out a message that 
children with single parents are undeserving of the same opportunities and 
participation in society that children with two parents enjoy. It is disappointing that 
Munby P did not utilise Article 2 CRC, or draw upon the work of the Committee of 
the Rights of the Child, to interpret and apply Article 14 ECHR, and to show how the 
‘relationship provisions’ discriminate against children living in non-nuclear families.  
                                                 
160 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 7 (2005): Implementing 
Child Rights in Early Childhood, 20 September 2006, CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1available at 
httep://www.refworld.org.docid/46obc5a62.html (accessed 14th February 2018). At 11 (b) (iv).  
161 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Day of General Discussion on the Role of the Family, 
UN Doc CRC/C/34 (1994), 36 [190]-[191]. Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
HRBodies/ CRC/Discussions/ Recommendations/Recommendations1994.pdf> (last accessed 
10/12/17). 
162 See Baroness Hollis of Heigham when discussing the child’s need for a father provision. HL 
Debs, Vol 696, Col 81 (21 January 2008), available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldhansrd/text/80121-0012.htm> (accessed 
17/12/16). 
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Moreover, Munby P should also have considered Article 6 CRC in connection with 
Article 14 ECHR, thus maximising the children’s rights discussion on the impact of 
the ‘relationship provisions’ on child development. Article 6 CRC says that States 
have an ‘obligation to ensure the survival, growth and development of the child, 
including the physical, mental, moral, spiritual and social dimensions of their 
development’. As Peleg observes, the child’s right to non-discrimination ‘should be 
protected not only for its own merit, but also in order to prevent a ‘negative eﬀect’ on 
the child’s development’.163 Therefore, denying a parental order not only discriminates 
against children without two-parents, but also affects their development. Overall, the 
judgment should have done much more to draw out the rights implications of the 
relationship provisions and how it is unacceptable for children with single parents to 
be treated differently because of their parents’ relationship status. Without discussing 
the ECHR and CRC in a more holistic and detailed way, these children’s rights have 
been considerably minimised by the judiciary.  
(c) What about the Children’s Rights Implications of the ‘Enduring 
Family Relationship’ Requirement? 
Crucially, the court in ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’, did not engage whatsoever with the second 
discriminatory relationship provision in the HFEA 2008; the ‘enduring family 
relationship’ requirement. It is recalled from the last chapter, that the ‘enduring family 
relationship’ threshold has been interpreted in a conjugal way by the courts.164 In ‘Re 
F and M’,165 which was discussed in the previous chapter, the intended parents 
successfully argued they were in an enduring relationship, but the focus was very 
much upon the duration of the couple’s relationship and their plans to marry. This 
should have been of much less importance than their ability to care for the children. 
The fact that a couple plans to marry does not make them better parents, nor does the 
                                                 
163 N Peleg, ‘Time to Grow Up: The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s Jurisprudence of 
the Right to Development’, Chapter 22, p 371, in Law and Childhood Studies: Current Legal 
Issues, Volume 14, edited by M Freeman (2012), p377. 
164 See chapter 2 (part 2.3), which discusses the judiciary’s conjugal interpretation of the enduring 
family relationship threshold in Re F and M (Children) (Thai Surrogacy) (Enduring Family 
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duration of their relationship. If the judiciary moved away from a conjugal 
interpretation of ‘enduring family relationship’ this would allow platonic co-parents 
to apply for a parental order. Factors such as love, commitment, parenting and care-
giving contingencies should be the focus of CAFCASS officers and the courts, and 
this should replace the legislation’s current emphasis on conjugality and endurance, 
which tell us little about the best interests of the child.   
A further problem with the ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold, is that it could 
encourage couples to remain in a long and unhappy relationship, because this would 
satisfy the ‘endurance’ and ‘conjugality’ factors. This risk arose in Re X,166 where the 
couple had tried to reconcile for the purposes of applying for a parental order. The fact 
that only a couple can apply for a parental order, demonstrates that the HFEA’s 
‘relationship provisions’ are aimed to discourage divorce and separation. As Carol 
Smart explains, divorce has been equated with harming children throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century.167 She explains that this concern peaked in the late 1980s 
and 1990s because social scientific evidence ‘appeared to give weight to the idea that 
divorce harmed children in a range of ways including affecting their health, 
educational achievement, and marriage prospects.’168 However, this attitude towards 
divorce harming children changed after a new ethos emerged in the Children Act 1989, 
‘based on the idea that divorce might sever spousal relationships, but that it did not 
and should not impede parental relationships and obligations’.169 As such, ‘divorce no 
longer had to mean family breakdown; it could simply mean marital breakdown, 
because the family could continue to survive (even thrive) across households.’170 The 
enduring family relationship threshold creates a perception that divorce and separation 
are harmful for the child, and that parents should remain together. This ignores the fact 
that separation and / or divorce may actually resolve the conflicts and tensions that 
                                                 
166 Op cit, n39. 
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exist within the family, thus allowing the child to benefit from a relationship with both 
parents.  
In practice the ‘enduring family relationship’ threshold might only delay the parents’ 
separation because once the parental order is awarded the couple no longer have to 
stay together. Delaying separation does not necessarily protect children. In 1999, Pryor 
explained that: 
‘In children whose parents subsequently separate, increased levels of distress and 
behavior problems are evident before the separation and these account for high levels 
of distress after separation, especially in boys ... Thus, problems, which are often 
assumed to arise as a result of a separation, are found to be present before family 
dissolution occurs … unhappy but intact families in childhood do not necessarily 
protect young people.’171 
Therefore, if the ‘enduring family relationship’ encourages couples to stay together to 
apply for a parental order, which they cannot do earlier than six weeks after the child 
is born,172 the baby could pick up on any conflict during that period. A more recent 
2015 poll of young people aged 14-22 with experience of parental separation, which 
was carried out by ComRes on behalf of family law organisation Resolution, found 
that an overwhelming majority (82%) of the young people surveyed said that, despite 
their feelings at the time, they felt it was ultimately better that their parents divorced 
rather than stay together unhappily.173 The enduring family relationship requirement 
should be removed because it could encourage couples to remain in unhappy 
relationships for the sake of applying for a parental order.  
 3.4 What about the Identity Rights of Children with Single Parents? 
                                                 
171 J Pryor, ‘Waiting Until They Leave Home: The Experiences of Young Adults Whose Parents 
Separate’, Journal of Divorce & Remarriage, (1999) 32:1-2, 47-61, DOI: 
10.1300/J087v32n01_04. At p49. 
172 Section 54(7) HFEA 2008. 
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One major issue neglected from ‘Re Z’ and ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’ is the child’s right to 
identity;174 in particular, the rights implications for the children of single parents who 
do not have a parental order. Article 7 of the CRC provides the child with the right to 
be ‘registered immediately after birth’, ‘the right from birth to a name’, ‘the right to 
acquire a nationality’ and ‘as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his 
or her parents’. Article 8 of the CRC recognises ‘the right of the child to preserve his 
or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations.’ Identity is an 
important ‘facet of human development’ and is considered to be in the best interests 
of the child.175 Nevertheless, the concept of ‘identity’ is contested and difficult to 
define.176 Tatum suggests that the answer to the question, ‘who am I’, is ‘shaped by 
individual characteristics, family dynamics, historical factors, and social and political 
contexts’.177 On this definition, being born as a result of surrogacy and having different 
‘parents’ (e.g. gestational, social and legal) will likely shape the child’s identity.   
It is suggested that a parental order is the ‘key’ to shaping, recognising and respecting 
the child’s identity as a surrogacy-conceived child.  According to Munby P in ‘Re X’178 
a parental order is important for the identity of all surrogacy-conceived children 
because it: 
‘Goes to the most fundamental aspects of status and, transcending even status, to the 
very identity of the child as a human being: who he is and who his parents are. It is 
central to his being, whether as an individual or as a member of his family.179 
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E Verhellen, F Ang, E Berghmans and M Verheyde. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2006). 
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The following sub-sections consider which aspects of the child’s identity are affected 
by the absence of a parental order.  
(I) Legal Recognition of the Parent-Child Relationship  
According to Theis J in A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death of Applicant),180 
‘the concept of identity includes the legal recognition of relationships between 
children and parents’.181 A parental order is crucial for protecting the legal ties 
between the child and his / her intended parents, and therefore the child’s identity. In 
A v P Theis J held that ‘the primary aim of s 54 is to allow an order to be made which 
has a transformative effect on the legal relationship between the child and the 
applicants’.182 The effect of the parental order is that the ‘child is treated as though 
born to the applicants’183 and this has clear implications for the child’s ‘right to respect 
for family life under Article 8’.184 In J v G185 Theis J highlighted the implications of 
legal recognition of the child’s relationship with his / her parents: 
‘A parental order will safeguard the children's welfare on a lifelong basis as it will 
(1) Confer joint and equal legal parenthood and parental responsibility upon both the 
applicants. This will ensure each child's security and identity as lifelong members of 
the applicants’ family.’186 
Accordingly, the exclusion of single parents from section 54 HFEA 2008 leaves 
children without ‘security and identity’, ‘a sense of finality and completeness’187 and 
‘the lifelong security and stability that their welfare clearly demands’.188 The child’s 
relationship with his / her intended parent cannot be legally recognised without 
                                                 
180 [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam), [27] (Theis J). Hereafter ‘A v P’. 
181 [28] (Theis J). 
182 [24] (Theis J). 
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185 Op cit, n44, paras [27]-[29]. 
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recourse to another less appropriate order. Theis J set out several disadvantages with 
denying the child in A v P a parental order: 
‘(i) There is no legal relationship between the child and his biological father who is 
also the commissioning father 
(ii) The child is denied the social and emotional benefits of recognition of that 
relationship 
(iii) The child may be financially disadvantaged if he is not recognised legally as the 
child of his father (in terms of inheritance) 
(iv) The child does not have a legal reality which matches the day to day reality’.189 
In light of these problems, it is unsurprising that a parental order has been declared the 
‘optimum legal…solution’190 for a surrogacy-conceived child. 
Without legal recognition of the parent-child relationship, aspects of the child’s right 
to identity, including nationality,191 are compromised. In the case of A and B (No 2 - 
Parental Order),192 Theis J warned that if a parental order cannot be awarded, and 
there are no other orders in place, the intended parents ‘may not have parental 
responsibility, which may affect their ability to take certain steps on behalf of the child, 
for example being able to consent to medical treatment or apply for a passport.193 This 
is particularly problematic where the single intended parent has entered into an 
international surrogacy arrangement abroad, because their child may be recognised as 
a different nationality. In the US for example, any child born through surrogacy is 
automatically a US citizen. The award of a parental order also affects the child’s birth 
certificate. In the UK, the surrogate and her partner, if she has one, are named on the 
child’s birth certificate by virtue of sections 33 and 38 HFEA 2008. When a parental 
order is made, a new certificate is issued, naming the intended parents as the child’s 
parents. To deny such an important order on the basis of the intended parent’s status 
                                                 
189 [26] (Theis J). 
190 ‘Re X’, op cit, n39. At [7] (Munby P). 
191  See Mennesson v France, op cit, n129. Paragraphs 97 and 98. 
192 [2015] EWHC 2080 (Fam). 
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as a single person obstructs the birth registration process, and this is contrary to the 
child’s rights under Articles 7 and 8 CRC, and the best interests of the child.194 
(II) Psychological Identity 
In addition to legal recognition of the child’s relationship with his / her parent(s), a 
parental order also acknowledges the ‘psychological relationship’ between the 
intended parents and child. As Woodhouse observes, children ‘identify as their family 
and draw their own identity from the people who take daily care of them and are their 
psychological parents’.195 This was recognised by Munby P in ‘Re X’:196 
‘A parental order, like an adoption order, has an effect extending far beyond the 
merely legal. It has the most profound personal, emotional, psychological, social and, 
it may be in some cases, cultural and religious, consequences. It creates what Thorpe 
LJ in Re J (Adoption: Non-Patrial) [1998] INLR 424, 429, referred to as “the 
psychological relationship of parent and child with all its far-reaching manifestations 
and consequences.”’197 
Denying children with single parents a parental order ignores how the child draws 
their own identity from the people who take daily care of them. In Re G198 Baroness 
Hale famously described that psychological parenthood involves: 
‘The relationship which develops through the child demanding and the parent 
providing for the child's needs, initially at the most basic level of feeding, nurturing, 
comforting and loving, and later at the more sophisticated level of guiding, 
socialising, educating and protecting’.199  
Therefore, the exclusion of single parents from applying for a parental order, 
undermines the development of this relationship. Despite other orders being available 
including adoption, wardship and child arrangements, these alternatives distort the 
                                                 
194 Article 3 CRC. 
195 B Bennett Woodhouse, op cit, n21, p127. 
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198 [2006] UKHL 43. 
199 [35] (Baroness Hale). 
100 
 
reality that the intended parent is the biological parent of the child.  The inability for 
single parents to apply for a parental order is inconsistent with the Preamble of the 
CRC which recognises ‘that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his 
/ her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding.’ This secure and happy environment is unlikely to 
be achieved by discriminating against families headed by single parents. 
(III) Genetic Identity and Identity of Origin 
A parental order is important for two further facets of the child’s identity: genetic 
identity and ‘identity of origin’.200 In Re X, Munby P highlighted that an adoption 
order would be unsuitable for a surrogacy-conceived child because it would distort the 
child’s biological link with his father. Related to genetic identity is identity of origin, 
which Woodhouse201 defines as: 
‘A right to know and explore, commensurate with her evolving capacity for 
autonomy, her identity as a member of the family and group into which she was born. 
The trusteeship model of adult power implies that we adults… have a duty to 
recognize and protect the child's access to this heritage…’.202 
A parental order allows the child to ‘know and explore’ their identity as a member of 
the family and group into which he / she was born. The parental order reflects the 
child’s origins and acknowledges the intention of the surrogate to give the child to the 
intended parents. It is argued that the child’s right to ‘identity of origin’ is inherent in 
the CRC (Articles 7 and 8). The former guarantees the child’s right to birth 
registration, name and nationality and the right to know and be cared for by parents.203 
Article 8 CRC guarantees the right of the child to ‘preserve his or her identity, 
including nationality, name and family relations.’ The exclusion of children with 
single parents from ever having a parental order does not protect these rights. Overall, 
these cases demonstrate that a parental order is important for multiple facets of the 
                                                 
200 B Bennett Woodhouse, op cit, n21. 
201 Ibid, p128. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Chapter 5 argues that the child should have knowledge of all their ‘parents’ including their 
surrogate, gamete donors and intended parents. 
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child’s identity. Firstly, a parental order recognises the legal relationship204 between 
the child and his / her intended parents. Secondly, a parental order recognises the 
child’s psychological relationship205 with his / her intended parents. Thirdly, the order 
recognises the child’s origins206 (i.e. the child was born as a result of a surrogacy 
arrangement). Finally, if a genetic link exists between one, or both, of the intended 
parents and the child, the parental order also reflects this genetic relationship.207  
(IV) Adoption, Wardship and Child Arrangements Orders: 
Alternative Solutions? 
It was argued in the last chapter than an adoption order, a child arrangements order, 
and wardship are inappropriate for a surrogacy-conceived child. As McK Norrie notes: 
‘At first glance, the similarities between the two orders [adoption and parental orders] 
are striking, and were clearly designed to be so … The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations 2010 apply many of the crucial provisions 
in the adoption legislation to parental orders ... These provisions ensure that the 
overall effect of both orders is virtually identical: a radical transference not only of 
the responsibility and right to bring up the child, but also of parenthood itself from 
one set of parents (commonly called the ‘birth parents’ in adoption and the ‘surrogate 
mother’ and her partner in surrogacy) to another.’208 
However, there are crucial differences between a parental order and adoption order, 
which make the former more appropriate in the surrogacy context. Firstly, the transfer 
of parenthood through adoption, ‘is perceived to give the state an interest, manifested 
in the responsibilities of the local authority’,209 whereas the application for a parental 
order after surrogacy … is perceived as more purely a private law process, and subject 
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206 Ibid. 
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therefore to far less state oversight’.210 Secondly, a parental order reflects how the 
child was born, represents the story of his / her conception and reflects the biological 
link the child has with at least one of the intended parents. In AB & CD211 Theis J 
stated that: 
‘A parental order and the consequences that flow from it are, from a welfare 
perspective, far more suited to surrogacy situations ... Put simply, they are a more 
honest order which reflects the reality of what was intended, the lineage connection 
that already exists and more accurately reflects the child’s identity. An adoption order 
in these situations leaves open the risk of a fiction regarding identity that may need to 
be resolved by the child later in life. The effect of an adoption order according to s 67 
(1) ACA 2002 of treating the child ‘as if’ the child is born as a child of the adopter or 
adopters is not the reality; the child is born with a biological connection to one of the 
applicants.’212 
Moreover, the purpose of a parental order is to transfer parenthood from the legal 
mother – the surrogate – who never intended to have a rearing role, to those who were 
always intended to act as parents (i.e. the intended parents).  As McK Norrie observes, 
‘the making of an adoption order will never have been the intent with which the subject 
of an adoption application was conceived. Intent is thereby revealed as one of the 
major points of distinction between the two orders’.213 Given the differences between 
parental and adoption orders, it is suggested that the judiciary fail to adopt a children’s 
rights approach when they award the latter to a surrogacy-conceived child.  
In B v C214 the court highlighted that the child’s life-long welfare was their paramount 
consideration and that an adoption order would be the most appropriate because it 
would afford the father the overall parental rights and responsibility and provide 
permanence for the child in accordance with the family wishes.215 Applying Tobin’s 
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model, it is suggested that this solution adopts a selective, rather than ‘substantive’, 
children’s rights approach. The judgment makes significant references to the child’s 
life-long welfare and how an adoption order could provide ‘legal security to the child’s 
relationship with his father’,216 however, it ignores the disadvantages with awarding 
an adoption order to a surrogacy-conceived child. It is recalled that in A v P which was 
published four years before B v C, Theis J set out the disadvantages with applying for 
an adoption order in a surrogacy case. In addition to the ‘practical impediments’,217 
adoption would have a ‘distorting effect’: 
‘In the absence of a parental order a legal relationship between Mrs A [the intended 
mother] and B [the child] could be created by way of a residence order or a special 
guardianship order. However these orders would not negate the legal relationship 
between the child and the surrogate mother and father under English law and only last 
during the child's minority.’218 
Theis J was clear that the recognition of a relationship between the child and his / her 
intended parents, ‘cannot be developed by any other route’.219 Therefore, it is 
surprising that the judgment in B v C is not critical of giving an adoption order to a 
surrogacy-conceived child. An adoption order, in these circumstances, overlooks the 
child’s identity as B’s biological child, the child’s ‘identity of origin’220 as a surrogacy-
conceived (not adopted) child, and the child’s psychological relationship with his 
intended father. As such, B v C has not only compounded the discrimination faced by 
children with single parents by maintaining that adoption is an adequate solution but 
fails to expose how adoption does not safeguard the identity of surrogacy-conceived 
children.  
An adoption order also ignores the contact many surrogacy-conceived children have 
with their surrogate. Compared to a parental order, an adoption order is arguably more 
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drastic for the child and their identity. According to Baroness Hale in Re P,221 an 
adoption order does more than deprive the child’s birth parents of their parental 
responsibility for bringing up the child: 
‘It severs, irrevocably and for all time, the legal relationship between a child and her 
family of birth. It creates, irrevocably and for all time (unless the child is later adopted 
again into another family), a new legal relationship, not only between the child and 
her adoptive parents, but between the child and each of her adoptive parent’s 
families...’222 
The government’s policy aim has been to ‘reduce the scope for postadoption contact 
between adopted children and their birth families’.223 An adoption order, which severs 
the legal relationship between a child and her birth family, is inappropriate in the 
surrogacy context where many intended parents choose to remain friends with the 
surrogate, who can have a continuing role in the child’s life.224 There is no legal 
obligation upon the intended parents to tell the child about the surrogate, or remain in 
contact with the surrogate. However, compared to adoption, surrogacy gives more 
scope for the child to remain in touch with their birth ‘parent’. Although there is little 
empirical evidence available about long-term contact and relationships between 
surrogates and surrogacy families, Imrie and Jadva reported that ‘most surrogates and 
surrogacy families have been found to remain in contact in the short-term in studies 
of UK and US-based surrogates’.225 This was also found by Blyth,226 Braverman and 
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Corson227 and Jadva.228 Imrie and Jadva also reported that although the level of contact 
varied greatly, ‘one study of 34 UK surrogates found that surrogates maintained 
contact with 79% of couples and 76% of children 1 year after the birth of the child.’229 
Given the scope for surrogacy-conceived children to remain in contact with their 
surrogate, adoption is an inappropriate alternative.  
Another judicial solution has been to award a child Arrangements Order, as was the 
case in ‘Re A’230 which was discussed in the previous chapter. Theis J stated that a 
Child Arrangements Order would ensure the father had parental responsibility for the 
child, so that he ‘is able to take all steps that are necessary to be able to meet the day 
to day welfare needs of A.’231 In this respect, the order allows the father to fulfil the 
child’s psychological need for a parent and his physical needs. Theis J suggested that 
the order would also provide ‘clarity in relation to his [the father’s] legal status and 
position in relation to A’.232 This may be true, but only as a temporary solution. 
Although Theis J was in an unenviable position given that the alternative was to leave 
the intended father without parental responsibility, it is disappointing that she did not 
express her discontent with this solution. The Child Arrangements Order does not 
make the father a legal parent which undermines his genetic connection with the child 
and conceals the child’s identity as a surrogacy-conceived child.  
The judiciary’s decision to make a surrogacy-conceived child a Ward of Court in 
several cases is also an inadequate solution for the surrogacy-conceived child’s 
identity. M v F & SM 233 concerned a child (A), who was born as a result of a surrogacy 
arrangement in the UK. M (intended mother) and F (intended father) were the 
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biological parents. F and the surrogate (SM) were the legal parents of the child.234 
Whilst the surrogate (SM) was pregnant, the relationship between the intended parents 
ended, and F decided that he did not want to have any involvement with the child. 
Since the child’s birth the surrogate surrendered his care to the intended mother (M). 
The surrogate had ‘no wish to be involved in the upbringing of the child and would be 
content for a parental order to be made in favour of the applicant if that route was in 
law available to her’.235 Keehan J noted that F (the intended father), ‘played no role 
whatsoever in A’s life. He has not seen him. As noted above he does not wish to be 
involved in his child's upbringing’.236  As a single applicant, M could not apply for a 
parental order in respect of A. Therefore, the surrogate and F remained the legal 
parents of A. To provide stability for the child and some legal status for the intended 
mother, the child was made a Ward of Court on 28 February 2017. Care and control 
of him was granted to the intended mother, and F was prohibited from removing the 
child from her care.237 Making the child a ward of court, rather than awarding a 
parental order, is an unsatisfactory outcome for the child and his mother. Wardship 
means that M is unable to make important changes to the child’s education, residence, 
whereabouts, name, or consent to more significant forms of medical treatment, without 
prior permission from the court. This is a severe restriction on the mother and child’s 
right to private and family life (Article 8 ECHR) and this situation would not happen 
to a two-parent surrogacy family. Overall, children with single parents should not be: 
‘Compelled to make do with legal solutions – adoption orders or child arrangements 
orders – which do not provide the optimum legal and psychological solution for, and 
thus do not promote the best interests of, a child born of a surrogacy arrangement’.238  
Reforms must be undertaken to remove the relationship provisions from the 2008 Act, 
so that the children of single parents, and platonic co-parents, are not subject to orders 
that do not reflect the reality of how they were born. To use the language adopted by 
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Professor Michael Freeman, giving a surrogacy-conceived child an adoption or a child 
arrangement order, or making them a Ward of Court, ‘deceives the child of their true 
origins’.239 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that the exclusion of single people from applying for a 
parental order, interferes with the rights of the child, most notably the right to non-
discrimination, the right to private and family life and the right to identity. The first 
part challenged the government’s assumption that only a couple are equipped to deal 
with surrogacy, using Golombok’s studies on solo-mothers of choice with donor 
conceived children.240 It is acknowledged that the study is limited for the purposes of 
this chapter because it focuses on single motherhood in the context of donor conceived 
children, not surrogacy. However, some useful links were still identified. Firstly, like 
single mothers using donor conception, single parents using surrogacy make an active 
decision to parent alone and thus differ from those who unintentionally find 
themselves in that situation (e.g. due to unplanned pregnancy or marital breakdown). 
Like solo mothers using donors, single parents entering into surrogacy arrangements 
have not experienced the problems associated with marital breakdown or unplanned 
single parenthood. Therefore, children born to single parents via surrogacy are also 
unlikely to encounter the emotional and behavioural problems of children who have 
experienced the financial hardship and / or conflict between parents following divorce 
or unplanned pregnancies. It is argued that the government was more concerned with 
upholding the two-parent ‘sexual family’ rather than making a rigorous best interests 
assessment to consider the impact of excluding single parents from the HFEA 2008 
on the child. The government should have used the evidence available, which 
challenges the long-standing assumption that children are better off with two parents.  
The next part of the chapter demonstrated that the relationship provisions violate the 
child’s right to private and family life and non-discrimination. Although Munby P 
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issued a declaration of incompatibility in ‘Z (A Child) (No. 2)’ this was not a victory 
for promoting the rights of surrogacy-conceived children. An application of the key 
tenets of a child rights-based approach revealed that the judgment did not 
conceptualise the issues in terms of the child’s right to non-discrimination and failed 
to utilise the CRC which was particularly relevant to Z’s plight. As such, reforms must 
take the judgment further and really centralise these rights in new surrogacy 
regulation. 
A parental order presents the ‘optimum legal and psychological solution’241 for the 
surrogacy-conceived child. A parental order is preferable to an adoption order, because 
‘it confirms the important legal, practical and psychological reality of the child’s 
identity’.242 The final part of the chapter demonstrated that denying the child a parental 
order based on the relationship status of his / her parent(s) is contrary to the child’s 
right to identity in terms of their legal and psychological relationships with their 
parents, genetic identity, and identity of origin. Adoption orders, wardship and child 
arrangements orders do not reflect the child’s identity as a surrogacy-conceived child. 
The importance of a parental order for the intended parent’s ability to consent to 
medical treatment (as compared to Wardship which restricts the intended parents 
ability to do this)243 also highlights how a parental order should be awarded to the 
intended much sooner.244 
Considering the evidence presented in this chapter, the relationship provisions should 
be urgently removed. Policy-makers should consider moving away from an approach 
that prioritises family structure over the ‘actual contingencies of care-taking 
relationships’.245 This would allow a more diverse range of intended parents to apply 
for a parental order following surrogacy, thus protecting the child’s rights to identity, 
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private and family life, and non-discrimination which are protected by the ECHR and 
CRC.   
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Chapter Four 
 
4. Do the Procreative Rights of ‘Doubly Infertile’ Intended Parent(s) Demand 
the Removal of the ‘Genetic’ Requirement? 
 
4. 1 Introduction 
As Diduck laments, ‘the pervasive, and at times misplaced, emphasis on genetics is 
driving a [biologically] unbalanced overly genetic view of parenthood’.1 Surrogacy 
has traditionally been viewed as a solution for infertile couples to have a genetically 
related child. The Warnock Committee2 recognised that surrogacy ‘offers to some 
couples their only chance of having a child genetically related to one or both of them’.3 
In 1998, the Brazier Review4 rejected ‘cases of pre-conceptual arrangements where a 
surrogate agrees to carry a child unrelated to either of the commissioning couple’.5 
The European Court’s judgment in Paradiso and Campanelli6 perpetuates the view 
that surrogacy is a purely genetic endeavour. Unsurprisingly, the genetic view of 
surrogacy is entrenched in UK legislation. Section 54(1)(b) of the HFEA 2008, 
provides that one of the prerequisite’s to applying for legal parentage and a parental 
order is that ‘the gametes of at least one of the applicants were used to bring about the 
creation of the embryo…’. Where neither intended parent has contributed their 
gametes to the creation of the embryo, that couple cannot apply for a parental order. 
                                                 
1 A Diduck, ‘'If only we can find the appropriate terms to use the issue will be solved': Law, identity 
and parenthood’, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 19, No 4, 2007, p470. 
2 M Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
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3 Ibid, 8.13. 
4 Brazier Report, Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments 
and Regulation, Cm 4068 (1998) – hereafter ‘The Brazier Review'. 
5 Ibid, 7.24. 
6 Paradiso and Campanelli Appl no. 25358/12 (ECtHR, 2nd Section, 27th January 2015); and 
Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy Appl no. 25358/12 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber 24 January 2017). 
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In the UK, the genetic requirement and its implications for procreative rights have 
been ignored from academic debates, judicial scrutiny and the reform agenda. In 2016, 
the genetic requirement was mentioned fleetingly in the Myth Busting Report,7 which 
briefly explained that the rationale for the requirement: 
‘Is presumably to ‘legitimise’ the relationship and in some way to prevent and protect 
women and their husbands/partners being pressured into … conceiving babies purely 
with the aim of giving them away.’8 
The 2016 Report is a missed opportunity for delving further into the requirement. This 
chapter, which consists of three substantive sections, aims to expose the problems with 
the genetic requirement and explore why it is contrary to Articles 8 and 14 of the 
ECHR. The first section explores the three forms of parenthood enunciated by 
Baroness Hale in Re G,9 genetic, gestational and social / psychological. There are some 
parents who use surrogacy because they cannot carry a pregnancy to term, nor 
contribute their eggs or sperm to the creation of the embryo. For example, women with 
Mayer Rokitansky Kuster Hauser syndrome (MRKH) are born without a vagina, 
cervix and uterus and are unable to become pregnant.10 Furthermore, cancer treatments 
including chemotherapy, radiotherapy, surgery and hormonal therapy can affect the 
eggs in the ovaries, the pituitary gland and hormone production, and the womb, cervix 
and ovaries.11 Parents who cannot conceive and carry a pregnancy to term are ‘doubly-
infertile’ (which is also referred to throughout as conception and pregnancy 
infertile).12 The second part of the chapter considers how ‘doubly-infertile’ intended 
parents are marginalised by the genetic requirement and examines: (1) the judiciary’s 
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K%20Report%20FINAL.pdf> (last accessed 13/04/18). 
8 Ibid, 4.4, p33. 
9 Re G [2006] UKHL 43, [33]-[36]. 
10 https://www.mrkh.org.uk/mrkh.html (last accessed 28/08/18). 
11https://www.macmillan.org.uk/information-and-support/coping/side-effects-and-
symptoms/fertility-in-women/how-treatment-can-affect-fertility.html (last accessed 28/08/18). 
12 A person who is ‘conception’ and ‘pregnancy’ infertile is referred to as ‘doubly-infertile’. 
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language when discussing genetic and non-genetic parents; and, (2) how non-genetic 
parents are treated when the surrogacy arrangement does not go to plan. 
The next part of the chapter explores two cases to see whether section 54(1)(b) HFEA 
2008 violates Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. The first judgment is Paradiso and 
Campanelli13 which was subsequently overturned by the Grand Chamber. The second 
judgment is AB and Another,14 which was handed down by the High Court of South 
Africa and subsequently overturned by the Constitutional Court.15 Both cases involved 
parents who had a genetically unrelated child through surrogacy. The judgments are 
used to explore how the law responds to claims of parenthood when there is no genetic 
connection. It is considered whether: (1) the genetic requirement is contrary to Article 
8 ECHR and the meaning of ‘family life’; (2) the genetic requirement discriminates 
against a specific subclass of infertile people (those who are both pregnancy and 
conception infertile); and (3) the genetic requirement discriminates between surrogacy 
and IVF.  
The final part of the chapter critiques the argument that the genetic requirement is 
justified because doubly-infertile intended parents can ‘adopt instead’. Although 
adoption results in the same outcome as non-genetic surrogacy (adults become the 
parents of a child to whom they are not genetically related), empirical work carried 
out for this thesis, demonstrates how the processes involved in adoption and surrogacy 
are fundamentally different, which also resonates with the findings in pre-existing 
studies.16 As such, it is questioned whether Robertson’s17 procreative liberty 
                                                 
13 Op cit, n6. 
14 AB v Minister of Social Development As Amicus Curiae: Centre for Child Law (40658/13) 
[2015] ZAGPPHC 580; 2016 2 SA 27; [2015] 4 All SA 24. Hereafter ‘AB v Minister of Social 
Development (HC)’. 
15 AB and Another v Minister of Social Development [2016] ZACC 43. Hereafter ‘AB and Another 
(CC)’. 
16 V Jadva, C Murray, E Lycett, F MacCallum and S Golombok, ‘Surrogacy: the experience of 
surrogate mothers’, Human Reproduction Vol.18, No.10 pp.2196-2204, 2003. 
17 J. A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, 291pp, 
Princeton University Press (1996). 
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framework should be extended to parents raising children to whom they are genetically 
unrelated.18  
4.2 Exploring the Genetic View of Surrogacy Imposed by UK Law and 
Policy-Makers 
In Children of Choice, 19 Robertson argues that the ability to procreate genetically 
related offspring, experience gestation and parent one’s child, are activities that should 
have presumptive primacy.20 He suggests that some activities seem so closely 
associated with, or essential to, reproductive decisions that they should be considered 
part of it and uses the example of a woman’s need to acquire and then use genomic 
information about herself, her partner, her gametes, her embryos, or her foetus before 
deciding whether to reproduce. 21 Because this information will determine whether a 
person or couple will reproduce, freedom to acquire and use it would seem to be part 
of procreative liberty.22 In contrast, Robertson suggests that adopting a child or rearing 
children not related by genetic kinship, are activities that do not fall within the scope 
of ‘procreative rights’ because these activities arise after reproduction has already 
occurred.23 He explains, ‘a right to gestate as part of procreative liberty is coherent 
only when it is integrally related to the gestator’s own genetic reproduction.’24 
Furthermore, Robertson agrees that a ‘robust conception of procreative liberty should 
extend to gestational surrogacy’25 but only because it ‘is essential for genetic 
                                                 
18 J Robertson’s procreative liberty framework only applies to genetic reproduction. For criticism 
of this see A Alghrani ‘Uterus transplantation in and beyond cisgender women: revisiting 
procreative liberty in light of emerging reproductive technologies’, Journal of Law and the 
Biosciences, lsy012, https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsy012.  
19 J. A. Robertson, op cit, n17. 
20 Ibid, pp24-25. 
21 J. A. Robertson, ‘Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics’, American Journal of Law & 
Medicine, 29 (2003):  439-87, p448. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Professor J. A. Robertson, ‘Is there a right to gestate?’ 2017, Journal of Law and the 
Biosciences,1–7 doi:10.1093/jlb/lsx010. At p 6. 
25 Ibid, p3. 
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reproduction when a woman is unfit or unable to gestate’.26 As such, he limits 
procreative liberty to activities that involve procreating genetically related offspring 
(e.g. gestational surrogacy where the intended mother’s eggs are used).27 
This genetic understanding of procreative liberty is evident within the HFEA 2008, 
which provides that only two people can apply for a parental order, one of whom must 
have a genetic connection to the child.28 Like the ‘relationship provisions’ discussed 
in the previous chapters, it is argued that the genetic requirement entrenches the 
‘sexual family’,29 by denying non-genetic couples a parental order. This genetic view 
of surrogacy can be traced to the Warnock Report and Brazier Review. The Warnock 
Report stated that ‘surrogacy must not be ruled out, since it offers to some couples 
their only chance of having a child genetically related to one or both of them.’30 
Section 30(1)(b) of the HFEA 1990 stated that ‘the gametes of the husband or the wife, 
or both, were used to bring about the creation of the embryo’, thus confining surrogacy 
to those able to contribute their gametes to the creation of the child. 
In 1998, The Brazier Review also perceived surrogacy as a solution for infertile 
couples to have a genetically related child. It noted that ‘for a parental order to be 
granted in accordance with section 30 of the 1990 Act … a woman undertakes to bear 
a child who is genetically related to at least one of the commissioning couple’.31 The 
Review recognised that there had been occasions where Guardians had doubts about 
whether a genetic relationship to the child exists.32 The Brazier Review was concerned 
that women ‘who are already pregnant may be persuaded to agree to give up the child 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 With gestational surrogacy, donor eggs or the intended mother’s eggs are used to create the 
child. The surrogate does not use her own eggs and is genetically unrelated to the baby.  
28 Section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008. 
29 M Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and other Twentieth Century Tragedies 
(Routledge: New York and London, 1995), p143. 
30 Warnock Report, op cit, n2, 8.13. 
31 Brazier Review, op cit, n4, 7.24. 
32 Ibid. 
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at birth under the cover of an assumed surrogacy arrangement.’33 Furthermore, The 
Brazier Review objected to: 
‘… cases of pre-conceptual arrangements where a surrogate agrees to carry a child 
unrelated to either of the commissioning couple i.e. an embryo created by donor 
gametes. In such a case there would currently be no eligibility for a parental order nor 
do we judge that there should be.’34 
The Review considered that non-genetic surrogacy amounted to pre-natal adoption 
and that ‘surrogacy must not become a device by which to evade adoption laws’.35 To 
ensure that surrogacy was restricted to those where at least one intended parent 
contributes their gametes to the creation of the child, the Brazier Review recommended 
that judges should be able to order DNA tests to establish that a genetic link exists 
between the child and at least one of their intended parents.36 Brazier’s 
recommendation for DNA testing was not adopted by the HFEA 2008 and there is no 
statutory requirement for intended parents to prove that at least one of the applicant’s 
contributed their gametes to the creation of the child.  
In some of the parental order applications decided in the UK, the judiciary have 
demonstrated a willingness to accept, at face value, that section 54(1)(b) has been 
satisfied. This is evident in D and L (Minors) (Surrogacy),37 which concerned a 
surrogacy arrangement entered into by a male same-sex couple using a clinic in India. 
Baker J rejected a suggestion to direct DNA testing to establish that the first Applicant 
was the genetic father of the twins. He stated:  
‘I have given careful consideration to this suggestion but reached a clear conclusion, 
without requiring DNA evidence, that I am satisfied on the evidence that the clinic’s 
account of the circumstances of the twin’s birth is true, that the children were carried 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 In the Matter of D and L (Minors) (Surrogacy) And in The Matter of Human Fertilisation And 
Embryology Act 2008 [2012] EWHC 2631. Hereafter ‘D and L’. 
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by Miss B, that the first Applicant is their father, and that the provisions of section 54 
(1) are satisfied.’38 
Again, in Re C a child39 the criteria in section 54(1)(b) was dealt with quickly.  A letter 
from the applicant’s doctor confirmed ‘A’s genetic connection to C’ and that the 
embryo was ‘created using the gametes of A.’40 It is unclear whether this genetic 
connection was confirmed by DNA testing. Similarly, in WT41 it was accepted that the 
embryo was created with the intended father’s gametes and an egg from an anonymous 
egg donor. No DNA evidence was obtained and instead, Theis J relied on 
documentation from the Clinic which confirmed the biological connection between 
KR and WT.42 Theis J stated that his biological connection ‘clearly manifests KR’s 
ethnicity which I accept as part of the evidential picture in being satisfied that this 
criteria is met (s54(1))’.43 These cases suggest that section 54(1)(b) is not necessarily 
enforced or checked.44 
Since the genetic requirement is not always checked, and intended parents do not need 
to apply for a parental order, doubly-infertile intended parents could enter into a 
surrogacy arrangement regardless and not disclose that neither parent has a genetic 
connection to the child. This could create an environment of secrecy which is not in 
the best interests of the child, an argument that is returned to in the following chapter. 
Since Warnock and Brazier, the predominant view that surrogacy is a solution to have 
a genetic child has shifted. The intended parents interviewed for this project either 
disagreed with the genetic requirement provision altogether or believed that the issue 
needed to be debated more. When asked about the genetic requirement one intended 
mother interviewed for this project, Sophie, said: 
                                                 
38 [24] (Baker J). 
39 [2013] EWHC 2408 (Fam). 
40 [5] (Theis J). 
41 [2014] EWHC 1303 (Fam). 
42 [24] (Theis J). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Where DNA testing has been used, it has usually arisen in international commercial surrogacy 
cases. In Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), DNA testing was needed to 
prove to the immigration authorities that one of the male applicants was the biological father of 
the children. See para [10] (Hedley J). 
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‘It’s just so difficult and so tragic when there’s people who happen to have problems 
at both ends and then you know they’ve got no options to have children… I do feel 
there is a level of unfairness in the law that does need more thought.’45 
The implications of the genetic requirement for doubly-infertile intended parents, and 
the message this creates for how the law values social / psychological parenthood, are 
now discussed.  
(I) Does the Genetic View of Surrogacy Marginalise Other Types of 
Parenthood?  
The South African High Court identified two types of infertility in ‘AB v Minister of 
Social Development (HC)’.46 The first, is ‘conception infertility’, which is the inability 
to contribute one’s own gametes to the creation of an embryo. In respect of the first 
type, ‘conception infertility’, the judgment observed two causes. Firstly, there are 
individuals who ‘may elect not to use their own gametes (although they are able to do 
so) and intend to use both male and female donor gametes’.47 Typically these 
individuals use donors to prevent their prospective child from inheriting a ‘disease or 
disability of which members of the class are likely genetic carriers’.48 Secondly, the 
South African High Court also identified ‘those who are biologically unable to 
contribute their own gametes to conception or are not involved in a sexual relationship 
with a person who is able to make such contribution’.49  
The South African High Court also identified a second type of infertility, ‘pregnancy-
infertility’, which refers to the inability of a woman to procure implantation or to carry 
a pregnancy to full term.50  Where a woman is ‘conception infertile’, but can become 
pregnant, she has recourse to IVF where she can use donor eggs and/ or sperm. By 
contrast, where a woman is both pregnancy and conception infertile, her only option 
                                                 
45 Interview 02IM, recorded on 09/07/16 (on file with the author). 
46 Op cit, n14. 
47 [26] (Basson J). 
48 Ibid. 
49 [27] (Basson J). 
50 [28] (Basson J). 
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is surrogacy using donated gametes. However, in the UK a doubly-infertile couple 
cannot apply for a section 54 parental order because neither intended parent has 
contributed a gamete to the creation of the embryo. In the South African case, the 
claimant ‘AB’ fell into this sub-class: she was both pregnancy and conception infertile. 
Whilst she qualified for surrogacy on the basis of being pregnancy-infertile, ‘she was 
effectively disqualified from using surrogacy because she was also conception-
infertile and therefore unable to establish a genetic link with a prospective child’.51 
It is suggested that section 54 interferes with the procreative choices of couples / 
individuals who are conception and pregnancy infertile. Their inability to apply for a 
parental order is contrary to the three-fold conception of parenthood set out by 
Baroness Hale in Re G,52 where she explained that there are: 
‘At least three ways in which a person may be or become a natural parent of a child, 
each of which may be a very significant factor in the child's welfare, depending upon 
the circumstances of the particular case’.53  
The first is genetic parenthood and the second is gestational. Genetic and gestational 
parenthood does not adequately describe parents who are pregnancy infertile and / or 
conception infertile. Consequently, Baroness Hale acknowledged the importance of 
‘social and psychological’ parenthood. Adopting Goldstein at al., Baroness Hale 
stated that social and psychological parenthood involves: 
‘The relationship which develops through the child demanding and the parent 
providing for the child's needs, initially at the most basic level of feeding, nurturing, 
comforting and loving, and later at the more sophisticated level of guiding, 
socialising, educating and protecting’.54  
Whereas ‘in the great majority of cases, the natural mother combines all three’,55 
Baroness Hale recognised that there are also parents, including those using surrogacy, 
                                                 
51 [29] (Basson J). 
52Op cit, n9. 
53 [33] (Baroness Hale). 
54 [35] (Baroness Hale). 
55 [36] (Baroness Hale). 
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‘who are neither genetic nor gestational, but who have become the psychological 
parents of the child and thus have an important contribution to make to their welfare’.56 
Baroness Hale’s speech confirms that the non-genetic intended parent using surrogacy 
should also be regarded as a natural parent.  
The current emphasis on genetics in section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 could result in the 
non-genetic parent being marginalised where the other intended parent is conception-
fertile and has contributed their sperm/eggs to the embryo. In the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment, CG v CW & G (Children)57 which concerned an appeal by the biological 
mother against an order granting her lesbian partner's application to be the primary 
carer for their two children, Thorpe LJ doubted that a distinction between a biological 
and non-biological parent would be made in a case concerning a family formed with 
the use of donated gametes.58 Thorpe LJ stated: 
 ‘Again, in the case of the male homosexual couple who enter into a surrogacy 
agreement in order to parent, I do not consider that a decisive distinction is to be drawn 
subsequently on the basis that one of the contenders for care supplied the sperm.’59 
However, the fact that the HFEA 2008 only allows a non-genetic parent to apply for a 
parental order if his / her partner has a genetic link to the child, suggests that a 
distinction has already been drawn between a biological intended parent and non-
biological intended parent. The non-genetic parent is marginalised from the very start 
because it is only by virtue of his / her partner that they can apply for a parental order.  
The marginalisation, or differential treatment of the non-genetic parent, is apparent in 
the language used by the judiciary in parental order application cases. In Re F & M,60 
a case discussed in the previous chapters on the ‘relationship provisions’, P and B 
entered into a surrogacy arrangement with a surrogate in Thailand. An embryo was 
implanted into the surrogate, Ps sperm having been fertilised with eggs from an 
                                                 
56 [37] (Baroness Hale). 
57 [2006] EWCA Civ 372. 
58 [41] (Thorpe LJ). 
59 [42] (Thorpe LJ). 
60 Re F & M (Children) (Thai Surrogacy) (Enduring family relationship) [2016] EWHC 1594 
(Fam). 
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anonymous donor.61 As such, P was the children’s biological father and B was the 
second non-biological intended parent. When the couple applied for a parental order, 
the judgment acknowledged the parental role played by the couple. The twins had been 
cared for by the applicants since they were born and for the first ten days of their lives 
the intended parents visited the babies on a daily basis in hospital.62 After that they 
cared for them in Thailand until the children returned with the intended parents to the 
UK on 22 March 2015 on British passports.63 The Parental Order Reporter advised 
that a parental order should be made because the children ‘are much loved and well 
cared for children, who demonstrated an attachment to both [P] and [B].’64  
However, despite the shared parenting role performed by P and B, it is suggested that 
the judgment subtly attaches more importance to P’s biological role:  
‘It is clearly in F and M’s welfare interests for the court to make s.54 Parental Orders. 
The applicants have a relationship with the children as their parents (P is their 
biological as well as their physiological and emotional parent) and it is necessary to 
make the parental orders to give legal effect and recognition to the children’s 
identities’.65 
The special attention paid to P’s two categories of parenthood (biological and 
emotional / social) suggests that there is an implicit hierarchy of parenthood, whereby 
the parent who satisfies genetic or gestational parenthood is perceived to be superior 
to the ‘psychological’ or ‘social’ parent. It is disappointing that Re F & M did not pay 
special attention to B’s psychological and social parenthood, and the value this would 
also bring to the children’s identities. The judgment fails to recognise Thorpe LJ’s 
comments in CG v CW & G (Children),66 where he stated that where the care of the 
                                                 
61 [3] (Russell J). 
62 [7] (Russell J). 
63 [7] (Russell J). 
64 [7] (Russell J). 
65 [47] (Russell J). 
66 Op cit, n57. 
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new born and developing baby is shared, the children will not distinguish between one 
parent and the other on the grounds of biological relationship.67  
In the event of a dispute between two intended parents, or the intended parents and the 
surrogate, Lord Nicholls’ suggestion in Re G68 that ‘a child should not be removed 
from the primary care of his or her biological parents without compelling reason’69 
raises uncertainty for the non-genetic intended parent.  In CW v NT and another,70 the 
child’s biological intended father applied for a residence order. The parties had entered 
into a surrogacy agreement, but following the birth of the child, the surrogate refused 
to hand her over. The child’s welfare required that she remain with the surrogate. 
Baker J was satisfied that the surrogate ‘would foster contact and a close relationship 
between the child and her father’.71 Presumably, the child would also be spending time 
with the intended mother whilst in the care of her biological father, yet the judgment 
did not mention the surrogate’s need to foster a relationship between the child and Mrs 
W (the intended mother), thereby failing to acknowledge Mrs W’s role as a social 
parent. The judgment reveals another problem with the HFEA 2008’s current 
definition of parenthood. The surrogate is referred to as ‘the mother’ throughout the 
judgment because according to section 33 HFEA 2008, the child’s legal mother is the 
gestational parent. This leaves no room for Mrs W’s role to develop as the child’s 
psychological parent. When a dispute arises, the legislation should not marginalise the 
parent without a genetic and gestational claim. Mrs W was responsible for instigating 
the surrogacy arrangement and planned to raise the resulting child. The subsequent 
breakdown between the intended parents and surrogate should not mean the non-
genetic intended parent is excluded from future involvement with the child. The 
following section considers in more detail whether, and if so how, the genetic 
requirement violates the Articles 8 and 14 ECHR.  
                                                 
67 [44] (Thorpe LJ). 
68 Op cit, n9. 
69 [2] (Lord Nicholls).  
70 [2011] EWHC 33. 
71 [73] (Baker J). 
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4.3 What are the Human Rights Implications of the ‘Genetic 
Requirement’ for Non-Genetic Intended Parents? 
The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed in its previous decisions that 
‘family life’, for the purposes of Article 8, does not require a genetic tie. This was 
confirmed in X. Y. & Z. v. United Kingdom,72 where it was held that the relationship 
between a transgender man (X) and his child (Z) born to his female partner (Y) by 
artificial insemination by donor (AID) amounted to family life within the meaning of 
Article 8, despite the absence of a genetic link between X and his child. The Court 
noted that ‘X was involved throughout that [AID] process and has acted as Z’s “father” 
in every respect since the birth ... In these circumstances, the Court considers that de 
facto family ties link the three applicants’.73 In Paradiso and Campanelli74 however, 
the Grand Chamber found that no family life (de facto or otherwise) existed between 
a child and his genetically unrelated intended parents. The Grand Chamber’s 
restrictive definition of family life in the case is criticised next, and the implications 
for non-genetic surrogacy families are discussed.  
 (I) The Chamber’s Decision in Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy 
In January 2015, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment 
concerning a married couple, Ms Paradiso and Mr Campanelli, who were both Italian 
nationals.75 The couple entered into a commercial surrogacy arrangement with a 
surrogate in Russia and in accordance with Russian law, the intended parents were 
registered as the child’s legal parents.76 In Italy, the intended parents applied for the 
registration of the birth of their child but their request was refused on the grounds that 
the birth documents failed to disclose that the child had been born as a result of a 
surrogacy arrangement.77  
                                                 
72 Reports 1997-II no. 35 at para. 619, (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 143. 
73 [37]. 
74 Op cit, n6. 
75 Ibid. 
76 [6], [7]. 
77 [10], [12]. 
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It also transpired that Mr Campanelli was not the child’s genetic father. The couple 
believed that Mr Campanelli’s genetic material had been transported to Russia, 
fertilised with donated eggs and transferred to the surrogate. However, DNA testing 
revealed that Mr Campanelli was not in fact the child’s genetic father. This is distinct 
from a situation where both parties are doubly-infertile (i.e. unable to carry a 
pregnancy to term or contribute any genetic material). Mr Campanelli could contribute 
his genetic material, but an error had occurred in the Russian clinic in that his seminal 
fluid had not been used. As Ms Paradiso was not the child’s genetic mother, neither 
parent had a genetic link to the child. The Italian Youth court decided that the child 
should be immediately removed from the couple,78 not only given the lack of the 
genetic relationship between the intended parents and the child, but also because of 
‘doubt on whether they [the intended parents] were genuinely capable of providing 
emotional and educational support’.79  
The baby was removed from his intended parent’s care and placed in a children’s home 
in a locality unknown to the intended parents.80 The applicants were also forbidden 
from having contact with the child.81 It is difficult to conceive how this was in the best 
interests of the child who had been raised by his social parents from the moment of 
his birth. The baby was then entrusted to foster parents and left without a formal 
identity.82 This had a ‘significant impact on administrative matters: it was unclear 
under what name the child was to be registered for school, for vaccination records, or 
for residence’.83 The minors’ court declared that the intended parents could not adopt 
the child because they were neither parents nor relatives of the child.84 Therefore, the 
child who had grown up with his social parents for eight months, had his family life 
disrupted because of the Italian court’s narrow, genetic view of parenthood.  
                                                 
78 [22]. 
79 [22].  
80 The children’s rights implications of this are critiqued in the following chapter. 
81 [23]. 
82 [33]. 
83 Ibid. 
84 [30]. The charges under section 72 of Law no. 184/1983 deprived the applicants of the possibility 
of fostering (affido) the child and of adopting him or other minors. 
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Aggrieved by these events, the intended parents lodged an application with the 
European Court, relying on Article 8 ECHR. They complained that the refusal to 
recognise the legal parent-child relationship and the removal of the child from their 
care violated their right to respect for private and family life.85 The Court dismissed 
the complaint relating to the Italian authorities’ refusal to register the child’s birth 
certificate, ‘finding that the applicants had not exhausted available domestic 
remedies’.86 Nevertheless, the Court of First Instance upheld the second complaint, 
the removal of the child from the intended parent’s care. It observed that: 
‘“Family life” for the purposes of Article 8 existed between the child and the intended 
parents of whom neither was the child’s genetic parent but who had acted as parents 
and cared for the child for the first six months of his life’.87  
In reaching the conclusion that the applicant’s Article 8 ECHR right(s) had been 
violated, ‘it took into account the fact that the applicants had shared with the child the 
first important stages of his young life, and that they had acted as parents towards the 
child’.88 This mirrors Baroness Hale’s three-fold conception of parenthood in Re G 
and her endorsement of social and psychological parenthood as a form of natural 
parenthood. In practice however, the finding did little to protect the couple’s right to 
rear their child – which is a fundamental aspect of procreative liberty according to 
Robertson89 – because the ruling did not oblige the Italian authorities to return the 
child to the physical care of the intended parents. This is because ‘the little boy had 
undoubtedly developed emotional ties with his foster family’ in the meantime. 90  
(II) Consequences of the Grand Chamber’s Biological Primacy 
Approach for Non-Genetic Surrogacy Families?  
                                                 
85 [3] 
86 [62], [90]. 
87 [86], [87]. 
88 [69]. 
89 Nevertheless, Robertson explains that ‘reproduction is having or rearing offspring with one’s 
own genes’. Op cit, n24, p4 (emphasis added). 
90 [88]. 
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In comparison to the Chamber’s judgment, the Grand Chamber found that no ‘family 
life’, for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR, existed between the couple and the child. 
This was despite the fact that ‘the child had been born as the result of a serious and 
duly considered parental project’,91 and had been looked after by the applicants as 
soon as he was born.92 The Grand Chamber refused to find that de facto family life 
existed on the basis that the relationship between the applicants and child was 
‘tenuous’93 because there was no biological link between the parents and child. This 
narrow biological view of parenthood completely ignores the social and psychological 
parental role performed by the applicants: the first applicant, following the child’s 
birth, ‘had rapidly taken him into her care and had taken up residence with him in a 
flat in Moscow, forming strong emotional bonds’.94 Moreover, on the child’s arrival 
in Italy he ‘lived with the applicants in an environment which, both materially and 
emotionally, was welcoming, secure and conducive to his harmonious development’.95  
The Grand Chamber also suggested that no family life existed between the applicants 
and child, because they had not lived together for a long enough period. This overlooks 
the fact that the ‘abrupt termination of their cohabitation arose solely from the 
measures taken by the Italian authorities’ and not the applicants’.96  The Grand 
Chamber’s arbitrary approach to duration is also contrary to the Court’s previous 
decisions in Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy97 and Kopf and Liberda v. Austria,98 where 
family life was held to exist between foster parents who had cared for a child on a 
temporary basis.99 In Moretti, the Court attached importance to the fact that ‘the child 
had arrived in the family at the age of one month and that, for nineteen months, the 
applicants had shared the first important stages of his young life’.100 The child was 
                                                 
91 [106]. 
92 [106]. 
93 [211]. 
94 [106]. 
95 Ibid. 
96 [106]. 
97 No. 16318/07, para [48], 27 April 2010. 
98 No. 1598/06, para [37], 17 January 2012. 
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100 Ibid. 
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also well integrated in the family and deeply attached to the applicants and their 
children.  
If these factors were sufficient for ‘de facto’ “family ties” in Moretti, then surely ‘de 
facto’ family life should have been established in Paradiso, where the child had lived 
with applicants since birth; the family lived together for eight months, including six 
months in Italy;101 and this period ‘corresponded to the first important stages in the 
child’s young life’.102 The applicants had forged close emotional bonds with the child 
in the first stages of his life, the strength of which was, clear from the report drawn up 
by the team of social workers.103 Moreover, as the dissenting judgment in Paradiso 
recognised, ‘the cohabitation started from the very day the child was born, lasted until 
the child was removed from the applicants, and would have continued indefinitely if 
the authorities had not intervened to bring it to an end’.104 Instead of focusing on the 
quality of personal ties between the social and psychological parents and child, the 
Grand Chamber arbitrarily focused on the absence of a biological link and the duration 
of the cohabitation. The Grand Chamber suggested that duration is worth less in a 
family with no biological ties and more where at least one of the parents has a genetic 
connection to the child:  
‘It is true that, in the present case, the duration of cohabitation with the child was 
longer than that in the case of D. and Others v. Belgium … in which the Court held 
that family life, protected by Article 8, had existed for only two months before the 
temporary separation of a Belgian couple and a child born in Ukraine to a surrogate 
mother. In that case, however, there was a biological tie with at least one of the parents 
and cohabitation had subsequently resumed.’105 
The Grand Chamber should not have held that biological families deserve more 
protection over non-biological families. Its narrow conception of ‘family life’ is an 
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anomaly when viewed alongside the extensive definition given to family life in its 
previous decisions. As the minority opinion points out: 
 ‘… While biological ties between those who act as parents and a child may be a very 
important indication of the existence of family life, the absence of such ties does not 
necessarily mean that there is no family life.’106 
The ECtHR previously accepted in Nazarenko v. Russia107 that the relationship 
between a man and a child, who had very close personal ties and believed for years 
that they were father and daughter, until it was eventually revealed that the man was 
not the child’s biological father, amounted to family life. The minority in Paradiso 
also refer to Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg,108 Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy,109 
and Kopf and Liberda v. Austria110 which affirm that ‘it is the existence of genuine 
personal ties that is important, not the existence of biological ties or of a recognised 
legal tie’.111  
Mulligan suggests that the Grand Chamber’s decision in Paradiso protects ‘the 
entitlement of Member States to take robust action to deal with an illegal surrogacy 
arrangement after the child is born’.112 However, this ‘robust action’, including 
denying recognition of the legal parent-child relationship, ‘seems to be conﬁned to 
circumstances in which there is no genetic link between the intended parents and the 
child.’113 One of the implications of the Grand Chamber’s decision is to project a 
message across member states that it is legitimate to punish non-genetic intended 
parents (who circumvent national laws and enter commercial arrangements overseas) 
by denying a finding of ‘family life’. The Grand Chamber should not have used its 
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objections to cross-border surrogacy to dictate that only biological surrogacy families 
deserve Article 8 protection and non-genetic surrogacy families do not. The judgment 
ultimately makes a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate families, ‘a 
distinction that was rejected by the Court many years ago’114 in Marckx v. Belgium.115 
It is argued that section 54(1)(b) makes the same distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate families by choosing to exclude doubly-infertile intended parents from 
applying for a parental order. The decision shows the problems with a narrow view of 
procreative rights.  
4.4 Is the Genetic Requirement Discriminatory? Lessons from South 
Africa:  
It is suggested that the exclusion of doubly-infertile intended parents from applying 
for a parental order in the UK is also discriminatory. For Article 14 ECHR to apply, 
the difference in treatment must relate to a substantive Convention right; in this 
context, Article 8. In 1976, the ECtHR decided in Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and 
Pedersen,116 that a difference in treatment must be based on ‘a personal characteristic 
(‘status’) by which persons or groups of persons are distinguishable from each other’.25 
It is argued that a person’s fertility is a personal characteristic by which groups of 
people can be distinguished. In any event, subsequent judgments illustrate that the 
European Court will render Article 14 applicable to a difference in treatment that is 
not based on a ‘personal’ characteristic.117  
Considering fertility is a personal characteristic, denying a parental order to those who 
are doubly-infertile and have no genetic connection to their child invokes Article 14 
ECHR. In the context of surrogacy, Article 14 has already been invoked in Re Z (A 
Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Parental Order),118 and In the 
Matter of Z (A Child) (No. 2),119 which concerned a ‘personal characteristic’ or 
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‘status’, namely, the applicant’s relationship status. Article 14 was invoked because 
the single parent’s Article 8 right had been violated on the basis of a difference in 
treatment; being single was a status within Article 14. By analogy, it is suggested that 
infertility (including double-infertility, which is the inability to gestate and contribute 
gametes) should also be considered a ‘status’ within Article 14 ECHR. The exclusion 
of non-genetic intended parents operates on the sole basis of the couple’s infertility, 
as compared to those who can contribute gametes and qualify for a parental order.  
A similar argument was made by the South African High Court in ‘AB v Minister of 
Social Development (HC)’.120 where a corresponding provision was ruled 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the, ‘applicant’s rights to equality, 
dignity, reproductive health care, autonomy and privacy’.121 The Constitutional Court 
of South Africa was asked to confirm the validity of the High Court’s decision but in 
a judgment delivered in November 2016, the majority, led by Nkabinde J, refused. 
Taking a different stance to the High Court, Nkabinde J found the genetic link 
requirement to be constitutional.122 For the purposes of this chapter, the contrasting 
judgments are extremely insightful and are used to consider whether the UK’s 
corresponding provision discriminates against doubly-infertile intended parents.   
(I) Discrimination against a ‘Subclass’  
‘AB v Minister of Social Development (HC)’123 and ‘AB and Another (CC)’,124 
concerned a woman, AB, who was ‘conception and pregnancy infertile’,125 (i.e. 
doubly-infertile).  Between 2001 and 2011 she underwent 18 unsuccessful IVF 
cycles.126  In 2001, AB unsuccessfully attempted to fall pregnant by undergoing two 
cycles of IVF treatment using her own ova and her then-husband’s sperm.127 After the 
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second cycle failed, AB’s gynaecologist advised her that she could no longer supply 
her own gametes for the purpose of conceiving a child.128 Therefore, AB undertook 
two further unsuccessful IVF cycles using anonymous donor ova and the sperm of her 
then-husband.129 After 20 years of marriage, AB’s relationship with her husband 
ended in divorce in 2002, but ‘this did not weaken her resolve to have a child’.130  She 
used anonymous donor ova as well as donor sperm nine times, on each occasion 
unsuccessfully.131 In 2009, AB switched fertility clinics and a further five IVF cycles 
resulted in AB falling pregnant on two occasions, each time ending in miscarriage.132  
Following her second miscarriage, AB was informed that the chances of successful 
conception by way of IVF treatment had become ‘highly improbable if not impossible’ 
and that she was ‘permanently and irreversibly infertile in two different senses: first, 
she is unable to contribute her own gametes for conception; and second, she is unable 
to carry a pregnancy to term’.133 AB looked into surrogacy as a means to have a child 
and a potential surrogate agreed to act for her.134  As a single woman unable to donate 
her own ova, ‘the only way for AB to proceed was to use both donor ova and donor 
sperm, as she had done over the course of the last 14 of the total of 18 IVF cycles she 
had undergone’.135  However, on consulting an attorney, AB was informed that ‘as a 
single woman incapable of donating a gamete, AB could not legally enter into a 
surrogacy agreement because of section 294 of the Children’s Act’136 which sets as a 
requirement that a genetic link to the intended parent(s) exists. 
In light of AB’s dilemma, she approached the High Court of South Africa seeking an 
order declaring section 294 of the Children’s Act inconsistent with the Constitution 
and invalid.137 The applicants’ successful constitutional challenge in the High Court 
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was grounded in the assertion that section 294 violated the rule of law, as well as the 
rights to equality, human dignity, reproductive autonomy, privacy and access to 
healthcare.138 Basson J was of the view that: 
‘[T]he genetic requirement in the context of surrogacy infringes on the constitutional 
right to make decisions concerning reproduction and consequently also constitute a 
violation of the human dignity of members of a class.’ 139 
It can be deduced from the High Court judgment (and the minority judgment from the 
Constitutional Court) that the provision was unconstitutional on the basis that section 
294 of the Children’s Act discriminated against a particular sub-class of infertile 
people, namely those who are both conception and pregnancy infertile (i.e. ‘doubly-
infertile).140 Where a woman is both pregnancy and conception infertile, her only 
option is surrogacy using donated gametes. In the South African case, AB was both 
pregnancy and conception infertile. Whilst she qualified for surrogacy on the basis of 
being pregnancy-infertile, ‘she was effectively disqualified from using surrogacy 
because she was also conception-infertile and therefore unable to establish a genetic 
link with a prospective child’.141 The High Court held that the differentiation based on 
the genetic link requirement constitutes discrimination because it has the effect of 
excluding members of the subclass ‘from accessing surrogate motherhood as a 
reproductive avenue’.142  The minority judgment delivered by the South African 
Constitutional Court similarly found the provision to be discriminatory on the same 
basis.  
It is submitted that the corresponding provision in section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008, could 
be in violation of Article 14 ECHR if double-infertility (conception and pregnancy 
infertility) amounts to a status within the Convention.  In the UK, the genetic link 
requirement has the effect of completely excluding pregnancy and conception infertile 
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people from applying for a parental order, thus dissuading this group of prospective 
parents from considering surrogacy as a reproductive avenue.  
(II) Discrimination between Families Created through IVF and 
Surrogacy 
The genetic relatedness requirement in section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 is discriminatory 
on the additional basis that it differentiates between those unable to contribute a 
gamete to the conception of a child and intend to use IVF, and those unable to 
contribute a gamete to the conception of a child and intend to use surrogacy.143 Where 
a couple, or individual, are pregnancy fertile but conception infertile, they can choose 
to use IVF using a donated embryo. Using donated eggs and / or sperm may be 
recommended for women with blocked or damaged fallopian tubes, people with 
unexplained fertility problems, men with low sperm count and older women.144 
Therefore, conception infertile men and women have recourse to double-donation IVF 
and there is no requirement for either parent to have a genetic link to the child. One 
intended mother interviewed for this project, Lauren, was also critical of the genetic 
requirement and noted how the law discriminates between infertile people using IVF 
and those using surrogacy: 
‘I don’t see why you should be discriminated against if you’re doubly-infertile. I think 
it’s insulting to donor conceived families to assume that if you’ve not got a genetic 
connection you’re less of a parent to your child. I also think, why should surrogacy 
be an exception … if double donation is ok for IVF then why is it not ok for 
surrogacy?’145 
It has been suggested that requiring a genetic link between parents and child in the 
case of surrogacy, but not IVF, is justified because with IVF the mother still gestates 
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the child. This argument is evident in the Constitutional Court’s majority judgment in 
AB and Another: 
‘… the procedures in respect of IVF and surrogacy differ substantially.  In relation to 
the former, although the “host mother” may not necessarily be the genetic mother of 
the child she retains a gestational link to the child as a result of carrying the child.  In 
regard to surrogacy a genetic link is created between the child-to-be and the 
commissioning parents or parent.’146  
The majority were of the view that ‘[t]he gestational link is considered emotionally 
significant as it allows the woman to feel that the child is ‘hers’ and that she is a 
‘normal’ mother who conceived ‘naturally’.’147  This is problematic because, as the 
minority of the Constitutional Court observed, it ‘entrenches certain “normal” kinds 
of family life …The implication is that the mother of an adopted child should not feel 
that she is a “normal” mother’.148 It implies that when a woman uses IVF, her 
gestational role makes her a ‘normal’ mother because she has compensated for being 
unable to contribute her genetics. It is unacceptable to suggest that mothers who have 
used IVF only have a claim to parenthood because of their gestational contribution. 
This completely undervalues her psychological and social role as a parent and 
undervalues the second parent involved in double-donor IVF / surrogacy, who will not 
have gestated the child nor contributed eggs / sperm. This reasoning suggests that the 
second parent is not a ‘real’ parent because he / she did not have any gestational or 
genetic role.  
It is argued that the procreative decisions of doubly-infertile intended parents aiming 
to use surrogacy should be respected. One potential solution is to allow intended 
parents using double-donor surrogacy to apply for a parental order, providing it would 
not harm the child.149 Deleting section 54(1)(b) would remove the unjustified 
discrimination encountered by doubly-infertile people and send a valuable message 
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that social and psychological parenthood is just as important as gestational and genetic 
parenthood. 
4.5 Challenging the ‘Adopt Instead’ Argument: Exploring why Double-
Donor Surrogacy is a Procreative Choice 
At the crux of the discrimination preventing doubly infertile intended parents from 
applying for a parental order, is the assumption that non-genetic intended parents may 
as well use adoption. The ‘adopt instead’ argument is problematic because it assumes 
that becoming the parent of a genetically unrelated child by means of adoption 
is ‘functionally equivalent to becoming the parent of a child genetically unrelated to 
oneself by means of surrogacy’.150 Section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 effectively dictates 
that doubly-infertile couples should adopt rather than use double-donor surrogacy, 
thus severely limiting the procreative choices of the doubly-infertile. Although 
adoption and double-donor surrogacy can ‘both result in a person becoming the parent 
of a child unrelated to them, what this entails may be radically different’.151 The ‘adopt 
instead’ argument ignores the procreative input doubly-infertile intended parents can 
have in the surrogacy context. The following section draws upon empirical work 
carried out for this thesis, which shows how the processes relating to surrogacy are 
unique and differ greatly from adoption.  
The ‘adopt instead’ argument also ignores the fact that a doubly-infertile couple / 
individual may not want to adopt a child or be in a position to do so. There are many 
barriers facing adoptive parents in the UK, including emotional and practical. 
Considering how different double-donor surrogacy and adoption are, the ‘adopt 
instead’ argument should not be taken seriously and doubly-infertile intended parents 
should be allowed to use surrogacy and apply for a parental order.  
(I) Comparing Surrogacy and Adoption Processes: Conception, 
Surrogate Selection and Pregnancy  
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Although the end result of adoption and double-donor surrogacy is that a person / 
couple becomes the legal parent of a child genetically unrelated to them, the nature of 
the relationship between the parents and child is substantially different. This is 
observed by Khampepe J in his minority judgment in the South African’s 
Constitutional Court’s decision, AB and Another:152 
‘In the case of double-donor surrogacy, an emotional link develops between 
commissioning parent and child through the choices that the commissioning parent 
makes before conception, at conception, and during pregnancy’.153   
By contrast, the emotional link that develops between parent and adoptive child, ‘is of 
an entirely different nature’.154 With surrogacy, the intended parents are ‘involved at 
various stages in the creation of a child’,155 including gamete selection, which ‘causes 
prospective parents – particularly non-biological parents – to feel that they are 
contributing to the process of procreation’.156 Although the intended parent is not a 
gestational or genetic parent, ‘gamete donor selection by the prospective parents 
establishes a positive psychological link between the prospective parents and their 
prospective child...’.157 
The empirical work carried out for this thesis confirms Khampepe J’s argument that 
the processes involved in double-donor surrogacy are radically different from 
adoption. One mother, Liz, who had twins through surrogacy was interviewed about 
her experiences as the non-genetic parent. She explained that she was very involved 
in the selection of donor eggs, which were fertilised with her husband’s sperm. The 
husband’s genetic connection to the children meant they could apply for a parental 
order. However, after the award of the parental order the intended parents separated, 
and Liz now has sole care of the children. She explained that she was involved in 
selecting the donor eggs and used a company in California. She chose someone ‘who’d 
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done it twice before and who did it for ethical reasons’.158 Although Liz never met the 
egg donor, she had a portfolio of her. Liz explained that she knew everything about 
the egg donor, including ‘what her Grandparents died of and pages and pages of 
pictures of her growing up’.159 Although Liz does not have a genetic link to her 
children, she contributed to the process of procreation by involving herself in the egg 
donor selection process. The ‘adopt instead’ argument does not stand up to scrutiny 
considering how intended parents can be involved in the conception of the chid, 
whereas adoptive parents cannot.  
Furthermore, with double-donor surrogacy the intended parents have a role in 
selecting the surrogate. As Khampepe J observes in ‘AB and Another’, ‘this process 
occurs before conception, and can radically alter how the commissioning parent and 
prospective child relate once the child is born.’160 This process does not happen with 
adoption. A further difference between the processes involving adoption and 
surrogacy, is that parents using surrogacy are often intimately involved in the 
pregnancy. In one study, Jadva et al. asked the surrogate mothers how involved the 
intended mother and father had been during the pregnancy.161 This was rated according 
to one of three categories for mothers and fathers separately: ‘no or little involvement’; 
‘moderately involved’; and ‘very involved’.162 ‘No or little involvement’ was coded 
when the intended parent ‘had very little contact with the surrogate mother during her 
pregnancy’.163 ‘Moderately involved’ was coded when the intended parent ‘showed 
some interest in the pregnancy by attending some scans or antenatal appointments’,164 
and a rating of  ‘very involved’ was coded when the intended parent ‘attended all of 
the scans or were aware of all the appointments and would discuss the appointments 
with the surrogate mother if unable to attend’.165 The results showed that the surrogates 
felt the vast majority (83%) of intended mothers were ‘very involved’ with the 
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pregnancy, with 17% of surrogates reporting that the intended mother had been 
‘moderately involved’.166 
This corresponds with the empirical findings of this thesis, where most of the intended 
parents reported being ‘very involved’ in the surrogate’s pregnancy. One of the 
intended mothers, Liz, who selected the egg donor from California was very involved 
in the pregnancy despite the two surrogates living in another country (India). The 
surrogates had ‘3D scans every two weeks’ and they were all emailed over to Liz 
which meant she was a part of the pregnancy despite living on the other side of the 
world. A second intended mother, Sophie, had a child through surrogacy and was 
interviewed for this project. She reported being very involved in the pregnancy and 
described herself as ‘lucky’ because she ‘went to every single appointment, even the 
ones towards the end where you just go to see the midwife and you’re with them for 
20 minutes’.167 Sophie was ‘there for everything’168 and when she saw her surrogate, 
Sophie explained it was like ‘seeing the baby and it helped me to…bond with the baby 
and feel like we were having a child’.169 Being so involved in the pregnancy was 
important for the intended mother because: 
‘Obviously not having a bump, not being visibly pregnant sometimes it doesn’t feel 
very real and actually seeing [the surrogate] and being involved as much as possible 
in the process helped me feel bonded...’.170 
During the pregnancy Sophie and her surrogate ‘were in touch almost every single day 
and she [the surrogate] was sending me little updates like the baby’s kicking or he’s 
particularly active today…’.171 Gemma, an intended mother who was single and had 
no genetic link to her child, also reported feeling very involved in the surrogate’s 
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pregnancy: ‘I’ve not missed anything I almost feel like I’ve been pregnant myself 
really! It’s been a different experience.’172 This type of involvement in the pregnancy 
is not something adoptive parents have the opportunity to do with their adopted 
children. These empirical insights suggest that double-donor surrogacy should be 
brought within the scope of Robertson’s procreative liberty framework. Although it 
does not concern genetic procreation, the activities the intended parents are involved 
with before the child is born are connected to the process of procreation. 
Another difference between (double-donor) surrogacy and adoption, is that with the 
former the intended parents and surrogate have the opportunity to remain in each 
other’s lives after the child is born. Sophie and her surrogate decided to have contact 
afterwards because she: 
 ‘Always felt very strongly that my son should have contact with [the surrogate] and 
her family because that’s a part of his history and I’d never want to deny him of 
that…’.173 
After Sophie’s child was born, she sent the surrogate ‘pictures regularly and little 
updates on how he was doing’.174 As will be seen in chapter 6, this long-term contact 
is likely to be facilitated by organisations like COTS and SUK. Lauren, who used 
SUK, explained that the ethos of the organisation is ‘surrogacy through friendship and 
the emphasis is on the relationship between the surrogate and the intended parents and 
investing in a genuine bond’.175 She and her husband met their surrogate at a social 
and described the experience in the following way: 
‘It felt like meeting my husband in a way, like meeting ‘the one’, we just instantly 
connected and knew there was something very special in the relationship.’176 
Lauren and her husband Zak then got to know the surrogate other over a six-month 
period, ‘hanging out, getting to know each other’s family and met each other’s 
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extended family: brothers, sisters, mums, dads, cousins.... Just getting to know each 
other really and building up trust.’177 This is less likely to happen with adoption where 
the mother giving her child up for adoption is unknown to the adopters. As such, ‘there 
are important psychological differences between becoming a parent through adoption, 
and having a child through surrogacy’,178 so it is not the case that the doubly-infertile 
may as well adopt.   
Overall, the processes involving double-donor surrogacy and adoption are completely 
different. With surrogacy, the intended parents have the opportunity select donors and 
a surrogate, be highly involved in the pregnancy and maintain contact with the 
surrogate, and her family, afterwards. Therefore, ‘having a child using double-donor 
surrogacy is thus not merely a difference in mechanics’.179  As Khampepe J notes in 
AB and Another ‘CC’, ‘we must show equal respect to these different mechanisms of 
forming a family.’180 Adoption is not a less-optimal way of having a family. Rather, 
double-donor surrogacy and adoption are different, and we should let individuals 
decide how they want to create a family. A parental order (as opposed to an adoption 
order) is the most appropriate order for double-donor surrogacy because it reflects how 
the child has deliberately been brought into existence as a result of the intended 
parent’s intention and procreative input, and the surrogate’s intention to become 
pregnant with the purpose of handing the child over to the intended parents. Double-
donor surrogacy is therefore distinct from pre-natal adoption because the surrogate 
must have the intention to have a child for the purposes of surrogacy before any 
fertility treatment takes place. 
(II) Judging the Procreative Choices of Doubly-Infertile people? 
Section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 effectively leaves doubly-infertile couples no option 
other than to adopt. It is suggested that behind this provision lies a deep-rooted view 
that adoption is the only appropriate method of family-building for those who cannot 
                                                 
177 Ibid. 
178,AB and Another (CC), op cit n15. Para [180] Khampepe J. 
179 [185] Khampepe J. 
180 [180] Khampepe J. 
140 
 
contribute their gametes to the creation of the child. Worryingly, there is a view that 
when doubly-infertile people choose to pursue ARTs and surrogacy over adoption, 
they are somehow selfish. This view is fuelled by commentators including Batholet 
who suggests that: 
 ‘[i]f we genuinely cared about children's interests, we would focus on finding 
adoptive homes for existing children in need rather than on creating new made-to-
order adoptees for adults in need.’181 
This suggests that doubly-infertile people who choose to have a child through 
surrogacy cannot really care about children, otherwise they would have chosen 
adoption. Appleton and Pollak similarly note that law and popular culture ‘view 
adoption through a humanitarian lens that depicts selfless adults welcoming parentless 
children into their homes and hearts’.182 By contrast, there is a ‘popular understanding 
of assisted reproduction, including IVF, whose users are often depicted as self-
indulgent shoppers for “designer babies” or “insta-famil[ies].’183  
This view has been compounded by the Grand Chamber in Paradiso, which made 
‘accommodating reference’184 to the Italian court’s suggestion that the applicants were 
using the child as an instrument to: 
‘Fulfil a narcissistic desire … or to exorcise an individual or joint problem. 
Furthermore, it … doubted whether they [the applicants] displayed the “instinct of 
human solidarity which must be present in any person wishing to bring the children 
of others into their lives as their own children” ’.185 
The Grand Chamber did not criticise or speak out against this unjustified attack on the 
procreative choices of the applicants. In failing to do so, the Grand Chamber have 
                                                 
181 Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption, Infertility, and the New World of Child 
Production (Houghton Mifflin 1999). p 226. See also, D Friedrich, ‘A Duty to Adopt?’ Journal of 
Applied Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2013, which makes the case for a general duty to adopt. 
182 S Frelich Appleton and R A. Pollak, ‘Response Exploring the Connections Between Adoption 
and IVF: Twibling Analyses’, Minnesota Law Review Headnotes, 2011 (95:60), 60-80, p 65. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Op cit, n6. Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Lazarova Trajkovska, Bianku, Laffranque, 
Lemmens and Grozev, [12], p72. 
185 [207]. 
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compounded the view that non-genetic intended parents pursuing ARTs, over 
adoption, are ‘narcissistic’ monsters lacking ‘human solidarity’. The same criticism is 
not levelled at those who can conceive and have children naturally; fertile people also 
have the chance to adopt an existing child but there is no suggestion that their decision 
to have a child naturally is a selfish/ ‘narcissistic desire’. Change must come from the 
European Court to respect all forms of parenthood.  
Furthermore, even where an infertile person wants to adopt a child, rather than choose 
surrogacy, this option may be frustrated due to barriers facing adoptive parents. The 
number of children available for adoption in the UK is limited.186 Those seeking 
adoption also face hurdles of ‘suitability.’ One intended mother, Rosie, had a child 
through surrogacy. She had ten rounds of IVF to try to conceive but her doctors found 
that she had a condition in her uterus which meant she lost the pregnancies at a very 
early stage. Rosie and her husband then looked into adoption, however, she found that 
would be very difficult because of health conditions that she and her husband had. 
Therefore, even where adoption is the individual’s preferred choice before surrogacy, 
adoption law and regulation does not necessarily facilitate this choice.  
A 2010 study into adopters’ experiences of being recruited found that over a quarter 
of respondents (27percent) were actively turned away from applying from the agencies 
they approached, with 29 percent saying there were turned away from three or more 
agencies. One couple were told they were, ‘… too young, didn’t look married, didn’t 
look as if we are in a committed relationship and didn’t live in the area.’187 Another 
lesbian couple felt that ‘one authority was not interested in accepting us due to our 
sexuality’.188 Another respondent ‘walked away from the local authority as it was 
                                                 
186 Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England (including adoption), year ending 
31 March 2017’, available at, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads 
/attachment_data/file/664995/SFR50_2017-Children_looked_after_in_England.pdf (last accessed 
04/04/18). 
187 Adoption UK, ‘Waiting to be parents: adopters’ experiences of being recruited’, available at. < 
https:// www.adoptionuk.org/sites/default/files/articles/Waiting%20to%20be%20Parents%20-
%20Adopters %27%20Experiences%20of%20Being%20Recruited.pdf> (last accessed 04/04/18). 
188 Ibid. 
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made clear that couples who applied were priority over singles.’189 Addressing the 
problems with adoption practices are beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the 
study demonstrates how adoption is not always a choice, even for parents who want 
to pursue that route over surrogacy. 
Furthermore, not everyone wants to adopt a child, or is able to do so. Some of the 
intended parents interviewed for this project explained that they thought about 
adoption before choosing surrogacy. Sophie wanted to use surrogacy, rather than 
adoption, so that she and her husband: 
‘Could raise [the child] from birth…so kind of imprinting on them our love and values 
right from the beginning rather than…meeting a child when there is already kind of 
problems and then you’re trying to help them recover from that’. 
As noted by Blake et al., children available for adoption in the UK ‘have generally 
been removed from their parents by state intervention, usually on the grounds of abuse 
or neglect, and typically will also have spent time in foster care before adoption’.190 
Therefore, by the time the child is adopted, he / she ‘may well have had troubled and 
changing social relationships which may adversely affect their development and well-
being’.191 Not everyone is in a position to deal with these issues and become an 
adoptive parent. Feeling unequipped to be an adoptive mother was what motivated 
another intended parent, Lauren, to use surrogacy: she ‘knew absolutely that I would 
want to care for a child from the moment that they were born and for that child’s 
identity to have always been a part of my family as me with the mother.’192 Lauren 
thought about adoption but decided against that road to parenthood; she did not feel 
‘equipped to give a child through adoption the proper care having not been a parent 
before and all the issues that can come and I didn’t think that would be fair.’193 Since 
                                                 
189 Ibid. 
190 L Blake, M Richards and S Golombok, ‘The Families of Assisted Reproduction and Adoption’, 
in Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges, Françoise Baylis and Carolyn McLeod, 
(Oxford University Press, 2014). P65. 
191 Ibid, p65. 
192 Interview IM07, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author). By contrast, the Department of 
Education found that the average age of an adopted child was 3 years and 4 months, in the year 
ending 31 March 2017. Op cit, n186 above. 
193 Interview IM07, Ibid. 
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adoption may not be appropriate, or even an option, for some intended parents the 
‘adopt instead’ argument should not be used to stop doubly-infertile intended parents 
using surrogacy and applying for a parental order. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that there is an ‘overly genetic view of parenthood’194 
in the context of surrogacy. It is recalled that Robertson limits procreative liberty to 
those who create genetically related offspring: 
‘Procreative liberty should include a right to gestate when gestation is essential to or 
part of a person’s way to have genetic offspring for rearing, just as use of IVF, embryo 
freezing, sperm and egg freezing, and related activities are. They all enable a person 
to reproduce, ie, produce genetically related offspring.’195 
This version of procreative liberty is evident in section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008, which 
restricts parental orders to couples where at least one applicant has contributed their 
gametes to the creation of the child. This genetic view marginalises other types of 
‘natural parenthood’, including social and psychological.196 In Re F & M,197 for 
instance, the judgment created a hierarchy of parenthood by subtly attaching more 
importance to P’s biological role. 
This chapter also demonstrated that the ECtHR has also adopted a genetic view of 
‘family life’ in surrogacy cases. Despite the quality of personal ties that existed 
between the applicants and child, the Grand Chamber in Paradiso fixated on the 
duration of the cohabitation which was worth less because there was no genetic 
connection. The judgment ultimately makes a distinction between legitimate 
surrogacy families who are genetically related, and illegitimate surrogacy families 
who share no genetic connection, a distinction also made by section 54(1)(b) HFEA 
2008.  The South African judgments ‘AB v Minister of Social Development (HC)’198 
                                                 
194 A Diduck, op cit, n1. 
195Op cit, n24, p2, (emphasis added). 
196 Re G, op cit, n9. 
197 Op cit, n60. 
198 Op cit, n14. 
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and ‘AB and Another (CC)’199 demonstrates how the exclusion of doubly-infertile 
intended parents from section 54(1)(b) HFEA discriminates against this sub-class of 
parents. Ultimately, claims to parenthood should not be limited to gestation or biology; 
social and psychological parenthood must be acknowledged too. 
The argument that non-genetic intended parents may as well adopt is flawed. 
Empirical work carried out for this thesis suggests that there could be ‘important 
psychological differences between becoming a parent through adoption, and having a 
child through surrogacy’.200 The case studies involving Liz, Sophie, Gemma and 
Lauren showed that intended parents select donors, choose their surrogate and create 
friendships with their surrogate. They are involved in the pregnancy and maintain 
contact with the surrogate afterwards. Although these activities do not assist with the 
creation of a genetically related child, they are inextricably linked to the procreation 
process and should be brought within Robertson’s framework of procreative rights. In 
light of the problems with the genetic requirement, the HFEA 2008 should remove 
section 54(1)(b) HFEA and adopt a broader view of procreative liberty currently 
afforded by Robertson, the HFEA 2008 and the ECtHR. This would remove the 
discrimination currently encountered by doubly-infertile intended parents and 
acknowledge that this group of social and psychological parents have as much of a 
claim to parenthood as genetic parents.  
                                                 
199 Op cit, n15. 
200Ibid, [180] Khampepe J. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5. Exploring the HFEA 2008’s Gestational and Genetic Definitions of 
Parenthood: What About the Child’s Social Parent(s)?  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In Re G,1 Baroness Hale stated that ‘there are at least three ways in which a person 
may become the natural parent of a child, each of which may be a very significant 
factor in the child’s welfare, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case’.2 
The first is genetic parenthood, which can help the child understand ‘his own origins 
and lineage, which is an important component in finding an individual sense of self as 
one grows up’.3 The second type of natural parenthood, gestational, recognises that 
the process of gestation and birth can create ‘a very special relationship between 
mother and child, a relationship which is different from any other’.4 The third type of 
natural parenthood is social and psychological: 
‘Which develops through the child demanding and the parent providing for the child's 
needs, initially at the most basic level of feeding, nurturing, comforting and loving, 
and later at the more sophisticated level of guiding, socialising, educating and 
protecting.’5  
Whilst in many cases, the natural mother combines all three and the natural father 
combines genetic and psychological parenthood, ‘there are also parents who are 
neither genetic nor gestational, but who have become the psychological parents of the 
                                                 
1 [2006] UKHL 43. 
2 [33] (Baroness Hale). 
3 Ibid. 
4 [34] (Baroness Hale). 
5 [35] (Baroness Hale). 
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child and thus have an important contribution to make to their welfare.’6 Intended 
parents who have a child through surrogacy, where one or neither have a genetic 
connection to the child, is one example.  
Although doubly-infertile7 intended parents may be the natural ‘social’ parents of the 
child, they cannot apply for a parental order to become the child’s legal parents.8 
Furthermore, intended parents who can apply for a parental order (and satisfy section 
54(1)(b) HFEA 2008) are not the legal parents of the child until the parental order is 
awarded.9 This means they are the ‘social’ (and perhaps genetic) parents of the child 
but have no legal status to reflect this. Section 33 HFEA 2008 also assigns the 
surrogate legal motherhood even though she is not the child’s ‘social’ parent. It must 
be questioned whether legal parenthood should be linked to gestation (section 33 
HFEA 2008) and genetics (section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008), or whether it would be in 
the best interests of the child to award legal parenthood to the child’s intended parents 
(irrespective of whether a genetic tie exists) on the basis that they are the child’s social 
parents. 
This chapter explores these issues across three substantive parts. The first, considers 
whether section 33 HFEA 2008 is consistent with the best interests and rights of the 
surrogacy-conceived child. Interviews with four intended mothers who had children 
through surrogacy (Sophie, Sally, Lauren and Rosie) are used to consider whether 
legal parenthood should be assigned to the intended parents sooner, and what 
difference this would make for the child. It is questioned whether the basis of legal 
parenthood should be intention, an argument advanced by Horsey,10 or whether legal 
parenthood should be assigned to multiple parents (e.g. the surrogate and intended 
                                                 
6 [37] (Baroness Hale). 
7 Those who have no genetic and gestational connection to the child. 
8 Section 54(1)(b) HFEA. 
9 The intended parents cannot apply for a parental order until six weeks after the child’s birth. 
(Section 54(7) HFEA 2008). 
10 K Horsey, ‘Challenging presumptions: legal parenthood and surrogacy arrangements’, 22 Child 
and Family Law Quarterly, 449 2010. 
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parents).11  The advantages and disadvantages with each approach are explored. Part 
5.3 uses Re G,12 a case concerning a dispute between the child’s social parent and 
gestational and genetic mother, to explore the importance of social parenthood. It is 
suggested that section 54(1)(b) HFEA marginalises the non-genetic intended parent in 
cases: (1) where the surrogate changes her mind about the agreement,13 and (2) where 
the non-genetic intended parent’s relationship with the other intended parent breaks 
down.14 Studies from Golombok et al.,15 are used to consider whether removing the 
genetic requirement, thus allowing doubly-infertile parents to apply for a parental 
order, would have a negative impact on the child.  
The final part asks whether the removal of sections 33 and 54 (1) (b) can be reconciled 
with the child’s right to access information about their genetic and gestational 
origins,16 especially since parental disclosure to the child about their origins is a 
problem.17 It is considered whether the encouragement of early parental disclosure and 
reforms to the UK birth registration system, like those proposed by Crawshaw et al.,18 
could help to overcome these concerns. Ultimately, this chapter argues that social 
parents should be assigned legal parenthood (through a parental order) irrespective of 
whether they have a genetic and / or gestational tie to the child, and this does not have 
to mean denying the child information about their origins.  
                                                 
11 S Oultram, ‘One mum too few: maternal status in host surrogate motherhood arrangements’? 
Journal of Medical Ethics 2015; 41: 470–473. doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100949. 
12 Op cit, n1. 
13 CW v NT and another [2011] EWHC 33; and H & S (Surrogacy Agreement) [2015] EWFC 36. 
14 JP v LP & Others [2014] EWHC 595 (Fam). 
15 S. Golombok, C. Murray, V. Jadva , E. Lycett, F. MacCallum and J. Rust, ‘Non-genetic and 
non-gestational parenthood: consequences for parent–child relationships and the psychological 
well-being of mothers, fathers and children at age 3’, Human Reproduction Vol.21, No.7 pp. 1918–
1924, 2006. P. 1922. 
16 Articles 7 and 8 CRC; and Article 8 ECHR.  
17 E Blyth and L Frith, ‘Donor-Conceived People's Access to Genetic and Biographical History: 
An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor Identity’, 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23, (2009), 174-191. P185. 
18 M Crawhaw, E D Blyth and J Feast, ‘Can the UK’s birth registration system better serve the 
interests of those born following collaborative assisted reproduction?’, Reproductive BioMedicine 
and Society Online (2017) 4, 1–4. 
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5.2 Is the HFEA’s Approach to Legal Motherhood Consistent with 
Children’s Rights? 
Lind and Hewitt explain that ‘reproductive technologies clearly have the ability to 
complicate the status and function of parents by disrupting the genetic, gestational and 
social links between adults and children’.19 Surrogacy arrangements involve up to five 
‘parents’: two biological parents (an egg and sperm donor), a gestational parent (the 
surrogate) and two social parents (the intended parents). Despite this, section 33 HFEA 
2008 demonstrates that the ‘legal status of motherhood is bound to gestation’.20 The 
surrogate, ‘and no other woman’, is the legal mother, even if she is not genetically 
related to the child. It is only when a parental order is awarded to the intended parents, 
that the surrogate’s legal motherhood and parental responsibility are extinguished, and 
the intended parents finally become the child’s legal parents. This section explores 
whether this is in the best interests of the child. 
(I) Section 33 HFEA 2008: Legal Motherhood and Gestation 
It is apparent that ‘the current legal framework operates on the fundamental 
assumption that children should only have one mother and utilises an either / or 
approach’.21 As Horsey laments: 
‘The law is clear that the gestational mother's claim should be prioritised if she 
changes her mind and elects to keep the child. Not only is she unquestionably given 
legal motherhood, further legislation provides that surrogacy arrangements are wholly 
unenforceable. This is more than a presumption– law has made “a choice between 
mothers”’.22 
                                                 
19 C Lind and T Hewitt, ‘Law and the complexities of parenting: parental status and parental 
function’, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 31:4, (2009) 391-406, DOI: 
10.1080/09649060903430249. At p392. 
20 S Oultram, op cit, n11, p472.  
21 J Wallbank, ‘Too Many Mothers? Surrogacy, Kinship And The Welfare Of The Child’, Medical 
Law Review, 10, Autumn 2002, pp. 271–294, p277. 
22 K Horsey, op cit, n10, p460. 
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It is questionable whether this approach reflects the parties’ intentions or is in the best 
interests of the child. Problematically, the second parent depends upon whether the 
surrogate is married or in a civil partnership. If the surrogate is married to a man at the 
time of treatment, and the creation of the embryo carried by her was not brought about 
with the sperm of the other party to the marriage, then he is to be treated as the father 
(unless he did not consent to the treatment).23  This is the case even where the 
surrogate’s husband is not the genetic parent of the child. This is a ‘wholly unnecessary 
legal fiction’24 because it does ‘not mirror the way that fatherhood following other 
forms of assisted reproduction is regulated’.25 If the surrogate is in a civil partnership 
or married to a woman at the time of treatment, the other party to the civil partnership 
or marriage is treated as the child’s second parent unless it is shown that she did not 
consent to treatment.26 Again, this is the case even if the other party to the civil 
partnership or marriage is not the biological parent of the child.  
The intended parents must apply for a parental order to become the legal parents of 
the child. Whilst an adoption order can also grant legal parenthood to the intended 
parents, it is inappropriate for a surrogacy-conceived child.27 It is recalled from J v G28 
that a parental order confers joint and equal legal parenthood and parental 
responsibility upon both the intended parents.29 It also fully extinguishes the parental 
status of the surrogate (and her spouse / civil partner) under English law.30 However, 
without the surrogate’s consent, the intended parents cannot apply for a parental order. 
As Oultram notes, ‘one consequence of this is that if a host surrogacy arrangement 
fails the commissioning mother has no legally recognised maternal status in relation 
to the surrogate child’.31 As such, the surrogate has the ultimate say on whether the 
                                                 
23 Section 35 HFEA 2008. 
24 K Horsey, op cit, n10, p451. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Section 42 HFEA 2008. 
27 See chapter 3, part 3.4 which discusses how an adoption order, child arrangement order and 
wardship are inappropriate alternatives for a child conceived via surrogacy. 
28 [2013] EWCH 1432 (Fam). 
29 [27] (Theis J). 
30 Ibid. 
31 S Oultram, op cit, n11, p470. 
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intended parents are able to apply for a parental order. This suggests that the 
surrogate’s claim to parenthood is stronger than the intended parents and it must be 
questioned whether this is in the best interests of the surrogacy-conceived child. 
There is an argument that legal motherhood should be assigned to the surrogate 
because of the bonding that occurs between the gestational mother and child during 
gestation. However, bonding is ‘as much a reflection of social construction as it is of 
biology’.32 If the surrogate does not expect to be recognised as the legal parent of the 
child and she knows that the intended parents will raise the child, ‘bonding may not 
take place at all, not to the same extent, or in a different, more disconnected, way.’33 
There is a related child welfare argument for assigning legal motherhood to the 
surrogate: ‘…children having an uncertain biological legacy, or detachment from their 
“natural” mother, may be psychologically harmed’.34 However, three points can be 
made against this argument. Firstly, to ‘ascribe prima facie parenthood to a couple that 
never intended to keep the child may not promote the child's welfare'. 35 Secondly, as 
long as the child has knowledge about their surrogate (and gamete donors), the child 
is still able to have a certain ‘biological legacy’.36 Finally, ‘there is no evidence to 
support the claim that children are better cared for by biological, rather than 
intentional, parents.’37 The following subsections explore the views of the intended 
parents and surrogates interviewed for this project, to see how legal parenthood could, 
and should, be assigned in a way that promotes the child’s best interests. 
(II) Assigning Legal Parenthood Sooner? 
Four mothers, who were interviewed for this project, expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the way legal parenthood is currently assigned under the HFEA 2008. The first 
intended mother, Sophie, believed that it ‘would be good for the legal parentage of the 
child to be resolved very quickly … and we would have full parental responsibility for 
                                                 
32 K Horsey, op cit, n10, p461. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid, p462. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See part 3 below. 
37 K Horsey, op cit, n10, p463. 
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our child and therefore be able to make decisions on his behalf …’38 She explained 
during the interview that it can feel ‘very insecure’39 not to have legal parenthood until 
the parental order is awarded and stated that ‘it doesn’t seem like that’s in the best 
interests of the child for his parents that he’s living with to not have parental 
responsibility for him’.40 Sophie, explained that she thought a pre-birth order would 
be a positive reform and used divorce as an analogy: 
‘What would have been good is if you could make a pre-birth order, erm, and perhaps 
for that to be like with divorce when you have the decree nisi and the decree absolute 
– a provisional version during the pregnancy and then confirmed on birth and for that 
process to be very quick.’41 
Assigning legal parenthood to the intended parents upon the child’s birth would also 
provide more certainty for the parties involved. It would clarify that the intended 
parents can make important decisions on behalf of the child, including consent to 
emergency medical treatment. It would also give the child’s intended parents more 
power when disputes arise over neonatal care, for example between the intended 
parents and surrogate or intended parents and healthcare professionals. Another 
intended mother, Sally, was dissatisfied with the rules on legal parenthood.42 As her 
mother was the surrogate, Sally was reassured that if anything had gone wrong or the 
baby required medical treatment before the parental order was awarded, her mother 
‘could easily assist and give her consent…’.43 Sally explained that if the surrogate was 
someone outside her family she would have felt more dependent on them, which made 
her feel ‘quite uneasy’.44 Mary agreed that her daughter should have been assigned 
legal parenthood sooner. She suggested that assigning legal parenthood to the intended 
parents at an earlier stage would create greater certainty: 
                                                 
38 Interview ‘02IM’, recorded on 09/07/16 (on file with the author). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Sally’s mother Mary – also interviewed for this project – acted as her surrogate. 
43 Interview ‘08IM’, recorded on 08/07/16 (on file with the author). 
44 Ibid. 
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‘You have the stress of worrying if the pregnancy is going to go alright … and when 
they’ve safely arrived there’s still that doubt in the back of your mind that somebody 
somewhere could say something and say no’.45 
Mary believed that changing the law to recognise the intended parents as the child’s 
legal parents from the moment of birth would help discourage surrogates who are at 
risk of changing their mind; an uncertainty that is facilitated by section 33 HFEA 2008 
and the consent provision in section 54(6) HFEA 2008.  
Lauren also found problems with the provisions on legal parenthood. She explained 
how she was parenting her children but not recognised as the legal mother. Lauren’s 
husband was on the original birth certificate as the child’s father but her own lack of 
legal status made her feel vulnerable. If the children had been taken into emergency 
medical care, she was unsure if she would have been able to give consent to treatment. 
Lauren explained that: 
‘From a social point of view, as a new mum going to mum group it’s hard enough 
when you haven’t had a bump and haven’t had a pregnancy, your birth story is very 
unusual compared to everybody else. Then to know that technically you aren’t the 
mother…it’s very difficult.’46 
She also felt that the current rules on legal parenthood, and her inability to be 
recognised as the child’s legal mother, is ‘not helpful for parents having confidence 
and talking to their children proudly about their origins, which is hugely important 
from the child’s perspective’.47 
Rosie’s legal situation was slightly different. When the child was born, she shared 
parental responsibility with the surrogate (who was unmarried and not in a civil 
partnership). The surrogate nominated Rosie to be the second legal parent from birth.48 
                                                 
45 Interview 02SM, recorded on 10/07/16 (on file with the author). 
46 Interview ‘07IM’, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author). 
47 Ibid. 
48 According to section 43 HFEA 2008, ‘if no man is treated by virtue of section 35 as the father 
of the child and no woman is treated by virtue of section 42 as a parent of the child but— (a)the 
embryo or the sperm and eggs were placed in W, or W was artificially inseminated, in the course 
of treatment services provided in the United Kingdom by a person to whom a licence applies, (b)at 
the time when the embryo or the sperm and eggs were placed in W, or W was artificially 
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However, she was not the child’s legal mother which caused problems ‘in terms of 
coming into contact with the hospital when you’re having pregnancy care and ante-
natal care’.49 She found it incredibly difficult ‘not being able to stay with your baby in 
the immediate post-natal period...’50 and said this caused ‘a lot of stress’.51 During the 
interview, Rosie explained how she would get referred to as the ‘egg donor’ by the 
hospital which caused great emotional stress. She believed that ‘the law encourages 
this attitude’52 by denying her status as the child’s legal mother. It is suggested that 
according legal parenthood to the intended parent(s) from the moment of the child’s 
birth would help nurture the bond between the intended parent(s) and child and allow 
the intended parent(s) to feel more involved during the immediate post-natal period.  
It is clear from these accounts that the intended mothers would have preferred legal 
parenthood to be assigned to them sooner and believed this would have provided more 
certainty for them and their children. As D’Alton-Harrison notes, ‘recognition as a 
parent is important not only for the social status of the parent but also for the identity 
of the child’.53 Article 8 CRC provides that States will ‘undertake to respect the right 
of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family 
relations as recognised by law without unlawful interference’. Since the intended 
parents plan to raise the child, ‘family relations’ should include relationships between 
the child and their social parents. Section 33 HFEA 2008 also raises issues for the 
surrogacy-conceived child’s right to Article 7 CRC, which provides that the child 
should have ‘as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.’ 
The child’s intended parents should be assigned legal parenthood sooner, to ensure 
                                                 
inseminated, the agreed female parenthood conditions (as set out in section 44) were met in relation 
to another woman, in relation to treatment provided to W under that licence, and (c)the other 
woman remained alive at that time, then, subject to section 45(2) to (4), the other woman is to be 
treated as a parent of the child. 
49 Interview ‘03IM’, recorded on 11/07/16 (on file with the author). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 R D’Alton-Harrison, ‘Mater Semper Incertus Est: Who’s Your Mummy?’, 2014, Medical Law 
Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 357–383. P369. 
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that the adults looking after the child, have the rights and responsibilities that come 
with parental status: 
‘There are practical legal issues to navigate in raising a child which depend on 
recognition of parentage such as admission into the UK for the child based on the 
parent’s nationality, the right to approve medical procedures for the child, enrolment 
of the child into school, the right to bring and defend legal proceedings on behalf of 
the child, and succession rights of the child to the parent’s estate on intestacy.’54 
The child’s intended parents are unable to acquire these rights until after a parental 
order is awarded, which can take several months. 
(III) Intention-Based Parenthood? 
It is recalled from earlier chapters that the ‘functional family’ model could be used to 
assign legal parenthood in the surrogacy context. As Millbank suggests: 
‘Functional family claims rest on a performative aspect, that is, the parties are granted 
rights because of what they do in relation to one another, not because of the status of 
who they are or what manner of legal formality they have undertaken’.55  
Under this model, legal parenthood would be assigned to the intended parents – who 
care for the child daily – through the award of a parental order. The period from birth 
until a parental order is awarded is evidence that the intended parents have become the 
child’s social and psychological parents ‘in the real world’. Arbitrary factors such as 
relationship status and biology therefore become irrelevant. However, if – as this 
chapter proposes –legal parenthood is to be assigned to the intended parent(s) at birth, 
then they will not yet have performed any parenting functions, which reveals a 
weakness with the functional approach. A further problem with a functional approach 
is that it: 
 ‘falters in intra-family disputes because at the most basic level, there is simply no 
longer a united – functioning – functional family. Rather the court is confronted with 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 J Millbank, ‘The Limits of Functional Family: Lesbian Mother Litigation in the Era of the 
Eternal Biological Family’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, (2008) 22 (2): 
149. P150. 
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conflicted – dysfunctional – individuals with contradictory accounts of who their 
family is, and was.’56 
A functional claim to parenthood could be used by a surrogate who refuses to hand 
the child over to the intended parents, or an intended parent who separates from their 
spouse / partner and wants to parent the child alone. In the context of intra-lesbian 
disputes, Millbank makes an argument for a ‘form of automatic, universal and stable 
legal recognition for co-mothers based on pre-conception intention. The rationale for 
recognition is that the attempt to conceive was a shared enterprise between the 
women’.57 This shared desire to conceive and become parents ‘is not assessed by 
reference to post-birth factors, such as caregiving in the functional family model.’58 
An intention-based approach to legal parenthood in the surrogacy context would help 
reduce the marginalisation of intended parents who may find it difficult to prove they 
have functioned as a parent when they have separated from the other intended parent, 
or where the surrogate decides to keep the child.  
In the US judgment Johnson v Calvert,59 intention was pivotal in determining who the 
child’s legal mother should be. During the pregnancy, relations between the intended 
parents (Mr and Mrs Calvert) and surrogate (Ms Johnson) deteriorated which resulted 
in the surrogate changing her mind about handing over the child. 60  Seven months into 
the pregnancy, Mr and Mrs Calvert sought a declaration that they were the legal 
parents of the unborn child, and Ms Johnson responded with an action to be declared 
the legal mother.61 Under the Uniform Parentage Act, both the surrogate and the 
intended mother had shown evidence to support a finding that either was the child’s 
‘natural mother,’ the former by means of gestation and the latter by means of 
genetics.62 However, like UK law, California law only recognised one legal mother. 
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61 [88] (Panelli J). 
62 [92] (Panelli J). 
156 
 
Panelli J, writing for the majority, argued that the woman who intended to procreate 
the child – in this case Mrs Calvert – was the natural mother under Californian law: 
‘… [the Calverts] affirmatively intended the birth of the child, and took the necessary 
steps to effect in vitro fertilisation. But for their acted-on intention, the child would 
not exist … No reason appears why Anna's later change of heart should vitiate the 
determination that Crispina [Calvert] is the child's natural mother.’63 
In this respect, intention ‘is significant in its bringing “the infertile” couple in from the 
cold; it acts, as it were, as a way of regularizing (or normalizing) their procreative 
intent.’64 Horsey submits that intention ‘encompasses the motivation to have a child, 
initiation and involvement in the procreative process and a commitment to nurture and 
care’.65 She acknowledges that ‘the genetic and gestational contributors to the child (if 
they are different people) undoubtedly possess compelling claims to parenthood’66 but 
doubts whether ‘these claims are as strong or as accurately reflect the social situation 
that will be in place as those of the intending parents’.67 For example, if the surrogate 
and her spouse or civil partner do not intend to raise the child then assigning legal 
parenthood to them, rather than the intended parents, does not reflect the child’s social 
situation.  
The point at which legal parenthood should be assigned to the intended parents is 
problematic.  If it is assigned before the child is born, the intended parents could make 
decisions about the unborn child which could impede upon the surrogate’s own 
autonomy. Moreover, it is uncertain whether the intended parents would feel 
comfortable with acquiring legal parenthood whilst the child is in utero. Gemma, 
whose surrogate was pregnant at the time of the interview, said: ‘when it comes to the 
birth because she’s been there, done that, I would leave her [the surrogate] to make 
the right decision. Whatever she felt comfortable with.’68 If legal parenthood was 
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assigned to the intended parents pre-conception, or before birth, the surrogate may not 
feel in control of her own pregnancy. It is suggested that a presumption of legal 
parenthood could be created in favour of the intended parents, which comes into effect 
as soon as the child is born. This could take effect by pre-authorising parental orders 
so that legal parenthood is conferred on the intended parents at birth, a view shared by 
the 2017 Myth Busting Report.69 This presumption could be rebuttable, (and the 
parental order revoked) where the court decides it is not in the best interests of the 
child to be raised by the intended parents.70  
(IV) More than Two Legal Parents? 
During an interview with one of surrogates, Kate, it became clear that the views about 
legal parenthood in this context are far from uniform. When discussing the rules on 
legal motherhood being automatically assigned to the surrogate through section 33 
HFEA 2008, Kate explained that she was ‘one of those people who is for that’. She 
said: 
‘I think it’s good because to me, even though it is surrogacy and it’s not your baby 
and you’re doing it for someone else, the fact that you grow that baby and give birth 
makes you that child’s birth parent…They could bring it forward so the intended 
parents are the parents from day one, but I’m not for the reform at all.’71 
This might be explained by Kate’s desire to have continued contact with the child. She 
‘wished’ there was ‘something you could sign to agree to stay in contact, but I know 
that’ll never happen.’72 It is suggested that a compromise can be reached between the 
intended parent’s and surrogate’s claims to parenthood; legal parenthood could be 
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assigned to the surrogate and intended parents. Oultram suggests that where a 
surrogacy arrangement fails the intended mother ought to be granted the status of 
mother but ‘this should not be interpreted as advocating the denial of maternal status 
to the surrogate mother’.73 In other words, he suggests that surrogacy-conceived 
children should have two ‘legal’ mothers, the intended mother and the surrogate. This 
would require changes to the current law which only recognises that the child has two 
legal parents.  
Recognising multiple legal parents could also be an option where the parties all intend 
to be child’s social parents. In A.A. v. B.B.74 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the 
child had three legal parents: BB, his biological father; CC, his biological mother; and 
AA, his biological mother’s same sex partner. AA and CC were long-term same-sex 
partners who decided to start a family together. They approached their friend, BB, who 
agreed to be a sperm donor: 
‘The parties all agreed that the couple would be the child’s primary caregivers, and 
that it was in D.D.’s best interests to have a relationship with his father. All three 
individuals were very involved in D.D.’s life and believed that each had equal status 
as a parent.’75 
Rosenberg J.A., for the unanimous Court, concluded that ‘a declaration of parenthood 
has both practical and symbolic importance in a parent-child relationship…More 
importantly, it demonstrates to a child that his family is valued and accepted’.76 It is 
suggested that allowing multiple legal parents could be in the best interests of the child 
where the parties have all agreed to be the child’s social parents.  
However, where there is no dispute between the surrogate and intended parents, and 
the surrogate does not want to raise the child, it might be inappropriate to describe the 
surrogate as the child’s ‘mother’. As Wallbank suggests there is a difference between 
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maternity (the birthing role) and motherhood (raising the child).77 She points out that 
gestating a child does ‘not necessarily equate to being a mother’.78 It is also doubtful 
whether most surrogates want to be assigned legal motherhood. One of the intended 
mothers interviewed explained that: 
‘Surrogates do not want to be given legal parenthood at birth. They do not want to be 
recognised as the legal parent. Not only does it completely misrepresent their motives 
and what surrogacy is, they’re plagued by this perception that they are giving their 
child away. The law supports that myth and it’s not helpful, it stigmatises them. Also, 
they don’t want the practical responsibility of having legal parenthood for a child that 
isn’t theirs.’ 
In an interview with Rosie, who had a child through surrogacy, she was asked how 
she felt about legal motherhood being assigned to the surrogate. She replied: 
‘I think a more important question is how X [the surrogate] feels about it…. X’s 
feelings are very much that it is not her child and she doesn’t feel like it’s appropriate 
for the law to make it an obligation for her to be the legal parent for any period after 
the baby is born. She feels quite strongly actually.’79 
Although these views come from the intended parent (rather than the surrogates), these 
accounts resonate with findings from Imrie and Jadva who report that ‘in terms of the 
surrogate’s relationship with the child conceived through surrogacy, surrogates report 
that they do not view the child as their own child’.80  41% of surrogates reported 
‘feeling a “special bond” towards the child’,81 but none described this as a parental or 
mother-child bond. The 2017 Myth Busting Report82 also found that 72 (64.9%) 
surrogates thought that the legal parents of a child born through surrogacy should be 
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the intended parents, whether genetically related or not.83 Another 10 surrogates (9%) 
said it should be the intended parents when both are genetically related.84 Only four 
surrogates (3.6 %) said the surrogate and the intended father (if he provided sperm) 
should be the legal parents, and only four surrogates (3.6 %) thought the surrogate and 
her partner should be the legal parents.85 It is clear that the majority of surrogates who 
took part in the study did not view themselves the child’s mother and believed the 
intended parents should have legal parenthood. 
It is clear that section 33 HFEA, and the rules on parenthood, fail to support the child’s 
social parents (i.e. intended parents) who have no legal parenthood when their child is 
born. It is suggested that it is not in the child’s best interests for the surrogate to be 
awarded legal motherhood at the expense of the intended parents. Evidence also 
indicates that the majority of surrogates do not want to be assigned legal motherhood. 
It is suggested that the intended parents should be presumed to be the legal parents of 
the child (irrespective of genetic connection, or relationship status). This would allow 
the intended parents and surrogate to be ‘recognised for the actual roles they play: the 
commissioning parents intend to be parents and the surrogate intends to have the child 
for others’.86 Assigning legal parenthood to all parties could be an option where the 
surrogate and intended parents all agree to have a child-rearing role. 
5.3 The Genetic Requirement in Section 54 HFEA 2008: What about the 
Child’s ‘Social’ and ‘Psychological’ Parents? 
In addition to the problems arising from section 33 HFEA 2008, the legislation also 
adopts an overly genetic view of the child’s intended parents. Section 54(1)(b) requires 
that ‘the gametes of at least one of the applicants were used to bring about the creation 
of the embryo’.87 This section explores the children’s rights implications of the genetic 
requirement and how it affects the child’s social and psychological parent. It is recalled 
                                                 
83 Ibid, p21. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 K Horsey, op cit, n10, p470. 
87 See chapter 4 for a discussion on how this affects the rights of doubly-infertile intended parents. 
161 
 
from Re G,88 that Baroness Hale explained ‘there are at least three ways in which a 
person may become the natural parent of a child, each of which may be a very 
significant factor in the child’s welfare, depending upon the circumstances of the 
particular case’.89 In addition to genetic and gestational parenthood, the child may also 
have social and psychological parents.90 Social parenthood has been defined as ‘those 
who act as ‘parents’ in the real world in which a child lives’91 and as ‘a combination 
of motivation, intention, involvement and nurturance’.92 Shapiro contends that: 
‘It might be ideal (and certainly simpler) if being a social parent meant being a legal 
parent and vice versa. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Sometimes the law fails to 
acknowledge the parenthood of a child's social parent, while sometimes the legal 
parent of a child may not function as a social parent in the child’s world.’93 
However, there is a difference between natural and legal parents. A couple who use 
surrogacy, but are not genetically related to the child, may be the child’s natural 
parents (e.g. social parents) but they are not recognised as the child’s ‘legal’ parents. 
Legal parenthood is important because it gives ‘a person legal standing to bring and 
defend proceedings about the child and makes the child a member of that person’s 
family.’94  
The potential unfairness of section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 for the child’s social parent 
is evident from one of the empirical case studies. One of the intended mother’s, Liz, 
has no genetic link to her children but carries out the day-to-day parenting of her twins 
and is their mother ‘in the real world’.95 She was involved in the conception of the 
                                                 
88 Op cit, n1. 
89 [33]. 
90 [33]-[35]. 
91 J Shapiro, 'Changing Ways, New Technologies and the Devaluation of the Genetic Connection 
to Children' in M. Maclean (ed), Family Law and Family Values (Hart Publishing, 2005), p82. 
92 R Cook ‘Donating Parenthood: Perspectives on Parenthood from Surrogacy, Gamete Donation’ 
p135 in What is a Parent: A Socio-Legal Analysis Edited by A Bainham, S Day Sclater, and M 
Richards for the Cambridge Socio-Legal Group (Hart, 1999). 
93 J Shapiro, ‘A Lesbian Centered Critique of “Genetic Parenthood,’ 9 Journal of Race, Gender 
and Justice 591 (2005), pp 592-593. 
94 [32] (Baroness Hale). 
95 J Shapiro, op cit, n91. 
162 
 
children and chose the egg donors and surrogates. She also lived in India with the 
twins for several months after their birth before returning to England. Despite this, if 
Liz had been a single applicant, or she entered the surrogacy as part of a couple using 
a donated embryo (i.e. without her husband’s sperm) she would not have been able to 
apply for a parental order. An intended parent, or doubly-infertile couple, with no 
genetic link to the child cannot apply for a parental order even though they may act as 
the child’s parents ‘in the real world’96 and, unlike adoption, have had a role in 
procreating the child. 
The genetic requirement in section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2009 makes a dangerous 
presumption that children require biological parents. This is contrary to the ‘no 
presumption’ approach set out in J and Another v C and Others,97 where it was held 
that there would be no presumption in favour of biological parents in disputes between 
them and long-term foster carers. Instead, the welfare of the child was the paramount 
consideration and although the claim of natural parents was ‘often of great weight and 
cogency and often conclusive [it] had to be regarded in conjunction with all other 
relevant factors, and had to yield if, in the end, the welfare of the child so required’.98 
The effect of this was to clarify that there is no presumption favouring the genetic birth 
parents. When the law was reviewed in 1986, the Law Commission supported the ‘no 
presumption approach’ in J v C.99  The Law Commission noted that the child may 
have a closer relationship with someone other than his ‘natural’ genetic parent:100  
‘The emotional and psychological bonds which develop between a child (especially a 
very young child) and those who are bringing him up are just as “natural” as are his 
genetic ties to one whose interest may be based solely on a blood tie ...’101  
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Therefore, the Law Commission concluded that ‘the welfare of each child in the family 
should continue to be the paramount consideration whenever their custody or 
upbringing is in question between private individuals’.102 As such, section 1 of the 
Children Act 1989 does not include a presumption in favour of the 'natural parent' and 
it is not a factor in the welfare checklist. This invites the question as to why section 
54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 requires the child to have at least one genetic parent when the 
CA 1989 does not include a ‘natural parent’ presumption at all.  
 (I) Social and Psychological Parenthood: Lessons from Re G? 
It is argued that the genetic requirement, in addition to section 33 HFEA 2008, 
undermines social and psychological parenthood, which was deemed to be a natural 
form of parenthood by Baroness Hale in Re G.103 The case involved a lesbian couple, 
CG and CW, who arranged for anonymous donor insemination at a clinic abroad104 
which resulted in CG giving birth to two girls. CG and CW brought up the children 
together until their relationship broke down, at which point the couple disputed the 
future of the children. The first issue was ‘the weight to be attached to the fact that one 
party is both the natural and legal parent of the child and the other is not’.105 The 
second issue of principle was ‘the approach to be adopted by the court where the party 
with whom the child has her principal home is reluctant to acknowledge the 
importance of the other party in the child's life’.106  
In September 2003, an order was made which allowed CW (the children’s social 
parent) interim contact two evenings a week and every other weekend.107 Around 
December 2003 CG moved to her new partner’s home in Leicester where she enrolled 
the children at nursery and school without consulting CW.108 During a further hearing 
in November, the children’s genetic mother, CG, gave evidence that she wanted to 
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move with her new partner and the children to Cornwall.109 The judge concluded that 
‘the proposed move was in part deliberately designed to frustrate the current contact 
arrangements’110 and ordered that CG continue to live with the children in Leicester.111 
The judge continued the alternate weekend and also provided for CW to be informed 
about the children's education and medical treatment, thus acknowledging the 
importance of the children’s psychological and social parent.112 
Soon after, CG's solicitors wrote requesting CW's agreement to a move to Cornwall.113 
This was refused but while the children were on holiday with CW, CG and MG 
completed the sale of their home in Leicester and purchased a house in Cornwall.114 
CG and MG ‘collected the children at the regular handover point in Leicester and 
drove them through the night to their new home’.115 Both CW and the girls had not 
been informed of the plan and this constituted a breach of the court’s order for CG to 
remain in the Leicester area. As the Children's Guardian said in evidence: 
 ‘…from a child care perspective whether that order existed or not, to move the 
children in that way, in secret, without them having the opportunity to say goodbye to 
their friends and their school friends, I think, … was an appalling thing to do to 
them…’.116  
Ultimately, CG had unfairly sought to marginalise the children’s psychological and 
social mother without thinking about how this would impact upon the children.  
CW applied for the residential arrangements to be changed, so that the children's 
primary home would be with her in Shropshire.117 Bracewell J ‘had no confidence that 
if the children remained in Cornwall CG would promote the children's essential close 
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relationship with CW and her family’.118 Accordingly, she preserved the shared 
residence order but reversed the times allocated to each home so that the children 
would spend the majority of time with CW. CG unsuccessfully appealed to the Court 
of Appeal.119 Thorpe LJ accepted the propositions that ‘the identity of a child's natural 
(biological) parents is always a matter of significance’120 but qualified this by 
submitting that ‘in each case the weight to be given to the blood relationship will 
depend upon the matter in issue, the identity of the parties and the court's assessment 
of all other factors in the welfare checklist’.121  
Although CG successfully challenged the reversal in the parties' positions after 
appealing to the House of Lords, the importance of CW in the children’s lives was not 
overlooked by the courts or professionals involved. The children’s guardian described 
CW as an ‘impressive woman’ who was ‘genuinely driven by a desire to protect her 
children and that she has tried always to act in their best interests’.122 He also reported 
favourably, of CW’s son, C, and was impressed with the ‘articulate and intelligent 
young man’ who joined in all the games with his sisters.123 As aforementioned, 
Baroness Hale explained that there are at least three ways in which a person can 
become the natural parent of a child, ‘… each of which may be a very significant factor 
in the child's welfare, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case’.124 The 
first is genetic parenthood, which is important for the child because he ‘reaps the 
benefit not only of that love and commitment, but also of knowing his own origins and 
lineage, which is an important component in finding an individual sense of self as one 
grows up’.125  Nevertheless, Baroness Hale stated that genetic parenthood is important 
but by no means ‘an essential component’.126 The second type of parenthood is 
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gestational, which involves the conceiving and bearing of the child.127 Baroness Hale 
suggests that this facilitates certainty and convenience, but also recognises a deeper 
truth: ‘that the process of carrying a child and giving him birth…brings with it, in the 
vast majority of cases, a very special relationship between mother and child, a 
relationship which is different from any other’.128  
Genetic or gestational parenthood do not always apply to parents who use ARTs and/ 
or surrogacy. Consequently, Baroness Hale also acknowledged the importance of 
‘social and psychological’ parenthood. Adopting Goldstein at al., Baroness Hale stated 
that social and psychological parenthood involves: 
‘The relationship which develops through the child demanding and the parent 
providing for the child’s needs, initially at the most basic level of feeding, nurturing, 
comforting and loving, and later at the more sophisticated level of guiding, 
socialising, educating and protecting’.129  
Whereas ‘in the great majority of cases, the natural mother combines all three’130 
Baroness Hale acknowledged that there are also parents, including doubly-infertile 
intended parents using surrogacy and those in the position of CW, ‘who are neither 
genetic nor gestational, but who have become the psychological parents of the child 
and thus have an important contribution to make to their welfare’.131 The case 
highlights how social and psychological parenthood is a form of natural parenthood 
and how marginalising this type of parent can be harmful to the children involved. It 
is suggested that section 54(1)(b) HFEA marginalises social parenthood in the same 
way. The vulnerability of the non-genetic intended parent is evident: (1) where the 
surrogate changes her mind about the agreement, and (2) where the non-genetic 
intended parent’s relationship with the other intended parent breaks down.  
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(II) Breakdown of the Surrogacy Agreement: What about the Child’s 
Non-Genetic Intended Parent? 
In CW v NT and another,132 which was discussed in the previous chapter, the parties 
had entered into a surrogacy agreement, but following the birth of the child, the 
surrogate refused to hand her over. The child’s welfare required that she remain with 
the surrogate because Baker J was satisfied that the surrogate ‘would foster contact 
and a close relationship between the child and her father’.133 Presumably, the child 
would also be spending time with the intended mother whilst in the care of her 
biological father, yet the judgment did not mention the surrogate’s need to foster a 
relationship between the child and Mrs W (the intended mother), thereby failing to 
acknowledge Mrs W’s future role as a social parent in the child’s life. In this situation, 
Oultram’s suggestion that the child should have two legal mothers would ensure the 
child’s non-genetic intended mother, in this case Mrs W, is not marginalised.134 
In H & S,135 the non-genetic intended parent was also marginalised. The case 
concerned the future arrangements for an infant girl (M) who was born as the result of 
assisted conception and ‘of an agreement, the basis of which is highly contested, 
between S (the 1st Respondent and the mother) and H (the 1st Applicant and the father) 
and B (the 2nd Applicant) his partner’.136 S was the child’s legal mother and H was the 
child’s legal father. H was in a long-term and committed relationship with B and was 
at the time of conception. H and B contended that they had an agreement with S that 
she would act as a surrogate and that ‘H and B would co-parent the child but that S 
would continue to play a role in the child's life’.137 However, S contested this version 
of events and argued that she and H entered an agreement that excluded B and that ‘H 
would be, in effect, a sperm-donor’138 and that she would take on the role of M's main 
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parent and carer.139 Theis J clarified that the HFEA 2008 had no part in the decisions 
of the court because S did not consent to a parental order and denied that she was a 
surrogate. Theis J stated: 
‘Very sadly this case is another example of how “agreements” between potential 
parents reached privately to conceive children to build a family go wrong and cause 
great distress to the biological parents and their spouses or partners.’140 
This understates B’s role in the failed surrogacy arrangement. He is not simply the 
spouse or partner of the child’s ‘biological parent’, but planned to have an active role 
in raising the child alongside B.141 This was acknowledged by Theis J later in the 
judgment, when she stated: 
‘I can make a parental responsibility order in B’s favour pursuant to s 12 (2A) CA as 
a person who is not M's parent but who is named as a person with whom she is to 
spend time or otherwise have contact; and I do so as the evidence is that he is a 
significant person in her life; her biological father’s partner who cares for her has 
taken on a parental role when she has spent time with the Applicants.’142 
Nevertheless, the availability of parental responsibility, but not legal parenthood,143 
sends out a message that the child’s social and psychological intended parent is not as 
important as a biological or gestational parent. Assigning legal parenthood to the 
intended parents through a pre-birth parental order, which takes effect when the child 
is born, would ensure the child’s non-genetic parent is not marginalised when an 
assisted conception / surrogacy agreement goes awry.  
(III) Relationship Breakdown: What Happens to the Child’s Non-
Genetic Intended Parent? 
                                                 
139 Ibid. 
140 [2] (Theis J). 
141 A Child Arrangement order was made which determined that the child should live with H and 
B and both parties would have parental responsibility. Para [127] (Thesis J). 
142 [10] (Theis J). 
143 This option was unavailable because the child can only have two legal parents. 
169 
 
The non-genetic intended parent is also at risk of marginalisation from the child’s life 
when his / her relationship breaks down with the second intended parent (who has a 
genetic link to the child). This is evident in JP v LP & Others,144 which concerned a 
little boy, CP, who was born as the result of a surrogacy arrangement. The Applicant, 
JP, (the intended mother) was neither the birth nor genetic mother. JP had previously 
had a hysterectomy and along with LP, the father, decided to conceive through ‘partial’ 
surrogacy using the surrogate’s egg and the intended father’s sperm.145 The mother 
and father sought the help of a friend of the mother, SP, who was ‘artificially 
inseminated at home with the father’s sperm, and became pregnant’.146 CP was born 
on the 1st March 2010 and the surrogate was registered on the birth certificate as the 
‘mother’ of CP; the intended father was shown as the legal father on the birth 
certificate.147 
In June 2010, the relationship between the mother and father broke down and JP left 
the marital home with CP.148 On 15th July 2010 a shared residence order was made in 
favour of the mother and father. At that hearing JP and LP also undertook to regularise 
CP’s legal status by issuing an application for a parental order, but due to delay the 
application was out of time.149 During early 2011 ‘the relationship between the mother 
and father reached low ebb’150 and on 7 March 2011 the mother issued an application 
for a specific issue order seeking the return of CP after contact. The shared residence 
order was confirmed, and the mother and father undertook to reissue their parental 
order application without realising the statutory time limit had now expired. On 12 
September 2012 the mother made an application for sole residence of CP. The matter 
was transferred to the High Court and both CP and the surrogate were joined as 
parties.151  
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King J clarified that the surrogate – having carried a child following assisted 
reproduction – ‘and no other woman’, is the child’s legal mother by virtue of section 
33(1) HFEA 2008. Absent adoption or a parental order, she also retains parental 
responsibility for CP.152 The father, LP, ‘is the genetic and social father of CP.’153 By 
contrast, the intended mother: 
‘Has no status other than the emotional and social status of being CP’s psychological 
mother. Crucially she does not have parental responsibility, she cannot therefore give 
consent to medical treatment, register CP for a school or take a myriad of decisions in 
relation to CP which parents routinely do without a thought as to whether or not they 
have the authority to do so’.154 
A parental order was not an option because the statutory time limit had not been met. 
In any event, the shared residence order would have made it difficult to satisfy section 
54(4)(a) HFEA 2008, that ‘at the time of the application and the making of the order 
… the child’s home must be with the applicant’s.’155  
An adoption order could not ‘provide a solution to the problem of the mother’s status 
of irrevocable parental responsibility’156 because if JP were to adopt CP alone, the 
father’s parental responsibility would be permanently extinguished as a result of 
sections 46 and 67 of the ACA 2002. Similarly, the mother and father could not adopt 
together because they were no longer married or living as partners in an enduring 
family relationship (as required by s 50 (1) and s 60 of the ACA 2002).157 A Special 
Guardianship Order was equally unavailable because it would have allowed JP to 
exercise her newly granted parental responsibility to the exclusion of the surrogate and 
the father.158 The mother was granted a shared residence order under s8 of the Children 
                                                 
152 [23] (Theis J). 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 [28] (Theis J). For criticism of the relationship provisions see chapters 2 and 3. 
156 [32] (Theis J). 
157 Ibid. 
158 [33] (Theis J). 
171 
 
Act 1989, the effect of which is to confer parental responsibility upon her. However, 
King J stated: 
‘It remains, on any view, an unsatisfactory solution and understandably leaves the 
mother feeling vulnerable; a residence order does not confer legal motherhood upon 
her and, in the unlikely event that she ceased to have a residence order, she would lose 
her parental responsibility. Whilst a residence order regulates where CP lives and 
gives the mother parental responsibility, the surrogate mother retains legal 
motherhood and parental responsibility pursuant to s33, HFEA 2008.’159 
The court endorsed a family structure designed and presented by the parties. The 
parties agreed that CP shall remain a ward of court until further order.160 The parties 
agreed a shared residence order between the mother and father and agreed that all 
issues of parental responsibility are delegated to the mother and father jointly.161 
Finally, the parties agreed that the surrogate should be prohibited from exercising any 
parental responsibility for CP without the leave of the court.162 The case shows how 
the intended parent with no genetic connection to the child is left without the security 
of legal parenthood when this situation arises. A presumption of legal parenthood in 
respect of the intended parents would help to resolve this problem. It would ensure 
that legal parenthood is assigned to those who act, or intend to act, as the child’s 
psychological and social parent (in this case LP and JP). This would place those in 
JP’s position in securer position and allow them to make decisions on behalf of the 
child. Alternatively, there could be scope for the law to accommodate for the child 
having more than one legal mother,163 although as discussed earlier the majority of 
surrogates who took part in the Myth Busting Report did not want to be assigned legal 
motherhood at all.164 
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(IV) Social Parenthood: Children’s Identity and Psychological Well-
Being? 
It is suggested that assigning legal parenthood to purely social parents (i.e. doubly 
infertile couples or those without a genetic link to the child) is unlikely to have 
negative effects on the child’s identity and psychological well-being.165 Golombok et 
al’s., study which looks at children at three years old, suggests that the ‘absence of a 
genetic or gestational link between the mother and the child does not appear to impact 
negatively on parent–child relationships’.166 The study found that families without a 
gestational and / or genetic link ‘reflected higher levels of warmth and interaction 
between mothers and their 3-year-old children in the assisted reproduction families 
than in the comparison group of families with a naturally conceived child’.167  
With respect to psychological well-being, the researchers did not identify any 
differences between family types.168 Families in which the mother lacks a genetic and 
/ or gestational link to the child, and families in which the father lacks a genetic link 
to the child, are different in one important respect: the difference is ‘the level of 
mother–child interaction, with the surrogacy and oocyte donation mothers showing 
higher levels of interaction than the mothers of children conceived by donor 
insemination’.169 Golombok et al., note that this finding is surprising because it might 
be ‘expected that mothers who lack a biological link with their child would interact 
less with their child than biologically related mothers’.170 However, the researchers 
suggest that: 
‘[I]t may be that women who are unable to conceive or carry a child themselves may 
become especially committed to parenting when they eventually become mothers or 
may try to compensate for the absence of a genetic or gestational link.’171 
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As such, this study indicates that removing the genetic requirement is unlikely to affect 
psychological well-being, and parent-child wellbeing, in a negative way. To the 
contrary, Re G itself demonstrates the valuable role a social mother can play in the 
child’s life. In Re G, the child’s social mother (CW) had brought up the children from 
birth. The children had developed a good relationship with CW and her son and the 
judge accepted that ‘this relationship should be maintained throughout their minority 
through good quality frequent contact.’172 Moreover, the relationship between CW and 
her children was described as ‘an essential close relationship’ which must be 
promoted.173 In a previous hearing, Her Honour Judge Hughes, had also provided for 
CW to be informed about the children’s education and medical treatment,174 thus 
acknowledging the importance of not marginalising the child’s psychological and 
social parent. 
It is suggested that section 54(1)(b) should be removed and a presumption of legal 
parenthood in respect of the intended parents should be created, on the basis that it is 
in the child’s best interests for his / her social parents to be given legal parenthood.  
As Alghrani and Griffiths argue: 
‘Founding families is not a matter of genetics, but of love and commitment. Removing 
this requirement will allow the law to be more consistent with other areas of law and 
do more to protect the welfare of children in ensuring the individuals acting as parents 
are able to apply for the corresponding legal parental status.’175 
5.4 Double-Donor Surrogacy and a New Presumption of Legal 
Parenthood: Can these Reforms be Reconciled with the Child’s Right to 
Identity?  
Removing section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 would allow children to be conceived as a 
result of surrogacy and embryo donation (i.e. double-donor surrogacy). This means 
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the child would have no genetic or gestational tie to either intended parent. This final 
section considers whether the removal of section 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008, and the 
removal of section 33 HFEA 2008 (and creation of a presumption of legal parenthood 
in respect of the intended parents), can be reconciled with ‘the growing legal emphasis 
of a child’s ‘right’ to knowledge about their origins and genetic parents’.176 
McCandless argues that this trend is ‘evidenced by the growth of ‘open adoptions’ and 
the fact that since April 1st 2005, gamete donors must provide identifying information, 
to which the children, born from their gametes, will be entitled to obtain, upon 
reaching 18’.177  This section begins by setting out the right to establish details of one’s 
identity, which has been developed by the ECtHR and facilitated by changes to UK 
donor anonymity rules in 2005. 
(I) The Right to Establish Details of one’s Identity 
It is argued that access to genetic and gestational origins is important for the best 
interests of the child and his / her right to respect for identity (Articles 7 and 8 CRC) 
and private and family life (Article 8 ECHR, Article 16 CRC). Article 7 of the CRC 
provides the child with the right ‘...as far as possible ...to know ...his parents’ and it is 
argued that this should encompass all three forms of natural parenthood set out by 
Baroness Hale in Re G: gestational, genetic and social. Article 8 CRC also provides 
that States will ‘undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her 
identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognised by law without 
unlawful interference’. Again, recording details of the surrogate and any gamete 
donors will help protect this right.  
The right to establish details of one’s identity was developed in Gaskin,178 where the 
European Court ruled that the UK government had breached Article 8 by denying Mr 
Gaskin access to the records about him held by the English local authority in whose 
care he had been placed as a child. The Court concluded that ‘respect for private life 
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requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual 
human beings…’.179 If the genetic requirement is to be removed from the legislation, 
the child’s right to establish details of their identity, including genetic progenitors, 
must be safeguarded in order for double-donor surrogacy to be compatible with Article 
8 ECHR. In addition, if legal motherhood is no longer assigned to the surrogate, details 
of the surrogate must be recorded so that the child has access to information about 
their gestational ‘parent’.  
In the UK, anonymous gamete donation was abolished in April 2005. This change was 
catalysed by R (on the application of Rose and another).180 Rose, an adult woman, had 
been conceived in the UK using donor insemination prior to the HFEA 1990. Despite 
great efforts, she was unable to discover any information about the sperm donor. The 
other applicant, EM, a six-year old, had been conceived using donor insemination after 
the HFEA 1990 came into force. Both claimants had sought access to information 
about their anonymous sperm donors and the establishment of a contact register. The 
claimants relied on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. In ‘Rose’ Baker J held it is 
clear from the Strasbourg jurisprudence, including Gaskin,181 Johnson v. Ireland ,182 
Marckx v. Belgium183 and Mikulic v. Croatia184 that:  
‘Respect for private and family life requires that everyone should be able to establish 
details of their identity as individual human beings. This includes their origins and the 
opportunity to understand them. It also embraces their physical and social identity and 
psychological integrity’.185 
Ms Rose’s evidence demonstrates the importance of having the opportunity to access 
information about one’s genetic identity and origins. She felt that these genetic 
connections were very important to her ‘socially, emotionally, medically, and even 
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spiritually’.186 Moreover, she believed it was no exaggeration that ‘non-identifying 
information will assist me in forming a fuller sense of self or identity and answer 
questions that I have been asking for a long time...’.187 Therefore, if section 54(1)(b) 
is removed, thus allowing double-donor surrogacy, the child must have access to 
information about their genetic progenitors. As noted by Baker J, it is entirely 
understandable that donor conceived children should wish to know about their origins, 
in the same way that adopted children do: ‘A human being is a human being whatever 
the circumstances of his conception and an AID child is entitled to establish a picture 
of his identity as much as anyone else.’ 188 He also noted that we live in a much more 
open society and ‘secrecy nowadays has to be justified where previously it did not’.189 
Although Baker J agreed that Article 8 was engaged, he adjourned further deliberation 
on whether there had actually been an infringement pending completion of the 
government consultation. 
Nevertheless, the case catalysed changes to donor anonymity rules in the UK. 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor 
Information) Regulations 2004,190 were introduced to allow donor-conceived children 
(born from donations made after 1 April 2005) access to identifying information about 
their donor on reaching the age of 18.  Blyth explains that when requesting identifying 
information held on the Register, a donor-conceived individual can request the 
following donor information from the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFE Authority): ‘Full names (and any former names), date of birth and town or 
district where born, ‘appearance’, and last known postal address (or address recorded 
at time of registration’.191 Under the 2004 Regulations, the HFE Authority was 
‘required to collect additional non-identifying donor information from July 2004’,192 
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including marital status, parents’ ethnic group, and personal and family medical 
history, which could be made available to any offspring seeking this information on 
reaching the age of 16.193  
Rules on donor information have since been amended by the HFEA 2008. Since 1st 
October 2009, 16 year olds have been able to ‘ascertain whether information held on 
the Register indicates that (s)he may be donor-conceived and, if so, to receive any 
recorded non-identifying information about her or his donor.’194 A 16 year-old can 
also find out whether information held on the Register ‘indicates that (s)he may be 
donor-conceived and, if so, to receive any recorded non-identifying information about 
any donor-conceived genetically-related siblings.’195 Moreover, Blyth explains that: 
‘any person born after 1st August 1991 aged at least 18 may both register with Donor 
Sibling Link – a new register established by the HFEA - and request identifying 
information about any donor-conceived sibling who has already agreed to the 
disclosure of her or his identity. Where any subsequent donor conceived siblings join 
DSL, all existing registered siblings will be notified.’196 
Therefore, children born as a result of donated gametes or embryos have a right to 
access this information providing a UK licensed clinic was used. Individuals subject 
to a parental order (i.e. those born as a result of surrogacy) can also access their ‘long 
birth certificate’, which records the surrogate as the child’s legal mother.  However, 
as Blyth and Frith lament: 
‘Donor-conceived people's ability to access information to which they are entitled is 
entirely dependent on their awareness of the nature of their conception and this is 
clearly compromised if parents do not tell their children about their conception in the 
first place. Concerns have been expressed about low levels of parental disclosure...’.197 
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If sections 33 HFEA 2008 and 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 are removed, there is a risk that 
surrogacy-conceived children will not learn of their genetic and / or gestational origins 
due to varying levels of parental disclosure. 
(II) Comparative ‘Disclosure’ Rates in Surrogacy, Gamete Donation 
and Embryo Donation Families: Encouraging Early Parental 
Disclosure? 
In the context of surrogacy, genetic and non-genetic intended parents have different 
information to disclose to their child. For gestational surrogacy, where the child is 
genetically related to both intended parents, disclosure involves telling the child that 
they were carried by a surrogate. By contrast, where donated gametes have been used, 
either from the surrogate or donors, the intended parents may also need to disclose the 
child’s genetic identity. Given the varying levels of disclosure between surrogacy, 
donor insemination (DI), and egg donation (ED) families, there is a risk that children 
born as a result of surrogacy and embryo donation, will only be partially informed of 
their conception. For instance, the child may be told about their surrogate but not the 
fact they were conceived as a result of embryo donation too. Readings et al., conducted 
the first study to look comparatively at parents’ decisions in donor insemination (DI), 
egg donation (ED) and surrogacy families regarding telling their child and others about 
the method of conception.198 Egg (oocytes) donation ‘is indicated where a woman is 
unable to produce healthy eggs of her own, whether due to age, to previous 
chemotherapy, to ovarian dysgenesis, dysfunction or absence, or for 
genetic/chromosomal/infection reasons.’199 Sperm donation involves the insemination 
of a woman (in this context the surrogate) with sperm from a man who is not the 
intended parent. ‘The sperm is usually ejaculated in a clinical setting, tested for safety 
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and preserved and placed into the woman’s cervix or uterus or used to fertilize an egg 
through the use of IVF’.200  
Readings et al., observed that the rates of disclosure varied depending upon the method 
of conception. In the context of DI, studies show consistent rates of disclosure or 
intention to disclose, with studies reporting between 30% and 40%.201 Less is known 
about ED families, but studies have found: 
‘quite variable rates of telling, from 29% of parents intending to tell their child about 
their conception (Murray and Golombok, 2003) to a US study by Klock and Greenfeld 
(2004) finding that 59% of ED parents planned to tell. A donor study of ED families 
conducted in Belgium found that 44% of couples intended to tell their child about the 
nature of their origins (Baetens et al., 2000)’.202 
Moreover, in 2004, Golombok et al., also found that 46% of DI parents intended to 
tell their child about the nature of their conception compared to 56% of ED parents.203 
In light of these studies on ED families, Readings et al., state that the evidence 
‘generally suggests that ED parents may be slightly more open about the child's 
conception than Dl parents.’204 Explanations for greater openness in ED families ‘have 
ranged from ED being a more socially acceptable procedure, to the idea that pregnancy 
and childbirth compensate in some way for the absence of a genetic relationship’.205  
In contrast to ED and DI families, less is known about the disclosure patterns in 
surrogacy families. One study by MacCallum in 2003 found that out of 42 couples 
with a child born by surrogacy, all were planning to tell the child about the nature of 
their birth; the most common reason for disclosure was that the child had the right to 
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know the truth.206 In 2000 Van den Akker studied 29 women at various stages of 
surrogacy arrangements and found that 97% said they would disclose the surrogacy to 
their child.207 Another small UK study of 20 intended parents found that all intended 
to tell their child about the surrogacy.208  
On the face of it, this data suggests that intended parents are open to their children 
about their origins. However, an intention to inform the child about their conception 
is different from acting upon that intention to inform. Furthermore, parents are 
selective about what aspects of the child’s conception they disclose. In the study by 
Readings et al., despite intended parents having reported that they had told their 
children about their conception, ‘closer inspection revealed that 16 out of the 21 
(76.2%) families in genetic surrogacy arrangements had only told their child that they 
were carried by another woman and had not yet disclosed the use of the surrogate 
mother’s egg’,209 but all said they would probably tell in the future.210 This indicates 
that where surrogacy is used in conjunction with gamete or embryo donation, partial 
disclosure is a problem that could be exacerbated by removing the genetic requirement 
in section 54 HFEA 2008. Moreover, if legal motherhood is no longer assigned to the 
surrogate (who would no longer feature on the child’s original birth certificate) 
couples might not inform the child about the surrogate and the fact they are not the 
child’s genetic parents.  
In order to reconcile the removal of sections 33 and 54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 with the 
child’s right to know their genetic and gestational origins, early parental disclosure 
needs to be encouraged. Blyth suggests ‘funding the Donor Conception Network to 
produce materials on “how to tell”, and to run workshops on “telling”’.211 As part of 
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this education drive, the government needs to address the stigma and misconceptions 
about donor conceived children and non-biological families. The Strasbourg 
institutions must play a stronger role in promoting early parental disclosure across 
member states. In this respect, Paradiso and Campanelli,212 which was discussed in 
the previous chapter, is extremely unhelpful because it creates stigma for donor 
conceived children who have been born through surrogacy. In particular, the majority 
referred to the possibility that ‘the child resulted from a narcissistic desire on the part 
of the couple or that he was intended to resolve problems in their relationship.’213 The 
joint concurring opinions in Paradiso were particularly scathing of surrogacy and the 
non-biological family: 
‘We consider that gestational surrogacy, whether remunerated or not, is incompatible 
with human dignity... Pregnancy, with its worries, constraints and joys, as well as the 
trials and stress of childbirth, create a unique link between the biological mother and 
the child. From the outset, surrogacy is focused on drastically severing this link...’.214 
This suggests that there is a legitimate type of family consisting of biological parents 
and their children. The attitude of the ECtHR will only result in a return of the culture 
of secrecy that the applicant’s in Gaskin and Rose sought to challenge, and the 
Strasbourg institutions must now work with member states to encourage early levels 
of parental disclosure. 
(III) Reforming the Birth Registration System in the UK  
The second reform that needs to accompany the removal of sections 33 and 54(1)(b) 
HFEA 2008, concerns the UK birth registration system. According to Crawshaw, 
Blyth and Feast:  
‘The advent and increasing prevalence of gamete and embryo donation and surrogacy 
– or collaborative assisted reproduction – call into question the ability of the UK’s 
birth registration system to serve adequately the interests of those born as a result of 
such procedures’.215 
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At the moment, children subject to a parental order have two birth certificates. The 
‘long’ birth certiﬁcate is a ‘certiﬁed copy of an entry’216 and provides details of the 
individual’s name, date and place of birth, the father's name (if given at time of 
registration), his place of birth and occupation and the mother's name, place of birth, 
maiden surname and, after 1984, occupation.217The second birth certificate, 
‘Certiﬁcate of Birth’, is colloquially known as the ‘short birth certiﬁcate’. This 
provides details of the individual’s name, sex, date and place of birth. However, it 
provides no information regarding parentage. When a child is born following a 
surrogacy arrangement, and a parental order is made, a Parental Order certiﬁcate (‘a 
true copy of an entry in the Parental Order Register’) is issued. A new Certiﬁcate of 
Birth is also issued following the parental order, which provides details of the name 
by which the child will be known following the order. At age 16 in Scotland, and 18 
in the rest of the UK, a person subject to a parental order can apply for a copy of their 
original ‘long’ birth certiﬁcate from the relevant General Registry Office (GRO), but 
it is unlikely individuals will request this unless they have been informed about their 
conception.  
The main problem with the current birth registration system is that is fails to record 
details of all the child’s parents (genetic, gestational and social). Crawshaw et al., 
argue that this sits uneasily with the CRC and ECHR which promote the view that 
individuals should have a right to know their parents.218 Although the birth registration 
system in the UK has adapted to take into account ‘adoption, surrogacy arrangements, 
civil partnerships and re-registration for transgender individuals’,219 Crawshaw et al., 
contend that: 
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‘Birth registration has become a record of citizenship and legal parentage alone, and 
is not a source of information about one’s progenitors through recording biological 
facts or a public health record’.220   
As a result, they suggest that birth certificates should include three groups of ‘parents’. 
The first group includes those with a linear genetic relationship to the child (i.e. the 
genetic ‘parents’ who may variously be the surrogate, the intended parents in a 
surrogacy arrangement, or an embryo or gamete donor).221 The second group consists 
of those who carried the pregnancy and gave birth, even if they are not raising the 
child (i.e. the birth / gestational ‘parent’).222 The final group consists of those raising 
the child (i.e. the intended parents).  This approach would ensure that the gestational, 
genetic and social parents are recorded so that the child has information about their 
genetic and gestational origins. The certificate could clarify that only the intended 
parents are the legal parents of the child. Where the parties agree that the donor and / 
or surrogate is to play a child-rearing role, reforms should take place to allow for the 
child to have multiple legal parents. 
Crawshaw et al., propose that ‘the current ‘short’ and ‘long’ birth certificates, and 
perhaps even the current Parental Order and Adoption certificates, should be replaced 
with one certificate called a ‘certificate of legal parentage’.223 This would be 
introduced for all official purposes and would include a statement that it is a record of 
legal parentage only and that information about any additional records concerning 
genetic and/or gestational parentage will be provided on request.224 It seems that in the 
case of surrogacy, the intended parents would be recorded on the child’s ‘certificate 
of legal parentage’. When surrogacy conceived individuals make enquiries to the 
GRO, it would clarify that:  
                                                 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid, p2. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid, p3. 
224 Ibid. 
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‘(i) where surrogacy was involved then a gamete donor or donors may also have been 
used; and (ii) that where the enquirer had been born overseas or through informal 
arrangements then information may be lacking’.225 
The underlying rationale for this particular model, as opposed to annotating the birth 
certificate, seems to be the right to privacy for donor-conceived people and their 
parents.226 However, the main problem with this model is that everyone’s birth 
certificate, whether donor / surrogacy conceived or not, will include a statement that 
the ‘certificate of legal parentage’ is a record of legal parentage only and that 
information about any additional records concerning genetic and / or gestational 
parentage will be provided on request. This still relies on parental disclosure, because 
if everyone’s birth certificate has the same statement, a surrogacy / donor conceived 
person will not be put on notice to access the additional records about their genetic 
and / or gestational parentage. As such, there needs to be informed debate about 
whether the birth certificate should include all three groups of parents outlined by 
Crawshaw: genetic parents, gestational parents, and the child’s social intended 
parents. In the case of double donation, this would include the names of the egg donor, 
sperm donor, surrogate and intended parent(s).  It could be made clear that only the 
intended parents have legal parenthood and parental responsibility.227 The other 
groups are recorded to give the child information about their conception, rather than 
to give parental rights and responsibilities to these groups.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter demonstrated how assigning legal motherhood to the 
surrogate is not necessarily in the best interests of the child. Interviews with Sophie, 
Sally, Lauren and Rosie, who all had children through surrogacy, revealed a sense of 
vulnerability whilst waiting for legal parenthood to be assigned to them through a 
parental order. It is suggested that legal parenthood should be assigned to the intended 
parents much earlier to ensure that the child’s parents have the parental rights to look 
                                                 
225 Ibid. 
226Ibid, p4, 
227 Unless all parties (i.e. the intended parents, surrogate and / or donor) plan to raise the child 
together, in which can legal reforms are needed to allow for multiple parenthood in the UK. 
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after their children. It would be best to assign legal parenthood to the intended parents 
at the point of birth. This would resolve the issue of the surrogate’s autonomy being 
compromised whilst the child is still in utero.  
It was also considered whether legal parenthood could be assigned to the surrogate 
and intended parents, therefore necessitating a change in the law to accommodate more 
than two legal parents. This may be useful where a dispute arises between the surrogate 
and intended parents,228 or where the parties decide that they all want to raise the 
child.229 However, it is suggested that in the majority of cases assigning legal 
motherhood to the surrogate does not reflect the parties’ intentions. Two of the 
intended mothers interviewed for this project explained that their surrogate did not see 
themselves as the child’s parent and did not want to be tasked with any parental 
obligations. Although these views came from the intended parents (rather than the 
surrogates) this resonates with Imrie and Jadva’s study which indicates that the 
surrogate does not view the child as their own child.230 It is suggested that policy-
makers should develop a legal presumption of parenthood in favour of the intended 
parents.  
The second part of this chapter revealed that the genetic requirement in section 
54(1)(b) HFEA 2008 marginalises social parenthood, which was deemed to be a 
natural form of parenthood in Re G.231 Despite this, surrogacy regulation marginalises 
the child’s social (non-genetic) parent when the surrogacy agreement breaks down. 
CW v NT and another232 and H & S233 are prime examples of this. Furthermore, JP v 
LP & Others234 illustrates how the non-genetic intended parent is at risk of 
marginalisation from the child’s life when his / her relationship breaks down with the 
second intended parent (who has a genetic link to the child). JP had no parental 
                                                 
228 S Oultram, op cit, n11. 
229 For example, A.A. v. B.B., (2007) 83 O.R. (3d) 561 (C.A.) [A.A. v. B.B.], where all parties 
wanted to raise the child from the outset. 
230 S Imrie and V Jadva, op cit, n80. 
231 Op cit, n1. 
232 Op cit, n13. 
233 Op cit, n13. 
234 Op cit, n14. 
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responsibility or legal parenthood to reflect her role as the child’s social mother. It is 
the child who loses out from their main caregiver not having legal parenthood; the 
child’s mother in JP v LP & Others had no power to make decisions on behalf of the 
child, including consent to medical treatment. The final part addressed the concern 
that removing sections 33 and 43(1)(b) HFEA 2008 could compromise the child’s 
right to identity. For example, if the surrogate is no longer recorded on the child’s birth 
certificate as the legal mother and a donated embryo is used, the child may not be 
given information about their genetic and gestational ‘parents’. However, it is 
concluded that early parental disclosure and reforms to the birth registration system in 
the UK235 would help to address this risk. Therefore, there should be a presumption 
that the intended parents, irrespective of genetic link, are the legal parents of the 
child.236 This would not only be fairer to the parties concerned but would also reflect 
the child’s reality.  
                                                 
235 Crawshaw et al., op cit, n18. 
236 This could be rebutted where the parties agree that the child should have more than two legal 
parents; where the intended parents intentions change; or where it is in the best interests of the 
child to be raised by the surrogate (or another adult). 
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Chapter Six 
 
6. Facebook Groups, Vulnerable Surrogates and Fractured Dreams of 
Parenthood: How Should Regulation Respond to ‘Do-It-Yourself’ Surrogacy 
Arrangements? 
6.1 Introduction 
The option to meet surrogates online and through other informal means, gives the 
impression that ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) surrogacy arrangements offer a simple and 
quick way to become parents. This type of arrangement is not facilitated or arranged 
by a non-profit organisation like Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy 
(COTS), Surrogacy UK (SUK), or Brilliant Beginnings (BB). Although the parties 
might initially sign up with a non-profit organisation, they do not use the help or 
support of the organisation throughout the surrogacy and may originally meet through 
a secret online social chat group (e.g. Facebook).   
DIY arrangements are appealing for intended parents, who can circumvent the lengthy 
waiting lists for joining a non-profit organisation, meet a wider range of surrogates, 
and avoid the watchful eye of a professional organisation. However, this chapter aims 
to demonstrate how DIY arrangements can go wrong and, when they do, the problems 
outweigh any procreative freedom the intended parents hoped to achieve by ‘going it 
alone’. DIY arrangements can cause intended parents and surrogates to fall out, 
resulting in disputes about who the child’s legal parent(s) should be.1 This 
environment of acrimony is not conducive to supporting the child’s best interests and 
welfare.2 Informal arrangements also create conditions in which surrogates can be 
                                                 
1 See for example, Re Z (Surrogacy agreements) (Child arrangement orders) [2016] EWFC 34. 
Hereafter ‘Re Z (Surrogacy agreements)’. See also CW v NT and another [2011] EWHC 33 which 
was discussed in the previous chapters. 
2 See H v S (Surrogacy Agreement) [2015] EWFC 36, where the surrogate breastfed and co-slept 
with the child to minimise the intended father’s contact with his child, [18] (Russell J). Hereafter 
‘H v S’. 
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exploited,3 a concern usually reserved for foreign surrogates from poorer socio-
economic countries, including India.4  
The first part of this chapter explores two types of informal DIY arrangements: (1) 
arrangements entered into between friends, and (2) arrangements entered between 
strangers through online platforms like ‘Facebook’. Interviews with three mothers 
involved with this project, Sophie, Rosie and Lauren, are used to evaluate the 
processes involved with COTS and SUK. Their experiences will be compared with 
those of Bea, who entered into a surrogacy agreement using a secret ‘Facebook’ group. 
The next part of this chapter looks at the consequences of DIY arrangements for 
surrogates. It is suggested that the prohibition on commercial surrogacy following the 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SA Act) has been counter-productive. One of the 
main aims of the legislation was to prevent both the exploitation of women, and the 
commodification of children. The prohibitive legislation is, at least in part, responsible 
for driving intended parents into DIY arrangements and international commercial 
surrogacy agreements overseas. One of the main problems is the shortage of surrogates 
in the UK which is driving UK couples into DIY and international arrangements.5 The 
case of ‘Re Z (Surrogacy agreements)’,6 delivered by Russell J, is used to show how 
exploitation is an emerging issue in the UK; the casual nature by which surrogates and 
intended parents can now meet and enter into an informal agreement has led to an 
environment where exploitation thrives. Wertheimer’s7 accounts of exploitation are 
used to evaluate the various aspects of DIY arrangements.   
                                                 
3 ‘Re Z (Surrogacy agreements)’, op cit, n1. 
4 See generally, K Schanbacher ‘India's Gestational Surrogacy Market: An Exploitation of Poor, 
Uneducated Women’ 25, Hastings Women's Law Journal, 201 2014; C Thomale, ‘State of play of 
cross-border surrogacy arrangements–is there a case for regulatory intervention by the EU?’, 
Journal of Private International Law, 2017; and S Saravanan, ‘An ethnomethodological approach 
to examine exploitation in the context of capacity, trust and experience of commercial surrogacy 
in India’, Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2013, 8:10. 
5 ‘Childless UK Couples Forced Abroad to Find Surrogates’, The Guardian, 20th February 2016, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/feb/20/childless-uk-couples-forced-abroad-
surrogates> (last accessed 16/09/18). 
6 Op cit, n1. 
7 A Wertheimer, ‘Two Questions About Surrogacy and Exploitation’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 211-239. 
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In light of the serious problems caused by DIY arrangements, for both the surrogate 
and intended parents involved, the final part of this chapter suggests that a new form 
of regulation is required. It is considered whether the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFE Authority) should have a role in licensing and regulating 
non-profit surrogacy organisations like COTS, SUK and BB. It is also questioned 
whether regulation alone is sufficient to persuade intended parents to forgo the ‘DIY’ 
route, or whether certain incentives, such as a pre-birth order for those who use a 
licensed surrogacy organisation, would be required. 
6.2 Comparing DIY Arrangements with those Arranged through Non-
Profit Organisations 
This section looks at three types of surrogacy arrangements, two of which are DIY 
arrangements. The first DIY arrangement looked at are those entered into by intended 
parents and surrogates, who are friends. This type of arrangement arose in H v S,8 the 
problems of which are discussed shortly. The second type involves DIY arrangements 
entered into by strangers over the internet. This arose in CW v NT and another,9 and 
was the route taken by one of the intended mother’s interviewed for this thesis, Bea. 
The third type of arrangement is more formal, and involves not for profit surrogacy 
agencies, such as COTS, SUK, or BB. The differences between these three routes are 
explored in order to evaluate which option better protects the intended parents and 
children involved. 
(I) Informal DIY Arrangements between Friends: ‘The Lack of a 
Properly Supported and Regulated Framework’10 
The first type of DIY surrogacy arrangement discussed here involves those entered 
between friends. This type of DIY arrangement arose in the case, ‘H v S’, which 
concerned the future arrangements for a baby girl (M) who was born as a result of 
artificial or assisted conception and of an agreement – ‘the basis of which is highly 
                                                 
8 Op cit, n2. 
9 Op cit, n1. 
10 H v S, op cit, n2. 
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contested’11 – between S (the 1st Respondent, the mother) and H (the 1st Applicant, the 
father), and B (the 2nd Applicant) his partner. The child’s father, H, ‘was in a long-
term and committed relationship with B’.12 H and B argued that they had an agreement 
with S that she would act as a surrogate and that H and B would co-parent the child, 
but that S would continue to play a role in the child’s life.13 S argued that she and H 
entered an agreement that excluded B, and that H would be, in effect, a sperm-donor.14 
S claimed that she planned to take on the role of M's main parent and carer.15 
Throughout the proceedings S ‘vociferously rejected’16 B playing any parental role in 
M’s life.17 Russell J stated: 
‘Very sadly this case is another example of how “agreements” between potential 
parents reached privately to conceive children to build a family go wrong and cause 
great distress to the biological parents and their spouses or partners…’.18 
Russell J criticised ‘the lack of a properly supported and regulated framework’19 for 
private DIY arrangements and noted that arrangements of this kind have ‘inevitably, 
lead to an increase in these cases before the Family Court.’20 H and B sought parental 
responsibility through a child arrangement order and wanted M to live with them; 
letting S spend time with M on occasion. S asked for an order that M should live with 
her. Russell J found that it was in M’s best interests to live with her father, H, and his 
partner, B. She reached that conclusion ‘having had regard throughout to the welfare 
checklist and to M's interests now and in the long term’.21 
                                                 
11 [1] (Russell J). 
12 [1] (Russell J). 
13 [1] (Russell J). 
14 [1] (Russell J) 
15 [1] (Russell J). 
16 [1] (Russell J). 
17 [1] (Russell J). 
18 [2] (Russell J). 
19 [2] (Russell J). 
20 [2] (Russell J). 
21 [126] (Russell J). 
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As S denied acting as a surrogate and refused to consent to the intended parents' 
application for legal parenthood, the legislation governing surrogacy played no part in 
the case. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates how informal DIY assisted conception 
arrangements can frustrate the intentions of those involved. The case raises serious 
concerns about whether UK surrogacy regulation adequately protects the procreative 
rights and intentions of intended parents who enter DIY arrangements in this way. 
Russell J found on the balance of probabilities that S, had: 
 ‘[d]eliberately misled the Applicants in order to conceive a child for herself rather 
than changing her mind at a later date. Having at first encouraged H to be involved S 
was already trying to exclude H not long before M was born from involvement with 
the birth and with the child.’22 
This must have caused immeasurable disappointment for the applicants because it was 
clear that H had ‘so desperately wanted a child’.23 S had also consistently done all she 
could ‘to minimise the role that H had in the child’s life’24 and Russell J criticised her 
for acting as a ‘woman determined to treat the child as solely her own’.25 S ensured 
that H was not at the hospital when M was born; she registered the birth without 
putting H on the certificate and did not give the child any names except those chosen 
by her and did not reflect the child’s paternal family names in that choice.26 As such, 
there is no protection for those in H and B’s position. H had thought carefully about 
having a child and the emails he exchanged with S in 2012 illustrated ‘his awareness 
of the difficulties that would be encountered as well as a clear expression of his very 
great desire to have a child; and to have that child with B.’27  
                                                 
22 [55] (Russell J). 
23 [55] (Russell J). 
24 [56] (Russell J). 
25 [56] (Russell J). 
26 [56] (Russell J). 
27 Russell J concluded that the child should live with H and B and made a Child Arrangements 
order to that effect. This gave H and B parental responsibility, [123]. For discussion about why 
this is an inadequate solution for B and the child, see chapter 3. 
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It is suggested that one potential solution would be for legislation and policy-makers 
to actively discourage informal arrangements of this kind.28 Policy-makers could 
develop incentives for surrogates and intended parents to register with a recognised 
non-profit surrogacy organisation (e.g. SUK, COTS or BB) and work with the 
organisation throughout the surrogacy. This should be the case even where the 
surrogate and intended parents are friends. This would ensure that the parties have a 
more structured framework and the support and expertise of a professional 
organisation. There is still a risk the surrogate would change her mind, but this would 
be less likely given the safeguards in place with professional organisations, which are 
discussed in subsection (III).   
(II) DIY Arrangements Facilitated by the Internet: The Problems with 
Secret Facebook Sites and Other Online Forums 
A further worrying development is the rise of DIY surrogacy arrangements established 
through the internet. DIY arrangements conducted through social media platforms, 
including ‘Facebook’, create a risk that intended parents (and surrogates) will be 
exploited. Baker J summarised the problem in CW v NT and another:29 
‘Negotiating a surrogacy arrangement on a commercial basis is a criminal offence in 
this country. A number of agencies have been set up to facilitate surrogacy 
arrangements by making appropriate introductions, and providing advice and 
counselling to the parties. Those agencies have to be careful to ensure that the rules 
prohibiting commercial transactions are respected. [H]owever, the advent of the 
internet has facilitated the making of informal surrogacy arrangements between 
adults. In such cases, those entering the arrangement do not have the advantage of the 
advice, counselling and support that the established agencies provide.’30 
                                                 
28 Part 6.3 develops this argument. 
29 Op cit, n1. 
30 [2] (Baker J). 
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One example of an internet surrogacy arrangement gone wrong, involved a UK 
woman, Greenslade, pretending to be a surrogate.31 In 2004 Greenslade made £2,500 
before her attempt at successive sales of her baby was unmasked. One of her victims, 
who paid a £1,500 deposit on a £9,000 contract for the child, had suffered 13 
miscarriages. Greenslade had advertised on a website for surrogates and targeted up 
to five respondents.  
Surrogacy chatrooms are readily accessible through open and closed groups on social 
media sites including ‘Facebook’ which means that exploitation can arise for both 
surrogates and intended parents. Another recent case involved Samantha Brown32 who 
took £8,000 from a couple after promising to be a surrogate for them. Brown pretended 
she lost the baby in a car accident. UK surrogacy regulation should not allow this kind 
of abuse and exploitation to take place, and it is suggested that requiring all parties to 
register with and meet through an accredited non-profit surrogacy organisation would 
reduce this risk.  
 (a) CW v NT and another33 
The problems with DIY surrogacy arrangements, initiated via the internet, are seen in 
the startling case of CW v NT and another, concerning a baby girl called ‘T’. In 2009, 
T’s ‘mother’ met a couple (‘Mr and Mrs W’) over the internet and agreed informally 
that she would be inseminated by Mr W and hand the baby to the W’s after he / she 
was born.34 Baker J described the W’s as ‘frequent visitors to surrogacy websites’.35 
The first contact between the mother and the W’s came on 17th July 2009 when the 
mother emailed Mr W in these terms:  
                                                 
31 ‘Woman who Sold Baby Three Times is Jailed’ available at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_11960.asp (last accessed 21/04/16). 
32 The Telegraph, “Couple Conned by Fake Surrogate Mother’s Baby Lies”, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/12117244/Couple-conned-by-fake-surrogate-
mothers-baby-lies.html (accessed 07/05/16). 
33 Op cit, n1. 
34 [11] (Baker J). 
35 [44] (Baker J). 
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‘hello sweetie my name is [name given] and I am a surrogate mother in the UK …. I 
read our [sic] ad on yedda [the surrogacy website] and I am truly interested in helping 
you to make your family complete. I hope you contact me back and I can tell you all 
about me.’36 
After receiving this, the W’s got in contact with the mother. Subsequently, the mother 
became pregnant and received several thousand pounds from the intended parents 
during the pregnancy.37   
However, during the pregnancy relations between the parties deteriorated and a friend 
of the mother’s telephoned Mrs W and told her that the mother had changed her mind, 
and wanted to keep the baby.38 Despite the criticisms and findings about the mother, 
Baker J acquitted her of the charge that she deliberately set out to deceive the W’s 
from the outset.39 Having listened carefully to her evidence, Baker J did not believe 
that the mother entered the surrogacy arrangement with the fixed intention of keeping 
the baby.40 He accepted her evidence that she changed her mind about this matter 
during the course of the pregnancy. Nevertheless, the W’s dream to become parents 
and raise the child, was clearly frustrated by the DIY arrangement, and it is suggested 
that this would not have happened if regulation actively encouraged the parties to meet 
through a more formal platform like COTS, SUK or Brilliant Beginnings. 
Moreover, Mr and Mrs W’s general use of the internet in the context of surrogacy was 
concerning. The couple were registered on several surrogacy websites and there had 
already been one occasion involving a South African woman living in Wales who had 
disappeared after they had paid her £1000.41 This shows how unregulated 
arrangements expose the intended parents to exploitation and extortion as their desire 
to become parents makes them vulnerable. Baker J was concerned about ‘the 
dangerous and murky waters into which they, and particularly Mrs W, have strayed 
                                                 
36 [10] (Baker J). 
37 [3] (Baker J). 
38 [15] (Baker J). 
39 [34] (Baker J). 
40 [34] (Baker J). 
41 [8] (Baker J). 
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via the internet’.42 He was particularly worried about the W’s involvement with a 
woman known to them as ‘D’ but known to the police and social services in Scotland, 
as ‘CL’.43 Mrs W said she came across CL on an internet chatroom. CL told Mrs W 
that she was a victim of domestic violence and as Mrs W was a victim of similar 
violence in the past, she offered CL ‘refuge for a few weeks’.44 CL arrived at the W’s 
home where she stayed for about two weeks and it was alleged that she had a tattoo 
across her chest reading ‘Porn Princess’.45 At some point during her stay, social 
services visited the W’s home looking for CL, and ‘it was at this point that her true 
identity was revealed’.46 Shortly afterwards, CL left the W’s property.  
It transpired that CL is a prostitute, with seven children in care in Scotland.47 She is 
known on the internet as a surrogate and claims to have 13 children.48 She left 
Edinburgh when pregnant with her sixth child and went to stay with the W’s in 
England.49 When social workers visited the Ws’ home, Mrs W told her that the woman 
she knew as D was someone she had met over the internet. The social workers were 
‘concerned that the Ws might have arranged to take over the baby that CL was 
carrying’.50 This creates serious child safeguarding issues because it suggests that the 
W’s planned to take CL’s child without informing social services. Baker J was 
unconvinced by the Ws’ evidence about CL and did not believe Mrs W’s denial that 
she met CL through a surrogacy website: 
‘Given the shared interest in surrogacy, I think it probable that it was this, rather than 
domestic violence, that brought them together … I find that Mrs. W came across her 
via a surrogacy website.’51 
                                                 
42 [38] (Baker J). 
43 [38] (Baker J). 
44 [39] (Baker J). 
45 [39] (Baker J). 
46 [39] (Baker J). 
47 [40] (Baker J). 
48 [40] (Baker J). 
49 [40] (Baker J). 
50 [40] (Baker J). 
51 [42] (Baker J). 
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Furthermore, Baker J was ‘struck by their [the W’s] inability to appreciate the risks 
that arose by inviting a person like CL into their house’.52 In doing so, the W’s not 
only put themselves at risk of exploitation (they had already had money taken off them 
from a South African woman living in Wales, pretending to be a surrogate) but 
crucially, put their children at risk. As Baker J explained, ‘it cannot be said too strongly 
that it is extremely unwise to invite someone into your home whom you have only met 
over the internet.’53 It seems the W’s desperation to have a child through surrogacy 
made them lose sight of their responsibility for their existing children. Clearly, DIY 
arrangements are problematic for the intended parents whose plan to become parents 
can be thwarted. These arrangements also raise welfare concerns for any existing 
children, when strangers found online are introduced (without the kind of checks or 
screening provided by SUK / COTS / BB) and invited inside the family home. As 
such, DIY arrangements must be discouraged by new regulation. 
 
(b) Secret Facebook Groups: Bea’s Surrogacy Journey 
One of the intended mothers interviewed for this project, Bea, had twins through 
surrogacy and met her surrogate on a ‘secret Facebook group’.54 She had ‘Crohn’s’ 
disease and had a lot of operations on her abdomen which resulted in her fallopian 
tubes being damaged. Bea and her husband decided to use surrogacy to have children 
and joined COTS. However, they met their surrogate ‘on one of the secret Facebook 
groups’. The surrogate was also with COTS but they were not introduced by the 
organisation. Once the parties had met on the secret Facebook group, they entered into 
a COTS agreement. During the interview, Bea revealed that there were lots of intended 
parents and surrogates ‘on Facebook and it seemed that people were meeting that way 
rather than waiting for a COTS match.’55 
                                                 
52 [43] (Baker J). 
53 [43] (Baker J). 
54 Interview 01IM, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author). 
55 Ibid. 
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Bea and her husband, Jack, applied for a parental order in respect of their twins, and 
this was awarded by the court. However, she explained that her surrogacy journey was 
not a smooth one. Whilst everything was exciting when the parties first met, the 
relationship between the intended parents and surrogate deteriorated during the 
pregnancy. One source of tension was the surrogate’s use of social media: 
‘If she wasn’t feeling very well she’d post it on the Facebook group and I’d read it on 
there, rather than her telling me that she wasn’t feeling very well. All sorts about the 
pregnancy and how she was feeling she’d put on Facebook rather than telling me. So 
really I’d feel a bit like an outsider in what was a pregnancy which I really ought to 
have been a part of … we really wanted to be involved and it felt like she was keeping 
us out of it a bit.’56 
When the children were born, they were in incubators on a specialist ward. Bea felt 
that the surrogate suddenly wanted to be on the unit a lot.  She believed that the 
surrogate and her husband wanted to observe her going through a difficult period and 
would have appreciated ‘bit of space at that point …’ to help her bond with the 
children. 57 It is argued that the tension created when DIY arrangements go wrong, 
frustrates the child’s need to ‘grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding,’58 which is crucial for the harmonious 
development of his / her personality. It is not conducive to the child’s best interests 
for his / her life to start with conflict. Bea also described the parental order process as 
a ‘nightmare’ because their surrogate ‘just wouldn’t speak to CAFCASS’.59 This 
meant the intended parents had to wait for the surrogate to consent to the parental order 
and did not receive the children’s long birth certificate until the children were 18 
months old. This meant the children were being cared for by Bea and her husband, but 
they had no legal parenthood to reflect this until the parental order was awarded. 
Awarding legal parenthood to the intended parents at the moment of the child’s birth, 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Preamble to the CRC. 
59 Interview 01IM, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author). 
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a suggestion advocated in the previous chapter, would provide more certainty to 
parents like Bea who found herself at the whim of the surrogate. 
In light of these problems, Bea was asked whether she should have found her surrogate 
using a different channel. Bea replied: 
‘…You’d bite anyone’s hand off that offered because you’re desperate and there 
aren’t enough people willing to do it. I think we would do it again, we’d do it all the 
same again because we’ve got our children now.’60 
This demonstrates that intended parents are aware of the risks with the DIY route but 
feel they do not have any other option if they are to become parents. The desperation 
intended parents feel means they are open to as much exploitation as surrogates. Given 
the shortage of UK surrogates, meeting one through an informal platform, without 
checks or screening, may be some intended parents’ only option to create a family. 
(III) Surrogacy Arrangements with not for profit surrogacy agencies 
This section draws upon the empirical work carried out for this thesis to evaluate the 
processes involved in COTS and SUK. The aim is to show how the processes involved 
with non-profit organisations provide more support and security for intended parents 
and surrogates than DIY arrangements. 
(a) COTS 
One of the intended mothers interviewed for this project, Sophie, entered into a 
surrogacy arrangement using COTS, a non-profit organisation which was founded in 
1988 by Kim Cotton. Its primary objective is to: 
‘Pass on our collective experience to surrogates and would be parents, helping them 
to understand the implications of surrogacy before they enter into an arrangement and 
to deal with any problems that may arise during it.’61 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 https://www.surrogacy.org.uk/ (Last accessed 04/06/18). 
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Sophie and her husband joined COTS and were eventually matched with a surrogate. 
The IVF worked, and the surrogate became pregnant ‘quite quickly’. Sophie still had 
reservations with using COTS because ‘they’re limited in what they can do’ and there 
is a ‘shortage of surrogates compared to the vast number of parents that are… hoping 
to become parents’.62 
The reason Sophie chose COTS (over other not for profit agencies such as SUK), was 
that the former asks the intended parents to write a profile, which is sent to the 
surrogates who are available at the time. The surrogate then reviews the profile and if 
she is interested, the surrogate informs COTS, who will then put the parties in touch. 
Sophie commented that: 
 ‘I kind of liked that … means of introduction because I really like writing and thought 
that I could write my story well and hope that somebody would want to get to know 
us from reading our story…’.63 
Sophie described herself as being ‘so lucky with our surrogate’.64 The parties wrote a 
non-enforceable agreement and both sides ‘honoured that agreement completely’.65 
COTS provided the template for the agreement and set up an agreement meeting where 
the intended parents and surrogates went through it in a more formal way. The parties 
agreed upon everything, including reasonable expenses, what would happen in the 
event of a miscarriage or multiple pregnancies, how much contact the intended parents 
and surrogates are to have during, and after the pregnancy, and the arrangements for 
birth. One of the clear benefits of going through COTS or SUK, is the parties are given 
the chance to communicate their expectations of each other and think about what will 
happen if problems arise. 
Furthermore, one of the benefits of a profile is that the parties know each other’s values 
from the very beginning: 
                                                 
62 Interview 02IM, recorded on 09/07/16 (on file with the author). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
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‘So Z [the surrogate] had said right from the beginning even in her profile for COTS 
that she really wanted the parents to be at the birth and … obviously we really wanted 
that as well. We were delighted that [she] wanted us to be there and that was agreed 
from the outset.’66 
By contrast, where parties meet informally through the internet, they do not 
necessarily write a ‘profile’ and get to know each other’s story and values in the same 
way. This could explain why Sophie’s surrogacy journey was less complicated than 
Bea’s, who met her surrogate through a secret Facebook group. According to the 
organisation’s website, COTS require that surrogates and intended parents have a 
meeting with a support worker before going on the ‘active list’ of Triangle.67 Triangle 
is a splinter organisation which puts surrogates and intended parents in touch. The 
support workers ensure that ‘all parties understand the implications of surrogacy and 
are going into the arrangement with their eyes open’.68  
Having a support worker who helps the parties understand the agreement, and the 
consequences of surrogacy, is not a feature of DIY arrangements. COTS also require 
surrogates and intended parents to have up to date medical tests and Criminal Record 
Checks,69 another feature absent from the DIY context. Moreover, ‘all active 
surrogates and intended parents receive monthly phone calls from a COTS Support 
Worker’,70 who gives practical advice and moral support. The structured framework 
operated by COTS is missing from the DIY context, which could explain why more 
problems arise with the latter.  
(b) Surrogacy Arrangements with SUK 
Another non-profit surrogacy organisation operating in the UK, is SUK. The website 
for the organisation states that the ethos is ‘surrogacy through friendship’: 
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‘Through our organisation, Surrogates and Intended Parents can meet one another and 
form the friendships that can lead to dreams coming true. We are here to help and 
support you through all stages of your surrogacy journey’.71 
Lauren, an intended mother who had a child using surrogacy, used this organisation. 
She found out when she was 15 that she had a congenital absence of the uterus and 
would never be able to get pregnant or carry her own child. For Lauren, ‘surrogacy 
was the only option that she wanted to pursue to have a family’.72 She started by 
researching surrogacy online and she and her husband came across two organisations, 
COTS and SUK. They contacted both, and SUK responded first.  
Lauren and her husband went along to one of SUK’s socials to find out how SUK 
worked and ‘knew absolutely that that was the organisation for us.’73 Lauren explained 
that: 
‘The ethos of SUK is surrogacy through friendship and the emphasis is on the 
relationship between the surrogate and the intended parents, and investing in a genuine 
bond … Some people see each other after the surrogacy every three months or every 
year. It doesn’t matter how it manifests but it should be a genuine bond of friendship 
and trust.’74 
This ‘friendship first’ ethos explains why Lauren had an excellent relationship with 
her surrogate. Lauren’s surrogate came to a SUK social to meet Lauren and her 
husband, and to find out if they were the same as they appeared from their profile and 
diaries on the SUK message board. The parties were introduced, and Lauren talked 
with her surrogate for ‘12 hours’ and compared it to meeting her husband or ‘the 
one’.75 She said, ‘we just instantly connected and knew there was something very 
special in the relationship’.76 
                                                 
71 https://www.surrogacyuk.org/ (last accessed 08/06/18). 
72 Interview 07IM, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author). 
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Lauren and her husband decided they wanted to get to know the surrogate. SUK 
operate a minimum three month getting-to-know period, but Lauren and her husband 
spent six months getting to know their surrogate where they spent a lot of time together 
‘getting to know each other’s family and … building up trust.’77 Again, this getting-
to-know period does not necessarily occur when parties meet through informal means. 
Unlike DIY arrangements entered via the internet, Lauren described the SUK joining 
process as ‘really rigorous’. At the end of the get-to-know period, Lauren, her husband, 
and their surrogate sat down as a team, with a mediator from SUK where they went 
through an agreement form. This covered ‘every single aspect of surrogacy, diet to 
levels of contact during, before and afterwards’.78  
Rosie, another intended mother whose surrogate was pregnant at the time of the 
interview, also used SUK.79 Like Lauren, she explained that she ‘had to talk about a 
million and one different scenarios’80 and the things she and her surrogate agreed on, 
which confirms the rigour of the SUK process. Rosie, her husband, and their surrogate 
all received a copy of the documents and the non-binding agreement, which the parties 
sign to indicate that they are ‘happy and it [the agreement] properly represented what 
you’d spoken about and how you feel’.81 Once this process is completed, the parties 
can then start treatment and attempt to get pregnant.  
With informal DIY arrangements the parties do not necessarily spend time getting to 
know one another. Moreover, the parties to a DIY arrangement do not sit down as a 
team with a mediator or go through every single aspect of the agreement. In ‘Re Z 
(surrogacy agreements)’,82 the intended parents already had twins, via surrogacy, six 
months before entering a new surrogacy arrangement. The intended parents met the 
first surrogate, ‘V’: 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Interview 03IM, recorded on 11/07/16 (on file with the author).  
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Op cit, n1. 
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‘In a services area in a “restaurant off the motorway in the West Midlands” and, that 
at the meeting which lasted 3-4 hours, they had discussed “the agreement and who we 
were”. They had signed an agreement at that meeting and that had constituted 
“matching”’.83  
As a result, the parties knew hardly anything about each other. The applicants ‘met’ V 
online or on Facebook in late September 2011 and they ‘knew very little about V 
relying instead on the views of L who was also involved in the surrogacy 
forum’.84 Once introduced the intended parents and V ‘had become further acquainted 
online and arranged to meet in person’.85 The purpose and focus of this first meeting, 
was not to get to know one another, but ‘to sign the surrogacy agreement’.86 As such, 
‘it was abundantly clear that A and B knew very little at all about V, her circumstances 
or her motivation for acting as their surrogate when they signed the agreement with 
her.’87 The DIY arrangement between A, B and V did not involve any getting-to-know 
period or the ‘friendship first’ ethos adopted by SUK. Instead the parties rushed into 
an agreement at a time when the surrogate had financial troubles and had just separated 
from her partner. It is unsurprising that the relationship broke down and led to 
problems. 
When asked whether SUK is a better option than intended parents ‘going it alone and 
trying to find a surrogate through Facebook … where you don’t have the same kind of 
support’, Lauren believed so. She said: 
‘I know that people have successful surrogacy arrangements through independent 
Facebook groups. But I believe the risk of things going wrong is much higher.’88 
She explained that at SUK parties must undergo a lot of checks before becoming a 
member and have detailed membership sessions with experienced surrogates and 
intended parents. SUK also flag any concerns about the parties understanding of 
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surrogacy and parties must have background checks, a Disclosure and Barring Service 
check (DBS), Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) test, medical tests and General 
Practitioner (GP) letters. In addition to these checks, Lauren explained that the 
surrogate and intended parents also ‘have access to hundreds of people who are going 
through it or gone through it’89 and each party has an individual support worker who 
can be contacted anytime: 
‘If there are issues in your journey the support workers and trustees who are 
experienced mediators can intervene to support and help people reach the best 
possible outcome. So you’ve got a lot more checks, balances, support and best practice 
going through an organisation like SUK.’90 
By contrast, this level of support is missing from informal DIY arrangements. Bea’s 
surrogacy journey, which started through a secret Facebook group, shows how small 
problems such as the surrogate posting too much information on Facebook, rather than 
communicating with the intended parents, can escalate; the surrogate in that case, for 
instance, refused to talk to the CAFCASS officer and made the parental order process 
difficult. If Bea had the level of support offered by SUK, including a mediator, this 
problem could have been resolved before it had the chance to spiral. Ultimately, the 
procreative liberty intended parents believe they can achieve through DIY 
arrangements is illusory. It is important to acknowledge that while not for profit 
surrogacy agencies are a better route than DIY arrangements, they can still make 
serious errors which result in the child being left without a parental order.91 
6.3 DIY Arrangements and the Exploitation of Surrogates in the UK 
The procreative liberty intended parents hope to achieve through DIY arrangements 
also comes at a cost to the surrogate involved. The exploitation of surrogates has 
largely been associated with the women in international commercial surrogacy 
arrangements, especially those from poorer socio-economic countries like India.92 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid.  
91 See Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam) which is discussed below. 
92 Op cit, n4. 
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This has resulted in multiple efforts across different jurisdictions to limit reproductive 
tourism.93 In 2014, the European Parliament condemned the practice of gestational 
surrogacy on the basis that it ‘involves reproductive exploitation and use of the human 
body for ﬁnancial or other gain, in particular in the case of vulnerable women in 
developing countries …’.94 Furthermore, in its ‘project on parentage / surrogacy’, 95 
the Hague noted the broader concerns arising from surrogacy included, ‘the potential 
for exploitation of women, including surrogate mothers.’96  
The same concerns of exploitation are not associated with today’s UK surrogates. In 
1984, The Warnock Committee condemned surrogacy and was concerned with the 
exploitation that could arise from the practice.97 The subsequent SA Act 1985 
prohibited what policy-makers perceived to be the key causes of exploitation and 
commodification of children: enforceable contracts,98 advertising,99 and commercial 
payments.100  There is an assumption that the current model of regulation, which is 
modelled on altruistic surrogacy, sufficiently protects surrogates from the kind of 
exploitation encountered by those in international commercial arrangements. This 
assumption is also held by intended parents too. Sophie, who entered a surrogacy 
                                                 
93 See for example India. The Guardian (3rd January 2016) ‘“We pray that this clinic stays open”: 
India’s surrogates fear hardship from embryo ban’ 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/03/india-surrogate-embryo-ban-hardship-gujarat-
fertility-clinic (last accessed 15/06/18). 
94 European Parliament, Plenary Sitting, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the 
World 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (2015/2229(INI)), 30th November 
2015, A8-0344/2015. Available at, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2015-0344+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (last accessed 11/05/18). 
See para 114. 
95 See https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy (last accessed 
07/06/18). 
96 Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘Report of the February 2016 Meeting of the 
Experts’ Group on Parentage / Surrogacy’, at para 15 <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/f92c95b5-
4364-4461-bb04-2382e3c0d50d.pdf > (last accessed 07/06/18). 
97 M Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
Cmnd 9314 (1984). Hereafter, ‘The Warnock Report’. 
98 Section 1A SA Act 1985. 
99 Section 3 SA Act 1985. 
100 Section 2 SA Act 1985. 
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arrangement using COTS was put off from using international surrogacy because of 
concerns with exploitation. She said: 
‘I don’t think we could ever really kind of feel comfortable with some of the kind of 
issues … would surrogacy be safely and ethically practised in all of the locations and 
would the surrogate definitely be doing it freely and … be supported properly through 
it by friends and family?’101 
This highlights how exploitation is not associated with altruistic surrogacy in the UK. 
However, DIY arrangements, and the increasing use of the internet to facilitate this 
mode of arrangement, have created the conditions for exploitation to arise.  
The meaning of ‘exploitation’ is ambiguous and contested. Wertheimer explains ‘we 
typically say that A wrongfully exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of B’.102 
According to Wertheimer, to see whether an ‘unfair advantage’ has arisen, we must 
look at two dimensions of the transaction: (1) the dimension of value and, (2) the 
dimension of choice.103 With respect to the ‘dimensions of value’, the transaction is 
exploitative where A benefits from the transaction but it is harmful or unfair to B.104 
With respect to the dimension of choice, A exploits B only when B's choice is 
somehow compromised.105 Wertheimer applies the dimensions of value and choice to 
surrogacy and suggests there are three types of exploitation. The first is ‘harmful 
exploitation’. On this account, ‘surrogacy is exploitative because the intended parents 
gain from the transaction while the surrogate is—on balance—harmed.’106 The second 
account is ‘mutually advantageous exploitation’ whereby ‘the surrogate gains from 
the transaction but in a way that is unfair to her, perhaps because the intended parents 
gain much more than the surrogate.’107 The third account is moralistic exploitation, 
whereby the intended parents benefit from a transaction that is immoral, ‘perhaps 
because the relationship involves an exchange of radically incommensurate values, or 
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102A Wertheimer, op cit, n7, p212. 
103 Ibid, p213. 
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because the transaction wrongly commodifies procreational labor’.108 This is the 
definition of exploitation used by The Warnock Committee to object to surrogacy.109  
Turning to the ‘dimension of choice’, Wertheimer suggests that the voluntariness of 
the surrogate's decision may be compromised by coercion or her inability to fully 
appreciate what she is committing herself to doing.110 Where coercion is an issue, we 
must question whether the consent was sufficiently free, and where the surrogate is 
unable to fully appreciate the surrogacy arrangement we must question whether the 
consent was sufficiently informed or rational.111 This section explores the judgment 
delivered in ‘Re Z (Surrogacy agreements)’112 to consider whether exploitation, and 
which type, can arise within UK DIY arrangements.  
(I) ‘Re Z (surrogacy agreements)’: Exploitation in the UK Surrogacy 
Context?  
‘Re Z (surrogacy agreements)’ is a startling example of how the absence of proper 
regulation and a non-profit surrogacy organisation can result in vulnerable women 
being used as surrogates in DIY arrangements. The case, heard by Russell J, concerned 
an application for a child arrangements order, which was made in respect of a baby 
boy born in England in the summer of 2015, as a result of gestational surrogacy.113 
The intended parents, A and B were a same sex couple, and already had twins who 
had been born to a surrogate, V.114 Shortly after obtaining the parental orders in respect 
of the twins, the couple entered into a second surrogacy arrangement with X who was 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
109 Op cit, n97 at 8.17, ‘The moral and social objections to surrogacy have weighed heavily with 
us.’ 
110 A Wertheimer, op cit, n7, p224. 
111 Ibid, p224. For criticisms of A Wertheimer’s theory, or for alternative definitions of exploitation 
see, Lynn A. Jansen and Steven Wall, ‘Rethinking Exploitation: A Process-Centred Account’, 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Volume 23, Number 4, December 2013, pp. 381-410 (Article); 
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a young mother in her early twenties, with learning difficulties and a low-income.115 
The intended parents were introduced to X through a Facebook surrogacy site, ‘which 
was run or administered to provide a forum for the introduction of potential surrogates 
and commissioning parents’.116 There is no screening of either surrogates or intended 
parents and no support available other than support from others involved with the 
forum.117  
Some months before the child was born, the surrogate expressed her intention that she 
would refuse to consent to the making of a parental order, as required by section 54 
HFEA 2008. By the time that Z was born, the surrogate had suffered a miscarriage of 
one of the babies she was carrying and had hidden the fact that one foetus had survived 
from the applicants.118 The intended parents only found out Z was carried to full term 
just prior to his birth.119 The applicants launched legal proceedings in an attempt to 
get the surrogate to hand the baby over to them. The applicants claimed that ‘she had 
behaved in a deceitful and calculating manner and that it was not in Z’s best interests 
to remain living with her, her partner and their son’.120 The child, Z, was not the 
surrogate’s genetic or biological child (being the biological offspring of A and an egg 
donor) but under section 33 HFEA 2008, the surrogate was Z’s legal mother. Russell 
J accepted the guardian’s recommendations that Z should live with his gestational 
mother, X, and spend time with A and B for one in every 8 weekends until he reached 
the age of two.121 The guardian found that Z's primary attachment was to the surrogate 
and she was better able to meet all his needs, emotionally as well as physically.122 By 
contrast, A – Z’s biological parent – ‘visibly struggled to acknowledge her [the 
surrogate] as Z’s mother’.123   
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Using Wertheimer’s accounts of exploitation, it is suggested that the intended parents 
exploited X, the surrogate, by taking unfair advantage of her. In terms of the dimension 
of value, the surrogate stood to benefit from the transaction (at least financially), the 
intended parents were to receive something in return (a child and sibling for their 
twins), but the agreement was both harmful and unfair to the surrogate. Secondly, the 
surrogate’s choice was compromised because she was unable to fully appreciate the 
arrangement and what was involved. 124 It is suggested that out of Wertheimer’s three 
types of exploitation (‘harmful’, ‘mutually-advantageous’ and ‘morally harmful’), this 
case was an instance of ‘harmful’ exploitation ; the intended parents stood to gain 
enormously by the surrogacy, whereas the surrogate was without doubt harmed by the 
arrangement. 
(II) Taking Advantage of the Surrogate’s Vulnerabilities: Defect of 
Choice? 
As Wertheimer suggests, ‘the voluntariness of the surrogate's decision may be 
compromised by coercion or by her inability to fully appreciate just what she is 
committing herself to doing’.125 Where the latter arises, he states that we must 
‘question whether the consent was sufficiently informed or rational.’126 The surrogate 
in Re Z (Surrogacy agreements) did not fully understand the agreement and therefore 
did not provide informed consent. Russell J considered that it was ‘questionable 
whether she had a full understanding of the process at any stage’ of the surrogacy 
process127 and that it was clear that X, the surrogate, ‘could not read or understand the 
contract she had signed’.128 The surrogate’s defect in choice can also be inferred from 
the Clinical Psychologist’s report and cognitive assessment of X, completed in 
November 2015. The psychologist, Dr Willemsen, determined that X had ‘severe 
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learning difficulties’, ‘difficulties communicating and … [that] her written and verbal 
comprehension and communication abilities were low’.129 He confirmed that X has: 
‘Learning difficulties of “a likely congenital nature” and suffers from low self-esteem 
and that the combination of her environment and her learning difficulties render her a 
vulnerable young woman.’130 
Until Dr Willemsen saw X, neither her family nor her partner were aware of the 
difficulties, although she was ‘perceived as different from her siblings and her peers 
at school, and her partner told me [Dr Willemsen] that while he was aware she was 
vulnerable he did not know just how vulnerable’.131 X was described as wanting to 
please people and had trouble speaking up.132 She was described by Dr Willemsen as 
‘a vulnerable young woman who is susceptible to influence and pressure from 
others.’133 
X signed an agreement based on a template – found online – that mirrored commercial 
surrogacy arrangements in the USA. She signed this at a fast-food outlet near a railway 
station ‘after a brief face to face meeting lasting less than two hours’.134 The surrogate 
was accompanied by her young son and a young relative.135 This meant the intended 
parents and surrogate did not spend time getting to know one another and rushed 
straight into an agreement. Moreover, the intended parents were unconcerned about 
protection for X’s position and ‘never even bothered to send her a signed copy’.136 
Wertheimer suggests that if the defect in the surrogate’s choice arises ‘not due to a 
lack of “external information” or opportunity for deliberation, but is the result of her 
own cognitive and emotional limitations’, this ‘might’ be exploitation. This thesis goes 
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further: where a defect of choice has arisen at all, the defect should be enough to 
constitute exploitation. 
Following the agreement entered near the railway station, there were no further face 
to face meetings until X flew to Cyprus with one of the intended parents, A, ‘a man 
she had met once in a fast-food outlet in a strange town’.137 Russell J stated: 
‘It does not take much imagination to consider how this vulnerable young woman 
must have felt in a room in a clinic attended only by strangers while the “treatment” 
took place and the embryo was place inside her.’138  
The trip was unpleasant for the surrogate and she was ‘effectively excluded from 
discussions at the clinic; certainly she did not, on anyone's account, actively participate 
in any conversation with the consultant in the clinic’.139  She felt more isolated because 
she did not have credit on her phone and Russell J found it ‘incomprehensible’ that A 
had not seen to it that X was able to contact her family.140 Moreover, X ‘felt deeply 
uncomfortable about the arrangement but she could not find a way of expressing her 
feelings because she was concerned that she might upset and displease the couple.’141 
She did not want the surrogacy to continue but did not have the capacity to 
communicate her wishes. Russell J empathised that ‘she must have felt very alone at 
times’.142 
On the surrogate’s vulnerability, Russell J commented how it was striking that the 
applicants ‘did not seem able to see how vulnerable X was even at this stage’.143 She 
observed that the ‘guardian was almost immediately struck by it’ and ‘even on their 
first phone call she [the guardian] sensed that X was lacking in confidence and that by 
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the time she had met X and spoken to her she believed she had learning difficulties’.144 
Everyone with whom the guardian spoke: 
‘commented on her vulnerability: they included the mid-wife; P’s mother who 
described X as ‘naïve and gullible’; P, himself, spoke about “how vulnerable [X] is”; 
X’s step-father described her as “gullible”; her own sister described X as “very naïve”; 
a family friend described X as lacking confidence.’145 
There is a clear sense that the intended parents recognised the surrogate was vulnerable 
and played on her vulnerabilities for their own gain. As Wertheimer states, this 
worsens the exploitation because the intended parents manipulated the surrogate’s 
capacity as a rational agent to their advantage.  
(III) Harmful Exploitation and Risks to the Surrogate’s Health  
In addition to the surrogate’s defect in choice, the arrangement was harmful, thus 
requiring a discussion of Wertheimer’s ‘dimension of value’ and harmful exploitation 
definition. The agreement is, ‘on an all things considered approach’, harmful and 
unfair to the surrogate who had to undertake risks to her health and forgo her own 
procreative liberty. Firstly, the applicants had not arranged life insurance as agreed 
despite the agreement stipulating that it would be arranged before the pregnancy. X 
became so worried about this, she messaged A: ‘I would like to get insurance starting 
today please, as it should have been done befor we [sic] got pregnant 
xx’.146  Moreover, the procedure in Cyprus was also risky for the surrogate. X had 
never wanted to carry two embryos but ‘did not say anything to the applicants as she 
did not want to let them down’.147 X was ‘both scared and anxious’148 about carrying 
two embryos but believed the applicants when they told her that ‘probably only one 
would work’.149 She was also excluded from conversations in the clinic, despite the 
discussions being about her body and the embryos she was carrying. It is argued that 
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X’s right to make reproductive decisions was violated. According to the 1994 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (ICPD), 
reproductive rights: 
‘... rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide 
freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have 
the information and means to do so ... It also includes the right of all to make decisions 
concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence as expressed in 
human rights documents...’.150 
X, the surrogate, could not decide freely, and without coercion, how many embryos 
she wanted to carry. X was clearly under pressure and did not want to displease the 
intended parents, thus invalidating her consent. 
 
Multiple embryo transfers are usually associated with international commercial 
surrogacy.151 Mohapatra submits that ‘most surrogacy clinics in Ukraine and India 
implant the surrogates with multiple embryos to boost their success rate’.152 Pregnancy 
with multiple embryos ‘exposes surrogates to increased risks, such as “hypertension, 
gestational diabetes, and excessive bleeding in labor and delivery.”’153 The case of Re 
Z (Surrogacy agreements)154 highlights how surrogates involved in DIY arrangements 
in the UK are subject to the same health risks as surrogates in the Ukraine and India 
where multiple embryo transfers are a common feature. The surrogate in Re Z 
(Surrogacy agreements) was not even involved in the discussions in the Cyprus 
clinic,155 which suggests she was not informed of the risks with implanting multiple 
embryos.  
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Once back in the UK, and when blood tests confirmed the pregnancy, A and B started 
to pay X £500 a month.156 The total amount was agreed to be £9,000 and the applicants 
had agreed a sum of just £1,000 in the event of a hysterectomy; they said they 
‘absolutely’ could not afford a larger sum.157 This kind of clause is completely 
unethical because ‘this event, had it occurred, would have meant that X could never 
have any more children’.158 The surrogate, X, was only in her early twenties so if a 
hysterectomy was needed at such as young age, this would have had a significant 
impact on her reproductive rights and health. This is a clear example of ‘harmful 
exploitation’ because the benefits to the surrogate (if there were any) are outweighed 
by the risk to her health. Lauren, the intended mother who had a child through 
surrogacy with the support of SUK, referred to Re Z (Surrogacy agreements) during 
her interview and said that this type of situation ‘would have been flagged up at SUK 
immediately.’159 
 
It is worth noting that the intended parents’ exploitation of the surrogate in ‘Re Z 
(Surrogacy Agreements)’ is contrary to the best interests of the child. The surrogate is 
an important person in the child’s life.160 Although it is argued that the surrogate 
should not be recognised as the child’s legal mother161 her contribution still deserves 
respect. The surrogate donates the use of her body and time; without her, the child 
could not have been born. It is not in the child’s life-long welfare to be raised by 
intended parents who exploit their gestational parent. For example, if the intended 
parents in ‘Re Z (Surrogacy Agreements)’ had been granted a child arrangements 
order, and the child subsequently learnt of the intended parents ‘crass’ behaviour 
towards the surrogate when she was in Cyprus,162 he / she may feel guilty or begin to 
resent their intended parents. 
                                                 
156 [12]. 
157 [12] (Russell J). 
158 [12] (Russell J). 
159 Interview 03IM, recorded on 11/07/16 (on file with the author).  
160 Re G [2006] UKHL 43, [34] (Baroness Hale). 
161 Section 33 HFEA 2008 accords legal motherhood to the surrogate ‘and no other woman’. For 
criticism of this provision, see chapter 5. 
162 Russell J stated that the intended parent’s behaviour towards the surrogate ‘was crass; they did 
not know that she had never been abroad before because they didn't ask.  They took no steps to 
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The risk of surrogate exploitation within the DIY context is clear. Although less 
discussed and less obvious, there is a risk of exploitation for intended parents, too.163 
This exploitation appears to be exacerbated by the current legal framework, which 
does not encourage parties to use a non-profit organisation. In light of the deficiencies 
with current regulation, which does nothing to prevent intended parents entering DIY 
arrangements, the final part of this chapter considers whether non-profit surrogacy 
organisations should be used to discourage informal arrangements, and whether the 
HFE Authority has any role to play in this context. 
6.4 Discouraging DIY Arrangements: Should the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority License Non-Profit Surrogacy Organisations? 
The interviews carried out for this project indicate that non-profit organisations, 
including COTS and SUK, provide a more supportive and professional basis for 
parties entering surrogacy arrangements. The inhumane treatment of the surrogate in 
Re Z (Surrogacy agreements) shows that DIY arrangements inadequately support the 
surrogate. As such, ‘DIY’ arrangements should be discouraged in the UK. In order to 
achieve this, it is suggested that non-profit surrogacy organisations should be licensed, 
in the same way clinics providing IVF treatment are licensed by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.  
(I) Licensing Non-Profit Organisations: What are the Advantages for 
Intended Parents, Surrogates and Children? 
It is suggested that UK surrogacy arrangements should be arranged and facilitated by 
a non-profit organisation (e.g. COTS, SUK, or Brilliant Beginnings), and the non-
profit organisation should be licensed in a similar way to clinics providing IVF 
treatment. In 1984, the minority of The Warnock Committee argued: 
                                                 
ensure that she was comfortable or to find out from her what they could do to make her feel 
supported, and, above all appreciated’, [63]. 
163 Op cit, n32. 
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‘Whatever we as an Inquiry may recommend, the demand for surrogacy in one form 
or another will continue, and possibly even grow … As a consequence couples may 
give up any hope of a child, may take further risks such as of more miscarriages, or 
may decide to venture into some sort of “do-it-yourself” arrangement. The latter 
possibility – that couples are driven into making their own arrangements – is 
particularly unsatisfactory. These arrangements would be unsupported by medical and 
counselling services…’.164 
One only has to look at the case of Re Z (Surrogacy agreements) to see the exploitative 
effects of not having any professional services involved in a surrogacy arrangement. 
The minority suggested that the licensing authority proposed by The Warnock 
Committee (now known as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority) should 
include the regulation of surrogacy within its terms of reference.165 The minority also 
believed the authority should be empowered to license non-profit making agencies 
who could match the intended parents with the surrogate, and provide ‘adequate 
counselling to ensure that the legal and personal complications of surrogacy were fully 
understood.’166 The minority envisaged that only agencies without commercial 
motive, and with experience of child-care issues would be licensed.167 They also 
suggested that access to a surrogacy agency should only be by referral from a 
gynaecologist.168 This recommendation is rejected given that surrogacy is not just a 
way to overcome fertility, but something used by single parents, same-sex couples and 
doubly-infertile169 couples to have a family.  
In 1998, The Brazier Review observed that in a subsequent White Paper, Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology: A Framework for Legislation (Cm. 259) the 
Government rejected Greengross and Davies’ proposal to license non-profit making 
surrogacy agencies and to bring surrogacy arrangements within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
164 ‘The Warnock Report’, op cit, n97. Greengross and Davies (minority dissent) p88, para 4. 
165 Ibid, para 5. 
166 Ibid.  
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 See chapters 4 and 5. 
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HFE Authority.170 Moreover, although the White Paper proposed that the HFE 
Authority review surrogacy ‘from time to time and report to Parliament’171 and that 
regulation should permit the Secretary of State to extend the HFE Authority’s powers 
to include a power to license non-profit making surrogacy agencies, ‘these proposals 
did not find their way into what became the 1990 Act and so no express obligations 
were placed on the HFEA’.172 
 
At the time of The Brazier Review, COTS would have liked ‘to be “licensed” to assist 
in surrogacy arrangements’.173 COTS was concerned about underground surrogacy, 
and worried that many arrangements are made without any advice or support, or on 
the basis of advice from individuals or organisations of questionable integrity.174 
These concerns have materialised. The Brazier Review suggested there were two 
options for extending the role of the HFE Authority, to surrogacy arrangements. The 
first option would be to require that all authorised surrogacy had to take place in a 
licensed fertility clinic. The Brazier Review rejected this option because it was 
concerned that, ‘although infertility is clearly a reason for seeking surrogacy, we do 
not believe that surrogacy arrangements are correctly perceived as merely another 
treatment for infertile people’.175 It continued: 
‘The involvement of the surrogate mother requires a consideration of other factors, 
much more akin to the dilemmas of adoption than those of infertility, both from the 
point of view of her welfare and of the child’s welfare. We do not believe, therefore, 
that fertility clinics are necessarily the correct setting for negotiating surrogacy 
arrangements, though we accept that they have an important part to play, especially 
in IVF surrogacy.’176 
                                                 
170 Brazier Report, Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments 
and Regulation, Cm 4068 (1998), para 2.23. Hereafter ‘The Brazier Review'. At 2.25. 
171 Ibid, 2.26. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid, 3.34. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid, 6.13. 
176 Ibid. 
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Although a fertility clinic is not necessarily the correct setting for negotiating a 
surrogacy arrangement, a non-profit organisation like COTS or SUK already has an 
effective approach, which could be used in a regulatory scheme. 
The Brazier Review considered the alternative possibility that surrogacy could 
continue both in licensed fertility clinics but also under the auspices of non-medical 
bodies like COTS.177 The HFE Authority would be required to license both types of 
agency. The Brazier Review concluded that regulating non-profit surrogacy 
organisations was not an appropriate role for the HFE Authority. The Brazier Review’s 
proposals were supported by the HFE Authority: 
‘The HFEA regulates the medical treatments required by the surrogate mother in order 
to become pregnant in a surrogacy arrangement. The nature of the regulation required 
for surrogacy agencies is outside the HFEA’s remit and area of expertise … [T]he role 
of surrogacy agencies is to match up surrogate mothers with commissioning couples 
and to support the surrogacy arrangement after pregnancy has been achieved which 
can include the subsequent registration of birth, adoption or the obtaining of a parental 
order for the child. The body regulating surrogacy agencies would need to have 
knowledge and expertise in those areas, and not the medical and scientific expertise 
covered by the HFEA.’178 
 
Although the HFE Authority is responsible for regulating the medical treatments 
required by the surrogate in order to become pregnant (e.g. IVF or embryo transfers), 
it is still possible for the HFEA to extend its remit to the non-medical aspects of 
surrogacy. The Authority could set up a sub-committee with experts on surrogacy, 
who would have the knowledge to license and regulate non-profit organisations like 
COTS and SUK. Brazier was of the view that ‘any attempt to extend the remit of the 
HFEA (for example, by setting up a special subcommittee with the range of expertise 
required) would fail to reflect the unique nature of surrogacy arrangements’.179 
However, setting up a special subcommittee would better reflect the unique nature of 
                                                 
177 Ibid, 6.11. 
178Ibid, 6.18. 
179Ibid, 6.19. 
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surrogacy arrangements and allow licensed non-profit organisations to facilitate 
surrogacy agreements, thus deterring intended parents from resorting to DIY 
arrangements. The fact that surrogacy does not fit neatly into the HFE Authority’s 
expertise is all the more reason for it to be regulated, otherwise surrogacy agreements 
will continue to be made within a regulatory vacuum and cases like Re Z may reoccur.  
Regulating and licensing non-profit surrogacy organisations would add a layer of 
protection for those using these agencies and drive up standards within non-profit 
organisations. As the HFE Authority says on its website: 
‘Regulation is important because it ensures that the work carried out is to a certain 
standard; that only qualified people can do it; and that research on embryos is only 
done where there is a real need and in a way that’s ethical.’180 
The non-profit surrogacy organisation would also need to apply for a licence to carry 
out their work. A licence can be granted by the HFE Authority for up to four years, 
with new clinics receiving a two-year licence. Before granting a new licence, or 
renewing an existing one, the sub-committee responsible for surrogacy could conduct 
an inspection to make sure the non-profit organisation’s services are up to standard. 
Like fertility clinic inspections, the sub-committee could present the findings to the 
Authority’s Licence Committee, which decides whether to grant  or refuse a licence, 
‘or, if they feel the quality of service needs to be better, put conditions on the licence 
which ensure it only remains in place if improvements are made’.181  
It is important to note that non-profit surrogacy agencies are imperfect, and the 
conditions for a licence could help improve existing agencies and ensure that those 
facilitating the surrogacy arrangement have the expertise to advise intended parents 
and surrogates. In Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile),182 COTs made some serious 
errors when advising intended parents about the parental order requirements. The 
COTS membership form had specific rates for couples who lived abroad,183 despite 
                                                 
180 See the HFE Authority’s website, https://www.hfea.gov.uk/about-us/how-we-regulate/ (last 
accessed 13/06/18). 
181 Ibid. 
182 Op cit, n91. 
183 [22] (McFarlane J). 
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section 30(3)(b) HFEA 1990 making it clear that one, or both, of the intended parents 
must be domiciled in a part of the UK, or in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. 
Mr and Mrs G, the intended parents, were Turkish nationals domiciled in Turkey. 
COTS had believed that ‘parents in the position of Mr and Mrs G would qualify for a 
parental order and could simply take a baby born through surrogacy back to Turkey 
without any difficulty’.184 COTS overlooked the crucial fact that foreign intended 
parents, like Mr and Mrs G, by reason of their domicile, are unable to achieve the 
status of legal parents by means of a parental order.185 McFarlane J stated: 
‘I readily accept that COTS is a well intentioned voluntary organisation whose aim is 
to assist couples through surrogacy… That being said, COTS must at least shoulder 
part of the responsibility for the very unsatisfactory outcome (in legal terms) that they 
assisted in creating.’186 
McFarlane J suggested that agencies involved in facilitating surrogacy arrangements, 
whether ‘statutory or run by well motivated volunteers, must ensure that they are fully 
familiar with the basic requirements of the area of the law within which these 
arrangements are made.’187 The situation is wholly inadequate for the resulting child 
who was left without a parental order.188 Part of the conditions for a licence could be 
to ensure volunteers and others working in the non-profit organisation are familiar 
with the requirements in the HFEA 2008 (including the parental order requirements in 
section 54), the law according to the SA Act 1985, and crucially the Parental Order 
Regulations 2010 which determine that the child’s life-long welfare is to be the 
‘paramount concern’. 
(II) The Compliance Problem: Creating Incentives for Intended 
Parents to Choose the Licensed Route 
                                                 
184 [19] (McFarlane J). 
185 [3] (McFarlane J). 
186 [23] (McFarlane J). 
187 [52] (McFarlane J). 
188 In Re X (A Child: Surrogacy Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), Munby P stated that a 
parental order provides the child with the ‘optimum legal and psychological solution’, [7]. 
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Part of creating this new system of regulation would depend upon surrogates and 
intended parents choosing to use a non-profit organisation, rather than the DIY route. 
Jackson suggests that ‘if there is a widespread lack of understanding about the benefits 
of regulation, a two-pronged strategy may be necessary’.189 Firstly, it is important for 
the regulator (in this context the HFE Authority and the proposed surrogacy sub-
committee) to ‘broaden the scope of its public education function’.190  She suggests 
that it is not only important to have advice about the risks of opting out from regulation 
but also ‘more positively, a clear and accessible explanation of what the benefits of 
regulation are, for patients and for children.’191 In the context of surrogacy, the benefits 
of using a licensed surrogacy agency for the surrogate, intended parent(s) and resulting 
child should be explained. 
  
In addition to persuading intended parents and surrogates of the advantages of 
regulated and licensed non-profit surrogacy agencies, ‘there may be circumstances in 
which it would be appropriate to provide incentives to seeking regulated treatment 
services’.192 Jackson suggests that: 
‘Certainly in relation to surrogacy, any attempt to introduce a system in which 
surrogate mothers and commissioning parents went through a formal approval process 
before embarking on a surrogate pregnancy would have to be accompanied by some 
sort of advantage to doing so, otherwise few people would be willing to submit 
themselves to a potentially intrusive process which would have no possible benefits 
for them.’193 
It was argued in the previous chapter, that there should be a presumption of legal 
parenthood in respect of the child’s intended parents. Intended parents who go through 
the licensed route could have their parental order pre-authorised. The date the parental 
                                                 
189 E Jackson (2015) The law and DIY assisted conception. In: Horsey, Kirsty, (ed.) Revisiting the 
Regulation of Human Fertilisation and Embryology. Biomedical law and ethics library. Routledge, 
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order would take effect could be the day the child is born. Pre-birth orders are 
advocated by the Surrogacy Working Group which suggests that where the parental 
order requirements are met, ‘parental orders should be pre-authorised so that where 
arrangements run smoothly, legal parenthood is conferred on the IPs at birth.’194 It is 
suggested that this should be allowed where the surrogacy is entered with a licensed 
non-profit surrogacy organisation.  
The decision to award a parental order must be guided by the child’s welfare and best 
interests, so there would be difficulty making this assessment before the child is born. 
Nevertheless, CAFCASS could be involved during the pregnancy to check how the 
intended parents have prepared for the child’s birth. The CAFCASS officer could still 
undertake a child welfare assessment after the child is born, and where welfare 
concerns are raised the court would then have to revisit the parental order and decide 
where, and with whom, the child should live. This process would take place where the 
parties use a licensed non-profit surrogacy agency. As Jackson says, ‘perhaps some 
would-be parents might be persuaded that going through an official pre-approval 
procedure could make their lives easier in the long run.’195  
It is recalled from the previous chapter, that the uncertainty felt by intended parents 
while waiting for the parental order hearing is a problem. Sophie, a mother who 
entered into a surrogacy arrangement using COTS, explained that the surrogacy 
process would be better if intended parents could make a pre-birth order akin to 
divorce ‘when you have the decree nisi and the decree absolute, a provisional version 
during the pregnancy and then confirmed on birth and for that process to be very 
quick’.196 She explained that ‘it feels very insecure not to have that for however many 
months it take for the parental order to be resolved’.197 Lauren, the intended mother 
who entered into a surrogacy agreement using SUK, also explained how difficult it 
                                                 
194 ‘Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting and reform’, Report of the Surrogacy UK Working Group 
on Surrogacy Law Reform, November 2015, p38. Available at 
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/59740/1/Surrogacy%20in%20the%20UK%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (last 
accessed 16/09/18). 
195 E Jackson, op cit, n189, p17. 
196 Interview 02IM (on file with the author). 
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was not having the parental order finalised until 15 months after her children were 
born.198 Approving the parental order before birth (which would take effect on the day 
the child is born) might provide a real incentive for intended parents to use licensed 
non-profit surrogacy agencies, rather than risking DIY and international commercial 
surrogacy agreements. This would reduce the uncertainty intended parents currently 
feel about the parental order process. Beside avoiding the legal problems seen in Re 
Z, encouraging intended parents to use a non-profit facilitator would help to generate 
positive relationships with the surrogate, which can help promote the child's best 
interests.199 The empirical work shows that a pre-birth order is something intended 
parents would like to be introduced to the regulation, and the proposal is also supported 
by the SUK working group. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified and explored the problems with DIY surrogacy 
arrangements entered through informal platforms in the UK. The problems arising 
from these arrangements, include the exploitation of surrogates and the frustrated 
intentions of intended parents whose desire to have a child through surrogacy is 
thwarted when relationships between the parties deteriorate. Two types of informal 
DIY arrangements were discussed: (1) arrangements entered between friends, and (2) 
arrangements entered between strangers through online platforms like ‘Facebook’. 
Interviews with three mothers, Sophie, Rosie and Lauren, were used to understand the 
processes involved with COTS and SUK. Their accounts were compared with the case 
law and experiences of Bea who entered into a surrogacy agreement using a secret 
‘Facebook’ group.  
The comparative exercise indicates that surrogacy arrangements entered into with the 
help of a non-profit surrogacy organisation are more supportive and structured. Sophie 
described herself as being ‘so lucky with our surrogate’.200 She chose COTS because 
                                                 
198 Interview 07IM, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author). 
199 If the surrogate and intended parents have a positive relationship, the surrogate is less likely to 
object to the parental order being made or delaying that process (as was the case with Bea and her 
surrogate). 
200 Interview 02IM, recorded on 09/07/16 (on file with the author). 
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the organisation allowed intended parents to write a profile, which is sent out to 
available surrogates. She liked this means of introduction and felt able to ‘write my 
story well’.201 Lauren reported having a very special bond with her surrogate and this 
was developed with the help of the ‘friendship first’ ethos promoted by SUK. When 
Lauren met her surrogate at a SUK social event she felt ‘instantly connected and knew 
there was something very special in the relationship’.202 The organisation helped to 
develop this friendship through a getting-to-know period, which allowed the parties to 
‘invest in a genuine bond’.203 By contrast, arrangements entered into via the internet 
are risky and problematic for intended parents like Bea, who was left without support 
when her relationship with the surrogate deteriorated during the pregnancy.  
This chapter also explored whether DIY surrogacy arrangements can exploit UK 
surrogates. Although exploitation was a concern of the Warnock Report of 1984, it has 
been assumed that the issue was resolved after the SA Act 1985 prohibited commercial 
surrogacy, including payments to surrogates, profit-making agencies, enforceable 
contracts and advertising. Therefore, exploitation is now associated with surrogates 
used in international commercial surrogacy arrangements, particularly those from 
poorer socio-economic countries like India. Using Wertheimer’s account of 
exploitation to analyse the recent judgment, Re Z (Surrogacy Agreements), it became 
clear that exploitation is an emerging issue in the UK. The genuine bond and 
friendship-first ethos practised by SUK was completely absent from the DIY context 
in Re Z. Instead, the surrogate, X, was treated as a means to an end and signed the 
agreement at a fast-food outlet near a railway station ‘after a brief face to face meeting 
lasting less than two hours’.204 As Russell J observed, ‘the applicants’ sole focus was 
on signing an agreement. There was little, if any, evidence in their messages of interest 
in X herself…’.205 
Change to the current regulatory system is urgently required to dissuade intended 
parents and surrogates, from choosing the DIY route. The pull towards informal 
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arrangements is a strong one for intended parents, many of whom have spent years 
trying to have children. As Bea explained during her interview, ‘You’d bite anyone’s 
hand off that offered because you’re desperate and there aren’t enough people willing 
to do it.’206 It is proposed that the HFE Authority (or a sub-committee) should be 
responsible for licensing and regulating non-profit surrogacy organisations. This 
would ensure that the standards within those organisations are to a high quality. The 
HFE Authority could increase its education function by providing better information 
to intended parents and surrogates about the advantages of choosing a licensed non-
profit surrogacy organisation. Incentives could also be provided by the HFE Authority 
for intended parents to choose a regulated organisation. Intended parents using a 
licensed organisation would have the parental order pre-approved before the child’s 
birth and this would take effect on the date the child is born.207 This two-pronged 
approach, advocated by Jackson,208 could help to dissuade intended parents from 
entering risky and problematic DIY arrangements, thus reducing the incidence of 
exploitation and frustrated reproductive goals. 
Further research is now needed to ascertain whether it is feasible for the HFE 
Authority to license and regulate non-profit surrogacy organisations, and whether its 
position has changed since the Brazier Review, at which point it felt that surrogacy 
should not be within its remit.209 Moreover, the non-profit surrogacy organisations 
must also be consulted to see whether they are persuaded by the idea of being regulated 
by the HFE Authority. If the HFE Authority is still deemed an inappropriate body to 
regulate surrogacy, then policy-makers must make steps to appoint a body responsible 
for overseeing non-profit surrogacy organisations and help reduce DIY arrangements 
in the UK. 
                                                 
206 Interview 01IM, recorded on 15/07/18 (on file with the author). 
207 Since exploitation can arise within the family context, it is suggested that there needs to be more 
debate about whether family members should be allowed a pre-birth order automatically, or 
whether family members should also have to go through a licensed non-profit organisation to 
receive this benefit.  
208 E Jackson, op cit, n189. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
7. Exploring the Causes and Problems of Cross-Border Reproduction: How 
Should UK Regulation Respond to International Commercial Surrogacy 
Arrangements? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
UK surrogacy regulation operates on two levels: (1) domestic, and (2) international. 
This chapter examines the problems arising from international commercial surrogacy 
arrangements and considers how UK regulation should respond to this growing 
phenomenon. As Jackson et al., observe, ‘people travel to receive fertility services for 
a broad range of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ reasons.1 Some travel to receive procedures that are 
illegal or unavailable to them at home; others are in search of better care, shorter 
waiting times, greater privacy or lower costs.’2 Doctrinal analyses of the cases and 
interviews carried out with two intended parents, who had children after entering 
international commercial surrogacy arrangements, are used throughout the chapter to: 
(1) illuminate the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors influencing the decision to use cross-border 
surrogacy arrangements and, (2) the problems that ensue from these types of 
arrangements for both the intended parents and children involved. Commercial 
surrogacy involves payment to the surrogate, profit-making agencies such as fertility 
clinics and surrogacy brokers, advertising, and enforceable arrangements. 
This chapter begins by considering whether the ban on commercialisation, particularly 
the prohibition on payments to surrogates,3 which has existed in the UK since the 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SA Act 1985), is responsible for driving intended 
                                                 
1 E Jackson, J Millbank, I Karpin and A Stuhmcke, ‘Learning from Cross-Border Reproduction’ 
Medical Law Review, 2017, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp23–46. PP 23-24. 
2 Ibid, p24. 
3Section 54(8) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 limits payment to ‘reasonable 
expenses’. 
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parents overseas. The first part looks at the factors influencing the SA Act 1985’s 
prohibition of commercial surrogacy, including the ‘Baby Cotton’ case4 and the 
Warnock Report5 which was concerned with the ‘risk of commercial exploitation of 
surrogacy’.6 It is considered whether the purpose of the legislation, to prevent the 
exploitation of women, has been effective. In the second part of the chapter, a 
combination of doctrinal analysis and empirical analysis from the interviews with two 
intended parents – Liz and Steve – are used to assess the practical and legal problems 
arising from international commercial surrogacy arrangements and the implications 
for the intended parents’ procreative liberty. Specifically, the ‘obvious difficulties of 
inconvenience, delay, hardship and expense’7 and problematic conflict of laws, which 
can result in the intended parents being separated from their child, are examined. The 
reasonable expenses conundrum,8 which maintains that surrogates can only be paid 
‘reasonable expenses’ in the UK, is also grappled with and the tensions between child 
welfare and public policy objections to commercial surrogacy are discussed by 
drawing on the case law.9  It is contemplated whether the ‘ban’ on commercial 
surrogacy is sustainable, given that commercial payments exceeding ‘reasonable 
expenses’ have been authorised by the judiciary in a plethora of international 
surrogacy cases.10 These payments have in part benefited the surrogate involved, but 
it is usually the commercial agencies, surrogacy brokers and fertility clinics who make 
the most profit, despite the surrogate doing the hard work.11 
                                                 
4 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846. Hereafter ‘Baby Cotton’. 
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6 Ibid, 8.18. 
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8 Section 54 (8) HFEA 2008 states that the court must be satisfied that no money or other benefit 
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11 See In The Matter Of D And L (Minors) (Surrogacy) And In The Matter Of Human Fertilisation 
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The next part of the chapter explores how international commercial surrogacy affects 
the rights of the children born as a result of these cross-border arrangements, 
particularly the right to identity which has become a common theme throughout this 
thesis. Two specific concerns, which sit uneasily with the child’s right to identity 
inherent in Articles 7 and 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), are examined. Firstly, as the interview with Liz demonstrates, 
international reproductive travel allows intended parents to circumvent UK rules on 
gamete donor anonymity and to use gametes from jurisdictions where donor 
anonymity is still protected.12 Secondly, unlike domestic surrogacy arrangements, 
international commercial surrogacy does not guarantee that the child will have 
knowledge of their gestational parent, the surrogate. In India, the surrogate often gives 
false information to conceal her identity and address because of the stigma she may 
face from her family and community if it became knowledge that she has been a 
surrogate.13 This means the child is left without any accurate records of their 
gestational parent. The implications of these concerns are discussed with reference to 
the UK’s donor anonymity rules14 and the child’s right to access to information about 
their biological and gestational ‘parents’, inherent in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC. 
The final section of this chapter considers how UK regulation should dissuade 
intended parents from the ‘pull’ of international commercial arrangements. It is 
suggested that regulation should be less restrictive in the UK and policy-makers should 
consider whether paying surrogates a ‘moderate fee’, in addition to the reasonable 
                                                 
parents paid twenty-seven thousand US dollars (approximately seventeen thousand pounds at the 
exchange rate at the time) to the clinic, on the basis that the clinic would then pay ‘reasonable 
expenses’ to the surrogate in the sum of three hundred and fifty thousand rupees, approximately 
four thousand pounds at the current exchange rate. Para [36] (Baker J). This shows how the 
commercial agencies involved in surrogacy arrangements profit, rather than the surrogate. 
12 In some countries, including Spain, France, and Denmark, the anonymity of gamete donors is 
explicitly protected by law. See Inmaculada De Melo-Martín, ‘The Ethics of Anonymous Gamete 
Donation: Is There a Right to Know One's Genetic Origins’? 44 Hastings Center Report. 28 
(2014). 
13 ‘D and L’, op cit, n11. 
14 Including the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) 
Regulations 2004 (SI 1511/2004) (hereafter the ‘2004 Regulations’), section 24 of the HFEA 2008, 
and ‘Section 24: Register of information (explanatory notes).’ 
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expenses associated with pregnancy,15 would increase surrogates in the UK and deter 
intended parents from entering into high-risk cross-border surrogacy arrangements. 
7.2 The UK’s Ban on Commercial Surrogacy: Has it Encouraged 
International Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements?  
There is a lack of reliable data on surrogacy in the UK.16 Research indicates that the 
number of parental orders from international surrogacy increased from 2% in 2008 to 
38% in 2014.17 A Report carried out by CAFCASS relating to parental order 
applications made in 2013/2014 also found that whilst 59% of the surrogacy 
arrangements took place in the UK, a significant number (41%) took place overseas.18 
In 2015, the Myth Busting Report concluded that the number of UK intended parents 
who travel internationally for surrogacy from the UK ‘is small, but increasing’.19  
Therefore, from the limited data that does exist, it is known that international 
surrogacy is increasing. This trend is not unique to the UK and in 2012 The Permanent 
Bureau’s preliminary report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy 
                                                 
15 A Alghrani, D Griffiths and M Brazier “Surrogacy Law: From Piecemeal Tweaks to Sustained 
Review and Reform” in Alison Diduck, Noam Peleg and Helen Reece, (eds) Law In Society: 
Reflections on Children, Family, Culture and Philosophy- Essays in Honour of Michael Freeman 
(2014, Brill Publishers) pp425-453. 
16 A Alghrani and D Griffiths, ‘The regulation of surrogacy in the United Kingdom: the case for 
reform’, [2017] Child and Family Law Quarterly, 165, p171. 
17 Ibid, p4. Citing updated figures from M Crawshaw, E Blyth and O Akker, ‘The changing profile 
of surrogacy in the UK – Implications for national and international policy and practice' (2012) 
34(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 265. 
18 Cafcass Study of Parental Order Applications made in 2013/14, July 2015. Available at 
https://www.cafcass.gov.uk/media/257188/intranet4cafcass/DavWWWRoot/ce/policy_team/ 
Shared%20Documents/Research/Cafcass%20research/201415/Surrogacy/Study%20of%20parent
al%20order%20applications%202013-14%20(internet).pdf  (last accessed 15/04/16). 
19 ‘Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting and reform’, Report of the Surrogacy UK Working Group 
on Surrogacy Law Reform, November 2015, p18. Available at 
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/59740/1/Surrogacy%20in%20the%20UK%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (last 
accessed 16/09/18). 
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Arrangements20 noted that ‘international surrogacy arrangements are growing at a 
rapid pace and, unfortunately, so too appear to be the difficulties arising from them’.21   
(I) Is UK Surrogacy Regulation Overly Restrictive? 
The Permanent Bureau explained that prospective parents who are prohibited or 
restricted from using surrogacy at home travel to a jurisdiction with a more liberal 
approach.22 It suggests that ‘the growth in these cross-border arrangements has 
undoubtedly been facilitated by the Internet, other modern means of communication, 
and the ease of international travel.’23 Although surrogacy is not prohibited in the UK, 
regulation is restrictive. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SA Act) prohibits 
commercial surrogacy in the UK including, commercial payments to the surrogate24 
or third-party agencies,25 advertising to be a surrogate26 or appeal for a surrogate,27 
surrogacy contracts28 and commercial agencies.29 Legal motherhood is automatically 
assigned to the surrogate ‘and no other woman’,30 which causes uncertainty for the 
intended parents.31 It is suggested that these factors have created a restrictive surrogacy 
regime in the UK which has in turn led to a shortage of surrogates. This has resulted 
                                                 
20 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, A Preliminary Report 
on the Issues From International Surrogacy Arrangements, Preliminary Document No 10 (March 
2012), (‘Permanent Bureau Preliminary Report’) available at 
<https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d4ff8ecd-f747-46da-86c3-61074e9b17fe.pdf> (last accessed 
28/04/16). 
21 Ibid, para 2, p5. 
22 Ibid, para 5, p7. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Section 54(8) of the HFEA 2008 limits the surrogate’s pay to ‘reasonable expenses’. 
25 Section 2(3) Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. 
26 Section 3(1)(a). 
27 Section 3(1)(b). 
28 Section 1A. 
29 Section 2. 
30 Section 33 HFEA 2008. 
31 See chapter 5 (section 5.1) for discussion of the motherhood provision in section 33 HFEA 2008. 
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in UK intended parents travelling overseas to find a surrogate,32 in jurisdictions 
including India,33 the US34 and the Ukraine.35  
It must be questioned whether the domestic ban on commercialisation, particularly 
payments to surrogates, is sustainable considering the problems caused by 
international commercial surrogacy arrangements. This thesis is primarily concerned 
with allowing payments to the surrogate and suggests that changes should not be 
introduced to allow commercial surrogacy agencies to operate in the UK. The SA Act 
1985, which prohibits commercial surrogacy – including payments to the surrogate – 
was introduced following two controversial surrogacy cases. The first case of 
commercial surrogacy to come before the British courts was A v C,36 which was heard 
in 1976. The intended parents, Mr A and Mrs B offered a prostitute £3500, to have Mr 
A's child. She refused, but for £500 located a 19-year-old woman, Miss C, who agreed 
to bear Mr A’s child for £3000 and at birth to hand over the child to the couple. Miss 
C was artificially inseminated with Mr A's sperm at a clinic and gave birth to a son. 
However, Miss C changed her mind and refused to surrender the child. Mr A was 
initially granted access to the child, but this was withdrawn on appeal. The 
arrangement was described by Ormrod LJ as a ‘totally inhuman proceeding’37 and a 
‘sordid commercial bargain’.38 In 1985, the ‘Baby Cotton’39 case emerged. It involved 
Kim Cotton, a married mother of two, who received £6,500 for acting as a surrogate 
for an infertile couple living in the US. After local authority intervention, the intended 
parents were granted wardship of the child by the courts. In the judgment, Latey J 
                                                 
32 ‘Childless UK Couples Forced Abroad to Find Surrogates’, The Guardian, 20th February 2016, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/feb/20/childless-uk-couples-forced-abroad-
surrogates> (last accessed 16/09/18). 
33 ‘D and L’, op cit, n11 
34 RE: PM (Parental Order: Payments) [2013] EWHC 2328 (Fam). 
35 ‘X v Y’, op cit, n7. 
36 [1985] FLR 445. The case was not reported until 1985. 
37 Ibid, p454. 
38 Ibid, p457. 
39Op cit, n4. 
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referred to the ‘difficult and delicate problems of ethics, morality and social 
desirability raised by surrogacy’.40 
It was against this background of hostility towards commercial surrogacy, that 
Parliament passed the SA Act 1985. The Act was also heavily influenced by the 
recommendations of the Warnock Committee41 which was concerned with the ‘risk of 
commercial exploitation of surrogacy’.42 It recommended that: 
‘[L]egislation be introduced to render criminal the creation or the operation in the UK 
of agencies whose purposes include the recruitment of women for surrogate 
pregnancy or making arrangements for individuals or couples who wish to utilise the 
services of a carrying mother'.43  
The majority held that even in compelling medical circumstances, ‘the danger of 
exploitation of one human being by another appears to the majority of us far to 
outweigh the potential benefits, in almost every case’.44 The SA Act 1985 remains the 
principal legislation regulating surrogacy in the UK, and prohibits commercial 
arrangements.45 Advertisements offering to be a surrogate46 or looking for a woman 
willing to become a surrogate47 are prohibited and any arrangements are 
unenforceable.48 Under section 54(8) HFEA 2008, payments to surrogates cannot 
exceed ‘reasonable expenses’, which Surrogacy UK (SUK) and Childlessness 
Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS), two of the main non-profit organisations 
discussed in the last chapter, estimate to range between £7,000 and £15,000’.49  
(II) Has Regulation Prevented the Exploitation of Surrogates? 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 ‘The Warnock Report', op cit, n5. 
42 Ibid, 8.18. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, 8.17. 
45 Section 2(1)(a)-(c) SA Act 1985. 
46 Section 3(1)(a). 
47 Section 3(1)(b). 
48 Section 1A. 
49 A Alghrani, D Griffiths and M Brazier, op cit, n15. 
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It is suggested that the main aim of the SA Act 1985, to prevent the exploitation of 
women, has been counter-productive.50 In 1998, the Brazier Review was asked to 
consider whether payments to surrogates ‘should continue to be allowed and, if so, on 
what basis’.51 A major factor in the initiation of the review was a ‘concern about the 
level of payments being made to surrogate mothers by commissioning couples’.52 The 
Review recommended that payments to surrogates ‘should cover only genuine 
expenses associated with the pregnancy. Any additional payments should be 
prohibited in order to prevent surrogacy arrangements being entered into for financial 
reasons.’53 In 1999, Freeman lamented that the Brazier Review: 
‘[F]ails to appreciate that withdrawing remuneration from surrogates will only drive 
potential surrogates away from regulated surrogacy into an invisible and socially 
uncontrolled world where the regulators will be more like pimps that adoption 
agencies. There is every reason to control surrogacy and to guard against the perceived 
problems, but most women will expect to be rewarded’.54 
This ‘invisible and socially uncontrolled world’55 has materialised and it is recalled 
from the previous chapter, that ‘do-it-yourself’ arrangements facilitated by ‘Facebook’ 
have led to the exploitation of vulnerable surrogates in the UK.56 Moreover, 
prohibitive regulation has also pushed intended parents into international commercial 
surrogacy arrangements in jurisdictions like India, where women from poorer socio-
economic backgrounds are at risk of exploitation and abuse.57 Contrary to the majority 
                                                 
50 The Warnock Report, op cit, n5, 8.10 and 8.17. 
51 The Brazier Report, Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for 
Payments and Regulation, Cm 4068 (1998), para 5.1. Hereafter ‘The Brazier Review'. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, 5.24. 
54 M Freeman, ‘Does Surrogacy Have a Future After Brazier?' (1999) 7 Medical Law Review 1, 
p10. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See Re Z (Surrogacy agreements) (Child arrangement orders) [2015] EWFC 36, discussed in 
chapter 6. Hereafter ‘Re Z (Surrogacy agreements)’. 
57 See for example, K Schanbacher ‘India's Gestational Surrogacy Market: An Exploitation of 
Poor, Uneducated Women’ 25, Hastings Women's Law Journal, 201 2014; and S Saravanan, ‘An 
ethnomethodological approach to examine exploitation in the context of capacity, trust and 
experience of commercial surrogacy in India’, Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 
2013, 8:10. 
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of the Warnock Committee who hoped surrogacy would ‘wither on the vine’,58 the 
minority’s warning that without regulation ‘couples may give up any hope of a child, 
may take further risks such as… more miscarriages, or may decide to venture into 
some sort of “do-it-yourself” arrangement’59 has materialised.  
It is suggested that the limit on payments to surrogates, which is set at ‘reasonable 
expenses’, does not encourage enough surrogates to offer their help in the UK. The 
shortage of surrogates in the UK was perceived to be a problem by Liz, who had twins 
using surrogacy in India. She explained that she had initially tried Surrogacy UK, but: 
 ‘[T]hey had a two-year waiting list to even take your notes or match you up. There 
were two websites and I tried them both and there was such a demand for it. It was 
very difficult and such a delay, and time was moving on… it was a waste of time to 
be waiting.’60 
Alongside the two-year wait, Liz was of the view that ‘not many surrogates come 
forward’61 in the UK, and her concern that time was running out fuelled her decision 
to look overseas. Moreover, she found that there was a shortage of egg donors in the 
UK and decided to find a donor using an agency in California. After much research, 
Liz decided to enter a surrogacy arrangement in India, as a result of which twins were 
born to two different surrogates using her husband’s sperm and donor eggs.  
Another case study involved Steve, who was a father through surrogacy. He decided 
to use surrogacy with his same-sex partner in the US. The couple lived in Scotland 
and originally joined SUK to try and find a surrogate. By this point the couple had 
already made their embryos which were stored in the USA.62 Steve and his partner 
were part of SUK for almost two years but were not successful in finding their 
surrogate: 
                                                 
58The Brazier Review, op cit, n51. 
59 The Warnock Report, op cit, n5, p88 (para 4), dissenting opinion of Greengross and Davies.  
60 Interview 05IM, recorded on 27.08.16 (on file with the author). 
61 Ibid. 
62 The embryos were created using Steve’s sperm and his sister-in-law’s eggs. 
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‘A lot of the surrogates we felt were based in England, not Scotland which we felt put 
some surrogates off…The number of surrogates were very, very small compared to 
the number of families wanting to use surrogacy. So, we decided it wasn’t going to 
work within a reasonable time frame, so we decided to go to the States.’63 
The couple’s isolated position in Scotland, the long waiting time with SUK and the 
shortage of surrogates were factors that drove Steve and his partner overseas. Steve’s 
partner was American, and their embryos were in America which made it easier to go 
there. The couple also had family in the US which made surrogacy in the States an 
option. They met their surrogate through a good friend and formalised this through the 
help of an agency. The surrogate was a doctor, with her own family, and had been a 
surrogate before. The couple felt ‘these were good early indications that [the surrogate] 
was a good match for us’.64 At the time of the interview Steve is the father of an eight-
month baby, born as a result of this successful surrogacy. Liz and Steve’s experiences 
indicate that the shortage of surrogates in the UK (which could be due to reasonable 
expenses being inadequate and / or a lack of advertising) and long waiting times with 
organisations like SUK, are factors that encourage international commercial surrogacy 
arrangements. Part 7.5 of this chapter critically examines whether ‘moderate’ 
payments (as distinct from a full model of commercialisation) should be allowed in 
the UK to help encourage more surrogates to offer their help. 
 7.3 ‘Trekking Through the Thorn Forest’: The Practical and Legal 
Problems Arising from International Commercial Surrogacy? 
Given the incidence of international commercial surrogacy, this section explores the 
problems arising from these arrangements for UK intended parents and their children. 
The judiciary, who have been at the forefront of interpreting section 54 HFEA 2008 
and deciding parental order applications, have consistently warned UK intended 
parents against using international surrogacy to create a family. Hedley J in ‘X and 
Y’65 famously described international surrogacy as ‘less a journey along a primrose 
                                                 
63 Interview 04IF, recorded on 07/10/16 (on file with the author). 
64 Ibid. 
65Op cit, n7. 
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path, more a trek through a thorn forest.’66 In CW v NT and another,67 Baker J also 
warned intended parents against resorting to the ‘dangerous and murky waters’68 of 
the internet. 
(I) Financial Problems and Delay  
A major problem with international commercial surrogacy arrangements for intended 
parents, is the ‘obvious difficulties of inconvenience, delay, hardship and expense’.69 
Liz, the mother who had twins using two surrogates from India, explained that it was 
very difficult and costly living in India. Moreover, her husband left after two weeks 
which meant she was alone in an unfamiliar environment for three months. She 
explained how the British Embassy in India was ‘horrendous’ and ‘didn’t want to 
know’ about her situation. This made her feel unsupported and she spent her time 
either on the phone or emailing people to make sure she could get back to the UK with 
her twins:  
‘I was the only English person there [at the embassy], fighting for queuing, it’s very, 
very hard. You are allowed to leave India, you have an exit visa. They send a field 
social worker out just to do a brief investigation, to make sure the surrogates had been 
paid, check that the babies were healthy and had their vaccinations and you had to go 
back and they stamp your passports.’70 
She also had to pay more money to hire immigration solicitors in London ‘to try and 
get me back to England’.71 She found the British Consulate unhelpful and required 
everything to be in paper format. In addition, the Consulate only sent documents to 
the UK every Friday which meant waiting the entire week before the application for 
travel documents could progress. After finally getting permission to leave India and 
enter the UK with her twins, she experienced more inconvenience when she returned 
home; since she had been away for so long there had been a burst pipe in the house 
                                                 
66 [2] (Hedley J). 
67 [2011] EWHC 33. 
68 [38] (Baker J). 
69 ‘X & Y’, op cit, n7, [26] (Hedley J). 
70 Interview 05IM, recorded on 27.08.16 (on file with the author). 
71 Ibid.  
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with water and snow everywhere. Overall, the surrogacy in India was very expensive 
and Liz disclosed that she is heavily in debt and ‘still paying huge mortgage payments 
now because of it.’72 
Steve also experienced inconvenience and expense as a result of the US commercial 
surrogacy arrangement. He explained that the UK’s reasonable expenses requirement 
was an irony: ‘The High Court wants to approve those expenses as reasonable. The 
irony being that you have to get really expensive legal representation.’73 He disclosed 
that his legal fees were £25,000 and the surrogacy cost around £200,000. He found it 
unsatisfactory that only those who have the financial means, can use surrogacy in the 
US.74 Like DIY arrangements, this suggests that the procreative liberty seemingly 
created by international commercial surrogacy is an ‘illusion’. Only intended parents 
who can afford to travel overseas, pay for a surrogate and / or gametes, and pay for 
legal advice to return home, can have a family in this way. Even where the prospective 
parents have the money, they can be left in debt afterwards, a situation Liz found 
herself in. Intended parents would not have to pay such high fees75 to create a family 
of their own if UK legislation made surrogacy accessible in the UK. 
(II) Conflict of Laws: ‘Marooned Stateless and Parentless’76 
The second problem arising from international commercial surrogacy relates to 
difficult conflict of law issues ‘which may have wholly unintended and unforeseen 
consequences’.77  Difficulties have arisen because legal developments about who 
should be assigned legal parentage in surrogacy cases have not been globally uniform. 
By contrast, for adoption, regulation exists at an international level through The 
1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Interview 04IF, recorded on 07/10/16 (on file with the author). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Part 7.4 of this chapter considers whether moderate payments to surrogates should be allowed 
in the UK. 
76 X v Y, op cit, n7, [10] (Hedley J). 
77 Ibid, [27] (Hedley J). 
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Intercountry Adoption.78 This protects children and their families against the risks of 
‘illegal, irregular, premature or ill-prepared adoptions abroad’.79 No comparative 
international regulation exists for surrogacy and regulation differs significantly around 
the world. In some countries, including Canada80 and the UK81 altruistic surrogacy is 
legal whilst commercial surrogacy, which is characterised by profit-making agencies, 
enforceable contracts, and payment to the surrogate, is illegal. In the US surrogacy 
laws vary from state to state. Countries including France,82 Italy,83 and Pakistan,84 
prohibit all surrogacy arrangements whether commercial or altruistic. At the other 
extreme, commercial surrogacy is legal in India, the Ukraine85 and Russia.86 
Unsurprisingly, these disparities create conflict of laws for UK intended parents who 
enter international arrangements.  
The case of X and Y87 demonstrates the problems that arise from these conflicts, 
including parental status and statelessness. The case concerned a UK couple who had 
twins after entering an overseas surrogacy arrangement in the Ukraine with a married 
Ukrainian surrogate.88 When the twins were born, the Ukrainian surrogate was 
recognised as the legal mother in UK law under section 27(1) of the HFEA 1990.89 
Moreover, her husband was recognised as the legal father by virtue of section 28 
HFEA 1990.90 However, under Ukrainian law neither the surrogate nor the husband 
                                                 
78Convention of 29 May 1993, hereafter the ‘Hague Convention’. Available at 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69> (accessed 11/01/15).  
79 Hague Conference on Private International Law, webpage,<http://www. hcch.net/index_ 
en.php?act= text.display&tid=45> (accessed 11/05/15). 
80 The Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHR Act) 2004. 
81 The SA Act 1985. 
82Article 17/6 of the Civil Code.  
83 Act n.40 of 19/2/2004, ‘Rules about medically assisted reproduction’. 
84 The Guardian and Wards Act 1890. 
85 Family Code of Ukraine, article 123(2). 
86 The Family Code 1995. 
87 Op cit, n7. 
88 [4] (Hedley J). 
89 [5] (Hedley J). Now section 33 HFEA 2008. 
90 [5] (Hedley J). 
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had legal responsibility for the twins once they had been born.91 Consequently, the 
children were ‘marooned stateless and parentless’ with no right to remain in the 
Ukraine and no right to enter the UK.92  
After considerable delay, the children were given permission to enter the UK outside 
the ordinary rules once the intended parents had satisfied the UK immigration 
authorities that the intended father was the biological father of the twins.93 The 
intended parents then sought to regularise their status as parents by applying for a 
parental order. Hedley J could make a parental order having found that the conditions 
in section 30 of the HFEA 1990 had been satisfied.94 However, according to section 
30(5) HFEA 1990 ‘The Court must be satisfied that both the father of the child…and 
the woman who carried the child have freely, and with full understanding of what is 
involved, agreed unconditionally to the making of the order.’95 In this case, Hedley J 
found that the Ukrainian surrogate had given the requisite consent. The intended 
parents argued that although the surrogate’s husband had given consent, it should not 
be a requirement.96 Hedley J did not accept this and found that Parliament cannot be 
taken to have had any different intention in relation to husbands of foreign domicile.97  
This is problematic because the provision allows the husband / spouse of the surrogate 
to prevent a parental order being granted to UK intended parents, whilst the laws of 
their own country (Ukraine) relieve them of any parental responsibility. This means 
the intended parent’s right to have a child ‘may depend both upon the unswerving 
commitment of the surrogate (and her husband if she has one)…and upon their honesty 
in not taking advantage of their absolute veto’.98 The surrogacy ‘resulted in enormous 
delay, stress and expense’.99 In terms of the UK couple’s right to become parents, the 
                                                 
91 [8] (Hedley J). 
92 [10] (Hedley J). 
93 [10] (Hedley J). 
94 [25] (Hedley J). 
95 Section 35 HFEA 2008 provides that the surrogate’s husband in the child’s legal father. 
96 [14] (Hedley J). 
97 [16] (Hedley J). 
98 [27] (Hedley J). 
99 [2] (Hedley J). 
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case shows that it is a limited one in the context of international surrogacy because of 
the conflicting laws relating to parenthood. The fact the surrogate’s husband can veto 
the parental order is nonsensical and a severe limitation on the intended parent’s right 
to become legal parents of their children.  
The same conflict of laws arose again in Re: IJ (A Child),100 a case also heard by 
Hedley J. The child was born in the Ukraine and was conceived as a result of the 
fertilisation of an egg from an anonymous donor and by sperm from the intended 
father.101 Again, under Ukrainian law the parents of IJ were the UK intended parents, 
but under UK domestic law the legal parents of IJ were the surrogate and her 
husband.102 There were real problems involved in obtaining immigration clearance for 
the entry of IJ into the UK which were exacerbated by IJ in the meantime requiring 
some hospital treatment.103 The problem is that, ‘all overseas jurisdictions can confer 
parental status on the commissioning couple but that status is not recognised in our 
domestic law…’.104 Once again, the conflict of laws issue relating to parenthood 
shows that the right to procreate, and become legal parents, depends on the 
commitment of the international surrogate and her spouse or partner.105   
An instrument for regulating surrogacy at the international level could help resolve the 
conflict of laws that permeate international commercial surrogacy arrangements. 
Trimmings and Beaumont suggest that a ‘framework of co-operation amongst 
Contracting States’,106 like the ‘Hague Convention’ on Intercountry Adoption, could 
help to ‘promote the exchange of information and the transmission of documents’107 
                                                 
100 [2011] EWHC 921 (Fam). 
101 [2]. 
102 [3]. 
103 [3]. 
104 [4]. 
105 The same issue also arose in AB v DE [2013] EWCH 2413 (Fam). 
106 K Trimmings and P Beaumont ‘International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need For 
Legal Regulation At The International Level’, Journal of Private International Law Vol. 7 No. 3, 
December 2011, pp627-647, p635. 
107Ibid, p636. 
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between the country where the surrogacy took place and the intended parents’ country 
of origin. This exchange of information could help facilitate practical solutions, 
resolve conflict of laws relating to parentage, and ‘reduce ‘limping’ or unrecognised 
surrogacy arrangements’.108 Formulation of a Hague type Convention for surrogacy is 
yet to be formalised. Therefore, this chapter focuses on reforms to encourage UK 
intended parents to use surrogacy in the UK thus avoiding the cost, travel and legal 
complications of cross-border arrangements. 
(III) The ‘Reasonable Expenses’ Conundrum: Child Welfare and 
Public Policy 
A further conflict of laws arising from international commercial surrogacy relates to 
payment. Section 54(8) of the HFEA 2008 only allows ‘reasonable expenses’, 
however, the judiciary have retrospectively authorised payment that goes far beyond 
reasonable expenses in international surrogacy cases. The first English decision to deal 
with a commercial international surrogacy arrangement was X and Y.109 Hedley J 
turned to Section 30(7), which is now contained in section 54(8) HFEA 2008.  The 
provision stipulates that no money or other benefit, other than for expenses reasonably 
incurred, must have been given or received by the husband or wife (unless authorised 
by the court) for ‘the making of the order’, ‘any agreement required by subsection (5) 
above’, ‘the handing over of the child to the husband and the wife’, or ‘the making of 
any arrangements with a view to the making of the order’. 
In X and Y, the intended parents agreed to pay €235 per month to the surrogate 
during the pregnancy and a lump sum of €25,000 on the live birth of the twins.110 
It was conceded that the sums paid significantly exceeded ‘expenses reasonably 
incurred’.111 Hedley J stated that this was ‘inevitable on the basis of the 
applicants’ own evidence that the surrogate mother intended to use some of the 
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109 Op cit, n7. 
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money to put down a deposit for the purchase of a flat...’.112 Due to the reasonable 
expenses requirement, now contained in section 54(8) HFEA 2008, the parental 
order application could not succeed unless the court authorised the payments 
which exceeded reasonable expenses. Hedley J used the test adopted by Wall J 
in Re C113 to determine whether the payments could be authorised.  Wall J 
identified two questions: (i) whether the payment was indeed for ‘expenses 
reasonably incurred’, a pure question of fact; and (ii) if not, whether the court 
could or should authorise such payments.114  Wall J concluded that retrospective 
authorisation was legally possible and, for the same reasons, Hedley J shared that 
view.  
In relation to the public policy issues, (i.e. public concern with commercial 
surrogacy), Hedley J stated that ‘the cases in effect suggest (and I agree) that the 
court pose itself three questions’.115 The first asks whether the sum paid is 
disproportionate to reasonable expenses. The second asks whether the applicants 
acted in good faith and without ‘moral taint’ in their dealings with the surrogate. 
The final questions whether the applicants tried to defraud the authorities. In Re 
S116 Hedley J explained the three public policy concerns associated with the 
retrospective approval of payments: 
 ‘(1) To ensuring that commercial surrogacy agreements are not used to circumvent 
childcare laws in this country, so as to result in the approval of arrangements in favour 
of people who would not have been approved as parents under any set of existing 
arrangements in this country. 
(2) The court should be astute not to be involved in anything that looks like the simple 
payment for effectively buying children overseas.  That has been ruled out in this 
country and the court should not be party to any arrangements which effectively allow 
that.  
                                                 
112 [18] (Hedley J). 
113 (Application by Mr. and Mrs. X under Section 30 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990) [2002] 1FLR 909. 
114 Op cit, n7, [19] (Hedley J). 
115 [21] (Hedley J). 
116 [2009] EWHC 2977. 
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(3) The court should be astute to ensure that sums of money which might look modest 
in themselves are not in fact of such a substance that they overbear the will of a 
surrogate.’117 
In X and Y, Hedley J had no doubt that the intended parents were acting in good faith 
and that no advantage was taken of the surrogate.118 Moreover there was never any 
suggestion of any attempt to defraud the authorities and Hedley J was satisfied that the 
intended parents ‘sought at all times to comply with the requirements of English and 
Ukrainian law as they believed them to be.’119 However, Hedley J found the first 
question more difficult and observed that ‘its answer may vary considerably 
depending upon where the arrangement was made’.120  He explained, that ‘the whole 
basis of assessment will be quite different in say urban California to rural India’,121 
and the ascertainment of what amounts to reasonable expenses should be a question 
of fact in each case.122  In the present case Hedley J accepted that living costs in the 
relevant part of the Ukraine (a big city) bear comparison with those in the UK and 
concluded that ‘the sums paid were not so disproportionate to ‘expenses reasonably 
incurred’ that the granting of an order would be an unacceptable affront to public 
policy’.123  Moreover, he found that the welfare of the two children require that they 
be regarded as lifelong members of the applicants’ family which could be realised 
through the award of a parental order.124  In this particular case Hedley J authorised 
the payments.  
Nevertheless, Hedley J felt ‘bound to observe that I find this process of authorisation 
most uncomfortable’.125  He noted that the judiciary has to balance ‘two competing 
                                                 
117Op cit, n7, [7] (Hedley J). 
118 [21] (Hedley J). 
119 [22] (Hedley J). 
120 Ibid. 
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and potentially irreconcilably conflicting concepts’,126 namely, the legislature’s 
objection to commercial surrogacy, as evident from the SA Act 1985 and the 
reasonable expenses requirement in section 54(8) HFEA 2008, and the consequences 
of not awarding the parental order for the welfare of the child: 
‘The difficulty is that it is almost impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in 
which by the time the case comes to court, the welfare of any child (particularly a 
foreign child) would not be gravely compromised (at the very least) by a refusal to 
make an order.’127 
Following the introduction of the Parental Orders Regulations 2010, the reasonable 
expenses conundrum has been exacerbated as it has become more difficult to ‘balance’ 
public policy concerns with child welfare. As Hedley J explained in Re L (Commercial 
Surrogacy)128 the effect of the Regulations is to ‘weight the balance between public 
policy considerations and welfare…decisively in favour of welfare.’129 Hedley J 
concluded that ‘it will only be in the clearest case of the abuse of public policy that 
the court will be able to withhold an order if otherwise welfare considerations supports 
its making.’130 This approach was endorsed by the then President of the Family 
Division, Sir Nicholas Wall, in another case named Re X and Y.131 Accordingly, the 
balancing exercise between child welfare and public policy objections to commercial 
surrogacy has become a futile one, with child welfare likely to ‘triumph’ in every 
case.132  This means international commercial surrogacy arrangements have made it 
difficult for the judiciary to maintain the prohibitive stance of the SA Act 1985. The 
Act maintains that commercial surrogacy is illegal, yet the courts are likely to 
authorise commercial payments because failure to do so would not benefit the child. 
                                                 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Re L (Commercial Surrogacy) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam). 
129 Ibid, [10] (Hedley J). 
130 Ibid, [10] (Hedley J). 
131 Re X and Y (Parental Order: Retrospective Authorisation of Payments) [2011] EWHC 3147 
(Fam). [36], [40]. 
132 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Case Commentary: The regulation and recognition of surrogacy under 
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This reinforces how the patchwork of surrogacy regulation – the SA Act 1985 and the 
Parental Order Regulations 2010 – is contradictory and requires reform. 
The redundancy of the balancing exercise between child welfare and public policy is 
evident in the court’s flexible interpretation of Hedley J’s first question; whether the 
sums paid are ‘proportionate’ with reasonable expenses. Payments have ranged from 
US$23,000133 and US$53,000134 in California and £3,000 in India.135 Despite these 
high sums, no application for a parental order has been refused on the grounds of 
section 54(8) HFEA 2008. Fenton-Glynn argues that in order to find these high sums 
not disproportionate to reasonable expenses, ‘the courts have identified the relative 
comparator to be the amount given to other surrogates in the same jurisdiction’.136 In 
the case of Re C137, the payment was found to be proportionate, despite the fact that it 
was an amount equivalent to one to two years' average local wage, on the grounds that 
it was ‘less than the amount reported to be paid to surrogate mothers in St Petersburg, 
and does not appear unusually high in the context of what is paid in other areas in 
Russia’.138 This suggests that the courts have focused on whether the payment 
corresponds with what is paid in other areas of the country, rather than any reference 
to reasonable expenses.139 This is evident in Re G and M140 where Theis J found that 
compensation could be authorised by the court because the sum of money paid to the 
surrogate, $38,950, was ‘not significantly different to payments that have been made 
in similar cases involving US surrogacy arrangements.’141 This is problematic because 
authorising payment on the basis that it is similar to what is paid to other surrogates in 
the jurisdiction does not make it ‘proportionate’ to ‘reasonable expenses’. Surrogacy 
                                                 
133 Re S (Parental Order), op cit, n9. 
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regulation is contradictory. The SA Act 1985 prohibits commercial surrogacy, yet the 
case law shows how commercial surrogacy has effectively been introduced through 
the back door. Part 7.5 of this chapter questions whether the supposedly altruistic 
model of surrogacy that operates in the UK is sustainable, or whether moderate 
payment to surrogates should be allowed.  
7.4 International Commercial Surrogacy and the Child’s Identity Rights  
The next issue explored in this chapter, is how international commercial surrogacy 
affects the child’s identity. Achmad notes that international commercial surrogacy 
arrangements create risks for specific aspects of the child’s identity including: the 
genetic and biological, personal narrative, and cultural elements.142 Reproductive 
travel allows UK intended parents to circumvent UK rules on gamete donor anonymity 
and use gametes from jurisdictions where donor anonymity is still protected.143 It is 
considered how this affects the child’s genetic identity. Furthermore, international 
commercial surrogacy does not guarantee that the child will have knowledge of their 
gestational parent, the surrogate, thus putting the child’s genetic identity, personal 
narrative, and cultural identity at risk and raising concerns for Articles 7 and 8 CRC, 
and Article 8 ECHR.  
(I) Using Cross-Border Fertility Treatment to Circumvent Donor 
Anonymity Rules: Implications for the Child’s Right to Identity? 
In 2011, Culley et al., reported ﬁndings from their qualitative study of UK residents 
with experience of cross-border care.144 The study captured the socio-demographic 
characteristics of UK travellers, their reasons for seeking treatment abroad, the 
treatments they sought, the destinations they chose, and the outcomes of their 
                                                 
142 C Achmad, ‘Answering the ‘Who am I’ Question’, chapter 8 in Children’s Rights in 
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treatment.145 The four most commonly mentioned reasons for travel were: donor 
shortages in the UK (27 cases), cost (13 cases), perceived better success rates overseas 
(12 cases) and previous unsatisfactory care in the UK (7 cases).146 A previous study 
by Shenfield also found that 26% of UK women indicated ‘a wish for anonymous 
donation’ as one of their reasons for travelling abroad.147 The reasons identified for 
cross-border fertility treatment accord with Liz’s experience. She chose surrogacy 
overseas because she wanted to be treated by a consultant in India who she was more 
‘confident in… rather than anyone else’.148 She also perceived there to be a lack of 
egg donors in the UK and wanted the egg donor to be anonymous. She attributed the 
shortage of UK egg donors to the removal of donor anonymity:  
‘Now because of the traceability, there’s hardly anyone doing it. There’s a lack of 
sperm being donated and there’s a lack of donors because of there’s no anonymity. 
The ones that are donating eggs in the UK usually have fertility problems themselves, 
you see.’149 
Before finding her surrogates in India, she contacted a clinic in California to find an 
anonymous egg donor. The clinic gave her a catalogue of anonymous donors which 
included pictures. Liz chose an egg donor who lived in Cape Town and wrote to her 
to explain why she wanted children and how she wanted to bring the children up. Liz’s 
doctor in India arranged for the egg donor to travel to India at the same time as Liz, so 
that the embryos could be created using the husband’s sperm and the donor’s eggs. 
Liz never met the egg donor, but she had a portfolio of her and explained that ‘I know 
everything about her. What her Grandparents died of and pages and pages of pictures 
of her growing up... It suited me fine really.’150 
                                                 
145 Ibid, p2373. 
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It is argued that the circumvention of UK donor laws is problematic from a children’s 
rights perspective, particularly for the child’s ability to learn about their ‘genetic and 
biographical heritage’.151 As Hedley J cautioned in X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy):  
‘As babies become less available for adoption and given the withdrawal of donor 
confidentiality (wholly justifiable, of course, from the child’s perspective), more and 
more couples are likely to be tempted to follow the applicant’s path to commercial 
surrogacy in those places where it is lawful, of which there may be many.’152   
The withdrawal of donor anonymity, which Hedley J found to be ‘wholly justifiable 
from the child’s perspective’ began in 2004, when the Government introduced the 
2004 Regulations.153 The right to establish details of one’s identity and the 2004 
Regulations were discussed in detail in chapter 5.154 It is recalled that the 2004 
Regulations required the HFEA to collect additional non-identifying donor 
information that could be made available to a donor-conceived person. In addition, 
from 1 April 2005, all new donors have been required to provide identifying 
information (listed in s.2(3) 2004 Regulations), which will be made available to any 
donor-conceived person seeking this information who has reached the age of 18.  
These changes were influenced by two ‘direct challenges to the UK’s position on 
donor anonymity’;155 the case of Joanna Rose156 and the United Nations Committee 
on the Rights of the Child (2002), which questioned the compatibility of donor 
anonymity with the principles and provisions of the CRC.157 Access to one’s genetic 
                                                 
151 E Blyth and L Frith, ‘Donor-Conceived People's Access to Genetic and Biographical History: 
An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor Identity’, 
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origins information affects a number of rights within the CRC and ECHR, including 
the best interests of the child (Article 3 CRC), the right to know one’s parents (Art 7 
CRC), respect for identity (Art 8 CRC), private and family life (Art 8 ECHR) and 
protection against discrimination (Art 14 ECHR and Art 2 CRC). 
As a result of these two direct challenges, the UK Government launched a public 
consultation on the information to be provided to donor-conceived people in 2001.158 
211 responses supported the provision of non-identifying information, whereas just 17 
were against; some of the latter were opposed to the provision of non-identifying 
information because they believed only identifying information would suffice.159 The 
most frequently stated reasons for supporting the change related to the rights of the 
child, which were seen as exceeding those of the social parent (i.e. the person who 
raises the child) and the donor.160 Many were in favour of the change because they felt 
it was a basic human right to know one’s origins; non-identifying information would 
help the child’s ‘emotional well being, sense of self and self esteem’ and give the child 
a ‘solid sense of identity’.161 Consultees also felt that identifying information would 
help the child understand their ‘cultural and social identity’ and ‘genetic/medical 
information’.162 Finally, some consultees were of the view that non-identifying 
information would bring donor laws in line with the access to information which 
adopted children have.163 Interestingly, 22 people who had donated sperm, eggs or 
embryos were in favour of the provision of non-identifying information, whereas just 
one was against.164 On the basis of the consultation and responses, the Government 
introduced the 2004 Regulations and from 1st April 2005, UK law was changed to 
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allow children born through gamete donation to access identifying details of the 
donor.165 
Nevertheless, international commercial surrogacy allows UK intended parents to 
circumvent the law and use anonymous gamete donors overseas. This violates a 
number of rights, including Article 7 (1) CRC which provides that the child shall have 
a right from birth to ‘know and be cared for by his or her parents’. Where anonymous 
donors are used, the child is denied the right to knowledge of their genetic ‘parents’. 
Moreover, the right to access to information about one’s genetic and gestational 
‘parents’ is also inherent in Article 8 of the CRC. As Tobin explains of Article 8: 
‘States are obliged under international law to take measures to preserve a child’s 
identity and the Committee on the Rights of the Child has stressed that this extends to 
maintaining critical records, including family details.’166  
Since UK intended parents are free to use anonymous gamete donors in other 
jurisdictions, the UK has failed to ensure that critical records and the child’s family 
details are maintained. The circumvention of donor anonymity also violates the donor-
conceived individual’s right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. It is 
recalled that the European Court ruled in Gaskin167 that the UK government had 
breached Article 8 by denying Mr Gaskin access to the records about him held by the 
English local authority in whose care he had been placed as a child. The Court 
concluded that ‘respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to 
establish details of their identity as individual human beings…’.168  
Blyth and Frith challenge the assumption that changes to donor anonymity in 2005 are 
responsible for donor shortages in the UK and argue that ‘the decline began well 
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before any change in legislation concerning donor anonymity’.169 Therefore, despite 
the removal of donor anonymity, intended mothers like Liz may still have faced access 
problems. Policy-makers should develop measures to attract donors in the UK. One 
solution would be to increase the maximum number of families that can be created 
using one donor's sperm or eggs from 10 to 20.170 The Progress Educational Trust 
recommends that compensation for expenses ‘needs to be variable in order to reflect 
the fact that expenses themselves vary depending upon the different circumstances in 
which people find themselves’.171 A further strategy would be to invest in high profile 
recruitment campaigns.172 In Victoria (Australia), a doubling of the number of donors 
was reported following a high-profile recruitment campaign launched by Monash IVF, 
the State’s largest DI programme.173 Monash IVF had written to Victoria's male state 
Members of Parliament under 45, urging them to become donors to help replenish 
sperm bank supplies. Monash IVF received 70 inquiries from men, of which 14 
volunteered their sperm. A similar campaign could be organised in the UK, whereby 
clinics write to male and female MPs to raise awareness about egg and sperm donation. 
The recruitment campaign could allay fears that donors (who use a licensed clinic in 
the UK) will not have any legal obligations to a child born as a result of the donation, 
will not be named on the birth certificate and will not be required to support the child 
financially.174 A longer-term solution would be to encourage a global or European 
response to remove donor anonymity in all jurisdictions. Such change will take time 
and disagreement between member states is inevitable. Although discouraging or 
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banning gamete donor anonymity across member states, or even globally, may restrict 
reproductive liberty, it is argued that this is justified because of the children’s rights 
implications of not knowing one’s origins.175 As Blyth and Frith observe, ‘… donor 
conception should not be practiced at all if – for cultural, religious or other reasons – 
it cannot be practised nonanonymously.’176  
In addition to increasing gamete donation in the UK, intended parents who require the 
use of a gamete donor, such as those in Liz’s position, need to be educated about the 
child’s right to identity. Although gamete donor anonymity has been removed in the 
UK, it is recalled from chapter 5177  that parental disclosure is problematic. A donor-
conceived person’s ability to access information about their gamete donor hinges on 
whether the parents inform the child about their conception. Even if the surrogacy is 
disclosed, the child may not be informed that donor eggs / sperm were used. Jadva et 
al., found that ‘just under half of those who were involved in genetic surrogacy had 
not disclosed the use of the surrogate mother’s egg and thus the child was unaware 
that the surrogate mother was their genetic mother’.178 Findings from van den Akker’s 
study of infertile women planning on using surrogacy to start a family also showed 
that most women would disclose the use of surrogacy but not the use of gamete 
donation.179 97% of participants said they would disclose a surrogacy arrangement 
whereas only 34% would reveal donor sperm or donor egg origins.180 Jadva et al., 
contend that ‘by withholding this information, parents are creating a potentially 
difﬁcult situation whereby they feel they have disclosed the nature of the child’s birth 
but the child does not know the full story’.181 It is argued that this problem could be 
exacerbated where anonymous donation is used overseas because the child might not 
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have any record that they were conceived as a result of gamete donation and disclosure 
will depend solely on their parents. At least in the UK the child can access information 
about their gamete donor when they reach 16.  
(II) The Child’s Right to ‘Know’ their Surrogate?  
It is recalled from chapter 5, that providing the child with records of their surrogate 
would help protect the child’s right ‘to know’ his or her parents, outlined in Article 7 
(1) CRC. The right to access information about one’s biological and gestational 
‘parents’ is also inherent in Article 8 of the CRC. As Tobin explains of Article 8, 
‘states are obliged under international law to take measures to preserve a child’s 
identity and the Committee on the Rights of the Child has stressed that this extends to 
maintaining critical records, including family details.’182 Tobin argues that it would 
not be unreasonable for states to insist that organisations facilitating surrogacy 
arrangements: 
‘Maintain records of the individuals involved. This information might then be 
provided to the child at an appropriate time. Importantly, under this model it would 
be possible to ensure that surrogacy arrangement did not violate the child’s right to 
know his or her parents.’183 
However, the child’s identity rights are jeopardised when he / she is born as a result 
of an international commercial surrogacy arrangement. This is because of poor record-
keeping in some international clinics and the provision of incorrect contact details 
from surrogates and / or clinics. The case of In the Matter of D and L,184 demonstrates 
the problems with locating the child’s surrogate for the purposes of consent. The case 
involved parental order applications for twins born as a result of commercial surrogacy 
arrangements in India. Section 54(6) HFEA 2008, which requires the woman who 
carried the child to ‘have freely, and with full understanding of what is involved, 
agreed unconditionally to the making of the order’, was an issue because the intended 
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parents had not received any signed consent from the surrogate, and the clinic in India 
had been unhelpful in helping them find her.185   
The intended parents considered tracking down the surrogate at an address provided 
to them but were concerned ‘about the impact of any invasion of her privacy’.186 As 
such, the couple applied for a parental order without the necessary written consents. 
Following the hearing before Her Honour Judge Black, the intended parents sought 
the assistance of an enquiry agent to locate the surrogate.187 However, the agent was 
unsuccessful because ‘the address provided by the clinic where Miss B should be 
residing…is not the place where she lives’.188 Baker J was able to dispense with 
section 54(6) because all reasonable steps had been taken to locate the surrogate 
without success,189 and thus the court was ‘entitled to take into account evidence that 
the woman did give consent at earlier times to giving up the baby’,190 and the Parental 
Order Regulations 2010 mandate that ‘the child’s welfare is now the paramount 
consideration when the court is ‘coming to a decision’ in relation to the making of a 
parental order’.191 Baker J found there was no realistic hope of finding the surrogate 
and ‘if it is correct that she is living in the state of Andhra Pradesh, then she is one of 
many millions of women living in that state.’192 
From the child’s perspective, the court was correct to use section 54(7)193 and award 
the parental orders so that the child’s social parents would be recognised as their legal 
parents. However, the situation is still unsatisfactory for the children’s identity 
because they may wish to know or have knowledge of their surrogate, especially as 
they become older. As Baker J acknowledged In the Matter of D and L (Minors), ‘a 
surrogate mother is not merely a cipher. She plays the most important role in bringing 
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the child into the world. She is a ‘natural parent’ of the child’.194 Referring to Baroness 
Hale in Re G (Children),195 Baker J recalled that there are at least three ways in which 
a person may be or become a natural parent: genetic, gestational and psychological:196 
‘The act of carrying and giving birth to a baby establishes a relationship with the child 
which is one of the most important relationships in life’.197  
International commercial surrogacy arrangements create a risk that the child will never 
have details of their surrogate198  or even know that they were gestated by a surrogate 
if the intended parents decide not to inform them. As Achmad argues, a central aspect 
involved in answering the ‘who am I’ question and preserving one’s identity, ‘is being 
able to know about one’s own birth; information such as where, when, how and who 
was present’.199 This leaves children born as a result of international commercial 
surrogacy vulnerable to the same disappointment as Joanna Rose and ‘EM’ whose 
genetic connections were important to them for forming a ‘fuller sense of self or 
identity’.200 It is argued that if knowledge of one’s donor was considered important 
enough to remove donor anonymity in 2005, then the child’s right to know details of 
the surrogate is just as important to their identity.  
Although there is a risk that intended parents who use surrogacy in the UK may not 
inform their child about how they were conceived, the surrogate appears on the child’s 
original birth certificate by virtue of section 33 HFEA 2008. This ensures that the child 
has details of his / her gestational parent. It was suggested in chapter 5 that although 
the surrogate should not be assigned legal motherhood or be recorded as the legal 
mother on the child’s birth certificate, the surrogate should be recorded as the child’s 
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gestational parent.201 Compared to international surrogacy cases, there is more chance 
of the surrogate having contact with a child domiciled in the same country. Sophie, 
who had a child through surrogacy with the help of COTS, explained that she was in 
touch with her child’s surrogate ‘all the time’.202 She ‘felt very strongly that my son 
should have contact with [the surrogate] and her family because that’s a part of his 
history and I’d never want to deny him of that.’203 She also believed it was important 
to be honest with her son, so she always intended to remain in contact with the 
surrogate.204 After Sophie’s son was born, she sent the surrogate ‘pictures regularly 
and little updates on how he was doing’.205 The surrogate also sent Sophie updates on 
her daughter.  Lauren, who became a mother to twins with the help of SUK, also spoke 
of the ‘friendship’, ‘network’, and ‘community’ she experienced.206 This paints a very 
different picture from the ‘business transaction’ described by Liz. 207 UK surrogacy 
arrangements, facilitated by a non-profit organisation like COTS or SUK, should be 
encouraged because these arrangements set the foundations for long term contact 
between the parties which could help the child understand their origins.  
Identity also involves national origin and cultural identity.208 These aspects of the 
child’s identity are at risk for children born as a result of international surrogacy 
arrangements, ‘given that they are removed from the culture and ethnicity they are 
born in…’.209 As Achmad notes: 
‘Unless the commissioning parents in ICS [international commercial surrogacy] 
arrangements consciously ensure that the child knows their ethnic and cultural 
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background and take active steps to ensure these links and knowledge are maintained, 
the child may end up ethnically and culturally dislocated and isolated.210 
This disconnection may affect ‘children who remain in their birth country whilst 
waiting for their status to be recognised or regularised’.211 During this period, which 
can last months or even years, children ‘may become accustomed and grow attached 
to certain cultural aspects of their birth place’, 212 such as language. Until international 
reforms are made to mandate that information about the identity of the surrogate (and 
an egg/sperm donor if involved) is preserved,213 and children born overseas are 
informed about their ethnic and cultural background, UK policy-makers should 
encourage intended parents to use surrogacy in the UK. 
7.5 Encouraging Intended Parents to Use Surrogacy in the UK: Paying a 
‘Moderate Fee’ to Surrogates? 
The dichotomy between altruistic surrogacy arrangements, which are permitted in the 
UK, and commercial surrogacy, which is ‘prohibited’, is unsustainable. Commercial 
surrogacy has been introduced ‘through the back door’ in the UK as the judiciary are 
left with little option but to authorise payments that exceed reasonable expenses. To 
refuse authorisation would leave children without a parental order, thus jeopardising 
their life-long welfare, which is the court’s paramount concern following the Parental 
Order Regulations 2010. The unsustainability of the altruistic-commercialisation 
dichotomy merits reappraisal of the concerns with paying surrogates (the exploitation 
of women and commodification of children) which were expressed by Warnock, 
Brazier, and the judiciary in Baby Cotton. This thesis does not propose that a full 
model of commercialisation should be implemented in the UK. Surrogacy 
organisations should not be allowed to operate for profit because it could lead to a 
situation where everyone except the surrogate financially benefits from the 
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arrangement.214 It could also lead to a situation where only those intended parents with 
the financial means can have a child through surrogacy. Nevertheless, it is suggested 
that ‘moderate’ payment to the surrogate should be introduced, because it is 
reconcilable with the aspects of altruism that are effective (e.g. the friendship first 
ethos promoted by SUK) and acknowledges the surrogate’s labour.  
The Warnock Committee was of the view that ‘a woman who deliberately allows 
herself to become pregnant with the intention of giving up the child to which she will 
give birth…is the wrong way to approach pregnancy’.215 It was also of the view that 
surrogacy becomes, ‘positively exploitative when financial interests are involved. It is 
therefore with the commercial exploitation of surrogacy that we have been primarily 
… concerned’.216 The Report fails to explain why surrogacy becomes exploitative 
when surrogates are paid and, as McLachlan and Swales argue, it does not adequately 
address why surrogate motherhood contracts should be illegal.217 It is suggested that 
not paying surrogates enough could in itself be exploitative. 
In 1998, the Brazier Review was asked to consider whether payments to surrogates 
‘should continue to be allowed and, if so, on what basis’.218 The Review’s ‘terms of 
reference specifically excluded a consideration of: ‘commercialisation…that third 
parties should be able to profit from surrogacy arrangements…and enforceability of 
contracts’.219 It is suggested that this was missed opportunity for considering the 
advantages of regulated commercial surrogacy for the UK. The Brazier Review was 
accepting of altruistic surrogacy and recommended that payments to surrogates should 
cover ‘genuine expenses associated with the pregnancy’220 but swiftly concluded that 
                                                 
214 See for example D and L where the surrogate received ‘reasonable expenses’ whilst the clinic 
received twenty-seven thousand US dollars. Op cit, n11, [31] (Baker J). 
215 Warnock Report, op cit, n5, 8.11. 
216 Ibid, 8.17. 
217 H McLachlan & J Swales, ‘Surrogate Motherhood: Beyond the Warnock and the Brazier 
Reports’, (2005), Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics, 11:1, 12-
23, DOI: 10.1179/hrge.11.1.h87x5v7366r73831. 
218 Brazier Review, op cit, n51, 5.1. 
219 Ibid, 1.5. 
220 Ibid, 5.24. The Brazier Review also provided a list of permissible expenses relating to genuine 
expenses associated with the pregnancy. 
259 
 
payment to surrogates, other than genuine expenses, gave rise to the following 
concerns:  
‘(1) Payments create a danger that women will give a less than free and fully informed 
consent to act as a surrogate. (2) Payments risk the commodification of the child to be 
born. (3) Payments contravene the social norms of our society that, just as bodily parts 
cannot be sold, nor can such intimate services.’221 
As such, the Brazier Review recommended that ‘any additional payments should be 
prohibited in order to prevent surrogacy arrangements being entered into for financial 
reasons’.222 Brazier’s first concern about the exploitation of women has in fact arisen 
in the context of ‘altruistic’ DIY arrangements. In Re Z (Surrogacy agreement)223 the 
surrogate was a vulnerable woman with learning difficulties who met the intended 
parents through Facebook. The surrogate was not paid but she was nevertheless 
exploited,224 which dispels the myth that only commercial surrogacy creates 
conditions for exploitation. Therefore, policy-makers should ask, as Shalev has done, 
whether ‘the prohibition of payment for “surrogate” reproductive services [is] 
tantamount to moralized slavery’.225 
In addition, the cross-border nature of today’s surrogacy arrangements means that 
Brazier’s concerns in 1998 about exploitation and payment need to be reconsidered 
within today’s transnational context. It is hypocritical that the ban on 
commercialisation in the UK continues to be grounded in concerns about the 
exploitation of women, when regulation allows UK intended parents to enter 
commercial arrangements overseas and use women from poorer socio-economic 
countries like India and Ukraine. As Deckha notes in the Canadian context, payment 
for surrogacy is an offence punishable by up to ten years’ incarceration and a $500,000 
fine, ‘yet Canada will recognize those who acquire a child through legal commercial 
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surrogacy abroad as the legal parent of that child and permit the child to acquire 
Canadian citizenship’.226 The UK also bans commercialisation yet the English 
judiciary routinely authorise commercial payments retrospectively when intended 
parents return to the UK after using commercial surrogacy overseas.227 This allows 
the government to ‘sidestep controversy and ignore public ambivalence about the 
practice’s purported immorality.’228 UK policy-makers need to reassess whether 
banning payments to UK surrogates merely exports the problem of exploitation to 
women in poorer socio-economic countries, where the main economic winners are the 
third-party agencies involved, rather than the surrogate herself.229 
In response to Brazier’s second concern, it is suggested that paying surrogate’s more 
than reasonable expenses in the UK would not commodify children. As Freeman 
notes:  
‘…The money is paid to the surrogate not to compensate her for giving up the child, 
nor to ‘buy’ the child. The money is payment for her services, it is compensation for 
the burden of pregnancy. The child may have a right not to be sold, but that is a 
distortion of what is happening, even in cases of commercial surrogacy’.230 
Shalev agrees with Freeman and argues that ‘… the transaction under consideration is 
not for the sale of a baby but for the sale of reproductive services’.231 The Brazier 
Review’s third concern, that payments contravene the social norms of our society, is 
problematic because it suggests that women should not choose to receive payment for 
being a surrogate and must have been exploited where they did accept payment. This 
attitude was evident in the House of Commons following Baby Cotton. Mrs Cotton 
had no problem with handing the child over to the intended parents, but she was still 
presented as a victim of exploitation who had been commodified and ‘used as a rich 
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people’s baby farm’.232 The fact that Mrs Cotton went on to become a surrogate 
again,233 and founded the non-profit organisation COTS in 1988,234 suggests that she 
did not feel exploited. Moreover, her motivations to improve her own economic 
circumstances coincided with her empathy for the intended parents.235 In this respect, 
the commercial-altruistic dichotomy fails to acknowledge that some surrogates like 
Kim Cotton do want to be paid, and that altruistic and self-centred motivations can co-
exist. Child-bearing should not somehow become ‘dishonourable when done for 
money’236 rather than altruism. After all, we do not ‘object to paying doctors for their 
services in collaborative reproduction’,237 so the surrogate’s own services should be 
recognised and rewarded. 
Over three decades on from the SA Act 1985, payments to surrogates remains a ‘taboo’ 
subject and critics are quick to assume the status quo in maintaining that altruistic 
surrogacy is the only suitable model for the UK. The Myth Busting Report, conducted 
by Surrogacy UK, ruled out payments quickly and recommended new legislation on 
surrogacy which ‘facilitate the altruistic, compensatory nature of surrogacy in the UK 
while preventing commercialisation and sharp practice.’238 The Report observed that 
there was ‘little support’ amongst surrogates and intended parents for commercial 
surrogacy.239 However, this does not represent the view of all surrogacy organisations 
in the UK. Brilliant Beginnings,240 another non-profit surrogacy organisation, 
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recognises that ‘the law appears to restrict payments to “reasonable expenses” but in 
reality the courts routinely authorise compensation’.241 Brilliant Beginnings suggests 
that clarity is needed within UK law to permit ‘surrogates to be compensated for 
inconvenience as part of their expenses, reflecting reality and allowing this issue to be 
dealt with more honestly and transparently.’242 Kim Cotton, founder of Childlessness 
Overcome Through Surrogacy and surrogate to ‘Baby Cotton’,243 also believes that 
surrogates should be paid compensation, not just ‘reasonable expenses’: 
‘The 1985 Surrogacy Act is out of date. We should be able to advertise for a surrogate 
mother and be able to openly pay for her time, as she will give up between 12 to 18 
months of her life’.244 
Brilliant Beginnings and COTS both differ from SUK in this respect because they are 
open to paying surrogates compensation, rather than just ‘reasonable expenses’. 
SUK’s position that paying surrogates compensation has ‘little support’ needs to be 
explored further, especially in light COTS and Brilliant Beginnings, which support a 
move towards compensatory payment. Drawing upon the preliminary ﬁndings of an 
Australian empirical project on cross-border reproduction, Jackson et al., found that 
‘the historical stigma attached to the ‘commercialisation’ of reproductive contributors 
is not shared by intended parents’.245 The authors found that: 
‘For many participants, the lack of payment to the surrogate or egg donor in domestic 
arrangements was believed to be unfair to her, as she was then, effectively, the only 
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volunteer surrounded by a number of professional participants—including doctors, 
counsellors and lawyers—all of whom were acting for proﬁt.’246 
This corresponds with one of the intended father’s views, Steve, who was domiciled 
in the UK and entered into a commercial surrogacy arrangement in California.247 He 
explained that: 
‘I like the framework that [our surrogate] gets something out of it to better her life... 
She’s doing it to help us but also to make money and set up her own family. I don’t 
have an issue with that because we both know where we stand. I think domestically 
when people are doing it altruistically, it can be confusing for people. What are the 
reasons for it? I think those reasons are genuine, but culturally it throws up just as 
many questions as people who are doing it for money. So, I don’t see why we can’t 
be accommodated.’248 
This indicates that there are some intended parents, perhaps whose voices have not 
been represented in the UK, that challenge the view that altruism is incompatible with 
paying surrogates for their help and labour. It is also questionable whether the 
payments Steve made to his surrogate are so different from the reasonable expenses 
paid by Rosie, an intended mother who entered an ‘altruistic’ arrangement in the UK. 
Rosie explained that reasonable expenses covered any expense the surrogate incurred 
because of her pregnancy. This ranged from childcare, ‘ante-natal yoga’, ‘takeaway or 
convenience food to feed her family’, ‘a cleaner’, ‘a gardener’, and a ‘holiday when 
the baby’s born so they [the family] can regroup and reconnect’.249 It is clear that the 
line between reasonable expenses and payments is becoming increasingly blurred.  
It is suggested that one way forward for law reform, would be to allow a ‘moderate 
fee’ to be paid to surrogates, in addition to ‘reasonable expenses’. Alghrani, Griffiths 
and Brazier suggest that a ‘moderate fee’ could be based on the surrogate being paid 
minimum wage for her service.250 A nine-month pregnancy calculated at current 
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minimum wage equates to a sum in the region of £40,000 – £52,000. The authors note 
that this sum can be justified on the basis that: 
 ‘Pregnancy is hard work and a risky enterprise; allowing payment of a minimum 
wage allows for formal recognition of the valuable services surrogates provide; it is 
this service that is being remunerated and not the purchase of a baby.’251 
Nevertheless, the authors acknowledge that this sum exceeds the cost of surrogacy in 
some US states.252 They suggest that an alternative is to treat surrogacy as a full-time 
job and pay up to a maximum of the minimum wage of £7.38 for 37.5 hours over the 
40 weeks of the pregnancy.253 A further alternative would be to pay surrogates the 
living wage of £7.83 for 37.5 hours over 40 weeks.254 It is suggested that paying the 
surrogate a ‘moderate fee’ based on minimum or living wage is a better option than 
paying £40,000 - £52,000.  Having such a high sum (or worse still, creating a free 
market where intended parents and surrogates set the fee)255 could price intended 
parents ‘out of the market, so that only those of considerable means would have this 
method of founding a family open to them’.256  Restricting payment to a ‘moderate 
fee’ based on minimum or living wage would also ensure that sum does not ‘overbear 
the will of the surrogate’, something the ‘courts retrospectively authorising payments 
have been’257 concerned about. Ultimately, a balancing act is required for policy-
makers when calculating what a ‘moderate fee’ should be. Set the UK fee too high and 
the surrogate’s will could be overborne and / or UK couples will still resort to other 
jurisdictions like India, where a surrogate’s services can be obtained for less. 
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Moreover, ‘if set too low the change in the law may not produce more willing 
surrogates and thus commissioning individuals/couples will still look abroad.’258 
An informed debate in the UK, involving surrogates, intended parents and non-profit 
organisations, would allow a discussion of some fundamental questions. We could 
find out whether paying a ‘moderate fee’ to surrogates in the UK, in addition to 
reasonable expenses associated with the pregnancy, could encourage more surrogates 
to offer their help.259 As Deckha suggests in the context of Canada’s ban on 
commercial surrogacy, ‘allowing Canadians to pay women for surrogacy would very 
likely increase the number of women willing to be surrogates in Canada and thus 
alleviate the current shortage.’260 We could also find out whether defining ‘reasonable 
expenses’ in more concrete terms would provide more certainty to intended parents 
and surrogates; whether it is the terminology of ‘payment’ and ‘commercialisation’ 
that organisations like the SUK and the Myth Busting Report do not like; whether not 
paying surrogates more than reasonable expenses is of itself potentially exploitative; 
and whether the ban on advertising is responsible for the shortage of surrogates within 
the UK.  
Finally, there needs to be meaningful debate, involving intended parents, surrogates 
and professionals about whether surrogacy arrangements should be enforceable. In 
1989, Carmel Shalev argued in her book Birth Power: 
‘The paternalistic refusal to force the surrogate mother to keep her word denies the 
notion of female reproductive agency and reinforces the traditional perception of 
women as imprisoned in the subjectivity of their wombs. The benevolent protection 
of women from themselves places an indelible stamp of illegitimacy on the notion of 
a woman contracting to bear a child for another person. It implies that reproductive 
matters are not proper subjects for legal relations, reinforcing the public-private 
dichotomy that relegates women’s reproductive activity to the shadow life of a male-
dominated socioeconomic political order.’261 
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Shalev suggests that the only possible reason for preventing a surrogate from making 
a legally binding commitment to the intended parents is her biology; ‘her state of mind 
at the moment of agreement is not to be taken seriously because it is subject to change 
during the performance of her undertaking, due to the nature of pregnancy’.262 Shalev 
argues that ‘a woman pregnant with a child is no less deserving of special treatment 
than an artist pregnant with inspiration. But her special condition in no way justifies 
the condescension that denies her autonomy as a human being’.263 It is suggested that 
policy-makers need to revisit the assumptions that have been made about enforceable 
arrangements, advertising, and particularly payments to surrogates.  
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the causes of, and problems arising from, international 
commercial surrogacy arrangements, particularly for the intended parents and children 
involved.  The UK’s strict legislative regime is responsible for pushing intended 
parents like Liz and Steve into more surrogacy-friendly jurisdictions. The features of 
commercial surrogacy prohibited by the SA Act 1985 are futile given that UK intended 
parents can circumvent the law. The interviews with Liz, who entered a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement in India, and Steve, who entered a commercial arrangement in 
the US, revealed how intended parents can find themselves with practical and financial 
difficulties. The cases of X and Y264 and Re: IJ (A Child),265 also demonstrate how 
uncertain the quest for parenthood is in the international surrogacy context. 
Conflicting laws mean UK intended parents are at the whim of the surrogate, and her 
spouse/partner, who must consent to the parental order, whilst the laws of their own 
country relieve them of any responsibility, thus leaving the child parentless and 
stateless. The absence of uniform Private International Law rules on legal parentage 
has led to ‘limping parentage across borders in a number of cases and can create 
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significant problems for children and families’.266 As the Parentage / Surrogacy 
Project has noted, having no legal parent: 
‘[C]an have far-reaching legal consequences for all involved: for example, it may 
affect the child’s nationality, immigration status, the attribution of parental 
responsibility regarding the child or the identity of the individual(s) under a duty to 
financially maintain the child, etc. Difficulties may also arise because the parties 
involved in such an arrangement are vulnerable and at risk.’267 
In the long-term a ‘multilateral, legally binding instrument that would establish a 
global, coherent and ethical practice of international surrogacy’268 (like the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption), would help to resolve these problems. For 
now, it is suggested that surrogacy should be more accessible in the UK, (e.g. by 
allowing a ‘moderate fee’ to be paid to surrogates) which could discourage intended 
parents from looking to other jurisdictions for help. 
Another major problem arising from international commercial surrogacy 
arrangements is the conflict between child welfare and public policy objections to 
commercialisation. Section 54(8) of the HFEA 2008 only allows ‘reasonable 
expenses’, however, following the Parental Order Regulations 2010 the judiciary have 
retrospectively authorised payment that goes far beyond reasonable expenses in 
international commercial surrogacy cases. This shows how the patchwork of UK 
regulation is internally contradictory and needs updating.  
The next part of this chapter considered the implications of international commercial 
surrogacy arrangements for the children involved, particularly for their right to identity 
which is protected in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC and Article 8 of the ECHR. The 
empirical work suggested that some intended parents, like Liz, may use international 
commercial surrogacy because they perceive there to be a shortage of egg donors in 
the UK and also want an anonymous donor. This corresponds with findings by Culley 
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et al.269 However, as Hedley J recognised in X and Y, the withdrawal of gamete donor 
confidentiality is ‘wholly justifiable … from the child’s perspective’.270 Gamete 
donation in the UK must be increased and early parental disclosure of all aspects of 
the child’s conception must be actively encouraged. There should be debate as to the 
age at which children should be informed. International commercial surrogacy 
arrangements also jeopardise the child’s right to know their surrogate and have 
information about their gestational parents. Poor record-keeping and inaccurate details 
of the surrogate is a common theme in the parental order cases involving international 
surrogacy.271 International commercial surrogacy also has a bearing on the child’s 
cultural and ethnic origins and the child may feel disconnected from this if they are 
removed from their country of birth.272  
The final part of this chapter provided some suggestions to encourage intended parents 
to use surrogacy in the UK. Firstly, policy-makers, surrogates, intended parents and 
society must revisit concerns with exploitation and commodification. It is suggested 
that the assumptions made by the Warnock Committee about exploitation and payment 
have gone untested. Furthermore, the Brazier Review was unable to consider 
commercial surrogacy because it was outside its terms of reference. There needs to be 
a new review to consider whether advertisements should be allowed, whether contracts 
should be enforceable, and whether moderate payment to the surrogate would help 
increase the number of women who offer their help in the UK. Paying surrogates a 
‘moderate fee’, in addition to reasonable expenses, would reflect that the ‘pregnancy 
is hard work and a risky enterprise’273 and can still be reconciled with altruistic 
motivations. Since commercial sums are already authorised in international cases, it is 
suggested that ‘moderate’ payment would be acceptable especially if surrogates and 
intended parents use a licensed clinic.274 Other reforms, including pre-birth orders for 
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those using a licensed UK clinic, are also likely to encourage intended parents to use 
surrogacy at home since the quest to parenthood will become more certain.  
270 
 
Chapter Eight 
 
8. Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis, the contention has been that UK surrogacy regulation is 
outdated, piecemeal and not fit for purpose. The provisions in the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Acts 1990 and 2008 (HFEA’s 1990, 2008) entrench the ‘sexual 
family’1 and overwhelmingly fail to protect the plethora of less conventional families 
now using surrogacy, including single parents by choice,2 multiple parents, co-parents, 
and non-genetic parents. Restrictive legislation and the advent of the internet have 
spurred intended parents to enter high-risk ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) arrangements in the 
UK, predominantly through social media forums such as ‘Facebook’.3 Other intended 
parents have ventured overseas in the hope of finding a simpler path to parenthood but 
have instead found themselves trekking through a ‘thorn forest’4 of legal 
complications, which have resulted in their children being left ‘marooned parentless 
and stateless’.5 The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SA Act 1985) was introduced 
to placate a panicked society in the wake of Baby Cotton,6 however public attitudes 
towards surrogacy have changed considerably and new regulation is urgently required 
to reflect the societal and legal changes that have occurred over the last three decades.   
As noted in chapter 2, the recent declaration of incompatibility issued in the High 
Court by Munby P, between the ‘two-person’ requirement in section 54(1) HFEA 
                                                 
1 M A Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and other Twentieth Century Tragedies 
(Routledge: New York and London, 1995) 143. 
2 B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption) [2015] EWFC 17; Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act: Parental Order) [2015] EWFC 73, hereafter ‘Re Z’; and, In the matter of Z (A 
Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191 (Fam), hereafter ‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’. 
3 See for example CW v NT and another [2011] EWHC 33; H v S (Surrogacy Agreement) [2015] 
EWFC 36; and Re Z (Surrogacy agreements) (Child arrangement orders) [2016] EWFC 34 
(hereafter ‘Re Z (Surrogacy agreements)’). 
4 X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), [26] (Hedley J). Hereafter ‘X & Y’. At 
para [2] (Hedley J). 
5 Ibid, [10] (Hedley J). 
6 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846. 
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2008 and the single father’s right to private and family life (Article 8 European 
Convention on Human Rights),7 presented a perfect opportunity to re-examine the 
surrogacy landscape. This project set out to achieve this by asking the following 
questions: 
1) How fit for purpose is the current patchwork of regulation currently governing 
surrogacy? 
2) Does the legislation’s preference towards the sexual family affect the 
procreative rights of the intended parents and the rights of the child? 
3) How does the ban on commercial surrogacy affect procreative rights and the 
rights of the child? 
4) How has the judiciary (both domestic and in the European Court of Human 
Rights) treated the rights of the child and the intended parents’ procreative 
liberty?  
5) Which reforms are necessary to centralise procreative liberty and children’s 
rights in UK surrogacy legislation? 
 
The research presented in this thesis can help policy-makers and law reformers 
identify the changes that are now required. The suggested reforms have been 
influenced by a small qualitative study, which was conducted to investigate the 
experiences of eight intended parents and two surrogates who had used surrogacy in 
the UK or overseas. Although the sample was small, the participant’s experiences 
provided a unique, personal insight into the problems surrogates and intended parents 
encounter. Interestingly, some of the interviews departed from the status quo that 
altruistic surrogacy is the only acceptable regulatory model.8 This suggests that further 
research is needed to unpack the ‘taboo’ of commercialisation, particularly payments 
to the surrogate. 
                                                 
7‘Z (A Child) (No 2)’, op cit, n2. 
8 ‘Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting and reform’, Report of the Surrogacy UK Working Group 
on Surrogacy Law Reform, November 2015, p5 ‘Foreword’. Available at 
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/59740/1/Surrogacy%20in%20the%20UK%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (last 
accessed 16/09/18). 
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8.1 Areas of Reform 
The research pointed to three key areas in which reform is necessary. The first two 
relate to legal parenthood and the final relates to the way surrogacy is now practised 
by UK intended parents. 
(I) The ‘Relationship Provisions’ 
‘One of the central assumptions underpinning our conceptualization of family is that 
the entity is dependent upon a heterosexual relationship between a man and a woman. 
This form of affiliation, romanticized in the glorification of the nuclear family, is 
central to traditional family law ideology. Politicians as well as religious leaders extol 
this relationship (if it is sanctified) as the core of the family.’9 
This thesis has shown that UK surrogacy regulation ‘glorifies’ the ‘nuclear family’,10 
which consists of two parents and their genetically related children. As noted in 
chapters 2 and 3, to apply for a parental order, the intended parents must be husband 
and wife,11 civil partners,12 or ‘living as partners in an enduring family relationship’.13 
This narrow approach to parenthood leaves no protection for those headed by single 
parents and platonic co-parents, who must make do with an adoption order,14 child 
arrangements order,15 or wardship,16 none of which reflect the identity of surrogacy-
conceived children. In ‘Z (a child) (no 2)’, Munby P issued a declaration of 
incompatibility between the two-person requirement and Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, on 
the basis that there is a difference in treatment between a single person entering into a 
lawful surrogacy arrangement, and a couple entering the same arrangement, on the 
                                                 
9 M A Fineman, ‘The Neutered Mother’, 46 University of Miami Law Review, 653, 670 (1992). At 
p663. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Section 54(2)(a) HFEA 2008. 
12 Section 54(2)(b) HFEA 2008. 
13 Section 54(2)(c) HFEA 2008. In this chapter, the requirements in section 54(2) HFEA 2008 are 
referred to as the ‘relationship provisions’, because they determine whether a person is eligible to 
apply for a parental order on the basis of their relationship status.   
14 B v C, op cit, n2. 
15 Re Z, op cit, n2; and Re A (Foreign Surrogacy- Parental Responsibility) [2016] EWFC 70. 
16 See M v F & SM (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008) [2017] EWHC 2176 (Fam). 
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sole ground of the single person’s relationship status.17 UK surrogacy regulation 
violates the human rights of single parents, including single parents by choice which 
is a distinct group of single mothers and fathers who make an active decision to parent 
alone.18 The HFEA 2008 should discontinue its arbitrary focus on family structure and 
focus instead on the ‘actual contingencies of care-giving’.19 Removal of the two-parent 
requirement would also create much-needed parity with ARTs regulation, which 
allows single women to access IVF. 
Another ‘relationship provision’ that needs to be removed from the HFEA 2008 is the 
‘enduring family relationship’ threshold. This research exposed the implications of the 
provision for procreative autonomy, an issue that has gone uncriticised by academic 
commentators, the judiciary, and policy-makers. The provision has been interpreted in 
a way that requires couples to be in a sexual relationship, similar to marriage or civil 
partnership.20 This prevents co-parents and wider kin relations (e.g. the child’s mother 
and grandmother) from applying for a parental order, even if it is in the best interests 
of the child for the order to be made. Those accessing ARTs do not need to 
demonstrate an enduring family relationship, so removing this provision would help 
bring greater uniformity between surrogacy and ARTs regulation and help refocus the 
law away from conjugality towards caregiving. 
As noted in chapter 3, the ‘relationship provisions’ also fail to promote and protect the 
rights inherent in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
and ECHR, particularly the child’s rights to identity,21 private and family life22 and 
                                                 
17 [11] and [13]. 
18 S Golombok, S Zadeh, and S Imrie, v Smith, T Freeman, ‘Single Mothers by Choice: Mother–
Child Relationships and Children’s Psychological Adjustment’, Journal of Family Psychology, 
2016, Vol. 30, No. 4, 409–418, p410. N Carone, R Baiocco and V Lingiardi, ‘Single fathers by 
choice using surrogacy: why men decide to have a child as a single parent’, Human Reproduction, 
Vol.32, No.9 pp. 1871–1879, 2017. 
19 M Fineman, p143, op cit n1. 
20 See the judiciary’s interpretation of the provision in Re F and M (Children) (Thai Surrogacy) 
(Enduring Family Relationship) [2016] EWHC 1594 (Fam); and Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time 
limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam) (hereafter ‘Re X’). 
21 Articles 7 and 8 CRC. 
22 Article 8 ECHR and Article 16 CRC. 
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non-discrimination.23  The judiciary have persistently held that a parental order is key 
to shaping, recognising and respecting the child’s identity as a surrogacy-conceived 
child. because it: 
‘Goes to the most fundamental aspects of status and, transcending even status, to the 
very identity of the child as a human being: who he is and who his parents are. It is 
central to his being, whether as an individual or as a member of his family.’24 
Despite this, single parents and their children are unable to apply for a parental order. 
It is recalled from chapter 3 that the two-parent requirement assumes that single 
parenthood creates non-optimal conditions for children, including child poverty. 
However, single parents by choice ‘differ in a number of important ways from those 
who become single mothers following separation or divorce’.25 For instance, children 
are ‘less likely to have experienced the economic hardship or maternal psychological 
problems that commonly result from marital breakdown and unplanned single 
parenthood’.26 The nuances of single parenthood highlighted by this thesis call into 
question the government’s deep-rooted belief that surrogacy-conceived children 
require two parents.27 
Given the legislative limitations with the HFEA 2008, chapter 3 used Tobin’s 
framework,28 and other indicators of a children’s rights approach,29 to assess the 
judiciary’s response to the ‘relationship provisions’. It is concluded that the judgments 
                                                 
23 Article 14 ECHR and Article 2 CRC. 
24 Re X, op cit, n20. Para [54], (Munby P). 
25 V Jadva, S Badger, M Morrissette and S Golombok, 'Mom by Choice, Single by Life's 
Circumstances ... Findings from a Large Scale Survey of the Experiences of Single Mothers by 
Choice' (2009) 12(4) Human Fertility 175, p 182. (Emphasis added). 
26 S Golombok, S Zadeh, S Imrie, V Smith and T Freeman, op cit, n18, p410. 
27 Dawn Primarolo (MP) argued that the responsibility of surrogacy ‘is likely to be better handled 
by a couple than a single man or woman’. HC Debs, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 
Committee, Col 248-249 (12 June 2008), Dawn Primarolo, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmpublic/human/080612/am/80612s02.ht
m> (last accessed 02/01/17).   
28 J Tobin, ‘Judging the Judges: Are They Adopting the Rights Approach in Matters Involving 
Children?’  (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 579. 
29 Including the five suggested by K Hollingsworth and H Stalford, ‘Towards Children’s Rights 
Judgments’, chapter 3, in Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments: From Academic Vision to New 
Practice, edited by H Stalford, K Hollingsworth and S Gilmore, 2017 (Hart Publishing, 1st ed). 
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in Re Z and Re Z (No 2)30 are a missed opportunity for promoting the rights of the 
child. It does not utilise any of the relevant rights in the CRC, acknowledge the 
implications of the single parent exclusion for the enduring family relationship 
threshold, or capture how these relationship provisions affect the child’s right to 
identity.  The current legal regime that exists in the UK, and the judiciary’s inability 
to ‘read down’ the two-person requirement and provide much-needed relief for single 
parent surrogacy families, means that this group is: 
‘Compelled to make do with legal solutions – adoption orders or child arrangements 
orders – which do not provide the optimum legal and psychological solution for, and 
thus do not promote the best interests of, a child born of a surrogacy arrangement’.31  
It is now a matter of urgency that policy-makers remove all the relationship provisions 
from the HFEA 2008 and consider an alternative basis to assign legal parenthood. 
(II) Challenging the Genetic and Gestational View of Surrogacy 
The second area requiring urgent reform, relates to surrogacy regulation’s 
marginalisation of ‘social’ / ‘psychological’ parenthood. The genetic requirement in 
section 54(1)(b) HFEA provides that ‘the gametes of at least one of the applicants 
were used to bring about the creation of the embryo.’ This has resulted in the non-
genetic parent being marginalised where the surrogate changes her mind about the 
agreement,32 and where the non-genetic intended parent’s relationship with the genetic 
intended parent breaks down.33 Discussion of these issues in chapter 4 revealed a 
worrying difference in the way prospective parents using IVF and surrogacy are 
treated. Those seeking IVF treatment are permitted to use gamete donation whereas 
with surrogacy, at least one of the intended parent’s gametes must have been used. 
This implies that a parent who does not have a gestational and genetic role (i.e. 
                                                 
30 Op cit, n2. 
31 Re Z, op cit, n2. Para [21] (Munby P). 
32 CW v NT and H & S, op cit, n3 
33 JP v LP & Others [2014] EWHC 595 (Fam). 
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someone relying on double-donor surrogacy) is not a ‘real’ parent,34 whereas a woman 
using IVF is because her ability to gestate compensates for the absence of a genetic 
tie. Not only is this contrary to Baroness Hale’s statement in Re G35 that social / 
psychological parents can be just as important for the child as gestational and genetic 
parents,36 but it sends out an extremely damaging message that non-genetic families 
are inferior; this was rejected many years ago by the ECtHR in Marckx v. Belgium.37 
It is suggested that law reformers should remove the genetic requirement to help 
eradicate this discrimination and create parity between surrogacy and ARTs 
regulation. Such a move is also supported by the Myth Busting Report38 and some of 
the interviewees involved in this project, who found it: 
‘Insulting to donor conceived families to assume that if you’ve not got a genetic 
connection you’re less of a parent to your child … if double donation is ok for IVF 
then why is it not ok for surrogacy?’39 
A further assumption that must be addressed is the unchallenged view that doubly-
infertile intended parents should ‘adopt instead’.40 The empirical work carried out for 
this thesis demonstrates that the processes involved in double-donor surrogacy are 
radically different from adoption. For instance, Gemma, an intended mother who was 
single and had no genetic link to her child, explained that she had not missed any 
aspect of the pregnancy, to the extent that she felt as though she was pregnant herself.41 
This type of involvement is not something adoptive parents can do with their adopted 
children, thus making a parental order rather than an adoption order more appropriate 
for double-donor surrogacy families. Furthermore, with double-donor surrogacy the 
                                                 
34 This was implied in the South Africa Constitutional Court’s decision in AB and Another v 
Minister of Social Development [2016] ZACC 43. Hereafter ‘AB and Another (CC)’. Footnote 
[273] of the Constitutional Court’s majority decision. 
35 Re G [2006] UKHL 43. 
36 Paras [33]-[36] (Baroness Hale). 
37 13 June 1979, [31], Series A no. 31. 
38 Myth-Busting Report, op cit, n8. 
39 Interview 07IM, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author). 
40 Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption, Infertility, and the New World of Child Production 
(Houghton Mifflin 1999). p 226. See also, D Friedrich, ‘A Duty to Adopt?’ Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2013, which makes the case for a general duty to adopt. 
41 Interview 06IM, recorded on 11/07/17 (on file with the author). 
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intended parents and surrogate can remain in each other’s lives after the child is born. 
As such, ‘there are important psychological differences between becoming a parent 
through adoption, and having a child through surrogacy’.42  
As noted in chapter 5, the genetic requirement also sits uneasily with the best interests 
and welfare of surrogacy-conceived children. It makes a dangerous presumption that 
children require biological parents, which is contrary to J and Another v C and 
Others43 where it was held that there would be no presumption in favour of biological 
parents in disputes between them and long-term foster carers. Discussion of CW v NT 
and another44 and H & S,45 highlighted that it is the child who loses out when their 
social (non-genetic) intended parent is marginalised. Therefore, it is one of the main 
contentions of this thesis, that it would be in the best interests of the child, and fairer 
for the adults involved, for legal parenthood to be assigned to those who intend to raise 
the child (i.e. the intended parents). As Horsey states, ‘the genetic and gestational 
contributors to the child … undoubtedly possess compelling claims to parenthood’46 
but ‘these claims are not as strong or as accurately reflect the social situation that will 
be in place as those of the intending parents’.47 Consequently, section 33 HFEA 2008, 
which assigns legal motherhood to the surrogate and ‘no other woman’ would need to 
be removed. The provision fails to reflect that most surrogates do not want to be 
recognised as the legal parent of the child.48 It is suggested that a presumption of legal 
parenthood should be created in favour of the intended parents. The parental order 
could be pre-authorised by the High Court so that legal parenthood is conferred on the 
intended parents at birth, a view shared by the 2017 Myth Busting Report49 and some 
                                                 
42AB and Another (CC), op cit n34. Para [180] Khampepe J (Cameron J, Froneman J and Madlanga 
J concurring). 
43 [1969] 1 All ER 788. 
44Op cit, n3. 
45 Ibid. 
46K Horsey, ‘Challenging presumptions: legal parenthood and surrogacy arrangements’, 22 Child 
and Family Law Quarterly, 449 2010. P456. 
47 Ibid. 
48 S Imrie and V Jadva, ‘The long-term experiences of surrogates: relationships and contact with 
surrogacy families in genetic and gestational surrogacy arrangements’, Reproductive BioMedicine 
Online (2014) 29, 424–435. P425. 
49 Op cit, n8, p6. 
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of the intended parents interviewed for this project. This presumption could be 
rebuttable, (and the parental order revoked after the child’s birth) where the court 
decides it is not in the best interests of the child to be raised by the intended parents.50 
Recognising multiple legal parents could also be an option where the parties all intend 
to be child’s social parents.51  
Intention-based parenthood is one of the most important reforms advocated by this 
thesis, and it is suggested that this alternative basis for assigning legal parenthood 
should only exist for surrogacy (and potentially other ARTs). If this reform is 
implemented, legal parenthood would be assigned to the intended parent(s) 
irrespective of whether they have a genetic link with the child.  This thesis addressed 
the concern that removing the genetic requirement and section 33 HFEA 2008 could 
create a risk that surrogacy-conceived children will not learn of their genetic and / or 
gestational origins. Measures to encourage early parental disclosure can be developed 
including Crawshaw et al’s., suggestion that birth certificates should record the 
genetic ‘parents’, birth/gestational ‘parent’52 and those raising the child (i.e. the 
intended parents); it could be made clear that only the child’s intended parents are the 
legal parents. 
(III) Discouraging DIY and International Commercial Surrogacy? 
‘The path to parenthood has been less a journey along a primrose path, more a trek 
through a thorn forest.’53 
 
The third area of reform relates to the way surrogacy is now practised by UK intended 
parents. In chapter 6, DIY arrangements were compared with more formal 
arrangements facilitated by non-profit organisations including Childlessness 
Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS), Surrogacy UK (SUK) and Brilliant 
                                                 
50 For example, where the surrogate is better able to promote the child’s welfare and best interests, 
or where the intended parents (or one intended parent) change their mind about the surrogacy. 
51 As was the case in A.A. v. B.B., (2007) 83 O.R. (3d) 561 (C.A.) [A.A. v. B.B.]. 
52 Ibid. 
53X & Y, op cit, n4. 
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Beginnings (BB). The main conclusion reached was that DIY arrangements create 
greater risks for those involved. The case of ‘Re Z (Surrogacy agreements)’54 exposed 
how UK surrogates are at risk of exploitation in DIY arrangements due to the absence 
of professional support or screening. An application of Wertheimer’s55 theoretical 
accounts of exploitation identified the exploitative aspects of DIY arrangements, 
including risks to the surrogate’s health and future ability to procreate. Intended 
parents are also at risk of exploitation due to the ‘dangerous and murky waters’ of the 
internet.56  
New regulation is now required to encourage parties to enter more formal 
arrangements with COTS, SUK and BB, where the parties are given the chance to 
communicate their expectations of each other, have professional support and have a 
period of getting to know one another. As noted in chapter 6, The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority (HFE Authority) should have a role in licensing and 
regulating non-profit surrogacy organisations. This would add a layer of protection for 
those using these non-profit organisations by helping to improve standards. It is 
recalled that while organisations like COTS are better than DIY arrangements, they 
rely on the help of ‘well motivated volunteers’.57 In Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign 
Domicile),58 COTS administered incorrect legal advice which resulted in the intended 
parents being unable to apply for a parental order.59  Part of the conditions for a licence 
could be to ensure volunteers and others working in the non-profit organisation are 
familiar with the basic requirements in the HFEA 2008, the SA Act 1985, the Parental 
Order Regulations 2010, and any new surrogacy legislation that is enacted.  
It was acknowledged in chapter 6 that this new system of regulation would depend 
upon surrogates and intended parents choosing to use a non-profit organisation, rather 
than the DIY route. It is suggested that the benefits of using a licensed surrogacy 
                                                 
54 Op cit, n3. 
55 A Wertheimer, ‘Two Questions About Surrogacy and Exploitation’, Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 211-239. 
56 CW v NT, op cit, n3. Para [29], (Baker J). 
57 Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, [3] (McFarlane J). 
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agency could be explained by the HFE Authority, through advertising campaigns. 
Furthermore, authorisation of the parental order application before the child is born 
could be offered to those who use a licensed organisation. If surrogates are to be paid 
a moderate fee, an argument made in chapter 7, then this could be offered to surrogates 
who enter a surrogacy arrangement using a licensed non-profit organisation like 
COTS, SUK and BB. It is hoped that these incentives will help to discourage parties 
from the ‘dangerous and murky waters’60 of the internet and unregulated DIY 
arrangements. 
As noted in chapter 7, the restrictive features of UK regulation, including the ban on 
payments (other than reasonable expenses),61 the unenforceability of contracts,62 and 
the ban on advertisements,63 have led to a shortage of UK surrogates.64 UK intended 
parents, like Liz and Steve, who enter international commercial surrogacy 
arrangements face practical and legal difficulties.65 International commercial 
surrogacy arrangements have also made it difficult for the judiciary to preserve the 
prohibitive stance of the SA Act 1985. The Act maintains that commercial surrogacy 
is illegal, yet the courts are likely to authorise commercial payments because failure 
to do so would leave the child without a parental order. As Hedley J stated in Re L,66 
‘it will only be in the clearest case of the abuse of public policy that the court will be 
able to withhold an order if otherwise welfare considerations supports its making.’67 
The rationale for banning commercial surrogacy was to protect women from 
exploitation yet regulation has simply outsourced this problem to jurisdictions where 
women have less rights and more to lose.68  Moreover, the judgment in Re Z 
                                                 
60 CW v NT, op cit, n3. Para [29], (Baker J). 
61 Section 2 SA Act 1985 and section 54(8) HFEA 2008. 
62 Section 1A SA Act 1985. 
63 Section 3 SA Act 1985. 
64 ‘Childless UK Couples Forced Abroad to Find Surrogates’, The Guardian, 20th February 2016, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/feb/20/childless-uk-couples-forced-abroad-
surrogates> (last accessed 16/09/18). 
65 X v Y, op cit, n4, [10] (Hedley J). 
66 Re L (Commercial Surrogacy) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam). 
67 Ibid, [10] (Hedley J). 
68 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Outsourcing Ethical Dilemmas: Regulating International Surrogacy 
Arrangements’, Medical Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2016, pp. 59–75. 
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(Surrogacy agreements)69 indicates that those entering altruistic arrangements are also 
susceptible to exploitation 
It is one of the main conclusions of this thesis, that international commercial surrogacy 
is not conducive to promoting and protecting the rights of the child, particularly their 
right to identity.70 As Achmad notes, international commercial surrogacy 
arrangements create risks for the child’s genetic and biological identity, personal 
narrative and cultural identity.71 Reproductive travel allows intended parents to 
circumvent UK rules on gamete donor anonymity and use gametes from jurisdictions 
where anonymity is still protected.72 Those reforming surrogacy must look to the law 
regulating gamete donation in the UK which was influenced by seminal decisions like 
R (on the application of Rose and another)73 and Gaskin.74 In the latter, the ECtHR 
held that ‘respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish 
details of their identity as individual human beings…’.75 Circumvention of UK rules 
on donor anonymity violates the child’s right to ‘establish details of their identity as 
individual human beings’.76 Chapter 7 also showed how international commercial 
surrogacy jeopardises the child’s right to know their surrogate. Although the surrogate 
should not be assigned legal parenthood, she has helped to shape the child’s personal 
narrative and the child should have details about their gestational ‘parent’. There is a 
risk in international arrangements that the surrogate’s identity will not be recorded 
                                                 
69 Op cit, n3. 
70 Inherent in Articles 7 and 8 CRC and Article 8 ECHR. 
71 C Achmad, ‘Answering the ‘Who am I’ Question’, chapter 8 in Children’s Rights in 
International Commercial Surrogacy: Exploring the Challenges from a Child’s Rights, Public 
International Human Rights Law Perspective, (2018), p204. 
72Interview 05IM, recorded on 27.08.16 (on file with the author) (Liz); and Interview 04IF, 
recorded on 07/10/16 (on file with the author) (Steve). 
73 R (on the application of Rose and another) v Secretary of State for Health and another [2002] 
EWHC 1593 (Administrative Court).  
74Gaskin v. United Kingdom (Access to Personal Files), 7 July 1989, 12 EHRR. 
75 [39]. 
76 Ibid. 
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accurately or made available to the child,77 which leaves children without an important 
piece of their identity ‘jigsaw’.   
To avoid the problems that arise from international surrogacy, for both reproductive 
autonomy and children’s rights, intended parents should be actively encouraged to use 
surrogacy in the UK. To create a more surrogacy-friendly regime, policy-makers are 
urged to revisit the concerns with commercial surrogacy expressed by Warnock,78 
Brazier,79 and the judiciary in Baby Cotton.80 Although an open market in surrogacy 
is rejected,81 paying surrogates a ‘moderate fee’ based on minimum or living wage 
would acknowledge the surrogate’s hard work and could encourage more surrogates 
to offer their help.82 A ‘moderate fee’, rather than substantial commercial payment, 
would also help to ensure that the ‘friendship first’ ethos that some intended parents 
find appealing about ‘altruistic’ surrogacy is not undermined.83 Although the recent 
Myth Busting Report was quick to conclude that there was ‘little support’ amongst 
surrogates and intended parents for commercial surrogacy,84 this is not representative 
of all surrogates, intended parents and surrogacy organisations,85 who recognise that 
altruistic and commercial motivations can co-exist. Therefore, the issue of payments 
needs to be revisited by policy-makers and those involved with surrogacy in the UK. 
                                                 
77In The Matter Of D And L (Minors) (Surrogacy) And In The Matter Of Human Fertilisation And 
Embryology Act 2008 [2012] EWHC 2631 (Fam). 
78 M Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
Cmnd 9314 (1984). Hereafter, ‘The Warnock Report'. 
79 Brazier Report, Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments 
and Regulation, Cm 4068 (1998). Hereafter ‘The Brazier Review'. 
80 Op cit, n6. 
81 Allowing the intended parents and surrogate to set the price, could price some intended parents 
out of the market and lead to a situation where the surrogate’s will is overborne. 
82 A Alghrani, D Griffiths and M Brazier “Surrogacy Law: From Piecemeal Tweaks to Sustained 
Review and Reform” in Alison Diduck, Noam Peleg and Helen Reece, (eds) Law In Society: 
Reflections on Children, Family, Culture and Philosophy- Essays in Honour of Michael Freeman 
(2014, Brill Publishers) pp425-453. P16. 
83 Interview 07IM, recorded on 15/07/16 (on file with the author) (interview with Lauren, an 
intended mother who had twins using the help of SUK). 
84 Op cit, n8, p27. 
85 See E Jackson, J Millbank, I Karpin and A Stuhmcke, ‘Learning from Cross-Border 
Reproduction’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp23–46. Brilliant Beginnings and COTS also 
support a move towards compensatory payment. 
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8.2 Future Implications of the Research 
From the above discussion, seven main legal reforms have been identified: 
(1) Removal of the relationship provisions from section 54 HFEA 2008. 
(2) Removal of the genetic requirement from section 54 HFEA 2008. 
(3) Removal of section 33 HFEA 2008, so that the surrogate is no longer assigned 
legal motherhood.86 
(4) The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (or similar body) should 
regulate and license non-profit surrogacy organisations. 
(5) The judiciary should pre-authorise parental orders where a licensed surrogacy 
organisation is used by the intended parents and surrogate in the UK. 
(6) A rebuttable presumption of legal parenthood should be created in favour of 
the intended parents.  
(7) Moderate payments to surrogates (who enter a surrogacy arrangement using a 
licensed non-profit surrogacy organisation) should be considered. 
A new Act regulating surrogacy should be enacted to incorporate these extensive legal 
reforms. This would also create the opportunity to make surrogacy regulation more 
child-centred. The Act could incorporate the central message of the Parental Order 
Regulations 2010 – that the court’s paramount concern when considering parental 
order applications is the child’s best interests – into statutory form. New legislation 
could also include a checklist that is tailored to the best interests and rights of 
surrogacy-conceived children. The checklist could include reference to the child’s 
right to identity,87 private and family life88  and non-discrimination,89 thereby ‘drawing 
on and utilising to maximum effect the formal legal tools which give effect to 
children’s rights’.90 The legislation could also include explanatory guidance which 
emphasises the importance of informing the child about their genetic and gestational 
                                                 
86 This will also affect the fatherhood and second parent provisions. 
87 Articles 7 and 8 CRC; Article 8 ECHR. 
88 Article 8 ECHR. 
89 Article 2 CRC; Article 14 ECHR. 
90 H Stalford and K Hollingsworth, op cit, n29. 
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origins. This would feed into the broader landscape of encouraging early parental 
disclosure to children who are born as a result of ARTs.  
The above reforms would also better protect the procreative liberty of the intended 
parents and surrogate by assigning legal parenthood to those who intend to raise the 
child. Authorising the parental order before the child is born could encourage more 
intended parents to apply for a parental order. Currently, there is no obligation for 
intended parents to apply for a parental order following surrogacy and it is unknown 
how many children are in fact living with intended parents who have no legal 
parenthood for them. This is a particular risk for children born as a result of informal 
DIY arrangements. If the barriers to making a parental order application are 
minimised, and the six-month time limit,91  relationship provisions and genetic 
requirement are removed, more intended parents will be inclined to apply for a 
parental order. Overall, this thesis has shown that surrogacy operates in a completely 
different landscape to the one that existed at the time of The Warnock Report,92 Brazier 
Review93 and the HFEA 1990. The Law Commission is currently reviewing the law 
on surrogacy,94 which gives it an opportunity to develop the reforms outlined in this 
thesis and create a new Surrogacy Act which promotes:  
‘[T]wo cardinal principles of twenty-first century family law: that there should be no 
discrimination against the increasingly different kinds of family which society is 
creating; and that the child's welfare remains the … paramount consideration.’95 
                                                 
91 Section 54(3) HFEA 2008. 
92 Op cit, n78. 
93 Op cit, n79. 
94 https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/surrogacy/ (last accessed 01/07/18). 
95 Re Z, op cit, n2. Para [20]. 
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EVIDENCE OF ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
Mon 08/02/2016, 09:10 
Walmsley, Emma; 
Alghrani, Amel 
Dear Amel and Emma, 
                                                                
I am pleased to inform you that your study has been approved. Details and conditions 
of the approval can be found below.  
  
Ethics reference number: RETH001002   
Committee name: Research Ethics Subcommittee for Non-Invasive 
Procedures                
Review type: Full committee review       
Title of study: A socio-legal analysis of UK surrogacy laws: Searching for a new 
model of regulation that protects the rights of surrogate mothers, commissioning 
parents and their children. 
 
Principal Investigator: Dr Amel Alghrani and Professor Helen Stalford 
 
Student Investigator: Miss Emma Walmsley        
286 
 
 
School/Institute: School of Law and Social Justice       
        
First reviewer: Professor Arto Kiviniemi 
 
Approval date:  08/02/16 
                                                                                                                
The application was APPROVED subject to the following conditions: 
                                                                
Conditions                                           
                                                                 
All serious adverse events must be reported to the Subcommittee within 24 hours of 
their occurrence, via the Research Integrity and Governance Officer 
(ethics@liv.ac.uk). 
                
This approval applies for the duration of the research.  If it is proposed to extend the 
duration of the study as specified in the application form, the Subcommittee should be 
notified. If it is proposed to make an amendment to the research, you should notify the 
Committee by following the Notice of Amendment procedure. If the named PI / 
Supervisor leaves the employment of the University during the course of this approval, 
the approval will lapse. Therefore please contact the Research Integrity and 
Governance Officer at ethics@liverpool.ac.uk in order to notify them of a change in 
PI / Supervisor. 
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Appendix Two 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
Title of Research Project:  
 
‘A Socio-legal analysis of UK surrogacy laws: Searching for a new model of 
regulation that protects the rights of surrogate mothers, commissioning parents 
and their children’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please 
initial 
box Participant(s):  
1. I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet dated July 2016 
for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.   
 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving any reason, without my rights being affected.  In addition, should 
I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.   
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               Participant Name                           Date                    Signature 
  
 
 
                 
      Name of Person taking consent                                Date                   Signature 
 
 
 
 
3.  I agree for the data collected from me to be used in this research and future publications 
and that my name and any identifying details will be anonymised. 
 
 
 
4.   I understand and agree that once I submit my data it will become anonymised and that 
I will only be able to withdraw my data up to three weeks after the interview. 
 
5. As a professional, I request that my personal details are removed when the data is used. 
 
I agree to take part in the above study: 
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       Researcher                                                     Date                               Signature 
 
Principal Investigator and student researcher:      
Name Miss Emma Walmsley        
Work Address  School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool, Room 172, Mulberry 
Court, Mulberry Street, L7 7EZ 
Work Email  hsewalms@liv.ac.uk       
 
 
Version 2.1 
July 2016 
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Appendix Three 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet: Intended Parents and Surrogates 
 
 
My name is Emma Walmsley and I am conducting this research as a PhD 
student in the School of Law and Social Justice at the University of Liverpool, 
Liverpool, United Kingdom. You are being invited to participate in a research 
study. Before you decide whether to participate, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully and feel free to ask me if 
you would like more information or if there is anything that you do not 
understand. Please also feel free to discuss this with your friends, relatives and 
GP if you wish. I would like to stress that you do not have to accept this 
invitation and should only agree to take part if you want to. 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
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Title of the Research 
“A socio-legal analysis of UK surrogacy laws and the experiences of surrogates, 
intended parents and practitioners: Searching for a new model of regulation that 
protects the rights of surrogates, intended parents and children”. 
 
Purpose of the Research 
The laws regulating surrogacy in the UK are outdated and problematic. My PhD aims 
to examine how surrogacy laws should be reformed in the UK. Your experiences as 
an intended parent or surrogate will be used to inform an alternative model of 
regulation that will be developed by my PhD. 
 
Why have I been chosen to take part? 
You have been chosen to take part in this research because your views as an intended 
parent or surrogate means you have unique experiences in this area. My PhD project 
aims to illuminate the urgent need for law reform in this area to ensure the rights of 
surrogates, intended parents and their children are recognised in the future. Your 
insights can help inform a draft model of regulation that my PhD will develop. Other 
intended parents and surrogates have been chosen to take part in this research because 
they too are best placed to inform any legal reforms. Your participation is voluntary 
and you are free to withdraw at any time without explanation and without incurring a 
disadvantage.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
If you decide to take part you will be interviewed by the student researcher (Emma 
Walmsley). You can choose how you would like the interview to be conducted (i.e. 
Skype, face-to-face, telephone or email). The interviewer will send you some guidance 
before the interview takes place setting out the topics that will be discussed. This will 
give you some time to think about the issues. The duration of the interview will vary 
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depending upon how long you want to discuss your experiences. You will be asked a 
mixture of open and closed questions. The open questions are designed to encourage 
you to talk about your experiences of surrogacy and your opinions about why and how 
the law should change in this area. 
You will be asked to send any relevant documents to the researcher before the 
interview. These documents include legal correspondence, notes about your 
experiences/feelings or any other documents you might think are relevant to the 
interview. Please note that you do not have to send anything to the researcher. 
The interview will be audio-recorded. This is because the researcher can accurately 
transcribe the interview afterwards. If you are unhappy with anything being audio-
recorded, you can request that the interviewer turn off the recording.  
 
Are there any risks in taking part? 
Some of the questions asked may cause emotional distress. As an intended parent, you 
may need to recount certain events in your life such as infertility problems, searching 
for a surrogate, having a child through surrogacy and all of the emotional and legal 
difficulties that accompanied those events.  
As a surrogate, you may be asked to recount your motivations for helping the intended 
parents, your experiences of the surrogacy and your feelings after handing the child to 
the intended parents. 
In order to minimise any potential emotional risk and harm you will be advised 
throughout the process that you can ask to move on to the next question or stop the 
interview at any time. The researcher will offer to stop audio recording the interview 
if you become distressed. You will be given details of support services in this 
information sheet, in case you need some support after the interview.  
 
Are there any benefits in taking part? 
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The research will give you the chance to talk about your experiences as an intended 
parent or surrogate. You are central to this research. Without your perspective it would 
not be possible to find an alternative model of legal regulation. Your experiences will 
illuminate an important socio-legal issue and will add an important voice to the calls 
for reform. 
 
What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem? 
If you are unhappy, or if there is a problem, please feel free to let the researcher know 
by contacting Emma Walmsley (hsewalms@liv.ac.uk) and she will try to help. 
Alternatively, you can contact the student’s supervisor Dr Amel Alghrani at 
A.Alghrani@liverpool.ac.uk.  
If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you cannot come to us 
with then you should contact the Research Governance Officer at ethics@liv.ac.uk. 
When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide details of the 
name or description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researcher(s) 
involved, and the details of the complaint you wish to make. 
 
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
The interview will be audio-recorded. This recording will be used by the interviewer 
to write up the interview. The typed version of your interview will be made anonymous 
by removing any identifying information including your name. Anonymised direct 
quotations from your interview may be used in the reports or publications from the 
study, so your name will not be attached to them. All your personal data will be 
confidential and will be kept separately from your interview responses. All data will 
be stored securely using the University of Liverpool’s data servers. Only the 
interviewer and her two supervisors will have access to the data. The data will be 
stored for at least 10 years, which is recommended by the University of Liverpool’s 
‘Policy on Research Data Management’ (Principle 3.4).  After that point, the data will 
be destroyed.  
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What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results will be summarised and reported in a thesis and may be submitted for 
publication in an academic or professional journal. All participants will remain 
anonymous and will also be sent a copy of the report.  
 
What will happen if I want to stop taking part? 
You can withdraw at any time, without explanation. After the interview, you will have 
3 weeks to withdraw your consent to your interview being used. After this time, the 
researcher will have begun analysing the findings so it will be impossible to remove 
your interview responses. 
 
Who can I contact if I have further questions? 
You can contact the student researcher, Emma Walmsley, in the following ways: 
Email: hsewalms@liv.ac.uk  
Telephone: Can be requested 
 
Support services: 
Should you feel distressed either as a result of taking part, or in the future, the 
following resources may be of assistance. A link to the service’s webpage is provided 
alongside a brief explanation of what the service provides. 
 
• Brilliant Beginnings: http://www.brilliantbeginnings.co.uk/  
Provides support and guidance for intended parents and surrogates. 
• British Infertility Counselling Association: http://bica.net/  
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Professional association for infertility counsellors and counselling in the UK, 
which seeks to promote the highest standard of counselling for those 
considering or undergoing fertility investigations and treatment. 
• Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS): 
http://www.surrogacy.org.uk/  
Provides help to surrogates and intended parents, to understand the 
implications of surrogacy. 
• Infertility Network UK: http://www.infertilitynetworkuk.com/  
INUK is a national infertility charity, dedicated to the support of everyone 
affected by infertility.  
• Stonewall: http://www.stonewall.org.uk/  
Stonewall is the national lesbian, gay and bisexual rights charity.   
 
• Surrogacy UK: http://www.surrogacyuk.org/   
 SUK are run by volunteers who can help and support you during the stages 
of surrogacy. Their website hosts an online message-board and online 
community for friendship, advice and support. 
 
• NHS Counselling information: 
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/counselling/Pages/Introduction.aspx  
 
 
Version 3.0 June 2016- Interviews 
 
Emma Walmsley 
  
296 
 
Appendix Four 
 
SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Intended Parents 
1. What are your reasons for using surrogacy? 
2. How did you find your surrogate?  
3. Did you use an agency like COTS? 
4. What were your experiences when you met the surrogate? 
5. Did you make an informal arrangement with the surrogate? (E.g. what would 
happen if the surrogate wanted to abort the foetus/ present at the scans etc).  
6. Did any tensions arise in relation to what you agreed? 
7. How did you feel during the pregnancy? 
8. How did you feel when your child was born? 
The parental order process 
9. Did you pay the surrogate reasonable expenses? 
10. Do you mind asking me what the reasonable expenses covered? 
11. How did you feel about the agreement being unenforceable?  
12. How did you find out that you needed to apply for a parental order? 
Parentage 
13. How do you feel about the current rules that make the surrogate the legal 
mother of the child? 
14. Would you like to see IPs being given parenthood sooner (i.e. when the child 
is born)? 
Overseas surrogacy 
15. What were your main reasons for using surrogacy overseas? 
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16. What difficulties did you encounter? 
General 
17. Particularly good experiences. 
18. Particularly bad experiences. 
19. Opinions and views about how the law should work and what reforms need to 
take place. 
20. Advertising  
21. Shortage  
22. IVF  
Surrogates 
1. Would you mind telling me your reasons for deciding to become a surrogate? 
2. Did you use an agency like COTS? 
3. What were your experiences when you met the IPs? 
4. Did you make an informal arrangement?   
5. Did any tensions arise in relation to what you agreed? 
6. How did you feel during the pregnancy? 
7. How did you feel when the child was born? 
The parental order process 
8. Were you paid reasonable expenses? 
9. Do you mind asking me what the reasonable expenses covered? 
10. How did you feel about the agreement being unenforceable?  
11. parental order? 
Parentage 
12. How do you feel about the current rules that make the surrogate the legal mother 
of the child? 
13. Would you like to see IPs being given parenthood sooner (i.e. when the child is 
born)? 
General 
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14. Particularly good experiences. 
15. Particularly bad experiences. 
16. Opinions and views about how the law should work and what reforms need to take 
place.  
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Appendix Five 
 
PSEUDONYMS AND INTERVIEW CODES 
 
Pseudonym  Who was 
interviewed? 
Code & Date of Interview 
Intended Mother - Bea 
Husband -Jack 
Surrogate- Pippa 
Bea (Intended 
mother). 
01IM  15/07/16 
Intended Mother - Sophie 
Husband - Will 
Surrogate- Ellen 
Sophie (Intended 
mother). 
02IM  09/07/16 
Intended Mother - Rosie  
Husband - Gareth 
Surrogate – Penny 
Rosie (Intended 
mother). 
03IM 11/07/16 
Intended father - Steve 
Partner – Robert 
Surrogate – Anna 
Steve (Intended 
father). 
04IF  07/10/16 
Intended Mother - Liz 
Husband – Dan 
Liz (Intended mother). 05IM 26/08/16 
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Two anonymous Indian surrogates 
Intended Mother - Gemma 
Surrogate- Sinead  
Gemma (Intended 
mother). 
06IM  11/07/16 
Intended mother - Lauren 
Husband- Zak 
Surrogate- Molly 
Lauren (Intended 
mother and lawyer). 
07IM   15/07/16 
Intended mother- Sally 
Husband - David 
Surrogate- Mary (O2SM) 
Sally (Intended 
mother). 
08IM   08/07/16 
Surrogate- Kate Kate (Surrogate). 01SM 07/07/16 
Surrogate- Mary Mary (surrogate for 
her daughter Sally) 
02SM  10/07/16 
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